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SüTfiABY
Two integrated themes are the concern of this thesis, which are 
of great theoretical and practical importance. The major and broader 
theme is to explore the impact of culture in constructing 
organizational behaviour, particularly in non-Western countries. The 
second theme, which was the initial concern of this research, is to 
provide deep, significant insights and understandings of middle 
managers* compliance in relation to top managers in work 
organizations, and to investigate the affecting factors, particularly 
in the public sector in a developing country (viz Iraq). The 
research was carried out based on a model which was developed through 
an elaberation between the researcher's previous work experience and 
observation, and the material found in the literature. The fieldwork 
study was launched in (̂ t) companies within the 'Ministry of Trade' 
in Iraq.
The main contributions of this research are the following:
1) It explores and evidences the foundational impact of culture 
in constructing organizational behaviour.
2) It demonstrates the usefulness of adapting the "organization 
within society" approach in understanding organizational 
behaviour and the contributions that a socio-historical 
study of the evolution of society and its institutional 
development can make toward such an understanding.
3) It invalidates the notion of a single type of modem 
bureaucracy governed by universalistic standards, as it 
provides an example of a different type of bureaucracy that 
exists in a non-Westem country.
4) It supports the notion that dysfunctional patterns of
Ill
'bureaupathology' take forms that are related to the culture 
where the sick bureaucracy is found.
5) It challenges the one-sided picture of the impact of formal 
organizations on individuals' characteristics and behaviour, 
as it shows the impact of individuals' characteristics and 
conceptual structure, brought with them from their 
socialization in wider society, on formal organizations.
6) It shows that organizational behaviour is a function of both 
individual and organization characteristics, and that middle 
manager's compliance in relation to organizational authority 
is not a simple subservience in response to a stimulus or a 
reflection of a personality disorder, but rather that their 
'socialization' and 'powerlessness' both stand behind their 
compliance.
7) It supports the universal or 'dominant but variable ' thesis 
of culture and, moreover, singles out this thesis of culture 
at the level of middle managers across different 
organizations in one country; furthermore this research 
distinguishes the affecting factors that could stand behind 
the middle managers' variations at the dominant level of 
their organizational behaviour.
In very general terms, the findings led us to conclude that 
there seems to be no universal or typical model which could explain 
human behaviour in all societies or in specific ones, but rather 
human behaviour "mirrors at all times an intricate blend of the 
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INTRODUCTION
THE PRCBIÆM
I observed middle managers * behaviour in relation to the top 
manager while working for more than 10 years in many Iraqi 
organizations and in retrospect I asked myself why they comply with 
the top person (i.e. top manager) instructions and wishes as they do? 
If they respond to his coercion or authority which is imposed on 
them, or try to protect themselves from punishment, why do they in 
many cases comply with his order to a greater extent than is 
required, and even when there is no need for their compliance? why, 
despite the fact that they are, in their managerial position, 
supposed to be ' leaders ', do they feel it is very normative and 
legitimate to be overly concerned with top people's wishes and 
expectations, rather than their subordinates needs and expectations? 
why are they eager to please the 'boss', even at the expense of their 
organizations needs and requirements? and why do they vary in their 
degree of compliance?. Thinking of the many sayings proverbs and 
metaphors which they use in conversations, defining situations and 
explaining some aspects of their behaviour in relation to top people, 
I then asked myself : In what way and to what extent is their
behaviour influenced by the values or 'orientations' that those 
socialized adults have brought to the organization from their wider 
society? How and to what extent does the organizational culture and 
its characteristics influence their behaviour?
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
This study arises out of these questions in an attempt to answer 
them through wider and multi dimensional perspectives. It is hoped 
this would generate an understanding of middle management problems in 
contemporary work organizations in Iraq, in particular that it would
show t±ie impact of 'culture' in contrueting organizational behaviour 
in general.
The major objectives of this study are the following:
1 - To explore the impact of 'culture' of wider society and the 
organizational culture on employees' (here middle managers) 
organizational behaviour in relation to the organizations' authority 
figures (here top managers).
2 - To investigate middle managers' compliance in relation to 
top managers, and the affecting factors and the extent of their 
effect on this compliance.
AN OUTLINE OF THE OBAPIERS
Part One of this thesis presents the conceptual and 
methodological foundation for this study. Chapters 1 and 2 attempt 
to put this research in a wider perspective, not only in relation to 
my previous work observations, but more in relation to the body of 
knowledge in the field of organizational behaviour. Chapter 1 
concerns with middle managers' behavioural dilemmas in relation to 
top managers in work organizations. Chapter 2 presents a research 
model of studying organizational behaviour that is mainly based on 
the researcher's previous work observations and its conceptual 
perspective, which is the result of the research strategy in handling 
the data and providing modes of conceptualizion for interpreting and 
explaining, rather than from a preconceived theoretical framework. 
Chapter 3 deals with the methodology of the research design. The 
discussion centres on the way the project was actually carried 
out,and the principles which guided the choices and strategy that 
were made in collecting and analyzing the data.
Part two consists of the 'reflection on culture ' chapters among 
which Chapter 4 presents the identity and character istices, 
particularly in relation to authority, of Iraqi culture that was 
found by this research through studying the socio-historical 
evolution of this society. In Chapter 5 the researcher focusses on 
the dominant value-orientâtions in contemporary Iraqi society that 
characterize individuals and organizations. Accordingly Chapter 6 
will present the cultural setting of Iraqi bureaucratic-orientated 
organizations, and the identity and characteristics of Iraqi 
organizational culture.
Part Three consists of the research fieldwork findings in 
studying middle managers' behaviour in relation to top managers in 
Iraqi organization. The theme of Chapter 7 will be the nature and 
pattern of middle managers' orientations and behaviour as reflected 
by them. Trtiis will be followed in Chapter 8 with detailed 
examination and analysis of the middle managers* variations on the 
dominant pattern of orientation and behaviour in terms of their 
individuality difference factors. In Chapter 9, the focus will shift 
to study middle managers' variations in terms of the affecting 
organizational factors.
Throughout the thesis, 'his' refers to male and female, for 
convenience.
PART ONE
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
CHAPTER (1)
MIDDLE MANAGEMENT AND ITS BEHAVIOURAL 
DILEMMAS IN ITS RELATIONSHIP 
WITH TOP MANAGEMENT
INlBDDOCriCN
Little has been written about the middle manager and the role's 
dilemmas have not yet received sufficient attention in the 
literature. The problems associated with his role within 
organizational life have been dealt with in a normative manner and 
very rarely empirically studied. The problem of power and the 
political interaction as experienced by the middle manager are seldom 
analysed, either sociologically and/or culturally.
Before moving to this research's attempt to make sociological 
and cultural sense of the middle manager's behaviour towards top 
management in Iraqi organizations, seme conceptual considerations 
related to the definition of 'Middle Management', its role in 
organizational effectiveness and particularly its behavioural 
dilemmas in its relationship with top management, will be provided.
1. WHO ARE THE 'MIDDIJB MANAGERS'?
The concept of middle management is inevitably diffuse and its 
boundaries have not yet been precisely defined. The concept of "man 
in the middle" and its inplications has been used in the literature 
to refer generally to those people who are somewhere in the 
intermediate organizational space between the top levels of managers 
and the bottom levels of subordinates. Writers use the term 'middle 
management' to talk about different intermediate organizational 
levels. While Niles (1949) employed the term to refer to junior 
administrators v^o in her case were immediately below top management, 
the same implications of being the "man in the middle" have been used 
by many writers ( Roethlisberger 1945; Gardner and Whyte 1945; Wray 
1949) to refer to the position of the "foreman". Uyterhoeven (1972) 
uses the same term of "man in the middle" and its implications to
describe the characteristics of the position of the "general
managers" at the middle organizational level. Some writers, such as
Kay (1974 a), call middle managers, "those who manage managers,
supervisors, or professional and technical people and are not vice-
presidents of functional or staff areas or general managers (that is,
they have no profit and loss responsibilities) " (p.l06). Other
writers, such as Mann and Dent (1954) call the "supervisor" the man
in the middle and present the implications of his membership in two
organizational families.
At this point, it is clear that the 'middle' is composed of a
vast area reaching from those just below tcç) policy-̂ nakers to those
with barely supervisory responsibilities over lowest-level
subordinates. Within this broad level of middle management, there
are many sub-levels of those people who, through their 'life in the
middle ', tend to share similar role inç>lications in oanrm and their
roles have similar characteristics; they also face very similar kinds
of problems and dilemmas.
Defining precisely who we do call the middle management is not
easy because every organization and country has a different system
for designating people's status and hierarchical position. For the
purposes of this research, I am identifying "middle managers" as
those who are considered in Iraqi organizations as the "middle
management", that is;
The people in charge for departments as they 
are their heads, they are the first line to 
hold the title of 'manager* in Iraqi grading 
codes, and are accountable to the top management 
for their departments - activities and are managing 
staff subordinates accountable to them.
Within those organizations where the observations and field work 
of this research were carried out, the above people represent the 
'middle' of Iraqi organizational hierarchy; those below them are
acting and viewed as subordinates, and those above them are 
considered by themselves and by others as the members of top 
management, (i.e. the D.G. and his aids in the companies, or the 
president and his aids and D.G's in the establishments).
2. THE IMPCgaaNCE OF THE MIEDUS MANAGEMENT IN CRGftNIZATICMAL 
EFbTCTIVENESS
The importance of the middle management population arises from 
what they do and where they are situated in the organization. 
Members of this population have been called by different metonyms to 
indicate their important role in the organizational life; Kruger 
(1970) calls the middle managers, "the doers who enable the 
organization to reach out for its objectives. They are the backbone 
of the organization ...." (p.935). They are the "funnels" through 
which the intentions of top management flow down and information
flows up (Kay 1977); they are the "hearts" and "lungs" of the 
organizations (Mossa 1978). They are the "arms of management";
"grass-roots level of management"; "front-line personnel men"
( Roethl isberger 1945). If an organization is a car, say Kan ter and 
Stein (1979), "the top vould be the driver, the bottom would be the 
engine and the drive train, while the middle would constitute all of 
the electrical and mechanical connections between them", (p.80). 
Such metonyms try to indicate that the middle manager is the 'key 
man of management' as he is the most important communication link 
between the top managers who formulate policy and deal with the 
organization as a whole, and workers who achieve policy.
But what do the middle managers do and what are their main
duties and responsibilities? While it is difficult and perhaps even 
impossible to arrive at a complete and accurate description of the
duties and responsibilities of the job of 'middle manager' one could 
sample the broad domain of those duties and responsibilities which 
comprise his job as follows :
1. Interpret and implement organization goals and carry out the 
policies of top management and translate its intentions in terms of 
specific activities within his area of responsibility.
2. Aid the chief or top manager; make his (the middle manager) 
division function smoothly and deal with the day-to-day detail of the 
organization, leaving the top manager as free as possible for his 
responsibilities; in other words, make the boss look good.
3. Provide areas of expertise through his own knowledge and 
performance, and through the staff he manages, and he is expected to 
be a specialist in his own functional areas.
4. Cultivate a broad perspective, looking at persons in other 
parts of the organization as well as outside the organizaticxi.
5. Co-operate and co-ordinate his efforts with others in 
different parts of the organization and understand the interlocking 
of departments in major policy practices in order to create a 
smoothly functioning organization.
6. Keep communication channels open with subordinates and 
superiors, as well as with peers.
7. Exercise leadership and set the tone for the operations of 
his division and direct it properly.
8. Build up a contented and efficient staff, utilize them 
properly, motivate them and evoke in them the desire for high quality 
performance, and develop from them leaders for the future through 
training and experience.
9. Work on budget estimations, planning of assignments and 
workloads, office layout and make recommendations either to improve
8
performance or to accomplish operations not possible under the 
existing state of affairs.
It is quite clear from the above description that the job of 
middle manager commonly involves a range of managerial competences 
which would certainly embrace a wide variety of different sorts of 
activities.
To accomplish such a job, says Kruger (1970), the middle manager 
must have mainly three kinds of particular skills;
1. Human skills : because his job is essentially one which 
requires a great deal of decision-making about people as he achieves 
results primarily through the efforts of other people.
2. Technical skills: because he is managing a particular 
division with a particular function. Also, he needs to know the 
technical features surrounding his job.
3. Organizational conceptual skills: these relate to the 
process of administering in which the middle manager needs to relate 
his human and technical skills to particular situations in order to 
achieve maximum results.
Also Shepps (1971) notes, the responsibilities of the middle 
manager require an extensive application of behavioural science, and 
thus the middle manager is required to be skilled in applying 
behavioural knowledge to management problems.
Such skills are not very often obtained or effectively used by 
middle managers because of the conflict, pressures, frustrations, 
dissatisfactions, discontents and meaningless feelings which the 
literature suggests they suffer from.
3. MBDLE MANAGEMENT DILEMiAS IN ITS REIATKIBHIP WTIH TOP
It has been said that for middle managers the daily facts of 
organizational life are having "a boss's responsibility without a 
boss's authority; functioning as a specialist and a generalist at the 
same time; meeting the conflicting demands of superiors, subordinates 
and peers while still getting the job done" (Uyterhoeven, 1972, 
p. 75). This statement illustrates some of the main problems or 
dilemmas that the middle manager must handle in order to survive 
within the organization and which give the role of middle manager its 
peculiarity and its special characteristics. So, in order to
understand this peculiarity, one needs to study the dilemmas
especially in relationship to top management. One could categorize 
these dilemmas as:
A. The dileirma of performing multiple organizational roles.
B. The dilenma of membership in two organizational families and 
the feeling of marginality,
C. The dilemma of lack of power and authority.
A. The Dilemma of Performing Multiple Organizational Roles
From the previous description of the broad domain of duties and
responsibilities, middle managers appear to have, as Broussine and
Guerrier (1983) state, "the unenviable role of simultaneously both 
being influenced from above, and in turn influencing those below 
them, of being rewarded and in turn rewarding; or being controlled 
at the same time controlling; of being ccnmunicated to and having to 
conmunicate; and so on" (p.4). In order to fulfil his duties and 
responsibilities, the middle manager should play multiple roles and 
perform multiple activities. He has to be a follower and a leader, a
10
motivator and trainer of men, a communication specialist and a 
counsellor, a lawyer, a disciplinarian, a conflict resolver and also 
a manager who can provide a specialized and general knowledge. 
Mintzberg (1973) remarks that middle managers tend to view their 
activities as encompassing all the following roles which he 
identified as; "(sic) figurehead; liaison; leader; monitor; 
dissaninator; spokesman; entrepreneur; distrubance handler; resource 
allocator, and the role of negotiator". The dilemma of the middle 
manager does not lie in handling multiple roles and activities alone, 
but also in the duality and conflict of those roles. This dilenma 
may appear through the following sets of roles that the manager has 
to play;
1 - Follower and Leader
Ihe middle manager has the role both of being boss and bossed. 
Kanter and Stein (1979), pointed out that one of the critical 
characteristics of the roles of the 'man in the middle ' is the need 
to identify with 'management' in the organization on the one hand, 
and on the other to gain the trust and respect of people for whom 
those images are either negative, meaningless or laden with different 
content. By definition, middle management personnel, claims Kruger 
(1970), are "followers". They carry out the policies of top 
management and their primary job is to make the 'boss' look good to 
the end that the mission of the organization is achieved effectively 
and efficiently. Playing the role of ' follower ' means that the 
middle manager has to utilize his work force properly and make his 
division function smoothly, leaving top managers as free as possible 
for their other responsibilities.
If the middle manager is a 'follower', he is also, by being head 
of his department, a 'leader'. Playing the role of leader means that
11
the middle manager should be liked and trused by his subordinates and 
take account of their expectations of his behaviour. The middle 
manager has to play, at the same time, the two roles of a 'follower' 
and a 'leader' or, as Uyterhoeven (1972) analogyses them, "coach" and 
"player", when his superiors are usually coaches and his subordinates 
are normally players. Therefore, the middle manager is, he says, 
both a delegator and a doer, both a strategist and an operator.
In performing these dual roles of "player" and "coach", the 
middle manager must balance the interests or the damands of his 
subordinates whose commitment is essential, and the goals or demands 
imposed by superiors whose approval he seeks. But he can often be 
faced with the conflict between these two sets of demands or the 
conflict between his role as 'follower* and as 'leader'. For 
example, while his role as a follower or player may require him to 
exercise more control and involvement in curating details and doing 
things himself, acting as a leader of his subordinates demands less 
control and the ability to generate more trust and confidence in 
them. The middle managers, remarks Handy (1976), will often have to 
face this crucial dilemma of how to balance trust and control, 
especially because the degree of control is often dictated by top 
managers. Added to this, the middle manager does not usually have 
the opportunity to select his own men. Trust for the middle manager 
can only survive one mistake, as he would not like to be seen by top 
management as not doing his job properly. Hius, the middle manager 
often finds himself being more controlling than he would like to be, 
and when control is increased, trust is decreased. In balancing the 
two roles, the middle manager is not entirely free (Uyterhoeven, 
1972).
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2 - Strategist and Operator
One of the main roles of the middle manager in his intermediate 
position within the organizational hierarchy is what Uyterhoeven 
(1972) terms as the "bilingual role" of translating the strategic 
language of his superiors into the operational language of his 
subordinates, thereby achieving the goals chosen by his superiors. 
The top manager provides his abstract guidance on what he wants in 
the form of goals, but not how these are to be accomplished. It is 
the responsibility of the middle manager to figure out how to perform 
the task and to formulate strategy enabling the translation of the 
abstract guidance or intentions of top management into specific 
activities or concrete action. Keeling (1972) notices that the job 
of middle manager is essentially that of implementing policies in 
accordance with guidance and decision rules, determined by his 
superiors. In assuming the role of "bilingual", states Uyterhoeven 
(1972), the middle manager must;
1. be a strategist rather than just an order-taker. He 
therefore needs to go beyond the formal definition of his job, and 
function broadly to fulfil the real scope of his responsibility. 
This is because he is provided with a much broader de facto 
responsibility than is usually condified in job descriptions or 
organizational charts;
2. assume full responsiblity for translating the abstract goals 
into concrete action by making strategic decisions and planning;
3. communicate his decisions and plans effectively to both his 
superiors and subordinates.
On the other hand, the middle manager's success in accomplishing 
the required goals is measured by his superior in terms of 'results' 
rather than in terms of how these goals have been accomplished. Tcp
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management appraise his performance by matching the goals or the 
abstract guidance that he has received with the abstract results of 
his action or strategies. Thus, the middle manager, as Uyterhoeven 
(1972) puts it, must be able to translate the concrete action into 
abstract measurement.
In fact, the middle manager's dilenma arises when top management 
believes that there is a contradiction between those signals from 
abstract measurement and those from abstract guidance. When such 
contradiction occurs, the translation process frequently gets 
reversed :
"Instead of starting with the abstract guidance 
(goals) to develop specific action, the middle 
manager starts with the abstract measurement 
(required results) and translates backward to 
his plan of action" (p.79).
If his superiors evaluate his performance in terms of abstract 
measurement cxi the basis of profit and loss, the middle manager has 
to evaluate his subordinates in terms of concrete action, in other 
words, using the operational language. Thus, he needs greater 
expertise and more intimate knowledge of specifics to employ 
different quantitative measures as well as qualitative judgements in 
his evaluation.
Translating action into abstract measurement, as pointed out by 
Uyterhoeven (1972), requires :
1. The ability to relate the two different languages; one is 
operational and involves many dimensions; the other is abstract and 
often in terms of a single dimension.
2. The ability to tread a thin line between the results and the 
goals when they are contradictory and sometimes to make trade-offs.
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3 - specialist and Generalist
Middle managers are basically specialists in their functional 
areas says Kay (1974 a). They are recruited for their knowledge of 
specialist or professional skills in their youth and they are
appointed to the level of middle manager on the basis of outstanding 
achievements as a functional specialist. Thus, they are expected to 
provide areas of specialized knowledge. The middle manager's 
functional career depends very much on his specialization or an 
extensive involvement in a specific area. But this specialist, once 
he becomes caught up in the organizational hierarchy, is strongly 
required to be a "generalist" and to have a broad perspective of his 
role (Niles 1949). The transitional nature of being a middle manager 
presents him with new challenges (Uyterhoeven 1972; Torrington and 
Weightman 1982). Middle manager specialists often face, as
individuals, the frustration of little visability in a position that 
is not well understood. Yet, they may realize that to look for a 
bright future ahead and to rise very far in management requires them, 
somehow or other, to become more of a "generalist" (Martin 1979). 
The pressure of making this major transition arises, as Torrington 
and Weightman (1982) point out, out of the interest in promotion
which is a "sine qua non of being in management; in seme cases its 
absence can be grounds for dismissal" (p.7). The social pressure on 
the middle manager as an individual is to achieve promotion which 
will demonstrate personal success. In managerial life, the
orientation is toward what is to be rather than what is. 
Organizational regulation of salary system and performance appraisal 
usually create opportunities for some people to move a little higher 
up the ladder. Promotion or moving up in the organizational ladder 
involves the possibility of a better conpany car, a bigger and more
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luxurious office, a variation in fringe benefits and likelihood of
getting more authority and power. Tiiis situation, ranark Torrington
and Weightman (1982), has two inescapable effects;
"First the middle manager is very dependent on 
his superiors, as it is they who offer the promotion 
or the salary increase, who agree to the larger car
or the change of office   everything d^iends on
a superior saying "well done" and, perhaps, producing 
the bag of sweets.
Secondly, many middle managers will eventually be 
disappointed; if middle management is the training 
ground for senior management, as its transitional 
emphasis declares, then, most middle managers are 
not going to reach senior positions and will be 
categorised as failures" (p. 7-9).
Having no opportunity for upward mobility when the only position 
for which the middle manager is considered qualified is the job he 
currently holds leads to the "boxed-in feeling" among middle managers 
(Kay 1974 a). "They reach a point when they perceive no alternatives 
within their organization and they withdraw physically or 
psychologically, or they stay and tend to stagnate" (p. 128).
Making a transition from being mainly a specialist to becoming 
more of generalist does not come easily to many middle managers, 
especially to those with specific technical qualifications. It is 
difficult for those who have remained heavily involved in their 
professional techniques and deeply imbued with its values to adjust 
to the new role which requires a change in attitude. Also, this 
transition represents a major risk, says Uyterhoeven (1972) instead 
of facing familiar challenges through the functional specialisation 
ladder and using their proven skills, the challenge as 'generalist' 
is new and the skills unproven.
The middle managers, in attempting to possess the required 
general management skills so that they can successfully meet the new 
challenge, are faced with another dilemma. This dilemma is described 
by Torrington and Weightman (1982) as follows;
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"If they switch to management and allow their 
technlccü. expertise to wither, they look for 
r^laoement management skills that are equally 
precise, substantial and enabling. What they 
find, however, is either a series of prosaic 
administrative clerical duties or that range 
of extremely imprecise - and some would say 
unsubstantial - management skills connected 
with commercial judgement, understanding people 
organizational politics c&nd triggering sections 
of the administrative and ocmnunicative systems"
(p. 6)
Uyterhoeven (1972) points out another aspect of this dilemma 
that is that the middle manager in making his major and risky 
transition is likely to face an unfriendly working environment and, 
moreover, he may find that his promotion has caused resentment and 
frustration to many of those who were hoping to be chosen for his 
position; some may consider themselves better qualified, because of 
age, seniority or experience; they may view the experience and 
capabilities of the new middle manager as insufficient for the job. 
Others may resent him because he represents the 'educated elite'. To 
overcome such possible handicaps of resentment, the middle manager 
needs strong administrative skills, but these skills, as noticed by 
Uyterhoeven (1972), "are typically the new middle manager's short 
suit; he is more often long on technical abilities and experience, 
which are obviously less relevant to the task" (p.81).
In coping with the dilenma of transition from 'specialist' to 
'generalist' with its associated feelings of insecurity, the middle 
manager seeks to establish his new identity in the organization by 
creating and asserting a position of authority over others. In this 
position he uses his expertise or specialized knowledge and 
hierarchical position and, in addition, he tries to establish good 
personal relations with his subordinates in terms of "walking the 
job" (Torrington and Weightman 1982), and contain subordinates who 
are disposed to endanger his position: thus, he maintains compliance
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with his authority. On the other hand, he sets out to strengthen his 
position upstairs by meeting the orders and demands of his superiors 
and satisfying their expectations about him, so that he can get 
promotion.
4 - Managing Multiple Relationships
Delton (1959) describes the middle manager as a "claims 
adjustor". He must get things done and achieve his goals through
others; thus he needs the support and co-cperation or approval of a 
large number of people. The middle manager, in terms of 
organizational relationships, is at the focal point which forces him 
to fulfil a "threefold task" of acting as subordinate, superior and 
equal:
" - Upward, he relates to his boss as a 
subordinate; he takes orders.
- Downward, he relates to his team as 
a superior; he gives orders.
- Laterally, he often relates to peers 
in the organization as an equal."
(Uyterhoeven 1972, p. 76)
In addition to the above three arms of relationships, Morris 
(1975) adds a fourth one, that is "people outside the organizations". 
The manager's dilemma is not only in managing these four directions 
of influence, but more in being able to shift quickly and frequently 
from one to another. Moreover, he must find ways, in Morris's view, 
to bring all his directions of relationships into "dynamic balance". 
But this balance is very hard to achieve when his multiple 
relationships consist of conflicting and changing demands. The 
middle manager may find that meeting what is expected of him by his 
superiors as a good subordinate would make him appear as unreasonable
18
and unresponsive to his subordinates and this may weaken his role as 
a boss. Equally, he may appear to his superiors as a disloyal 
subordinate when he ignores or fights their orders in favour of his 
subordinates. The middle manager, says Uyterhoeven (1972), may find 
himself tom between these two directions. He may also appear to his 
subordinates as inconclusive and indecisive, particularly when he 
holds sometimes prolonged negotiations with his peers about a certain 
problem in order to arrive at a mutual solution. Faced with the 
dilenma of managing multiple relationships, it is very hard to create 
a 'dynamic balance' between them, and the middle manager will tend to 
focus his attention on the most important direction for him and for 
his future career.
B. The Dilemma of Uncertain Belonging and Peeling of Marginality
The feeling of ambiguity or uncertainty of the organizational 
identification, as some writers remark (Roethlisberger 1945; Wary 
1949), is one of the main behavioural dilemmas of the 'man in the 
middle '. People who occupy the top of the organizational hierarchy, 
are usually identified with the organization, by themselves as well 
as by others, and bear the label of 'managenent'. But those in the 
middle ranks are often uncertain about their identity as management 
or workers, although they are usually assured that they are members 
of management. Mann and Dent (1954) comment that whether the middle 
manager is a member of management is an unsettled question. 
Sometimes he seems to be and sometimes he seems not to be. Even when 
he is legally defined as a member of management, psychologically 
there still remains an ambiguity that disturbs him and the 
'management' as well. The middle managers may express their lack of 
a sense of full belonging in words such as "They say we are part of
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management but don't treat us that way" (Wray 1949), or as 
Roethl isberger (1945) notes, they feel that they are merely 
"stepchildren". Mant (1979) remarks that there is no particular 
identity to middle management work, "except that it stands in between 
those who matter at the top and those who matter at the bottom of the 
organization hierarchy" (p.38). The middle manager feels caught in a 
system where he is suspended somewhere in the organization between 
the prestigious, amply-rewarded top managers above him and the 
operating personnel below him.
By design, the middle manager is part of three groups; the first 
is his unit's workforce; the second, his peers; and the third, his 
and his peers superiors. The significant difference between the 
middle management level and other levels lies in the belonging by the 
'man in the middle' to two "organizational families", one composed of 
his subordinates and the other of his superiors (Mann and Dent 1954). 
While the tcp level acts primarily as superior and the members of the 
bottom levels as subordinates, the middle manager is 'leader' in one 
group and 'subordinate' in the other one. Moreover, the middle 
manager does not have full membership of either management or workers 
families. He is not like his workers; he has a boss's responsibility 
as he guides, delegates, plans and assumes full responsibility for 
his unit. Also, he "is less than a full member of the management 
line, he shares with those higher up the responsibility for carrying 
out policies but does not share in the making of them" (Wray 1949, p. 
301). This means that middle managers feel pressed to live up to the 
role of members of management, without being given the reward of full 
participation. Such a feeling, says Wray (1949), is carmon among 
people in "marginal positions" where they face a dilemma of coping 
with a good deal of personal conflict. This dilemma, explains
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Roethl isberger (1945), makes the 'man in the middle* (in his case the 
foreman) "a master and victim of double talk".
Mann and Dent (1954) believe that the middle manager's problem 
is not his "dual membership" itself, but the failure of top 
management to recognise the dual membership character of his role. 
This failure, they say, has led Wray (1949) to the foranan as a 
"marginal man", and Roethl isberger (1945) to see him as a "master and 
victim of double talk". Mann and Dent (1954) suggest that the middle 
manager should fully perform his "dual membership" and resolve the 
discrepancies in the expectations and objectives of those over him 
and those under him. Being a member of two organizational families, 
they emphasise, presents no special problem when there is no conflict 
of interest between the two groups or when it is possible for the 
person who has dual membership to isolate his activities in one group 
from his activities in the other. But, in fact, it is exceedingly 
difficult for the middle manager to isolate himself while his role is 
to be the link between management and workers who have a close 
relationship in time and space but not necessarily in point of view. 
He is expected to play the role of a mediator of conflict. Also 
conflict is most prevalent at middle management level (Kahn, et al, 
1964). The middle manager, says Dalton (1959), "bears the most 
inconsistent burdens" (p. 248). It is so common, Katz and Kahn
(1966) state, that the middle manager often finds himself in 
situations where compliance with one expectation would not only make 
compliance more difficult with the other, but in extreme conflict 
would completely exclude the possibility of compliance with the 
other. In opposition to Katz and Kahn (1966), Lawrence and Lorsch
(1967), in the same line as Mann and Dent (1954) suggest that the 
middle manager could successfully resolve the conflict better than
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members of higher levels. In their view the members of intermediate 
levels are likely to play a more successful role in conflict 
resolution rather than their superiors because of their greater 
technical knowledge of the subject matter of the conflict and their 
neutral position between competing interests. In fact, while middle 
managers are typically labelled with role ambiguity and are heavily 
exposed to role conflict, a great deal is expected from them by way 
of conflict resolution, as suggest by Lawrence and Lorsch. Under 
conditions of contradictory expectations or extreme conflict, it 
becomes increasingly difficult for the middle manager to perform his 
role of dual representation.
As a way to protect himself or to avoid the conflicting demands, 
the middle manager, as Mann and Dent (1954) mention, in effect 
renounce both groups and seek protection by joining a union. (In 
fact, in Iraq, as in many Arabic and Middle Eastern countries, such 
protection does not exist because there is no union for the 'man in 
the middle' to join). The middle manager can also renounce both 
groups by staying aloof and not getting very involved, and playing 
the role of pure transmitter between his superiors and subordinates 
and seeking protection by presenting himself to his subordinates as 
if he has nothing to do with top managers orders and, at the same 
time, assuring his superiors that he is exactly transferring their 
orders to the workforce. By doing this he tries to adopt a safe and 
ultra-cautious posture in the organization and project conflict 
outwards from himself. But in doing this, he increasingly becomes a 
'marginal man', as far as his workers and management are concerned.
The middle manager, says Dalton (1959), may manage the 
inconsistent interests of his superiors and subordinates by playing 
the "nebulous role of liaison semanticist: he translates the
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irregularities below him into decorous reports for his chiefs 
and liberally interprets their directives to his subordinates" (pp. 
248-49). But under conditions of extreme conflict, say Mann and Dent 
(1954), the middle manager is more likely to "take sides" and risk 
the loss of effectiveness in dealing with the other group. The 
'side' that the middle managers often take, as many writers suggest 
(Roethlisberger 1945; Katz and Kahn 1966; Mant 1979; Torrington and 
Weightman 1982) is the side of his superiors rather than his
subordinates. In other words, he is more likely to define his role 
in terms of his superior's expectations and ignore the expectations 
of his subordinates. The middle manager, remarks Mant (1979) is 
over-dependent on his superior and his primary concern is career 
survival. This is especially true when the middle manager is seeking 
promotion and climbing up the ladder for a higher position, and when 
his superiors have the most control and influence over his prcmoticn 
and advancement.
C. The Dilenma of Authority and power Deficiency
This crucial middle manager's dilemma has been typically
described in terms of "having the boss's responsibility but not the 
boss's authority". In conplaining that they have high levels of 
responsibilities but little scope to use authority, the middle 
managers appear to be saying (Kay 1974 a) that while they are
expected to produce results, they have little influence over the 
policies and events that determine these results. The responsibility 
and authority of middle managers do not overlap, says Uyterhoeven 
(1972), but rather the former exceeds the latter; while the middle 
manager typically assumes full responsibility for his department and 
is evaluated on the results of the total operation, he has only
limited authority in the pursuit of his goals.
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Although he is often assured that he is a member of 
'management', his 'power deficiency' underlies his feeling of 
uncertainty or indefinite membership because he, unlike other members 
(i.e. top managers), has limited authority and influence. This lack 
of authority leads the middle manager to be more ' reactive ' to the 
events imposed by others, rather than 'proactive', that is actively 
seeking opportunities to direct or influence events. His lack of 
authority and power do not allow him to play the role of strategist 
or "entrepreneur", who needs to go beyond the limits of his formal 
position (Kanter 1982). While he is supposed to be a 'leader', he 
lacks influence in making organizational decisions, which are now the 
prerogative of top management. The middle manager, argues Dickson 
(1977), does not contribute significantly to the decision-making 
process; he merely maintains the necessary procedures to provide 
standardised information for top management. He must put into effect 
organization policy, but often without sufficient authority or 
resources to carry it out. He has to get results through others and 
manage his multiple relationship, but he lacks the influence to make 
other organizational levels respond to his requests. He is expected 
to motivate his subordinates and value their good performance, but he 
does rot have free access to such motivational resources as 
'financial rewards' and 'authority to promote and advance his 
workers'. His access to such resources and consequently his 'power' 
is contingent upon the permission (implicit or explicit) and the 
backing of those in a position to over-rule him (i.e. his boss) 
(Strauss and Sayles 1960; Nundi 1975). While the middle manager 
needs to promote his personal influence among his subordinates, he 
appears to them, as Kay (1974 a) states, as having little weight with 
top managers and indecisive because he is not in a position to decide
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but rather he needs to take matters elsewhere for approval. Such 
lack of influence and the need of other's (usually top manager's) 
approval, which involves time, gives his subordinates the impression 
that he is not capable of making up his mind and that he is acting in 
a bureaucratic manner. Concentration of power and influence at the 
top of the organizations and excluding middle managers from the 
process of setting up organizational policy and decision-making gives 
him the feelings of remoteness and organizational insignificance 
which in their turn produce alienation and a lack of responsibility 
(Dickson 1977). Weir (1976) found, among the middle managers that he 
studied, a widespread desire for greater involvement with the 
anploying organization. What the middle managers want, says Berkwitt 
(1969), is more meaning to their corporate life. The middle manager 
stands in the organization not on the basis of ' telling ' him that he 
is a part of 'management', but rather by what the top manager 'does' 
or by what the middle manager provided with in reality. Mann and 
Dent (1954) found that 74% of supervisors - the 'men in the middle ' - 
judge their standing in the organization by the amount of 
responsibility and 'authority' they are given, rather than by what 
they are told about their standing.
If the middle manager in reaction to his 'powerlessness', adapts 
his organizational life to one based on low risk and playing-it-safe 
attitudes, this life is provoked by the fact that his powerlessness 
is coupled with accountability and with responsibility for results 
dependent on the actions of others. In response to his lack of 
authority and power, the middle manager tends to demand a ritualistic 
conformity from subordinates and creates a kind of influence by 
checking on what people are doing and trying to impress those above 
him by getting everything right and demanding that subordinates do
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the same. Thus, middle managers often become controlling, coercive, 
demanding in relationships with subordinates, and supervise them too 
closely (Kanter and Stein (1979).
4. MIEDLJS MANAGER BEHAVIOUR IN HIS POWER REIATICNSHIP WITH TOP 
MANfySOCENT
From what has been previously shown, it is clear that middle 
managers, in relation to top managers represent a pattern of power 
relationship where the former is 'powerless' and the latter is 
'powerful'. In other words, they are unequal in terms of 'power' and 
there is a degree of "power Distance" (HOfstede 1980) between the top 
manager and the middle manager, despite the fact that they are both, 
as members of 'management' supposed to share the 'organizational 
leadership'.
In response to his poverlessness, the middle manager often tends 
to be bureaucratically-oriented or somehow a 'yes-man'. Hunt (1979, 
quoted by Torrington and Weightman 1892) points out that middle 
managers have become disenfranchized and even over bureaucratised; 
they are mostly concerned about decisions and the latest changes 
imposed by superiors. Kanter and Stein (1979) argue that "styles of 
handling responsibility that are often seen as pathologies of 
bureaucracy or of individuals, can be attributed to the problems of 
middleness" (p. 95). They continue to say that some aspects of the 
"bureaucratic personality" that Merton has described reflect 
responses to 'powerlessness' rather than to power delegated 
otherwise.
Powerlessness, as Nord (1976 b) states, produces feelings of 
dependence and servility. Thus, the middle manager as a consequence 
of his 'powerlessness' tends to be over-dependent on his superiors.
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overly concerned about their demands and judgements and displaying a 
strong compliance behaviour toward them. He feels, as Roethlisberger 
(1945) describes, (in his case the supervisor), "a constant need to 
adjust himself to the demands of his superior and to seek the 
approval of his superior. Everything that he does he tries to 
evaluate in terms of his superior's reaction. Everything that his 
superior does he tries to evaluate in terms of what it means or 
implies about his superior's relation to him. Everything that his 
subordinates and workers do he immediately tries to evaluate in terms 
of criticism it may call forth from his superior" (p. 287). Thus, he 
often focuses his attention upward to his superiors and the logics of 
evaluation they represent, rather than downward to his subordinates 
and the feelings they have ( Roethl isberger 1945; Mant 1979). As his 
values and ambitions are oriented toward 'management' (Fox 1971), he 
is highly concerned with attaining influence or 'power'. His 
standing in organization and his performance are strongly affected by 
his power position which in its turn depends on the support and 
backing of his superiors.
Through their bureaucratic manner of acting within the 
organization, middle managers often become rule-minded because rules, 
say Kanter and Stein (1979), can represent one of their few areas of 
personal discretion, and because they are often measured on the basis 
of how well the rules made by those above are carried out by those 
below. Bureaucratic rules also screen the superiority of the boss's 
power (Gouldner 1955) and can cover the limited and shaky foundations 
of middle manager's power (Nundi 1975), or at least let him feel and 
appear to be subject to the rules rather than to the boss. He also 
uses his inflexible application of bureaucratic rules as a defensive 
weapon against upward criticism. His strict adherence to the rules 
is one of his adaptative modes to his dilemma of powerlessness.
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SUMMARY
The tern 'middle management' is a diffuse one. The implications 
of the 'man in the middle' have been applied in the literature to 
many organizational levels that are located in the intermediate space 
between the top and bottcm. The 'middleness' of the man in the 
middle and its requirements give his role many peculiarities in terms 
of the problems and dilemmas he encounters. He usually faces the 
dilemnas of performing multiple and often conflictual roles, and of 
having uncertain membership in the 'management', and being a member 
of two organizational families who are often in conflict. Above all, 
his major dilemma which is at the centre of his otlier dilemmas is 
that of 'power deficiency'. As his orientations are toward 
'management' and thus he is concerned with attaining influence and 
power, his relationship with superiors is crucial to him because 
they could decide, to a great extent, his power position. As a 
consequence of his dilemnas, particularly of his 'powerlessness', the 
middle managers display a style of behaviour that consists of acting 





From the previous chapter, it is very clear that the middle-top 
manager's power relationship in work organizations requires a deep 
and broad perspective to be understandable, rather than using a 
normative approach (such as that of Niles, 1949), or even with a one­
sided picture (such as that of Nundi 1975). In fact it is true that, 
as Nundi (1975) and Mant (1977) have pointed out, as middle managers 
feel powerless, they tend to play power politics in which their 
compliance is a tactic to increase power, but powerless middle 
managers present only one side of the picture. Even here, we still do 
not know why they choose compliance as their mode of adaptation to 
their problem of power deficiency and what the conceptualization is 
that stands behind such a choice. Oi the other side, we still do not 
know what the impact is of the 'culture' and 'socializaticwi' of wider 
society and of work organizations in securing or constructing middle 
managers' compliant behaviour. In fact this latter question 
introduces the investigation to a broader perspective, that of 
exploring the impact of culture in constructing organizational 
behaviour. Here middle managers' compliant behaviour is very useful 
in guiding such an exploration. Out of such questioning and through 
a commitment to such broader exploration, the research 'model* 
presented in Figure (1) has emerged. What this shows is the 'logic' 
of the design only, as the relations between different aspects of the 
model were much more complicated and needed great efforts to develop 
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1. OONCEPTOAL PERSPECTIVE
In analyzing behaviour within an organization, we need to know 
the properties of the original basic conpontents, the individual and 
the formal organization (Argyris 1957). Organizational behaviour is 
a function of the characteristics of both the individual and the 
organization (Nadler et al 1979). When individuals join an 
organization they bring many things with them to the organizational 
setting; they inevitably carry with them their cultural values which 
interact with structural and situational factors within the 
organization. As the characteristics of formal organizations have 
their impact upon individuals and their personality development 
(Argyris 1957, 1962, 1973), it is entirely possible that the
organizational form may itself be a determinant of personality, where 
the actors themselves, through their independent relationships, 
create the environment to which they adapt (Weick 1969). Thus in a 
very structured bureaucracy, not only does the bureaucracy affect the 
individual personality (Merton 1940; Weber 1946; Blau and Scott 1962) 
and make him dependent or conformity-orientated, but the individual 
may already be predisposed toward these traits.
A. Culture and Individuals Characteristics
A basic understanding of personality characteristics is of 
direct importance to organizational behaviour, as those 
characteristics demonstrate the broad patterns of ways in which 
individuals tend to react and behave. One of the important 
determinants of personality and its development is the culture within 
which one is brought up (Herbert 1976). The linkage between 
'culture' and 'personality' has been subject to heavy emphasis. 
Argyris states that "personality cannot be understood without taking
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into account the culture in which the personality exists. Culture 
and personality are inseparable. It is actually not culture and 
personality but culture in personality and personality in culture" 
(1957, p.48). Hoftstede (1980) remarks that culture and personality 
interact together and cultural traits can sometimes be measured by 
personality tests. In any society the attitudes and values that are 
encouraged within its culture are transmitted to the young. Culture, 
in order to exist and be transmitted to successive generations, 
requires acceptance and conformity from society's members. 
Socialization, which makes sure that members comply with the dictates 
of culture, usually takes place through the early training given to 
the young of a society, through teaching and requiring proper ways of 
behaviour, informal pressures to obey customs, and the enforcement of 
laws. Consequently, the basic qualities of the culture are preserved 
for generations. TSie shaping of personality in any culture, as 
Linton (1945) emphasizes, promotes the stability of social systems by 
developing individuals who are compatible with the demands made by 
the role requirements of that social system.
Many studies have demcxistrated how culture makes a significant 
difference in personality and behaviour patterns in different groups 
(Benedict 1934; Klukhohn and Murray 1948; Berger 1962). The 
relationship between 'culture' and 'personality' has been dealt with 
by a multiple rather than a unified approach, from different view 
points of many fields which take a variety of positions. But all 
these positions have emphasized the strong relationship between 
' culture ' and 'personality', and gave rise to the concept of 
'socialization' as a central analytical tool in studying and 
understanding this relationship (see LeVine 1973). Within the 
concept of socialization the emphasis has been placed either on the
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individual or the society. While the psychological studies have 
concerned themselves with the individual and learning theory during 
the socialization process, the sociologists have stressed the role of 
society and considered the wider connections between family, school 
and other environmental influences and personality.
Through that strong linkage between 'culture' and 'personality', 
many concepts have been devised to explain how culture shapes many of 
the basic, shared characteristics of its members; such concepts as 
"basic personality'* (Kardiner and Linton 1939), or "national 
character'* (Inkeles and Levinson 1969) or "social character" (Fromm 
1949; Riesman 1950) are all concerned with group similarities rather 
than individual differences.
'Basic personality' structure, which was developed through 
collaborative work by Kardiner and Linton in 1939 using data frcm 
primitive societies, is based on the uniformity in child-rearing 
practices (Kardiner 1945). Accordingly, this structure is a 
configuration which rests upon the following postulates;
1. Members of various families within any society or group 
employ similar techniques in child-rearing : although never identical, 
these techniques are culturally patterned.
2. The culturally-patterned techniques for the care and rearing 
of children differ frcm one society to another.
3. This similarity in early experiences which exerts a lasting 
effect upcn an individual's personality will tend to produce similar 
personality configurations in the individuals who are subjected to 
them (Kardiner 1945).
'Basic personality' structure, for seme investigators such as 
Inkeles and Levinson (1969), should be equated with 'national 
character ' which was a popular tenn in the early 1950*s. They state
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that this character "should refer to the mode or modes of the 
distribution of personality variants within a given society" (p.425). 
Others such as Benedict (1934) do not directly link basic or modal 
personality with the term 'national character'; for them the latter 
term is a particular way to study culture and learned cultural 
behaviour. In fact Linton (1945) conceived national character as 
modal personality structure, which represent the common or 
standardized characteristics in a given society.
In the same way, Fromm (1949) and Riesman (1950) were concerned 
with the term of 'social character', which as Riesman sees it, is 
those character traits that are shared by a group of people living in 
the same society and exposed to a generally similar socialization 
process.
Basic personality constructs, like cultural construct patterns, 
represent the mode or modes of thinking of a society but within 
certain ranges of variation. Thus it is doubtful that the actual 
personality of any individual will ever agree at all points with all
of these constructs; as Kluckhohn (1964) explains, 'basic
personality' does not represent the total personality of the 
individual but rather corresponds to the value- attitude systems 
which are basic to the individual's personality configuration. These 
basics may be reflected in many different forms of behaviour and 
could exist in totally different personality configurations.
Despite the fact that these concepts (basic personality and 
national or social character) have been subject to criticism (see for
example Inkeles and Levinson 1969; Terhune 1970) and are now somewhat
discredited (Child 1981) they have often been employed in many 
studies. Most researches on the contemporary Arab world are based on 
'national character' analysis. Also, as Child (1981) pointed out.
\
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some cultural historical perspectives which were used by some 
investigators (Dahrendorf 1965; Kohn 1960) gave the initial 
impression of accepting the notion of 'national character'. But 
these studies in fact provide a way to assess the identity of culture 
with a nation rather than the basic personality of its members. 
Culture determines the identity of human groups, and personality is 
the property of the individual which determines his identity, but we 
should not forget the strong interacticwi between the two to the 
extent that it is difficult to distinguish exceptional individuals 
from their cultural systems. If culture in any society guides 
behavioural tendencies and attitudes into paths consistent with its 
values, then it is accepted that members of a society will have 
similar tendencies, attitudes and norms. All this represents the 
collective level of their "mental programmes" (Hofstede 1980), and 
refers to the generalized shared meanings or values they hold in 
commcxi. But it is also at that generalized value level that one can 
find the most significant differences (Kluckhohn 1964; Kluckhohn and 
Strodbeck 1961). Personality comes from three levels; the first is 
the cultural, external environment and those influences which exert 
pressures to incorporate attitudes, values, or behaviours of others, 
in other words, the collective level which is common to people 
belonging to a certain group; the second is the 'individual level*, 
which is truly unique or internal to the person himself - no two 
people are exactly the same; this level consists of his biological, 
physiological, and inherent psychological processes; the third level 
is the adjustment process through which the individual relates to the 
external pressures (Herbert 1976). This level consists of the 
individual's interpretation of the social norms and the influences 
which surround him, and his feelings about them. The collective
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level (culture) strongly influences an individual's interpretations 
and feelings about his culture's norms and values, and plays a very 
important and, I would say, the dominant role within the traditional 
society in forming the socializing institutions and personality 
structure. But even within this kind of society, where culture 
leaves little apparent room for individual interpretation, we cannot 
accept that the individual is completely moulded by his cultural 
norms and values (Mangham 1978). The individual receives the norms, 
values, and all that is required by his society through the 
socialization process, but not in an abstract form or by a specific 
mechanism, but through cumulative interpretations by his 
socialization agents, particularly by parents. So a mixture of 
societal norms and the cumulative interpretations of them are 
communicated to the next learning generation to be interpreted 
individually once more, and then this mixture is subjected once again 
to the individual's own views. Also, individuals have not in the 
past, despite all the basic similarities, been socialized by the 
social institutions, especially the family, in exactly the same way 
or through the same training and atmosphere. Although the 
institutional structure and the kind of training involved in the
socialization process are basically the same for all members of one 
society or group, within this basic cultural framework there is a 
degree of variation between the individuals of one society. Because 
of this and other variations in many aspects in the individuals' past 
experiences, we can find, even in traditional culture, individuals 
who develop particular views of some of their societal norms and
values in marked contrast to other's views of the same norms or 
values. Even in a traditional society, and despite the strong social
pressure to conform with the established norms and values, people
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vary in the degree of their conformity to the most critical norms or 
values, and sometimes the individual is able to step outside of some 
group of dominant norms and values, and stand up to criticize them, 
while another person will defend them because he considers such norms 
and values correct and useful. so individuals within the same 
society who went through basically the same socialization process and 
structure vary in the degree of their internalization of their 
cultural norms and values. This does not mean necessarily that, 
especially in traditional societies, individuals will behave 
absolutely differently and in accordance with their degree of 
internalization of their cultural norms, but rather it is more likely 
in such societies that individuals will conduct themselves or behave 
similarly. The individual's interpretation and behaviour,
particularly in traditional society, has to be within the basic 
framework that is required by his societal norms if he wants to live 
and to be accepted. But individuals could vary in the degree of 
conforming to the same required action or behaviour, as well as in 
their motivation or strategy behind it, and in their readiness to 
change it.
In any society, as kluckhohn (1951) stated, "each individual is 
different frcm, yet similar to, each other individual" (p.409). That 
differentiation is sometimes numerous and fundamental between members 
of one society with respect to their outlook, interests and 
philosophy, but above all they have, from their social interaction 
within their culture, shared meanings which refer to their general 
conceptual structure.
The majority of individuals in any given culture are 
characterized by some dominant profile of value-orientations similar 
to those which characterize their culture, but individuals hold a
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degree of variations in that dominant pattern. All this constitutes, 
as Kluckhohn (1964) indicates, their 'dominant but variable value 
orientation". This concept of 'dominant but variable' cultural 
orientation has a relationship with the 'basic personality' type as 
Kluckhohn acknowledges, and her analysis is in the realm of 'national 
character'. She gives a valuable conceptual scheme in permitting a 
systematic order of the variation of value-orientations for both 
cultures and individuals. The theory of universal or 'dominant but 
variable value-orientations' (Kluckhohn 1964) is based on the 
following assumptions; first, bacause there are "a limited number of 
basic human problems for which all people at all times and in all 
places must find some solution" (1964, p.346), those 'coranon human' 
problems constitute the universal features of all cultures; second, 
people resolve these fundamental life problems within a limited range 
of possible solutions, and from that stems the cultural variation; 
third, the variation in value orientation is distributed in a way 
that a dominant value system can be identified. Accordingly, 
cultural systems differ in orientation, as Kluckhohn and Strodbeck 
(1961) suggest, along the following five 'life problems' :
1. Human nature orientation - is it conceived as good, evil, or 
mixed?
2. Man-nature orientation - what is the relation of man to 
nature, is it master over nature; harmony with nature, or 
subjective to nature?
3. Time orientation - is it towards the future, present, 
or past?
4. Activity orientation - is this being, being-in — becoming, 
or doing?
5. Relational orientation - the modal of man's relationship with 
people; is it a hierarchically ordered position, or 
a team work relationship, or individualism?
Inkeles and Levison (1969) suggest a useful extension to 
Kluckhohn ' s approach by including more human problems to which all 
people at all times must find some solution and they describe some of 
those suggested problems such as 'relation to authority' or handling 
of aggression.
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The ‘̂dominant but variable' theory of culture (Kluckhohn 1964) 
could be and has already been singled out in different ways and frcm 
different perspectives. In the international level of different
cultures, Hofstede (1980) in his "HERMES" study on forty different
countries has indicated that while there are universal cultural 
dimensions in all these forty countries, each was ranked in varying 
degrees (high, medium, low) in each dimension. Also this theory can 
be seen on the level of organizational culture in different countries 
(Evan 1975; Child 1981). The same "universal but variable" theory of
culture has been singled out on the organizational level within one
country (Bate 1982).
The term 'value' is a "conception, explicit or implicit, 
distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the 
desirable vrtiich influences the selection from available modes, means 
and ends of actions" (Kluckhohn 1951, p.395). So values are a 
feature of individuals as well as cultures. Hofstede (1980) defined 
value as "a broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over 
others" (p.19). Beliefs and attitudes also carry a value component, 
and the mutual relationship between values forms the individual's 
' value-system ' (mental program ).
Each person, Kluckhohn and Strodbeck say, "has within himself a 
rank of order of value orientations which usually is made af^rent by 
a variable allocation of time and interest in the activities of 
several behavior spheres" (1961, p.31). When we talk about cultural 
values we are not talking about something out there existing in the 
abstract, but rather they are in the minds of people and form the 
basis of a person's 'comroonsense' (Bate 1982). The cultural values 
can only be discovered in individuals and in collective attitudes and 
behaviours. The value systems of any culture are not directly
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observable because they are not tangible, but rather they are 
internalized constructs and can be inferred from verbal statements, 
deeds and other behaviours (Hofstede 1380). They form the deeply- 
embedded world which Silverman (1970) describes as "a taken-for- 
granted-world governed by what we understand as the laws of nature" 
(p.133).
B. Socialization
Societal norms in any culture construct the social institutions 
(family, school, political system, organization, etc) in particular 
patterns and structures and ways of functioning in harmony with the 
context of these norms. These institutions, csice they have become 
facts, build-up and reinforce the collectively shared societal norms, 
customary role patterns, and the broad areas of cultural values that 
led to them (Hofstede 1980). Consequently, each institution has its
* sub-culture *, which reflects partly the national culture of wider 
society and partly the institution's peculiar setting and structure 
(e.g. family, school, organization etc), as well as its own 
modifications to the national dominant cultural value-orientations. 
Social institutions work together through the socialization process 
to conform to the pattern of national societal norms: They are rings 
in one chain, each ring supporting and linking with another one. 
Thus the collectively shared norms, values and orientations are 
built-up and leamt within social institutions through the 
socialization process, particularly in the primary socialization 
within the family, school, religion, community, etc, and reflected in 
and reinforced or/and modified through secondary socialization 
(adulthood) within the secondary institutions such as the work 
•organization'.
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Not only does the concept of 'culture* lead to great 
teminological difficulties because it covers such a great range 
(Child 1981), so does the concept of 'socialization' Wiich suffers in 
the same way (White 1977). The major divide in views about 
'socialization' is whether it is a 'mechanical' process by which 
culture is transmitted, as the traditional sociologists define it, or 
the major factor in the building and developing of an individual's 
personality (see Zigler and Child 1973). In fact the main concern of 
'socialization' in all the above views is to fit individuals and 
society together. But socialization, as mentioned before, is not 
just a 'mechanism' by which the cultural content is transferred from 
one generation to the next, and the individual through his 
socialization process is not completely moulded by the norms and 
values of his culture. Socialization is not a dye-stamping programme 
aimed at producing individuals who are corbon copies of their parents 
(White 1977 ), but rather its effect is to raise up an active human 
being capable of taking decisions when he confronts various social 
situations, even if such actions are no more than an extreme 
conformity to societal norms. Socialization consists of not just 
passing on a range of knowledge, but also the characteristic 
behaviour of socialization's agents (typically the parents) and their 
cumulative interpretations of the content of their culture. Also it 
consists of individual interpretation of cultural norms, and 
experience of adaptations by which a person leams what is the 
appropriate behaviour when encountering different groups and 
situations, and develops, as Brim and Wheeler (1966) remark, the 
requisite orientation for a satisfactory functioning role. 
Socialization, as Mangham (1979) views it is:
"...a pervasive and essential societal process.
Through this process ... each of us becomes a
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'hixnan* being learning the habits, skills, 
beliefs and moves of our particular class, ethnic 
group and nationality. We leam these things 
sometimes consciously ... and in mar^ cases, 
uiconsciously, simply through our association 
with fellow members of the conmunity."(p.78)
So the individual is an active element in this learning process
even when his cultural norms and values provide him with very limited
choices. Socialization in this sense is not limited to a period of
time or a specific stage through which individuals pass during their
lifetime, but rather, it is, as Katz and Kahn (1966) remark, a
continuous dynamic process. It is, as the symbolic interactionist
perspective stresses, a cumulative life-long process whereby the
individual from his learning experience is able to adapt existing
knowledge and behaviour to new situations that he meets; he can draw
on a bank of cultural cumulative social values, norms, attitudes and
actions in combination to suit changing situations. Thus
Socialization as White (1977) defines it;
"... is more than just formal education, for it 
includes the acquisition of attitudes and values, 
behaviours, habits and skills transmitted not only 
in school, but through the family, the peer group 
and the mass media. Moreover the contents of the 
various forms of socialisation are not mutually 
exclusive, nor are the agents of socialisation 
necessarily working in harmony, so the proœæ 
actually ê qperienced by the individucJ. is 
^̂ oeedijiqly (xroplex, and will vary markedly both 
within and between societies." (my emphasise)."
(P.l)
Seme theorists such as Brim and Wheeler (1966) and Moore (1974) 
have found it useful to distinguish between two stages of 
socialization, "primary" and "secondary" socialization. Primary 
socialization, from tdie traditional positivist sociological 
perspective, is concerned with pre-school children, thus making very 
little reference to adult socialization. Also the traditional 
category of the sociologist for secondary socialization is related to
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education at school and college, or of other secondary groups.
Symbolic interactionists as White (1977) states, usually define
primary socialization as a process concerned with childhood, and
secondary socialization with adulthood. Brim and Wheeler (1966)
regard the phase of primary socialization as the process by which
individuals develop their basic personality characteristics during
which the family and school enable the child to leam the values,
norms, and behaviours of his culture, while secondary socialization
is defined as the process during which the individual acquires
specific behaviour, attitudes, values and norms suited to a
particular occupation or function in society. In this stage of
socialization the individual explores a new area of experience,
especially after the school career is over, and he continuously
examines and re-examines as well as manipulates and modifies his
cultural societal norms and values that were acquired during primary
socialization in the light of experience and new situations. In fact
primary and secondary socialization are continuations of one another,
and a form of learning in one stage within any given culture
necessarily follows frcm another. Thus, as White (1977) states:
"[in] childhood, as in adulthood, socialisation 
oonoentrates on the learning of ski Ils of attitude 
and behaviour, enabling the individueLL to exist 
harmoniously within social grouqps and to balance 
harmoniously the experiences between social groups 
to enable him to live his life with as little 
aggravation as possible yet keep abreast of the 
various role requirements of his life career."(p.8)
But as Brim and Wheeler (1966) remark, because primary and
secondary socialization processes are conducted within the same
cultural context and framework, the setting and the process of
secondary socialization depends to a large extent upon the societal
norms, values, and behaviours learned during primary socialization;
thus secondary socialization does not require a fundamental change
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from individuals. Moore (1974) in his study of organizational 
behaviour in relation to the whole culture, considered the family, 
school, army and church as primary units, and the 'organization* as a 
secondary unit.
C. Organizational Culture
Individuals bring with them when they join an organization their 
cultural values, norms, and orientations which were learned through 
their socialization process. So cultural influences enter the 
organization with the organizational members. The dominant value- 
or ientat ions of the wider society which enter the organization 
interact with the formal setting of the organization and its rules, 
laws, regulations, experiences and other organizational factors. 
During this interacting process, these orientations are subject to a 
process of re-inforcement, modification, and manipulation to fit the 
organizational requirements. Consequently, the organization produces 
a sub-culture which is a result of the interacticxi between the 
culture in wider society and the peculiarity of the organizaticaial 
setting through different historical realities. Thus the 
organization's sub-culture reflects partly the culture of wider 
society and partly the organization's peculiar setting and 
experiences.
When we talk about "organizational culture" we mean to talk 
about values and emotions. But what does organizational culture 
consist of and what are its characteristics?
Organizational culture is "the real world" as experienced by 
organization members, "the way things are, or the taken for granted 
way of life" (Reason 1977). It is the deep structural 
characteristics which reflect the organization's values and norms.
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and the model of reality held by individuals in an organization.
Pettigrew (1979) regards organizational culture as:
"... the source of a family of conceits. The 
offsprings of the conœpts of culture I have 
in mind are symbols, language, ideology, 
belief, ritual and myth." (p.574).
Also Dandridge et al (1980) emphasizes the term organizational
symbolism, which refers to:
"...those aspects of an organization that its 
members use to reveal or make oonprehendable 
the unconscious feelings, images and values 
that are inherent in that organization.
Symbolism expresses the underlying character, 
ideology or value system of an organization."
(P.77)
Thus, the underlying character of organization is revealed in
different forms of symbols, myths, ritualized events or ceremonies,
stories, jokes, legends, and vocabularies (Pettigrew 1979). These
symbols with other aspects of the organization's surface structure -
customary modes of dresses, physical appearances, the use of space
and the dominant atmosphere - all provide some clue to the deep
structure of organizations, and, as Bate (1982) points out, to the
dominant social or organizational meanings.
Writers such as Berg (1982) see the world as essentially built
up of meanings :
"Ckie of the most important aspects of human life 
is the ability to make sense of experience, i.e. 
to reflect upon life, to transform these 
reflections into representations (symbols, images, 
phantasies, etc) and to store these representations 
in a 'collective' memory. Thus, the world in which 
we operate becomes loaded with such r^xesentations 
it becomes a "symbolic reality."(p.9)
Norms, values, and actions are constructed upon meanings. These
meanings refer to a "conceptual structure" of generalizations which
in the organizational context, as Bate (1982) states :
"will encompass one's own roles, the roles of 
others, rules and institutions, traditional
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ways of acting, and qiecific issues such
as the nature of authority, "(p. 7)
'Meaning* is an essential concept in the "symbolic interact ion is t " 
perspective (Mead 1964; Blumer 1969). The bases of this perspective 
are that human society is made up of individuals who have selves, 
thus they do not simply behave in response to a stimuli or as a 
result or enactment or activation of factors such as environmental 
pressures, roles, motives, and so forth. Rather, the individual
synbolizes or attributes "meanings" to the world around him which 
derive from social interaction and a process of observation within 
human society. The individual behaviour or the way he acts arises 
out of these meanings things have for him. These meanings are 
subject to individual modification and interpretation processes 
through dealing and coping with different life situations and 
settings (Mangham 1978). Not only action arises out of 'meanings', 
but norms and values can be regarded as having the same derivative 
(Bate 1982).
In different cultures the same or similar events, phrases and 
actions can be perceived differently or similarly depending on the 
meanings they have for individuals in each culture. Often there is 
marked 'cultural differences' in values, norms, perceptions and 
actions. Findings of Segall et al (1966) suggest that different 
environmental factors in different cultures may produce experiences 
and expectations which generate certain distortions in perception. 
Although a oonmon experience of people within one culture enables 
them to have common or shared cultural meanings and to make similar 
interpretations of most essential everyday situations, no two people 
have identical experience. Thus individuals vary in their 
attachments to dominant cultural meanings as well as in their 
interpretations or at least their feelings about them, depending on 
their own individual experiences.
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So, in terns of organization culture, individuals have dominant 
social or organizational shared meanings, and shared orientations 
inclining them to behave in a similar way, but in varying degrees 
depending on their individual difference and organizational 
environmental factors. These shared orientations are the 
consequences of the interaction between dominant value-orientations 
in wider society and the organization's peculiar formal settings and 
requirements.
Such sentiments in defining organizational culture are expressed 
by McNeill (1979 -cited by Bate 1982); he states that organization 
culture :
...... .consists of patterns for organizational
behaviour that are learned, transmitted, 
and symbolically derived. These patterns for 
behaviour constitute a group's characteristic 
way of perceiving its organizational environment 
-a group's shared orientations to organizational 
stimuli. Organizational culture is neither an 
(xganizational attribute nor an u^ividual 
attribute; rather, it is a system of shared 
cxientations to organizational attributes, a 
^consensus of perceptions' regarding oganizaticnal 
stimuli."(my emphasis)(p.8)
Similarly, Bate (1982) defines organization culture as;
"... the meanings or aq)ects of the cono^tual 
structures %Aich people hold in common and which 
define the social or organizational 'reality'."( .p.7)
From these two definitions of organization culture we can
recognize that this culture has the same characteristics as any other
kind of culture as being shared, transmitted and having a deeply-
embedded nature. Organizational culture is a complex socio-
historical product which obtains through the evolution of
organization within the wider society. So in order to understand an
organization's present setting and culture - as well as the pattern
of shared orientations it's members are likely to have - it is
essential to go back to the history of the organization, that is the
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emergence of the organization, its original initiators, the purposes 
for which the organization was once created, etc. Such a historical 
review will indicate what pattern of norms, values and orientations 
which in particular the older "elite" or "dominant coalition" (Child 
1972) brought to the organization from the outside culture, and what 
kind of organizational structure they have established. This in turn 
will show the pattern of socialization process and the context the 
individuals are likely to receive within the organization.
D. Organizational Socialization
Preparing individuals for functioning in work organizations is 
not only the major aspect of socialization (Nord 1976a), but the 
organization itself too, as Mangham (1978) ranarks, engages in the 
process of socializing its members, "sometimes consciously as in 
induction and training programmes, more often unconsciously by 
passing on to novitiates 'this is the way we do things around here'" 
(pp.78-79). Socialization within organization is a process which 
involves learning and becoming a part of an organization's culture.
There has been increasing research concerned with socialization 
as it is accomplished by and affects formal organizations (Schein 
1968; Van Maanen and Schein 1979). Schein (1968) in his 
investigations of socialization in organizations defines this concept 
as;
"... the process by which a new member leams 
the value system, the norms and the required 
behaviour patterns of the society, organization 
cx group which he is entering."(p.3)
Van Maanen and Schein (1979) define 'organizational
socialization' in its most general sense as;
"...the process by which an individual acquires 
the social knowledge and skills necessary to 
assiine an organizational role."(p.211)
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Organizational socialization entails the learning of a cultural
perspective for interpreting one's experiences in a given sphere of
the work, which would allow a person to come to know an
organizational situation and act within it.
As was argued before, as individuals move from childhood to
adulthood, 'socialization' would differ in its content rather than in
its form (Brim 1966; Schein 1971). Undoubtedly, 'socialization' is a
cumulative life-long process in which work organizations participate
too. But, what is more, organizational socialization is, as Van
Maanen (1976) notes, a special case of 'adult socialization' that may
produce 'personal changes'. These changes as Brim (1966) and Schein
(1971) assert, are very unlikely to be permanent or fundamental, or
at the level of basic personality structure. Rather these changes
are the consequences of a process of cognitive learning with which
the social actor engages and through which he adjusts himself to role
demands that are considered to be necessary for participating in
organizational social situations. In other words, these changes
occur at the level of what Schein (1971) terms "constructed social
selves" (p.409) rather than at the level of more enduring underlying
qualities or basic self-image. In explaining the nature and extent
of these 'changes', Schein (1971) states :
"The changes which occur in a person during the 
course of his career as a result of adult 
socialization or acculturation are changes in 
the nature and integration of his social selves.
It is highly unlikely that he will change 
suÈastantially in his basic personcility structure 
and his pattern of psychological defences, but he 
change drastically in his socicLL selves in 
the sense of developing new attitudes and values, 
new competencies, new images of himself and new 
Wcys of entering and conducting himself in social 
situations. As be faces new roles which bring 
new demands, it is from his repertoire of 
attributes and skills that he constructs or 
reconstructs himself to meet these demands."(p.412)
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Thus, 'organizational socialization' may confirm and reinforce 
or modify the 'orientations' and the basic expectations of self-other 
relationships that the individuals have already acquired frcm their 
social interaction in wider society. Equally, this socialization may 
reject certain aspects of the new comers' orientations and behaviour 
which are considered inadequate for the role requirements of the 
organization, and thus the individual may become subject to coercive 
persuasion through which he will be forced to relinquish these 
values, attitudes and behaviours as the price of membership (Schein 
1968; 1971). However, at this point, one may argue that in any given 
society, work organizations are deeply embedded within larger society 
and they are one of its social institutions. The structures and ways 
of functioning of those organizations have been constructed by 
cultural societal norms of the wider society (Hofstede 1980). Thus, 
organizational socialization, particulary in traditional societies, 
will reinforce the value-orientation or the conceptual structure and 
ways of engaging with others that new comers have acquired from their 
socialization in wider society. In fact, although such arguments are 
quite correct, we must keep in mind that firstly, as has been 
suggested before, organizational sub-culture is not simply a piece of 
national culture, and a work organization as a social institution 
is not merely one of a series of identical links in one chain. But 
rather organizational ' sub-culture ' is the socio-historical product 
of the interaction between culture of wider society and the 
peculiarities of the organization. Thus, this sub-culture reflects 
partly the culture of wider society and partly the organization's own 
settings, experiences and history. Secondly, although organizations 
belonging to one national culture would have a universal or dominant 
pattern of culture, it Is also at this daninant level that they 
perp etuate a degree of variation (Bate 1982).
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The efforts to assess an organizations' variations in the 
socialization process have utilized different bases or criteria but 
with major emphasis upon types of organization and organizational
structure. One of these efforts is the typology suggested by Etzioni
(1969) which implies that organizations do not demand the same nature 
of 'ccmpliance' frcm its participants but, rather, across different 
types of organizations. Organizational socialization would stress 
various forms of compliance which depend upon the goals of each 
particular organization. Along the same line Blau and Scott (1962) 
have studied organizations' variations based on the criteria of who 
benefits fran the organization's output or 'cui bono'(p. 43). While 
Etzioni's work postulates three types of organization - i.e. 
normative, utilitarian and coercive, each of which requires a
different kind of compliance relationship - Blau and Scott for their 
part, derive four basic organization types - i.e. "mutual-benefit 
association, business concern, service organization, and commonwealth 
organization" (p. 43). In fact, Etzioni's typology and the Blau- 
Scott formulation have received many criticisms (Hall 1972). Based 
on emprical data. Hall concludes that the two typologies, "aside from 
the rather simple differentiation concerning the compliance system 
and the nature of the prime beneficiary, have only a limited 
application insofar as total organizational analysis is concerned. 
Neither typology differentiates clearly between organizations in 
terms of the variables considered important in structural
characterics ; e.g. complexity, activities and formalization. 
Furthermore, there is not clear differentiation in terms of the 
factors related to change" (p.51).
In the hopes of finding broader dimensions with which to study 
organization variations in the socialization process, Coffman's
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(1961) concept of "total institutions", as quoted by Van Maanen
(1976), tries to classify organizational settings not in terms of 
which types of organizations are total (i.e. having close or absolute 
control over their members) but how much totality does each display. 
Also Van Maanen (1976) has tried to turn attention to some of the 
structural characteristics affecting the socialization process along 
which organizations may be expected to differ. These characterics 
include those such as the formality of the organizational setting, 
the individual-versus-collective nature of the setting, the serial or 
disjunctive patterns of organizational socialization, etc.
Apparently, there is very little recognition of the influence of 
organizational soft factors in the variation of organizational
socialization. Such factors as 'leadership style or behaviour' may
stand, to a great extent, behind the variation of organizational 
socializaticxi among organizations belonging to one national culture 
or those which have similar goals or functions and very similar
structures and relatively similar in age, e.g. the Iraqi
organizations that we are investigating in this research.
E. The Impact of Culture on Organizational Behaviour
In the field of organizational behaviour, the context of 
organizational culture which is concerned with the institutionalized 
social relationships within the organizational functioning and its 
structure and ideology, is the missing half of the analysis of 
organizational behaviour (O'TdoI 1979). Organizational culture for 
different reasons has failed until recently to capture the serious 
attention of researchers.
Despite this failure in pointing the researchers attention 
towards organizational culture in alalyzing organizational behaviour.
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a good deal of effort has been spent in introducing the culture of 
wider society into understanding why organizational behaviour varies 
in different cultures under apparently similar structural 
circumstances. In fact the 1950's and 1960's did see some attempts 
in linking cultural factors with organizational bureaucratic 
behaviour, especially in some developing countries (Berger 1957; 
Riggs 1962; 1964; Whyte 1969). Most of these efforts were not 
followed up by a good number of empirical studies. One of the 
earliest and most ambitious attempts was that of Riggs (1964) in 
idealyptic models in industrial and traditional societies, and a 
third one of "prismatic" society. He attempts through his three 
models to relate organizational behaviour to what he sees as some 
cultural parameters of different levels of social and economic 
complexity.
Recently, the studies of Moore 1974; Evan 1975; Brossard and 
Maurice 1976; Nord 1976 a; HOfstede 1980; Child 1981; Tayeb 1981; 
Bate 1982, have all, with other efforts, given support to the view 
that culture can shape patterns of organizational behaviour. In fact 
the effects of culture of wider society on the organization that 
various studies have indicated have been categorized by Hofstede 
(1978) as;
1. Effects on the organization's 'soft' aspect, i.e. the 
philosophies, values and behaviour of organizational members.
2. Effects on the organization's 'hard' aspect, i.e. the 
distribution of power and structuring of activities.
As the two aspects - the members of organization (the 'soft' 
aspect) and the structure (the 'hard' aspect) - are strongly
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interrelated and interact together, so it would be meaningless, 
especially when studying organizational behaviour, to talk about one 
without discussing the other.
Despite the importance of introducing 'culture' to understand 
and study organizational behaviour, the approach of the 'organization 
within society', which focuses upon cultural and institutional 
explanatory variables, still lacks a substantial body of sup^rting 
research. Aslo some significant theoretical problems are still not 
dealt with (Child 1981). One of the main concerns of this approach 
is the exercise of power within organizations and its relation with 
the cultural values and social institutions which sustain and put 
into operation those values.
In some studies dealing with the impact of cuture on 
organizations we can distinguish the efforts to study and analyse the 
relation between culture and the patterns of exercising authority and 
power relationships within the organization. Such efforts appear in 
the studies of Abegglen 1958; Whyte 1969; Levinson 1968; Crozier 
1964; Kakar 1971; Hofstede 1980; Child 1981 and Tayeb 1981.
Oie clear example of the iiiçact of culture on the way authority 
is percieved and exercised, is the Japanese organization. Abegglen 
(1958) states, that patterns of authority and compliance within 
Japanese organizations relate strongly to the Japanese perception of 
the role of authority figures in traditional Japanese family 
institutions. McClelland (1969) indicates that patterns of Japanese 
family and factory paternalism (with other values) parallel one 
another. So in Japanese organizations the members of management who 
have been traditionally guided and organized by the tendency of 
paternalistic familism, are expected to play an active role in the 
personal life of employees, such as planning family budgets.
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providing housing, recreation facilities and even arranging marriages 
for employees. This way of perceiving and exercising authority
within Japanese organizations is in contrast to the case of French 
and American organizations. Americans, as McClelland states, 
perceive their role in specific bureaucratic terms and have a 
narrower definition of appropriate behaviour for their superiors. 
Also in French organizations the distance between superordinates and 
subordinates tends to be large and associated with low trust (Crozier 
1964). French groups tend to function as autonomously as possible in 
order to mitigate conflict (McClelland 1969).
Whyte (1969) in his comparative study between the United States 
and Peru, relates the autocratic management of Peruvian organizations 
to the authoritarianism and low interpersonal trust in the wider 
Peruvian society. In the same way Tayeb (1981) in Iran and Child
(1981) in Britain and Germany, attribute the subordination to 
authority that they encountered within the organizations they studied 
to authoritarianism in wider society.
Levinson (1968) and Kakar (1971) relate features of subordinate 
organizaticmal behaviour to parental authority relations in the 
family. Levinson demonstrates his observation about national 
commonalities between patterns of parental behaviour and the boss- 
subordinate relationship by comparing the child-rearing practices and 
typical managerial behaviour in Germany, England and the United 
States.
One of the four cultural dimensions that are identified by
Hofstede (1980) at the level of different culture is "Power Distance"
which reveals the degree of power inequality between bosses and 
subordinates and the pattern of relationship to authority, as well as 
the way authority and power are perceived and exercised in wider
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society and oonsequenly in organizations. In fact Hofstede (1980) 
has been strongly criticized by Child (1981) for the absence of any 
analysis of institutional development in the countries that he 
surveyed. In the absence of such analysis and of a soc io-histor ical 
background or evolution of each nation sampled, "we are left with 
very little basis for judging whether perceived power distance is 
actually a culturally derived phenomenon"(p.332).
In particular, the work of Crozier (1964) is one of the most 
successful efforts in relating cultural patterns to organizational 
behaviour. His attempt to understand the special nature of French 
bureaucracy was in 'terms of its relations with the social and 
cultural system of which it is part'. Crozier's way of studying 
organizational behaviour is one of the earliest studies based on the 
perspective of 'organizations within society* which was followed by 
others such as Brossard and Maurice (1976). Crozier shows how 
cultural phenomena can be employed to lend greater explanatory power 
to a body of empirical theory. He gives 'culture' a central place in 
his analysis and justifies this by examining relevant evidence in 
some depth. Organizational behaviour for Crozier (1973) is "culture 
bound" and organizational systems are "cultural answers to the 
problems encountered by human beings in achieving their collective 
ends. Although there are objective rational constraints that limit 
possibilities, there is no one best way in this matter"(p.219)
Crozier describes the pattern of organizational behaviour and 
certain characteristics of French bureaucracy in comparison with 
other countries, in particular with American organizations. He finds 
that within French bureaucracies, there are dysfunctional aspects 
such as: an unusual amount of centralization; a predominance of 
formal over informal relations; a tendency toward the isolation of
56
the individual; unemotionality, rigidity between levels and a concern
for hierarchical differentiation by status and privilege. Crozier
uses the cultural approach depending on the anthropological evidence
to find the roots of such traits in French culture. He claims that
the above "bureaucratic traits" are uniquely French, on which point
the researcher would, as well as Melcher (1973), Boddewyn (1973), and
Bate (1982), take issue and criticize him.
Crozier (1973) generalizes one of these traits as "rigidity" and
relates it to cultural meanings as following;
■[A]n organization becomes bureaucratic (in the 
pejorative sense of the woaod) when it becomes 
too rigid to correct its behavior by learning 
from its errors. But why does it become too 
rigid? If the consequences of rigidity and its 
mechanisms are similar, its latent functions 
seem quite different. Even if one takes into 
account different idiosyncracies of different 
researchers, it seems clear that bureaucratic 
dysfunctions have different origins and carry 
different meanings within the American and the 
French environments."(p.221)
The general fear of "face-to-face relationships" is also
observed by Crozier in French organization, which he relates to
French culture:
"Face-to-face dependence relationships are 
difficult to bear in the French cultural 
setting because Frenchmen have a very absolutist 
conception of authority. While they cannot bear 
omnipotent autliority, they feel it is indiq)ensible 
if any kind of cooperative activity is to succeed.
(1973, p.227)
He makes links between bureaucratic patterns of French 
organizations and the nature of major established institutions of 
French society, since he found similar bureaucratic patterns within 
th e  educational system, labour movement, and political and national 
administrative systiems.
Crozier (1973) tries to show "how differences in models of 
organizational behaviour help to clarify the latent functi.on of
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apparently dysfunctional activities" (p.227). His thesis of a
bureaucratic model is that there are cultural differences among
countries in the dysfunctional aspect of bureaucracies. He suggests
that comparing the mechanisms of social control and the specific
kinds of dysfunctions emerging from the functioning of formal
organizations in different cultural contexts is an effective means in
the sociological analysis of national values and cultural patterns.
Crozier's work, as Mouzells (1975) remarks, is an important step
in the analysis of power and conflict in organizations. Crozier
shows how important to the study of bureaucratic structure and change
the study of power relations between groups and the wider cultural
and historical context within which such relations are articulated.
He states that:
"Power relationships develop necessarily from the 
differential %mys in which individuals can master 
the different sources of uncertainty relevant for 
their collective action. The structure of an 
organizational system (formal and informal) can 
be viewed not only as an institutional an^#er to 
handle these power relationships, but also as the 
rules of the game members have to play. With the 
limit of the game, the players* strategies are 
rational; but the game itself is a man-made 
construct which is heavily dependent on the 
cultural capacities and aptitudes of the people 
concerned."(1973, fp.219-220)
Crozier's model is in contrast to the universalistic models 
which link attitudes and beliefs to organizational structure and 
patterns of action, such as those of Merton, Selznick, Gouldner, Blau 
and others. Crozier states that his experience within French 
organizations has convinced him that organizational structure and 
patterns of action are still to a large extent culture-bound. In 
fact Crozier seriously challenged the theory of Merton (1940) about 
the impact of the bureaucratic structure on the individual 
personality.
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In fact Crozier's work is a very valuable contribution in 
relating cultural patterns to organizational behaviour, and his model 
of bureaucratic organizational behaviour gives us an excellent 
picture of bureaucratic structures in France. Also he gives a 
valuable thesis of cultural differences among countries in the 
dysfunctional aspects of bureaucracies. But one could take issues 
and argue with him on some aspects of his work:
1. What he claims as uniquely French traits such as 
unemotionality, subordination, isolationism, rigidity and concern for 
hierarchical differentiation by status and privilege, and a 
predominance of formality over informality could be totally or partly 
found (to varying degrees) in other organizations in different 
countries. In fact it has already been found in English 
organizations (Bate 1982), Iran (Tayeb 1981) and Saudi Arabia (Basi 
1973 ). This does not suggest that there is no relation between 
culture in wider society and such traits in organizations, but rather 
the cpposite, as Tayeb (1981) has demonstrated in the case of Iran. 
Thus such traits are culturally bound, but they are not uniquely 
French and can be found in varying degrees within many other 
organizations in different countries. This will occur where those 
cultural components have similar dimensions to those which in French 
culture, stand behind the existence of such traits within 
organizations, and where socio-historical realities and socialization 
process have similar implications to that of French culture. Thus 
the latent functions or meanings of those dysfunctional aspects of 
bureaucracy may be similar to and quite likely different from those 
found by Crozier in France.
2. Patterns of organizational structure and behaviour within 
organizations in any country are not the result of the impact of
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culture on organization only (Crozier 1964), or the result of the
impact of bureaucratic structure on individuals' personalities
(Merton 1940; Blau and Soott 1962) but they are the consequence of
both interacting together rather than a single, direct cause and
effect. So the dysfunctional aspects of bureaucracies are the result
of continuous interaction between culture and its value-orien tat ions
in wider society and the formal bureaucracy through different
historical periods. This is at least the case of many developing
countries, such as Iraq, where modern bureaucratic organizations were
set up by foreign colonial rulers during their occupation of those
countries, e.g. the British occupation of Iraq.
In fact this view of looking at the linkage between individuals
and their cultural value-system and organization is emphasized by
Silverman (1970) who states:
"[It] is not to say that the attachment of people
to an organization is given for all time by the
initial orientations which they bring from their 
experience of the social world. Tha involvement 
of the actors is also clearly influenced by 
their experience of the organization Itself, in 
particular the way in vhich it may invalidate prior 
expectations and generate new ones .... Attachments 
to an organization thus reflect the meanings which 
those concerned bring in from the wider society 
[and] the finite provinces of meaning specific to 
the organization."(pp. 183-184)
3. Crozier, when he gives 'culture' the central place in his 
analysis, ignores the contingency or contextual variables such as 
technology, size, age, tasks, environment, ...etc. It is true that 
the contigency approach has been found only partially succesful in 
accounting for the nature of organizational structure and behaviour 
(Child 1981). But also the influence of national or regional culture 
has not yet accounted for all variations in organizational behaviour 
by itself (Tayeb 1981). In my view, the dominant pattern of value 
orientation and consequently the dominant pattern of behaviour and
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Structure that can be recognized in the organizations of one country, 
will exist in small or large organizations, new or old, with high or 
low technology, but with degrees of variation according to those 
contextual variables. At the level of different cultures the 
relationship between contextual and structural variables, as Child 
(1981) states, will be similar.
4. The bureaucratic dysfunctional traits of organizational 
behaviour which Crozier claims are well-established French cultural 
traits, construct the doninant level of French organizational
culture, as it would do so in other organizations in different 
countries. But the universal or dominant pattern of organizational 
culture would vary (a) with different organizations belonging to one 
country (as Bate found in England 1982), (b) with different
organizational levels within one organization; and (c) with different 
individuals in one organizational level, as the researcher observed 
in Iraqi organizations. Once again we are in the realm of the 
'Universal but variable* theory of culture.
F. Individual Variation in the Dominant Conceptual Structure
Although individuals belonging to any given group would hold a 
general or dominant conceptual structure in ccmrnon, it is also at
this dominant level that they hold a degree of variation. At the
level of superior-subordinate relationship within organizations 
belonging to one national culture, writers such as Stewart (1970) not 
only pointed out the ' dominant but variable ' thesis of culture 
(Kluckhohn 1964), but also to some effecting factors that could be 
behind individuals' variations in the general or dominant conceptual 
structure of such relationships. She states that national culture;
"... sets the general expectations that people have
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of the relationships between superiors and 
subordinates: within this there can be variations 
caused by the traditions that have grown up In the 
organization, the nature of the formal organization 
and the personalities of the individuals."(p.76)
In studying the affecting factors that could be behind the
middle managers variation in the dominant pattern of orientation and
behaviour toward top management in Iraq, two sets of factors have
been put forward; 'Individual difference factors' and 'organizational
factors'.
1 - Individual Difference Factors
The cultural differences between groups belonging to one given 
nation - such as those based on age, regions, families, occupations, 
social classes, ...etc, - have received little recognition in the 
literature. From the researcher's previous work observation and the 
material found in seme relevant studies, the following individuality 
factors are assumed to affect middle managers behaviour toward top 
management in Iraq. In fact the affect, or rather the correlation 
between a number of these individuality factors, and organizational 
attitudes and behaviour, have been recognized and studied at various 
levels by writers such as Stogdill (1965), Cummings et al (1971), 
Nord (1976 a) and Lee (1981), including a very few studies conducted 
in the Arab world, such as those of Berger (1957) in Egypt and Ali 
(1977) and Al-Atiyyah (1977) in Iraq,
a. Age
This factor has been dealt with in the literature from different 
perspectives. While in some studies the main concern is with 'age' 
as 'maturation ' or its physical and psychological effects (see 
Levinson 1969; Kagon and Moss 1962; Whohlwill 1970) other studies are 
concerned with 'age' in cultural or socializational terms. Along
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this latter line, we find Nord (1976 a) studying age in terms of the 
"generation gap"; Berger (1957) in terms of "the length of being 
exposed to Western culture"; Vboom and Pahl (1971) in terms of 
"developmental and socio-cultural mechanisms"; Ali (1977) in terms of 
its effect in modifying the relationship between socialization (urban 
versus rural) and bureaucratic behaviour in Iraq.
Kagon and Moss (1962) have indicated how ageing is correlated 
with systematic shifts in levels of dominance, agressiveness, 
conformity and independence. One distinction between older and 
younger employees is that the older ones tend to have a more 
conservative attitude (Tannenbaum et al 1977; Hofstede 1980) as older 
people usually inhibit change in social life, while younger pecple 
tend to encourage innovation, scientific discovery, and economic, 
social and political development. In all the countries they 
surveyed, Tannenbaum et al (1977) found that the way older persons 
viewed plant leadership "is consistent with the notion that older 
persons are more conservative than younger persons, even if older 
persons earn the same salary and are at the same level as younger 
associates" (pp. 140-141 ). Hofstede (1980) finds that a preference 
for an autocratic or persuasive boss increases with age, which points 
to a relationship between age and conservatism. He also pointed to 
the effect of ageing in decreasing interest in 'challenge'. So older 
people, as other studies have suggested, tend to do what is required 
of them and be more conformist (Schein 1968; Al-Rubaie 1983). One of 
the studies surveyed by Melzer (1981) shows that older more than 
younger employees tend to identify with management and their 
policies. One of the suggested reasons for older people being more 
conformist is that they are likely to be anchored in 'security', that 
is, they are willing to maintain job security, a decent income and a
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good retirement pension (Schein 1968). Younger employees are said to 
be less afraid of economic insecurity than older employees (Strauss 
1974). But in contrast to the above view Hampton et al (1978) 
suggest that those who are aged 30-45 become anxious and receptive to 
motivation through fear because it is unlikely that they can move to 
new positions with equivalent pay, and bacause usually their life 
style depends on substantial income. But those who are over 45 
probably have accumulated enough capital to be able to work elsewhere 
for less money. The findings of Hofstede (1980) as well as of some 
other studies surveyed by him, indicate that age very strongly 
effects the increasing importance of security and decreasing 
importance of developing abilities and advancement.
The literature also suggest a distinction between older and 
young employees on issues such as 'initiative*, risk-taking, 
participation, freedom and equality. Handy (1976) states one of the 
"trait theory" arguments, which says that initiative or the capacity 
to perceive a r̂ ed for action and the urge to do it appears to 
correlate quite well with age; it drops after 40. Vrocm and Pahl 
(1971) indicate a significant negative relationship between age and 
both risk-taking and the value placed upon risk. They show that 
developmental and socio-cultural mechanisms may underlie such 
relationships. Across countries, Hofstede (1980) has found that 
preference for a particip>ative manager related partly to the 
respondent's age; 37 percent of those between 25 and 30 chose a 
participative manager, but only 25 percent of those between 40 and 50 
chose a participative manager. Hampton et al (1978) remark that 
'age' seems to weaken the ability to work jointly with others ; 
younger managers appear to be more effective in utilizing groups for 
decision-making than older managers. This, they state, could be
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because the younger managers come through an educational system that 
places greater emphasis on group activity, or they are less sensitive 
to status, more flexible and have a greater willingness to express 
opinions. Such a notion about older managers also appears in 
O"Boole's statement "that observation has taught us that 50-year old 
authoritarian managers never become open and democratic" (p.8). 
Also, in the same direction, Rokeach (1973) in the U.S.A. and Feather 
(1977) in Australia (cited in Hofstede 1980) have found that in both 
countries 'freedom' and 'equality' appeal less to older than to 
younger people. But quite in contrast with the above view, Berger 
(1957) in his study of Egyptian bureaucracy, has given a different 
notion of older managers. By conceiving that bureaucratic rules 
permit great use of 'discretion power', which for him is one of the 
characteristics of Western bureaucracy, he remarks that older 
respondents in his study indicated a high bureaucratic orientation in 
terms of being willing to use greater personal iniative. To take 
account of such findings, one should consider the following
1. Berger's study, as well as some others such as that of Ali
(1977) on Iraqi bureaucracy, do not allow us to distinguish betwen 
the effect of age as 'maturation' and the effect of 'seniority' or 
the length of service. Berger's older respondents have had, as he 
stated, more years of service in the government than the younger ones 
and most of them hold positions in the top grades. As he found that 
'age' and 'grade' tend to exert influence in the same direction and 
that bureaucratic orientation is more a characteristic of older 
respondents and those in the higher grades, such findings could be 
the effect of 'seniority' or the length of service, rather than the 
effect of 'maturation'.
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2. When Berger dealt with each one of the three components that 
constituted his 'bureaucratic orientation scale' separately, rather 
than with the total scale, he found that in the first component; 
"rationality and efficiency", the older respondents scored higher 
than the younger ones. On the second; "hierarchy", the reverse 
result was obtained, and on the third component; "discretion and 
initiative", the evidence was inconclusive.
For some writers, the dependence, conformity and psychological 
withdrawal that characterizes the middle manager's lot are connected 
with middle-age or mid-career crises (Kay 1974 b). While many 
theories appear about the causes of such mid-career problems, 
Levinson (1969) suggests that it is an effect of age. In fact, the 
middle manager's crisis, as Hunt (1982) argues, is far more than just 
an age effect, but no doubt 'age' itself effects the degree of the 
middle manager's disillusionment.
b. Family background and childhood socialization experienoes 
In the field of socialization, sociologists and psychoanalysts 
through various viewpoints have all recognized the key role of the 
family in childhod socialization. While sociologists are concerned 
with the family as the first and the foremost agent of socialization, 
psycho, a malysts focus on its early child-rearing activities through 
which they believe the major outlines of individual personality are 
crystalized. Anthropologists engaged with studying 'culture' and 
'personality' were among those who were most highly influenced by 
psychoanalytic ideas, particulary Freudian theory. Thus, we find 
that students of "basic personality" and "national character" 
(Kardiner 1939; Erikson 1950; Frcrm 1949) have considered the 
culturally standardized child-rearing practices within the family 
during the child's first five or six years of life as the primary and
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the most crucial influences in personality structuration. They 
follow a sequential causal chain to link between early childhood 
experience and adult personality. This causal chain has received 
many criticisms, not only because it designated only one modal 
personality pattern for any given group (which seems hardly 
justified) but also for its many shortcomings (see Inkeles and 
Levinson 1969; Schaffer 1980).
In fact, the belief that early experience, particularly the 
physical-care experiences such as toilet training, orality, feeding 
and weaning, etc., have such a great impact in determining adult 
behaviour is far from understanding socialization as a curtmulative 
life-long process through which the notion of oneself becomes 
enhanced. Early learning experience "will bring about long-term 
effects only if it is repeatedly reinforced throughout subsequent 
childhood" (Schaffer 1980, p. 89, in reference to Clarke 1968). Also 
the child, during his socialization process, is not passive but 
rather, active; "his behaviour is organized, not 'absent*, and even 
to the earliest social interactions he brings certain characteristics 
which will affect the behaviour of other people towards him" 
(Schaffer 1980). As we are interested in the long term effects of 
childhood experience, we need to go back to the basic cultural 
argument which was presented by HOfstede (1980). It says that 
societal norms in any given society construct the social 
institutions, such as the ' family ' and 'school', in particular 
patterns and ways of functioning in harmony with the context of these 
norms. In these institutions the individual, during his 
socialization process, learns "the ways of a given society or social 
group well enough so that he can function within it" (Elkin 1960, 
p.4). The family provides the individual with his primary learning
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and his first social training in appropriate responses to his
societal requirements. In these basic learning and training
activities, the family builds up and reinforces the societal norms or
the dominant conceptual structure on which its setting and way of
functioning have been based. Such cultural conceptual structures
will continue to be built up and reinforced by other institutions
such as the 'school '. Recognizing the influence of childhood
experience, at the same time as conceiving 'socialization' as a
continuous dynamic process, is clear in the following statement by
White (1977);
"(in) childhood, patterns of attitudes cuxi action 
are established which suit the need for people to
interact meaningfully and harmoniously. Later in
life after some view of •himself* has become well 
-established, mechanisms of socialization can 
still operate to dispose the Individual to behave 
in appropriate ways, and to help him either to 
select the right attitudes and actions from his 
mental bank, or to learn new appropriate responses."
(p. 16)
As has been argued before, individuals who belong to one 
national culture or one given group have not experienced exectly the 
same familial socialization through the same training and atmosphere, 
especially since such socialization takes place within predominately 
informal and personal social relationships. Socializing the child is 
not constructed in an abstract form or by a specific mechanism, but 
rather by the socialization agents (e.g. the parents) who are not 
necessarily working in harmony and who vary in their personalities, 
ways of thinking, and interpretations of their societal norms. so 
family structure and its ways of child-rearing and the degree and 
quality of constructing and reinforcing the dominant conceptual 
structure are to a great extent reflections of the personalities and 
characteristic behaviours of the parents and their own notion of 
culture, as well as their own childhood and adult experiences. This
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oould be partly behind the variation in child socialization between
families belonging to one culture or group. In fact, some writers
have tried to assess such national internal variation in child-
rearing behaviour in terns of "social classes" (Kohn 1962-1963, 1969;
White 1977) or in terms of "father's occupation" (Aberle and Naegele
1952; Miller and Swanson 1960).
Familial factors, such as the parents' notion of culture, and
their personality characteristics and experiences, are not the only
influences behind the variation in child socialization but there are
also many extrafamilial influences, such as ecological, economic and
social-structural factors. These extrafamilial factors not only
exert a significant influence on family patterning and affect the
socialization experience through the mediation of the family, but
also enter this experience in more direct ways (Inkeles and Levinson
1969). Child-rearing, as Karrby (1971) finds, reflects the social
and cultural conditions in which the family lives;
■parents who live and work under closely controlled 
social conditions may teach their children 
authoritarian ways of social interaction. Parents 
who live under conditions in which they are allowed 
to express themselves freely,to take re^xxisibility 
and to decide for themselves, may teach their 
children more democratic and responsible ways of 
interacting."(p. 169)
In order to understand the variation of this study's adults' 
(i.e. middle managers) orientation and behaviour in relation to 
authority within the organization in terms of their individual 
differences, the researcher will study a set of extrafamilial and 
familial factors. These factors interact together to shape these 
adults' social background and their childhood experiences.
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(1) Geoqrc^ical area of living (i.e.regional subcultural 
differences)
In any country, one may find that different geographical 
locations have different subcultures and individuals in their outlook 
and actions reflect their regional subcultural value-orientations. 
The prevailing way of recognizing these regional cultural 
differences, which are used by many writers such as Nord (1976 a), is 
in terms of rural versus urban backgrounds, which have been linked to 
important consequences for the type of orientation and behaviour of 
organizational members. Ecological and economic differences between 
rural and urban regions construct the dimension through which many 
writers try to study the social izational differences between these 
two types of societies. Many studies try to investigate the 
ecological and economic systems in different types of societies 
(e.g.hunting, agricultural, modem industrial and urbanized society) 
and their effects on the individual's degree of dependence-versus- 
autonomy and self-reliance. Barry and his associates (1973) show 
that in societies with "low food-accumulating (mainly hunting and 
gathering) societies" adults are socialized to be individualistic, 
assertive and self-reliant. By parallel reasoning, they said that 
adults in "high food accumulating (e.g. pastoral and agricultural) 
societies" are socialized to be compliant, conscientious and 
conservative. In comparing agricultural with modem urban society. 
Marsh (1978) by referring to many relative studies, argues that 
agricultural societies, because of their environment's requirements, 
are characterized by social tightness, harsh child-rearing practices, 
and an emphasis on compliance. Thus, such societies tend to exercise 
a cognitive style marked by dependency. In contrast, a modem 
industrial urban environment requires the individual to be more
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independent (Gruenfeld and MacEachron 1975, cited in Marsh 1978).
Kohn (1969) found that self-direction is somewhat more highly valued
by fathers who grew up in urban places, and conformity is more highly
valued by those who spent their childhoods in non-urban places,
whether on a farm or in a village or small town. Swope (1970)
provides quite a different line of thinking about rural versus urban
socialization. In discussing the impact of the geographical
background on the American executive's style, outlook and actions, he
states that the executive whose background is rural may be a little
ingenuous, less sophisticated, but more open, more ready to take on
responsibilities, and more self-reliant than the one with the urban
background. This is because, he says:
"Urban upbringing is a more regulated one. Social, 
athletic, and other activities are more organized, 
more directed than in rural areas. Instead of 
creatively working out their own activities, 
children are used to having these scheduled for 
them; they come to expect this to be dene. Such a 
life, obviously, tends to make the individual more 
d^iendent on others to provide many things for him.
........ (p.l23). A rural childhood is quite
different in many ways from its urban counterpart.
The family itself is more self-contained.......The
rural upbringing may include participation in the 
work activities of the family farm if there is one.
As a result, children leam at an earlier age to 
organize and carry out more adult chores of manual 
type than urbanites do. They come to expect that 
w w k  duties will be assigned to them. They are 
depended upon and must develop some self-reliance."
(p.124)
Ali (1977) in his study about rural versus urban socialization 
(which did not look at the peculiarity of Iraqi regional subcultural 
settings) followed the first direction of Western writers in arguing 
that rural socialization results in more compliance and dependency. 
But it also results in less iniative and self-autonomy than urban 
socialization. For him this is because of the rural authoritarian 
child socialization practices on the one hand, and on the other, the
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exposure of urban society to Western modernity and industrial 
technology which has led to the improv^ent of urban education, 
health care, communications, etc. In order to justify such a view in 
the case of Iraq, one needs to examine the implications more deeply, 
in the light of the peculiarity of Iraqi culture (which will be done 
later).
(2) Father's occupation
The father's occupation not only influences the familial 
socialization in terms of its determination of the family socio- 
econcmic status, but also in terms of the mode of child-rearing and 
parent-child relationship. Hall (1969) states that the occupation of 
the father or the family's man has an important impact on the family 
in that his position in the occupational system is apparently related 
to his position in family relationships. The more the family's man 
earns and the higher his occupational status is, the more is his 
powsr within the family. Aberle and Naegele (1952) argue that the 
father's occupation strongly influences his long-range expectations 
and evaluation of his child's behaviour at various age levels. It 
also enters intimately into the father's relationship with his child 
(particularly the son). While the father attempts to leave the 
office behind him, at home "he represents the occupational world to 
his family" (p. 370), and evaluates his children's behaviour in terms 
of his occupational role. Miller and Swanson (1960) found massive 
differences in child-rearing methods between parents, depending on 
whether the father's type of occupation was classified as 
"entrepreneurial" or "bureaucratic" (i.e. an organizational 
occupation). Kohn (1962-1963, 1969) found a congruency between 
occupational requirements and parental values which have important 
consequences for their relationships with their children and the type
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of values they display to them. He states that men "who work under 
occupational conditions that facilitate the exercise of self- 
direction are likely to value self-direction for their children; men 
who work under occupational conditions that inhibit or preclude the 
exercise of self-direction are likely to value conformity" (1969, 
p.151). He argues that class differences in parent-child 
relationships are a product of differences in parental values which 
in their turn stem particularly from occupational differences. While 
middle-class occupations, he says, require a greater degree of self- 
direction and initiative, the working conditions of working class 
occupations, in large measure, stress conformity - in terms of 
obeying authority - to supervisors and to explicit rules set down by 
someone in authority, as well as valuing respect for and 
subordination to authority. So "working-class parents want their 
children to conform to external authority because the parents 
themselves are willing to accord respect to authority, in return for 
security and respectability" (1962-1963, p.477). Consequently, 
working-class parents put greater stress on obedience to parental 
comments and respect for grown-ups than do middle-class parents who 
put their emphasis on self-direction and reliance. Hulin and 
Triandis (1981) support the same direction of thought by arguing that 
fathers with bureaucratic occupations work in large, highly 
differentiated organizations where progress depends on being a good 
organizational person and on specialization. Entrepreneurial fathers 
work in snail organizations with little division of labour, where 
progress depends on risk-taking. Thus parents with bureaucratic 
occupations teach their children to conform, and to help others, 
while entrepreneurial parents socialize their children to take risks 
and to be enterprising in business.
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(3) Parental levels of education
Parental levels of education are one of the familial factors 
that contribute significantly to the differences in parental values 
(Kohn 1969) and to socialization practices. Karrby (1971) found that 
better educated parents are significantly less controlling, more 
lenient and have a more nurturant attitude than parents with less 
education. She pointed out that "parents who are better educated are 
more able to reason with their children about social and moral 
behaviour, thus giving them more opportunities to judge their own 
actions and intentions than children who have less verbal interaction 
with their parents" (p.169). Kohn (1969), in his study of "class and 
conformity" shows that less-educated parents hold more "authoritarian 
conservatism" (p. 132) than parents of higher education, so they put 
higher value on children's conformity to authority rather than on 
self-direction. Ife remarks that it is not only the educational 
status of the father that affects parental values toward children, 
but the mother's own educational attainments also matter; the more 
educated mothers are more likely to value self-control and self- 
direction, and the less-educated are more likely to value obedience, 
also, Karrby (1971) pointed out that mothers who had completed 
secondary school had significantly less controlling, more lenient and 
more nurturant attitudes than mothers with elementary education.
(4) Childhood experiences during family socialization
If societal norms in any given society construct the family 
pattern and its ways of functioning in harmony with their context, so 
it is logical to find a culturally standardized child-socialization 
ideology that parents follow consciously and more often unconsciously 
in raising their children. But culture only sets up the framework of 
the required family structure and way of functioning, and within this
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framework one finds a wide variation depending on many familial and 
extrafamilial factors. Although national culture exercises a very 
powerful constraint upon family socialization, particularly in 
traditional societies, ways of family functioning also reflect what 
can be called 'home culture' or, rather, 'subculture', which is a 
combination of national culture and the peculiar setting of the 
family as an institution and all the influencing familial and 
extrafamilial factors. Despite all the similarities, each family can 
be viewed as a distinct social unit that has its own version of right 
and proper orientations and behaviours, and values things not exactly 
valued by other families and sanctions behaviours not necessarily 
given the same view by other families. In fact, in studying internal 
national variations, 'home culture' provides an important factor, 
particularly in societies that lack the Western type of 'class 
culture' phenomenon, as is the case in Arabic societies. The 
individual does not receive his 'home culture' in an abstract form 
but through his actual experiences. He does not only acquire it 
through conscious learning, but, more, through his interaction and 
association with parents and other members of the family, and by 
observing and imitating adult behaviour connected with their roles, 
so, if through our experiences we become "mentally programmed" to 
interpret new experiences in certain ways (Hofstede 1980), our 
childhood experiences in our home cultures would partly condition our 
way of thinking and influence the meanings we hold for the world 
around us today.
One of the basic cultural arguments is that the power-distance 
norm spills over from one sphere of life into others and thus people 
can be expected to carry over values and norms from their childhood 
experiences (Hofstede 1980). Thus, parent-child authority
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relationships develop attitudes and expectations about a person's 
future interaction with authority figures in work organizations. 
This argument is supported by many studies which investigate the 
linkage between patterns of authority relationship within work 
organizations (i.e. superior-subordinate relationship) and that of 
parent-child relationships (Abegglen 1958; McClelland 1969; levinson 
1968; Kakar 1971; Tayeb 1981). Levinson (1968) for example, as 
quoted by Nord (1976 a), from a psychoanalytical perspective, has 
suggested that the boss-subordinate relationship bears resemblance to 
the more fundamental relationship of parent-child. He states that in 
England, where the mother plays a more important role in child 
socialization, we find management practices are "feminine", but in 
Germany, the authoritarian and directive management practices 
parallel the German's child-rearing practices, where the father, who 
is the primary source of socialization, is viewed as being 
authoritative and directive. In the United States, despite that fact 
that one can distinguish many cultures rather than one identical 
culture, Levinson claims that the socialization practices are highly 
child-centred, where the child enjoys a great amount of freedom, and 
parents often play somewhat the role of ' servant ' to the child and 
help him to be independent. This American parental relationship, he 
says, characterizes people's views and attitudes towards government 
in general, which is expected to help the people help themselves. 
Also in work organizations, the pattern of superior-subordinate 
relationship parallels the American parent-child relationship: in
these organizations, the value of the individual is stressed and 
executives are expected to help the individual grow.
McClelland (1969) found that factory workers' cooperation, 
obedience, and performance in a work unit depend upon the congruence
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between the authority patterns that they have experienced in the
family and school, and the pattern they found in work organizations,
Hofstede (1980) recognizes that in high PDI (i.e. Power Distance
Index) countries, parents put great value on children's obedience, as
is the case in Italy (Kohn 1969), while in low PDI countries, parents
put less value on children's obedience to authority.
Tayeb (1981) demonstrates how Iranian hierarchical family
structure and authoritarian child-rearing ideology and practices
participate in building up authoritarian attitudes in relation to
authority, which manifest themselves later in Iranian work
organizations. She describes Iranian family pattern and child
socialization as follows :
■[The] power structure of the family is hierarchical 
with a father at the top position who maintains 
order and descipline in the household. Parent-child 
relationship is the earthy model of God-man 
relationship. Here too, the authority relationship 
is that of powerful and powerless and the child's 
obedience is maintained through both love and 
punishment. Submission and re^)ect to the seniors 
are the roles which the children are expected to 
play in the family 'game', whereas the role of the 
elders is that of giving orders and making decisions 
and seeing to it that the decisions and orders cire 
carried out."(p. 13).
c. Educational background
(1) Level of formal education
The degree of Power-distance between two individuals in power 
relationships is said to be affected by the level of formal education 
(Hofstede 1976; 1977; 1980). Less-educated employees are likely to 
hold more ' authoritarian ' values than those with higher education 
(Crozier 1964). Also, Tannenbaum et al (1977) have found that 
employees with less education tend to be less challenging to 
superiors. The less educated the employee is, the more hesitant he 
will be to behave in ways that imply he understands more about the
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work than his superior does; "Having less education than his 
superior he may feel that he does not know enough to introduce 
improvements that his superior has not already though of ... "
(p. 154). Kay (1974) pointed to other effects of the levels of 
education in remarking that mid-life crises tend to occur more 
frequently among middle-managers with higher levels of education 
because they tend to have higher expectations. In fact, the 
influences of the level of formal education on the degree of power- 
distance seem to be highly dependent, as ffofstede (1980) notes, on 
the educational system in the society under study. He recognizes 
that although in higher PDI countries employees in managerial 
occupations tend to have more years of formal education than in low 
PDI countries, low PDI values occur only in highly educated 
occupations in low power-distance countries. Education, as Hofstede 
says, is not only a matter of numbers - numbers of years at school or 
numbers of students, it is very important what is taught and how, and 
what kind of socialization the school has provided the individual 
with. This last remark would require us to look at the nature of the 
educational system of the society under study.
(2) Nature of formal educational socialization
School, as a social institution, builds up and reinforces the 
customary role patterns and the collectively shared societal norms 
that lead to them. It has its vital role in teaching individuals 
their dominant cultural pattern. We can enter a country's 
schoolrooms, say Whyte and Braun (1966) to see "the culture pattern 
of tomorrow being shaped before our eyes"(p.53). In high PDI
countries, Hofstede (1980) states, where children are more dependent 
on parents, we find more frequently that students are dependent on 
teachers; "There is more rote learning and the asking of questions
78
by the student is seldom encouraged ; teachers are more often supposed 
to be omniscient, even if they do not like it" (p. 126). Lee (1981) 
finds that the educational primary socialization, in terms of the 
achievement versus discipline school of value - orientation to which 
the individuals concerned were subject, has its influence on the 
individual's adoption of subsequent work roles. The influence of the 
nature of the French educational system on the maintenance of large 
power-distance within French organizations has been recognized by 
Crozier (1964) also. In several developing countries, Whyte and Braun 
(1966) demonstrate how cultural patterns learned at school pose 
problems for industrialization in these societies. They recognize 
that the educational system in these countries display authoritarian 
patterns of teacher^xipil relationships, with submissive children and 
autocratic teachers. Also, this system lacks independence training; 
children were required to memorize the teacher's solutions to 
problems they had been set and passages assigned to them by him; 
they did not participate in class discussion, where everything was 
entirely in response to the teacher's initiative, also a risk-taking 
capacity was neither rewarded nor encouraged, and above all, the 
heroes in the school texts were not men who had contributed to the 
economic development of their country but instead, military men whose 
behaviour did not illustrate a model of achievement to long-range 
goals, but rather, only took a few minutes or even a few seconds to 
become heroes. Such socialization is not incompatible with the 
industrial growth and development requirements which these societies 
need. Tayeb (1981) demonstrated how the nature of the Iranian formal 
educational system contributes to the building of authoritarian 
collectively shared learned values that exist in society in general 
and manifest themselves clearly in work organizations. She states 
that in this educational system;
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"The teacher-pupil relationship is an authoritarian 
one which perpetuates the dcminant-sukmissive role 
pattern to which the child has already been eiqosed 
at home. loyalty to leaders and belief in good 
intentions of rulers and full obedienoe to them are 
reinforced through the contents of textbooks and 
other features of the educational system such as 
centralization of the system, selecting loyal 
teachers, and conducting special morning ceremonies.
The learning process is based on memorizing theories 
and facts as lectured by the teachers and written in 
the books rather than on experiments and trial and 
error. This has resulted in lack of training of the 
mind for logical and analytical thinking and hence 
docile acceptance of the views of the teacher.
Oonflict with and challenge to the superior (teacher 
in this case) are concepts alien to the Iranian in 
general. Pear of punishment and inexperience in 
active discussion and participation in classroans 
and blind obedience have contributed to a strong 
unwillingness to accept responsibility and to make 
significant decisions independently."(pp. 14-15)
d. Work experience
Work experience is also an important factor which contributes to 
the degree of power- distance between two actors. Knowledge, 
information and experience gained by an individual through handling 
work responsibilities during his service within work organizations 
all participate in determining what Hall (1972) terms; "the ease of 
replacement" (p.233). Thus one could assume that the longer the 
length of service of an actor, the greater his experience and 
capacity to handle the job will be, and consequently the lower the 
ease of replacement. In fact, work experience or the length of 
service reflects different stages in the organizational career 
process through which individuals and organizations are linked in 
different kinds of relationships over time. Schein (1971) 
distinguishes between two main stages of an individual's movement 
through an organization during his 'career'; first, "acculturation or 
adult socialization" (p.402) which normally occurs in the early 
periods of an individual's career. During this time, the individual 
leams the ropes, figures out how to make headway in the
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organization, how to get along, and how to work (Van Maanen 1976). 
At this stage, the organization engages intensively with the basic 
training and socializing of the individual so that he will acquire 
its norms, values and expected patterns of behaviour. At this stage 
of the individual's career, he lacks influence in the organization 
and thus tends to be more dependent or influenced by his 
organization. In other words, at this point the organization has its 
maximum influence on the individual. Thus the individual in his 
early stages or periods of service within the organization tends to 
be more concerned with exploring the organizational world around him 
and with proving himself. He must be accepted by others in the 
organization, particularly those who hold the authority or power to 
influence his organizational position or career. And hence only 
after handling the problem of establishing a somewhat stable 
situational identity can he turn to other matters such as 
achievement, challenge, and innovation (Van Maanen 1976). If we take 
the case of being a 'middle manager ', during the early years of 
holding his managerial position, the individual has to meet the 
organization's social tests and demonstrate his loyalty, particularly 
to those who run the organization. So, he is unlikely in this stage 
to be concerned with nonconformist behaviour or innovation; he is 
likely to be or to show a dependence on his superiors, especially if 
he was selected by them to be a middle manager from the bottom 
organizational rank.
Acculturation or adult socialization, indicates Schein (1971), 
is followed by the second basic stage which is called "innovation" 
(p.402). If the individual in the former stage is influenced, in 
this stage he influences (innovates). In this innovation stage, the 
individual has already gained a "mutual acceptance" (Schein 1978)
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which includes "the various processes of formally and informally 
granting full membership to the new employee through initiation 
rites, the conferring of special status or privileges, more 
challenging and important job assignments, and the working out of a 
viable psychological contract" (p.82). The individual here has his 
maximum influence on the organization as he develops its dependence 
on him. But if we agree that managerial life is orientated toward 
what is to be, rather than what is and thus one of the big 
expectations of the middle manager is that middle management is the 
training ground for senior and top management, then this stage of 
'innovation* is likely to be a short one in the middle manager's 
career. This is because when the middle manager comes to realize his 
failure to move a little higher up the ladder and that the only job 
he is considered to be qualified for is his current one, then as Kay 
(1974 a) says, he will withdraw physically or, more likely, 
psychologically, or tend to stagnate and become dependent and 
conformist. These are known as the characteristics of middle manager 
mid-career crises.
2 - Organizational Factors
The research puts forward the following set of organizational 
factors that are assumed to affect middle managers orientation and 
behaviour toward top management and would explain part of their 
variation. In fact, while one can find a voluminous body of 
literature studying many of these organizational factors, there is 
very little and, at that, indirect evidence regarding the influence 
of these factors in organizational socialization and the consequent 
effects on employees' orientations and behaviours, particularly in 
relation to authority.
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a. Nature of the relationship between top and middle managers
Trtie nature of managers' relationships with their bosses are 
important factors influencing them at work. Much of the vertical 
power relationships between upper and lower participants in 
organizations, as Hall (1982) remarks, involve the way in which a 
superior interacts with his subordinates. Although, particularly in 
a rigidly bureaucratic hierarchical structure, power relationships 
are usually specified in advance, such relationships can develop as 
the nature of the relationship itself develops. Such development in 
the nature of the relationship may occur not only because of the
personalities and background of the lower participants or because 
they may develop some bases of power that allow them to extend power 
or influence over those further up the organizational hierarchy but, 
more, because of the managing style or personality characteristes of 
the person in the upper position. Organizational rules and norms
draw the framework of the expected superior-subordinate relationship, 
but within this framework different individuals in upper and lower
organizational positions may develop and experience various types of
superior-subordinate relationships. These types would present us 
with various modes or patterns of ' leader socialization* that 
different formal leaders could utilize in work organizations. In 
order to find out the likely effects of the nature of top-middle 
managers relationship on middle managers* orientation and behaviour, 
we will study this relationship from two aspects, i.e. the top 
manager's leadership behaviour and the degree of middle manager's 
participation in decision-making. These two aspects are assumed to 
exert their influences by increasing or decreasing the degree of 
power-distance between top and middle managers and, consequenly, 
affecting middle manager's orientation and behaviour in relation to 
authority (i.e. top management).
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(1) Tbp managers' leadership behaviour in relation to middle 
managers
ïhe study of leaders* behaviour has resulted in an abundance of 
literature which consists of a number of theories and models seeking 
to most clearly identify and best explain the presumably powerful 
effects of leader behaviour upon the satisfaction, attitudes and 
performance of hierarchical subordinates. Through these theories and 
models, 'leadership* may appear to a student in organizational 
behaviour as a highly complex and confused phenomenon. A part of 
this confusing and rather surprising fact in the development of 
leadership theory is that, as Hall (1982) notes, most studies have 
been concerned with lower or first-line leadership. That is, with 
"little evidence regarding the effect that top leaders have on 
organizations, simply because there has been very little research on 
top organizational leadership. Organization researchers have not 
gotten access to top business and government leaders" (Hall 1982, 
p. 163). So most leadership studies simply ignored the fact that the 
"supervisor" to whom they usually refer - implicitly and explicitly - 
when they talk about 'leaders' is a 'man-in-the-middle' vto lacks any 
real power. Although he is in a leadership position, in reality he 
is a powerless leader and, being a 'leader' or merely a 'follower' is 
highly contingent upon the degree that top leaders allow him to share 
power and dec is ion-making with them. Leadership at the top of the 
organization is vastly different from that at the first-line 
supervisory level. The top is different, says Kan ter and Stein 
(1979), in a variety of ways; "One of these is that the top of an 
organization is much more personalized than the supposedly rational 
and impersonal bureaucracy below. The leader's self, his or her 
character, is more critical and viewed more critically" (p. 12). Top
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management, Hall (1982) emphasizes, has the greatest impact on the 
organization, and these top level leaders have the potential for real 
effects on the behaviour and attitudes of subordinates, even for the 
high-level administrators. Such impact is even greater in 
organizations such as those of Iraq where the 'person' at the top is 
expected to have a great deal to do with what goes on in the 
organization. The personality of the top manager or the head in 
these organizations is superimposed on the organization which tends 
to follow his personal tendencies and to adapt itself to his 
characteristics and leadership style. The effects of tcp level 
leaders on the orientations and behaviours of those at the middle 
management level would be more than any other organizational levels. 
This is so because middle manager's peculiar dilenmas have led him to 
be over-dependent on those in a position to overrule (i.e. tcç> 
management) and highly concerned about their judgements and 
relationship with them. Stogdill (1974), for example, cites Browers 
and Seashore's (1966) findings in that the pattern of leader 
behaviour exhibited by top managers was reflected in similar 
behaviour in subordinate managers. Also he reports that Fleishman ^  
cd (1955) has found that the leadership behaviour of a subordinate 
manager is more conditioned by the behaviour of those in top 
management than by the training they received.
Researchers in leadership who are concerned with studying the 
effects of the actual behaviour of leaders on followers' attitudes 
and behaviour have categorized leaders according to their ways or 
styles of leading. One most common classification which can be found 
in every major research prograimie on leadership is based on the 
extent to which a 'manager' is concerned with people or 'employees' 
he leads, or with production or 'tasks'. One of the crucial issues
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in leadership theory, says Schein (1980), is "whether task concern 
and people concern are two ends of a single continuum or two 
independent dimensions such that one could be high or low on 
both."(p.l31)
In fact it seems that we need to distinguish between the 
leader's orientation (i.e. toward task or people) and his approach in 
dealing with both areas. In work organization and particularly at 
top levels it is very important for effective leaders to be highly 
concerned with both 'task' and 'people'. But when the situation 
requires the leader to be more concerned with getting results or 
output, this does not necessarily mean that he will or should be 
directive and not considerate towards his subordinates. But, rather 
he may, and should if he wants, be an effective leader, following a 
supportive approach of leadership which would serve both his concerns 
with task and people. Thus, getting results could be accomplished 
tdirough such an approach, which means the leader builds a shared 
trust and understanding rather than imposing tight control on every 
step, assisting their growth and development and supporting and 
training them, being interested enough to listen to their work and 
non-work problems,... etc. When a manager has to be more concerned 
with work or output, by following a supportive approach to leadership 
he would allow each of his individual subordinates to feel that he 
was being treated as a 'person' and not just another 'cog in the 
wheel'. And such a feeling would motivate subordinates to support 
and assist their leader in accomplishing the task required. In fact 
many researchers on leadership, notably Likert (1967), have reported 
that supportive leadership is more effective in achieving high 
productivity and morale, and that effective managers usually are task 
and people orientated. Thus, in studying leadership behaviour, the
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central issue is not whether the manager is task-orientated or 
people-orientated, but the approach that the manager takes in dealing 
with both areas. And it may be more realistic to talk about people- 
and-task-orientated situations than about people-and-task-orientated 
managers.
In fact the above line of thought can be found in McClelland's 
(1970) concept of "the two faces of power" (pp.29-47) which is 
particularly valuable in studying leadership in vertical power 
relationships in organizations. McClelland and Burnham (1980) 
emphasize that power is essential to good management, as it was found 
that the better and most effective managers were high in 'power 
motivation '. But power has two faces, i.e. "socialized" and 
"personal" which present two fundamentally different approaches of 
leadership, as Yukl (1981) has described:
First - A supportive approach: - which reflects the 'socialized' 
face of power. This approach seeks to build the skills and self- 
confidence of subordinates rather than making them weaker. A 
socialized manager is more ' institution-minded ' in terms of 
encouraging subordinates to be loyal to the organization and its 
ideals rather than to himself. He exercises power in a cautious and 
responsible manner and creates an effective work climate where 
subordinates feel that they have more responsibility. Also, 
"authority is delegated to a considerable extent, information is 
shared openly, and participation in decision-making is encouraged". 
(Yukl 1981). The manager who follows such an approach to leadership, 
says McClelland and Burnham (1980), also "creates high morale because 
he produces the greatest sense of organizational clarity and team 
spirit" (p.289).
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Second - An autocratic or authoritarian approach:- which
reflects the "personal" face of power. Managers motivated by this
type of power seek to dominate and subjugate subordinates by making
them feel powerless and keeping them dependent. Through this
approach to leadership, Yukl (1981) states that:
"Rewards and punishments are used to manipulate 
and oontrol subordinates. Authority is used as 
an excuse to oomnand obedience by subordinates 
and it is highly centralized in the leader, with 
little delegation or participation. Bcpert power 
is maximised by skillful impression management 
designed to maintain an image of infallibility, 
as well as by preventing subordinates from 
gaining access to vitrai information. Referent 
power is accumulated by using public relations 
tactics and media management to glorify the 
leader and make him appear benevolent.** (p59)
Since such an approach which subordinates commitment is often
generated by the leader or manager personally rather than by the
institution they both serve, disorganization often follows when a
personal power manager leaves. His subordinates* strong group
spirit, which the manager has personally inspired, deflates, and
subordinates do not know what to do for themselves (McClelland and
Burnham 1980).
The above two approaches of leadership correspond to many 
characteristics constituted in the common classification of 
"supportive versus autocratic" leadership styles that researchers of 
leadership have focused around, as has been presented by Hall (1982). 
But these two approaches do not take the common position of 
conceiving the ' supportive leader* as employee-oriented and 
'autocratic leader' as task-oriented. Thus the presentation by Hall 
(1982) of the classical contrasting styles of leaders behaviour could 
provide a better perspective to study leaders behaviour when we 
remove the issue of employee and task orientations. Hall (1982) 
states that the 'supportive leader' utilizes socio-emotional appeals
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to his subordinates which involve "consideration for subordinates", 
"consultative decision-making" and "general supervision". Such a 
leadership approach consists of different behavioural characteristics 
that have been found convergently by different studies (see Yukl 
1981). These behavioural characteristics are:
- Consideration for subordinates: the leader creates 
an environment of psychological support, mutual trust and confidence, 
openness, respect, friendship and warmth, and understanding.
- Consultative decision-making: the leader encourages a two-way 
communication with subordinates, keeping them informed, asking for 
their opinions and showing his appreciation for their ideas and 
suggestions. Such a leader deals with decision-making in a 
consultative, or democratic way, rather than an autocratic or 
arbitrary way.
- General supervision: the leader supervises in a general rather 
than a very close way. Instead of imposing tight control and giving 
specific instructions in terms of 'Do this', 'Dont do that', he 
provides subordinates with autonomy in getting things done. He gives 
them a freedom to exercise discretion in their work, and delegates 
authority to them. Also, a supportive manager helps his subordinates 
to further their careers, motivates and assists them in achieving 
high-standards in task-performance, and provides his praise and 
recognition for their accomplishments.
The two leadership approaches that derive from McClelland's 
concept of "the two faces of power" are more realistic for studying 
organizational behaviour as they recognize the influence game of 
management and that people are motivated, particularly in top 
managerial positions, to gain power and influence over others in work 
organization. But at the same time they distinguish between 
authoritarian and democratic exercises of 'power'.
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The literature on leadership behaviour has traditionally 
focussed on identifying the behavioural characteristics of the 
'effective supervisor' in terms of task performance and employee 
satisfaction. Thus we have very little evidence concerning the 
relationship between leadership behaviour and the power-distance 
between upper and lower participants in organizations. But, 
implicitly or indirectly the literature has defined the authoritarian 
or autocratic leader (who is classically referred to as task- 
oriented ) as someone who generates a large social distance. On the 
other hand, a supportive leader is more likely to develop favourable 
relations with subordinates and thus generate a low social distance 
with them. In fact, one of the earliest studies in management syle, 
that of White and Lippitt (1956), provides direct evidence of the 
effects of a leader's behaviour on subordinate behaviour. They 
investigated the effects of three different styles of leadership - 
democratic, autocratic and laisserfaire - upon the behaviour of 
group members. They report that group members' behaviour differed 
markedly under the three different styles; members under 
authoritarian leadership evidenced more submissive and dependent 
behaviour in relation to their autocratic leader. They treated him 
less as an equal, demanding his attention and approval, and talked 
back less to him. While White and Lippitt's study was on youth 
groups (lO-year old boys), some studies have undertaken subsequent 
investigations on adult work-groups and they reported similar 
results. Yukl (1981) states that under autocratic leadership, 
subordinates will be less innovative and creative, more dependent on 
the leader, and their loyalty will be to the leader personally rather 
than to the organization.
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Hence, we can assume that the top manager's supportive 
leadership behaviour in relation to the middle manager, would have 
the effect of reducing formality and power-distance between the two 
actors. Also it would provide the middle manager with a sense of 
leadership and power-sharing rather than only being in a leadership 
position without being able to perform as a leader. Considerate and 
supportive behaviour by a leader would also provide individuals (e.g. 
middle managers) in Iraqi organization with the culturally favoured 
paternalistic attitude from authority figures (e.g. the father).
(2) Middle managers' participation in decision-making
One of the basic reasons for middle managers' feelings of lack 
of influence is, as Kay (1974 a) points out, their lack of access to 
the decision-making process which makes them feel that their input is 
not solicited and perhaps not valued. In fact one of the usual 
assumptions found in the literature is that 'participation' is a 
communication between equals. And thus ' participation ' is an 
important method or strategy which can reduce differences in power 
and status between superiors and subordinates. Leavitt (1965) states 
that the theories of McGregor (1960), Likert (1961) and Argris (1962) 
have all identified participation with some form of 'power 
equalization'. Also Bartolke et al (1982) remarks, although 'power 
equalization' may not be stated explicitly as a consequence of 
participation, it is nonetheless implicit in the thinking of many 
social scientists. Notably Strauss (1963) has directly addressed the 
issue of 'power equalization' through participation in its broad 
sense as a process in which subordinates in an organization have some 
say or influence in the decision-making process. He states that 
"participation, however defined, is well accepted as a form of power 
equalization" (p. 60). In contrast, some writers, such as Hall
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(1982), assert that participation in decision-making appears to have 
very little effect on the individuals' power in power positions. 
Also Mulder and Wilke (1970) and Mulder (1971) have criticized the 
assumption that participation by the less powerful in the decision­
making process results in a reduction of the differences in power 
between the more powerful and the less powerful- They assert that 
"under certain conditions participation does not promote power 
equalization, but on the contrary, participation leads to a widening 
of the power gap" (Mulder and Wilke 1970, p.444). On the other hand, 
Tannenbaum et al (1977) and Kavcic and Tannenbaum (1981) remark that 
participation gives to lower-ranking persons some influence they 
might not otherwise have. And thus participation reduces, if not 
eliminates, the large power differential that ordinarily exists 
between employees at the bottom and top levels of the hierarchy. 
But, they say, participation "does not equalize power - it may in 
seme cases actually increase the power of 'top' personnel ... 
Authority and influence are, therefore, inevitably hierarchical in 
the work organization, equal i ter ian ideology notwithstanding" 
(Tannenbaum et al 1977, p. 209).
V V
The above statements of Tannenbaum et al (1977) and Kavcic and 
Tannenbaum (1981) suggest to us that the role of 'participation ' in 
applying an equalitarian ideology in organizational hierarchy should 
be conceived in more specific ways than as a general concept of 
'power equalization';-
First; It seems that 'power equalization through participation' 
has been thought to imply a reduction in the influence of the 
powerful (i.e. superiors), rather than an increase in the influence 
of the powerless (i.e. subordinates), or as taking power from 
managers and giving it to subordinates. When Rosner et al (1973)
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(cited by Hall 1982) found that greater workers' 'participation' had 
led them to feel that they had more personal influence, trust and 
responsibility but it did not reduce the influence of the manager, 
this, in fact, does not mean that participation does not affect the 
power differential between the two parties as Hall (1982) claims. But 
rather, such findings suggest that participation has reduced the 
power-distance between the manager and his workers by increasing the 
influence of workers rather than reducing the influence of the 
manager. In other words, this finding clearly suggests that 
participation has not taken power or influence from the manager and 
given it to the workers as has often been thought.
Second; The term 'equality' has been conceived using a more 
mathematical rather than an moral or symbolic meaning. 
Participation, as Tannenbaum et al (1974) remarks, would not equalize 
power between superiors and subordinates in terms of making them have 
the same amount of authority and influence. But participation would 
generate a feeling of symbolic equality, particularly from the 
subordinates point of view because it "mitigates some of the effects 
of hierarchy by adding qualities of the managerial role to non­
manager ial jobs...., [and] brings workers into management" 
(Tannenbaum 1974, p.128).
Third; The findings of writers such as Mulder and Wilk^ (1970) 
do not generate an assumption that participation does not reduce 
power-distance between superiors and subordinates, but, rather, these 
writers were very concerned to prevent such incorrect generalizations 
from their study. What they have demonstrated is that under certain 
conditions participation increases the power of the powerful (i.e. 
superiors) and specifically this occurs when the more powerful have 
considerably greater expert power than the less powerful. But when a
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subordinate acquires more expert power than his superior, more 
participation would lead to more effective influence by the 
subordinate on his superior. Thus, they say, persons who aspire to 
participate with people from higher levels in the decision-making 
process of their organizations must attain and maintain to some 
extent an equality in expertness with these 'superiors'. so, if 
participation actually increases the power of the expert power 
holder, as Mulder and Wilke (1970) emphasize, one can assume that 
participation would increase the power of middle managers as they are 
more likely than top management individuals to hold expert power due 
to their specialization in their functional areas and their extensive 
involvement in a wide range of different responsibilities and 
activités.
So it seems that if all forms of organizational democracy are 
"ways of reducing power distance" (Hofstede 1980, p.388) then, all 
the forms of democratic leadership approaches which top level 
managers may follow, would provide the middle manager with a greater 
sense of influence and participation in organizational leadership, 
which would decrease compliant behaviour and increase initiatives.
One may argue that such a democratic approach is unlikely to be 
favoured and even effective in reducing power-distance between 
superiors and subordinates in authoritarian organizations. But a 
democratic or supportive leadership approach, as Hall (1982) remarks, 
has its positive impact even in organizations which are thought to 
favour more authoritarian leadership styles. Also in authoritarian 
organizations in large power-distance countries, Hofstede (1980) 
states, there is strong ideological support for employee 
participation, which is "a compensation for what happens on the 
pragmatic level"(p.388). This means that people in these
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organizations feel the need for organizational democracy but they are 
not able to achieve it in reality because of the de facto resistance 
against it. Also when we talk about the unfavourableness and 
ineffectiveness of the democratic leadership in authoritarian 
organizations, we need to specify which form of democracy. Some 
forms may be unfavourable because they are incong ruent with 
employees' cultural value-orientations, but others could be quite 
culturally acceptable. For example, Muna (1980) has found that a 
consultative dec is ion-making style is highly favoured by Arab 
executives and employees as it has strong roots in Arabic culture. 
But joint dec is ion-making is unlikely to be widely adopted by Arab 
managements because "subordinates might view it as a sign of weakness 
on the part of the executive : they expect to be consulted, but not to 
make the final decision". Also because Arab executives seem to prefer 
and feel more at ease with individual-to-individual consultation, and 
because they and their subordinates tend to dislike team-work (Muna 
1980, p. 118).
b. Middle managers' role conflict and ambiguity 
A major source of 'stress' associated with managerial 
organizational roles which has been the concern of a great deal of 
research is role conflict and ambiguity. Role conflict is defined by 
Kahn et al (1964) as "the simultaneous occurrence of two (or more) 
sets of pressures such that compliance with one would make more 
difficult compliance with the other" (p.19). The terms introduced in 
the above definition are usually referred to by many writers as the 
stress experienced by a manager in a particular work role when he 
receives contradictory demands from his role senders. Such demands 
concern what he is to do such that they cannot be met by any 
coTipatible course of action, or doing things that he really does n o t
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want to do or does not think are part of the job requirements. The 
most frequent manifestation of role conflict, say Smith et al (1982) 
is "when a manager is caught between two groups of people who demand 
different kinds of behaviour or expect that the job should entail 
different functions" (p.77), which is the typical case of middle 
managers. Fran many studies of middle managers' behavioural dilemmas 
that have previously been reviewed (such as Roethlisberger 1945; 
Gardner and Whyte 1945; Wary 1949; Mann and Dent 1954; Katz and Kahn 
1966), it is clear that middle managers are heavily exposed to role 
conflict. Also Kahn et al (1964) have suggested that role conflict is 
likely to be greater at the middle manager's level than at any other 
organizational level. The suggested effect of role conflict on 
middle manager's behaviour, as has been demonstrated before, is that 
in order to protect himself and his career he tends either to project 
conflict outwards from himself by playing the role of pure 
transmitter between his superior and subordinates,or,which is more 
likely, to take the side of his superiors. In playing the role of 
pure transmitter and thus isolating himself, he increasingly becomes 
a 'marginal man'. In taking the side of his superiors he 
consequently becomes over-dependent on them and becones more 
compliant in his behaviour toward them.
On the other hand role ambiguity results "when a manager has 
inadequate information about his work role, that is, where there is 
lack of clarity about his work objectives associated with his role", 
about other's expectations of his work role particularly his role 
senders, and about the scope of authority and responsibilities of his 
job (Smith et al 1982, p.77). While House and Rizzo (1972) assert 
that role conflict and ambiguity are critical variables for 
organizational behaviour, their findings suggest that role ambiguity
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is a more powerful variable than role conflict. Although the 
literature more often concerns itself with role conflict than role 
ambiguity, studies on role ambiguity have reported that middle 
managers or those who occupy a middle organizational position 
experience more role ambiguity than top managers. Kahn et al _( 1964 ) 
suggests t±at role ambiguity is likely to be greater at middle 
manager level than at any other organizational level. Miller (1968, 
cited by Stogdill 1974) reports that middle managers frequently state 
they are unclear of the scope of their responsibilities as well as of 
the feelings and expectations of the people with whan they work. 
Also Stogdill (1974) reported Mullen's (1954) statement in that the 
predominant feeling among 'foremen', who are often described as being 
in the position of the "man-in-the-middle", is that they did not know 
the company policy on many important matters of their concern and 
thus they had to work in the dark. The lack of clear policy-making 
coupled with strengthening of the hierarchy, produces, as Dickson 
(1977) states, "a situation in which there is a lack of tangible 
objectives for middle managers. Where there is no clear link between 
an action and itis value or ultimate end, pressures can arise for 
formal rules to help individuals decide their behaviour" (p. 68). 
Role ambiguity results in uncertainty and insecurity, feelings which 
would lead to a preference for clear requirements and instructions, 
and consequently for more formality. In fact House and Rizzo (1972) 
support the hypothesis that the major conturibution of "formalization" 
practices concerns that of reducing role ambiguity. Kahn et al (1964) 
found that role ambiguity results in lower job satisfaction, high 
job-related tension, greater futility, and lower self-confidence. 
Lower self-confidence would result in more conformity (Handy 1976). 
Role ambiguity and lack of clear task definition, says Stogdill
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(1974), are associated with reluctance to initiate action. Many 
writers have pointed out the value of having clear, unequivocal 
definitions of roles for reducing role ambiguity. In contrast other 
writers, such as Stewart ( 1970), have argued that role clarity or 
closely defined roles inhibits innovation and autonomy, encourages 
rigid behaviour and decreases utilization of human resources and 
professional growth. Broussine and Guerrier (1983) remark that "much 
of the writing on organization theory may be seen as a dialogue 
between those writers who believe that the way to effective 
organization is through building up a system of clearly defined roles 
and those who believe that, sometimes at least, roles should be left 
fluid and only broadly defined" (p. 26).
In fact the effects of role ambiguity on individual behaviour 
depends to a great extent on his tolerance for ambiguity which 
influences his perception for the degree of uncertainty involved, and 
his behaviour to cope with it. Thus as Marshall and Cooper (1979) 
conceptualize it, "stress is not a characteristic of either 
environment or individual, but is the outcome of the interaction of 
the two" (p. 82). If the perception of the focal person "of his role 
is unclear, or if his conception of his role differs from that of the 
others in his role set, there will be a degree of role ambiguity" 
(Handy 1976, p.56). In fact Kahn et al (1964) have considered the 
influence of personality factors such as anxiety, flexibility, 
tolerance of ambiguity on the degree and ways role ambiguity was 
experienced, and on individuals coping behaviour. A tolerant person 
interprets an ambiguous situation as being a situation of certainty 
or minimum uncertainty, and would be more capable of handling 
uncertainty and more challenging in his coping behaviour. but 
individuals with low tolerance for ambiguity percieve (i.e.
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interpret) ambiguous situations as "sources of threat" (Budner 1962, 
p29). Such individuals would experience ambiguous situations as 
disturbing, and consequently would deny ambiguity by resorting to a 
fixed explanation and stereotyped behaviour, or escape fron the 
uncertainty involved by using a buffering mechanism such as 
'authoritarianism' (Fromm 1941). Marsh (1978) has found a positive
relationship between intolerance of ambiguity and 'field dependence'.
Tolerance of ambiguity is a learned capacity which relates to a 
great extent to the individual socialization experience at different 
stages of life. While the literature suggests the child-rearing 
experiences such as 'harshness' and 'dogmatism' are the critical 
antecedents of intolerance or ambiguity. Marsh (1978) has found that 
ecology, education and social structure also have their effects. 
Hofstede (1980) found that different societies possessed different 
degrees of 'uncertainty avoidance', which suggests that the 
individual degree of tolerance of ambiguity is heavily influenced by 
the collectively shared value-orientation and characteristics of 
people among whom he has been brought up. So one can argue, as Tayeb 
(1981) did, that in "Societies with a high tolerance for ambiguity, 
members of organizations are assumed to have a lower fear of
uncertainty and can cope better with it". Also organizational 
structures will reflect the "relative freedom offered to and
tolerated by the members" by loosening the structure (p.5).
But as individuals belonging to one given society vary in their 
socialization experiences, they would also hold various degrees of
tolerance of ambiguity. And organizations also would maintain a
degree of variation in tightening or loosening their structure.
At this point, we can assume that role ambiguity coupled with 
low tolerance for uncertainty will increase the middle manager's
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dependency and compliance in relation to authority in his work 
organization. This is so because his dependency and compliance will 
take away the middle manager's uncertainty for him, which he would 
otherwise have to carry himself.
c. Middle managers' job satisfaction
Job satisfaction is an attitudinal outcome of great interest in 
studying managerial behaviour. It relates to the meaning of work as 
it is perceived by the individual concerned, and depends on 
expectations and goals. Job satisfaction as an attitude intervenes 
between work requirements and work responses; thus the way people 
feel about their jobs can be quite useful in predicting their 
response (Herbert 1976).
In studying 'job satisfaction', one may find that this concept 
is, as Smith et al (1982) have noticed, "probably the most confused, 
confusing and poorly developed concept in organization psychology" 
(p.29). However, this concept has been viewed both as an 'overall 
dimension' and as a series of 'specific variables' which correspond 
to different aspects of work roles. Herzberg et al (1959) not only 
studied the job content or specific variables, but more, suggested 
that these variables constitute two dimensions, one related to 
variables associated with the job itself (intrinsic), and the other 
one to variables associated with the environment surrounding the job 
(extrinsic). Accordingly, Herzberg et al (1959) developed a two- 
factor theory based on the assumption that 'intrinsic' variables are 
involved in producing satisfaction but not dissatisfaction, while 
'extrinsic' variables lead to dissatisfaction but not satisfaction. 
So this theory suggests that 'satisfaction' depends on the job- 
content factors or the "motivators", e.g. achievement, recognition, 
work itself, responsibility and advancement. But 'dissatisfaction'
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results from the absence of sufficient "hygienic" factors, e.g. 
company policy and administration, supervision, salary, interpersonal 
relations and working conditions. It is clear that Herzberg*s 
"motivators" correspond to the higher needs of Maslow's Needs 
Hierarchy: self-esteem and actualization, while "hygienic" factors 
relate to Maslow's lower needs: security and social.
Although Herzberg ' s two factors theory or what has been called 
the 'motivator-hygiene theory' has had a substantial impact on 
management thinking and on organizations, research on this theory, as
Sashkin and Morris (1984) state, has found almost no evidence to
support it. In fact this theory has been open to some serious 
criticisms which Smith et al (1982) have put under two headings: 
first: the "methodological" issues which include Hertzberg's use of 
two different questions to obtain his responses, a question for 
satisfiers and a question for dissatisf iers. So, it is not 
surprising that he obtained two categories of replies, some as
motivators and the other as hygiene factors. Second: criticism
concerning the "interpretation" that Herzberg has placed içon the 
results. Having two sets of factors could be an expression of the 
defensive forces within an individual (i.e. employee); people like to 
have a good image of themselves and thus they tend to attribute the 
causes of dissatisfaction or failure to external objects or factors 
in the work situation which are not their own fault, and not due to 
personal incapacities. In other words Herzberg's two factors could 
be merely a "reflection of this tendency to attribute success to 
ourselves and to attribute failure to our environment" (Smith et al 
1982, p.40). In fact much evidence directly contradicts Herzberg 's 
view that 'hygiene' variables do not motivate, and showed that both 
'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' variables may act as satisfiers and
101
dissatisfiers. For example, Lahiri and Srivastva (1967) have studied 
job variables that contribute to the feeling of satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction among 'middle management' personnel. They found that 
both intrinsic and extrinsic job factors were determinants of 
satisfied and dissatisfied feelings toward the job, but that 
intrinsic variables act more as satisfiers and extrinsic variables 
act more as dissatisfiers which they attributed to the effect of 
occupational variables. The findings of Lahiri and Srivastva (1967) 
also did not support Maslow's need-hierarchy theory. According to 
this theory, they say, one would expect that middle managers would 
find 'motivators' as the only sources of satisfaction, but their 
findings have shown that extrinsic variables also act as satisfiers 
for middle managers. So when middle managers find that they have 
little chance of gratifying higher needs, i.e. self actualization, 
through the motivators, they tend to choose the hygiene factors, 
thinking that these factors can provide at least some satisfaction. 
However, although Herzberg's two-factors theory has been heavily 
criticized, the factors generated from his studies have been used by 
different studies as valid specific variables of job satisfaction 
(see Vroom 1964).
The fact that the above study of Lahiri and Srivastva (1967) was 
carried out in a different culture (India) means that their findings 
would reflect cultural and social differences in the relative 
importance that individuals in different cultures place on job items. 
This cultural difference in job satisfaction or motivation is also 
reported by Tayeb (1981) in Iran; Iranian employees' needs hierarchy, 
she says, demonstrated three main Iranian cultural characteristics; 
low tolerance for ambiguity (high uncertainty avoidance), large power- 
distance (low interest in having autonomy) and low interest in
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belonging to a group. These cultural differences give support to 
Hofstede ' s (1980) argument with the motivation theories of Maslow, 
Herzberg, McClelland and Vboom, who are the popular theorists in the 
U.S. management literature. He argues that each of these threories 
reflect the culture of its author, and that individuals in different 
countries, rather than having a universal order of needs, held 
different motivation patterns which are highly related to their 
cultural value-orientations.
Up to this point, it is clear that job satisfaction is
determined by a combination of forces in the individual and forces in 
the environment. Thus job satisfaction should be treated as a 
function of the relation between the characteristics of the actor and 
the characteristics of the work role, both the job content and 
context. Consequently, in any given society one must take into 
account the individual's active needs related both to their work and 
non-work roles which they bring from their socialization in wider 
society to their work organizations. In other words if job
satisfaction and its effect is to be understood it is critical that 
an accurate picture of the goals and needs of individuals be 
developed in terms of knowing what is important to people. Also we 
should consider the effect of the 'organizational occupational level ' 
in placing different importance on different needs and on the degree 
of perceived need satisfaction. Porter (1961; 1963) suggests that 
the vertical level of position within management has a strong 
relation to the degree of perceived job satisfacticm and the 
importance placed on different needs. The higher the organizational 
level of an individual, the greater the degree of his job
satisfaction. And the satisfaction of esteem and the need of self-
actualization is greater in higher than lower level positions. So
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when we consider the level of 'middle manager', we find that Porter 
and Lawler (1965, cited in Stogdill 1974) report the above notion of 
the effect of occupational level by saying that fron the bottom level 
of personnel up to the level of top managers, each higher level is 
more satisfied than the next lower level. Obviously this notion is
also a reflection of Maslow's hierarchy of needs whose validity with 
regard to middle managers in different cutures has now been 
questioned. In fact the picture that emerges from the previous 
chapter on middle managers' dilemmas is that middle managers are 
dissatisfied and their dissatisfaction, as Kay (1974 a) states, 
arises from both 'hygiene' factors and 'motivators'. Also they are 
dissatisfied because they are, more than at any other level, working 
under stress ; by their cross-relationships, by being heavily exposed 
to role conflict and ambiguity, by feeling 'boxed-in' and above all, 
by having little real authority at high levels of responsibility.
Although 'dissatisfaction' is suggested to be dominant among 
individuals holding middle managerial work roles, we cannot expect 
the same degrees of dissatisfaction among different middle managers 
in one organization, or in different organizations in one country or 
across different countries. It is likely for example to find that 
some Iraqi middle managers are quite satisfied, and not necessarily 
because they have gratified the needs underlying the motivators. But 
their satisfaction could also arise from gratifying the needs that 
underly the hygiene factors, particularly if such needs, rather than 
the needs for autonomy or self-actualization, are their culturally 
active needs. They may simply feel that it is not stressful to have 
little authority, or to be dependent on superiors and highly 
concerned with their expectations rather than with subordinates' 
expectations. Moreover, their compliance to superiors' expectations
104
and maintaining a good relationship with than could be the source of 
satisfying one of their most active needs, e.g. need for power and 
influence. But Iraqi middle managers, even in one organization, 
would vary in their perceived degree of job satisfaction. Such 
variation results from a combination of middle managers' individual 
variation in their 'active needs' and the experience of various
organizational environmental characteristics.
Thus a middle manager's job satisfaction is a fuction of both;
- His level of 'active needs', that is a combination of his 
'cultural needs' and his 'role's needs' as a middle manager.
- The characteristics of his work organizational environment
which determine the degree and the source of satisfying his 'active
needs'.
Knowing the middle manager's active needs and the
characteristics of his work organization would allow us to assume the 
likely effect of job satisfaction on his behaviour. When we consider 
the Iraqi middle manager, part of his most active needs are such 
things as safety, security, dependence, personal power and influence. 
If his organization is characterized by personalization and 
authoritarianism where satisfying such needs depends on the person at 
the top, one can assume that in such organizations the middle manager 
would try to satisfy his active needs by satisfying those at the top. 
In other words 'compliance' may be the price of satisfying one's 
active needs when in exchange for compliance, aie can get such 
advantages as retaining the position, security, status, influence, 
... etc (Simon 1957 a). Consequently, the more satisfied middle 
manager is likely to be the more orientated to comply and satisfy 
those at the top than the less satisfied one, so that he can keep the 
satisfaction of his active needs which depends highly on his 
compliance.
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In fact for the above latter assumption we have very little, and 
at that, indirect evidence in the literature, as most studies have 
been mainly concerned with studying the causes of job satisfaction 
rather than its consequences or effects. And the greatest effects of 
job satisfaction that have been proposed are usually on issues of 
performance and productivity. However, some studies, although 
indirectly, provide seme support for the above assumption. Pelz 
(1952) in studying the job satisfaction of those who hold the 
position of *the-man-in-the-middle' (i.e. supervisors), finds that
successful (and thus satisfied) supervisors have influence through 
good relationships with superiors. The implications of these 
findings may produce a reverse direction, in that the more satisfied 
manager would be more oriented to having good relationships with
superiors which would provide him with influence and effectiveness. 
Stogdill (1974) cites findings of different studies (Eran 1966; 
Grunfeld and Faltman 1967; Mordechai 1966; Myers 1966) where managers 
who identify themselves with their superiors are more satisfied and 
more effective in their jobs than managers who do not identify with 
superiors. Again, these findings may also have the same reverse 
implications; the more satisfied managers tending to identify
themselves with superiors in exchange for and in order to maintain 
the satisfaction of their active needs, mainly the need to have 
influence and be effective, which depends highly on having good
relationships with superiors.
2. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
This research's conceptual perspectives in studying middle 
managers behaviour toward top management have put forward four basic 
arguments:
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First; Culture has an enormous fundamental impact in constructing
organizational behaviour.
Second: Middle managers* behaviour toward top management is a
function of the characteristics of both the individual and 
the organization.
Third: Middle managers' behaviour is not simply a reaction to, or
activation of, environmental pressures but one may infer 
from their actions a shared meaning or conceptual structure 
that they may hold in common upon which they construct their 
behaviour in relation with top managers.
Fourth: Although one may distinguish a shared pattern of orientation
and behaviour among middle managers working in different 
organizations within one country, at this dominant level 
they hold a degree of variation. This variation could be 
affected by individual differences and by organizational 
factors.
Working Hypotheses:
With respect to studying the impact of ' culture ' on
organizational behaviour, no hypotheses were directly formed. This 
so, because the tendency in this research is not to follow the old 
game of "tell me what you think and I'll tell you what you are" and 
thus start with a definition of Iraqi values from which can be
hypothesized the typical pattern of behaviour that will be found in 
Iraqi organization. Rather, cultural effects are inferred from 
first, observing and studying the behaviour within Iraqi
organizations, and then studying the cultural values in wider
society, with the aim of discovering the impact on organizational 
behaviour.
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In studying middle managers behaviour toward top management in 
Iraqi organizations two hypotheses were formulated to guide the 
exploration of this study. These two hypotheses derived basically 
from the researcher's previous work observation within sane Iraqi 
organizations ;
Hypothesis No. 1
While working within some Iraqi organizations for more than 10
years - observing numerous joint actions, meetings through the
hierarchy, having the curiosity of following specific issues and
critical events, and witness many conversations and cases - I have
been able to identify many of the dominant patterns of behaviour and
infer the recurring meanings within them. The first research
hypothesis describes the dominant pattern of behaviour and meaning
that Iraqi middle managers seem to hold in their conceptual structure
about authority figures in their organizations (i.e. top managers);
'Middle managers' orientation and behaviour toward the 
top manager tends to comply with and conform to his 
expectations as a person who possesses the authority 
and power rather than as a leader with whom they share 
the organizational leadership and responsibilities. '
Hypothesis No. 2
The second hypothesis puts forward two sets of factors -
individual differences factors and organizational factors - which,
from the researcher's previous work observations and material
initially found in some relevant studies, are assumed to affect
middle managers* behaviour toward top management in Iraq:
'"The orientation and behaviour of middle managers 
toward top management will vary according to the 





B - Family background and childhood socialization
1) geographical area of living
2) father's occupation
3) parents' level of education
4) childhood experiences
C - Educational background
1) level of formal education
2) nature of formal education (place of education)
D - Wcxdc experience
1) length of service
2) years in managerial job in the present organization 
Organizational factors:
A - Nature of the relationship between top and middle Managers:
1) top manager's leadership behaviour in relation with 
middle managers
2) the degree of middle manager's participation in decision­
making
B - Middle manager's degree of role conflict and ambiguity 
C - Middle manager's degree of job satisfaction.
CHAPTER (3)
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
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In the issue of methodology one can find a maze of terms, 
definitions and philosophical arguments given by different writers. 
Out of this maze no agreement has been reached on the best research 
method and one could conclude that there is no single adequate 
approach to all problems. Such conclusion is clearly stated by 
Sterling (1972) when he says that "Since the research methods depend 
upon the questions and since I am unwilling to place restrictions on 
methods, - this rather sweeping conclusion is likely to be 
disappointing to those who had expected me to label some research 
methods as 'unscientific' and endorse others. I am sorry to 
disappoint, but this is precisely the attitude to which I am opposed" 
(page 3). Thus research methods should suite the problem under study 
and its circumstances.
As the idea behind this research emerged from the researcher's
cummalative observations during more than 10 years working in many
Iraqi organizations, the researcher has tried, in designing this 
research and its methodology, to utilize these observations, and with 
great flexibility to advance the knowledge about the problem at hand. 
The investigation in this research has followed two main methods, 
conducted at different times and through different strategies;
1 - Field work study
2 - Desk work study.
The field work study has preceeded the desk work study as later 
one was not initially within the design of this research. Although 
the researcher had many long-term observations and prior experience, 
these observations and later thoughts and initial discovery of theory 
were in the beginning just a puzzle, but an interesting and
stimulating one. Out of the field work, which produced data,
observations and strategies followed by analyzing these data, it
110
became clear that many bits and pieces in this puzzle were in reality 
one large whole. Thus the basis to solving this puzzle was provided, 
to a large extent by the concept of 'culture'. So the 'desk work 
study' emerged to provide this part, which has been the basis of 
linking all the pieces together in one clear and interesting picture. 
In fact many aspects of the initial research model referred to or 
reflected this thing called ' culture ' but implicitly and without a 
clear and systematic foundation.
In this chapter the researcher will explain the research design 
and methodology which was employed in the ' field work* and 'desk 
work' studies, aggregated to understand and analyze middle manager's 
behaviour toward top managers in Iraqi organizations.
1. FIETJ) WORK STUDY
A field study was carried out for three months in Iraq in order 
to collect the necessary information to verify the research 
hypotheses concerning middle managers behaviour toward top management 
in Iraqi organizations.
A. Field Work Population and Samples :
Due to the fact that most means of production in Iraq are 
controlled and owned by the state, apart from very isolated cases, 
the general form of this research has dealt with the public sector 
(state companies). These public sector companies, establishments and 
ministries are governed by uniform rules, instructions and 
regulations with some variations. This and the fact that the 
resources available (time, money and access) to this study were 
limited meant that I decided to take the ministry of trade as the 
research population.
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The choice of the ministry of trade was for the following 
reasons:
i. The ministry of trade, together with its four 
establishments, have a direct relationship with peoples' daily 
lives and a vital influence on their standard of living. Hius, 
this ministry demands good planning, wise dec is ion-making and 
good work-relationships and co-operation among all levels; all 
this is necessary to ensure that it can execute its job in 
providing the goods for the people and avoiding any shortages. 
It is also concerned with finding new markets for Iraqi 
products.
ii. Due to the above and for political reasons, all the 
ministry's establishments have many times received great 
attention from the government and higher levels in the ministry. 
These establishments were dominated by the political ideological 
emphasis for the right atmosphere at work, good personnel 
relationships, a higher job performance and a call for open and 
frank discussions. Thus it was assumed that the organizational 
behaviour within the establishments of this ministry would be 
more advanced in some aspects than other ministries.
iii. The establishments of ministry of trade are rather newly 
formed, so they were formed at a stage more advanced than those 
in earlier surrounding circumstances, beliefs, thoughts, 
experiences and methods. So it was assumed that these 
establishments would be more advanced as far as organizational 
environment and work relationships were concerned. One would 
expect people's behaviour would vary somewhat from other 
ministries.
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iv, I have been working for the ministry of trade and its 
establishments for more than 10 years. It was presumed that for 
the questionnaire to be answered objectively I needed to win the 
confidence and co-operation of the people involved. The fact 
that I worked in a similar and sometimes identical environment 
made me aware of the laws and regulations governing the work of 
these establishments, and the fact that they knew that helped to 
ensure that the questionnaire was satisfactorily completed.
After deciding that the ministry of trade and its establishments 
represented the best choice for the research population for the above 
reasons, I decided to select two of the ministry establishments. 
These two were:
1. The State Trade Estaolishment For Capital Goods (which 
includes *6* companies in addition to the establishment central 
office)
2. The State Establishment for Exporting (which includes *3' 
companies in addition to the central office).
This was done for the following reasons :
i. The ministry of trade has four establishments; three of 
these deal with importing and marketing activities and the 
fourth establishment deals with exporting. Thus I selected one 
of the ministry establishments dealing with importing and 
marketing, and the other establishment that was chosen was the 
state establishment for exporting. These two establishments 
together represent a major and important part of the ministry's 
activities.
ii. I worked in the state trade establishment for capital 
goods and some of its companies for a long period and happened 
to have many friends and colleagues in both establishments who 
could help me in gathering the necessary information.
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Although "no sample will fully represent its population in all 
respects" (Bnory 1980), a researcher must try to provide a 
representative sample in proportion to its numbers in the population. 
Because of the research limitations imposed by time, lack of 
resources and difficulty of travelling, only departments which were 
located in Baghdad were considered. To provide greater 
representation and thereby diminish potential bias, a sample of '100 
out of 160' middle managers were chosen based on the number of 
'departments' appearing in the organizational charts of both 
establishments. As this research is concerned with personnel who are 
in charge of departments, the ones chosen were department heads and 
were the first set of pecple to hold the title of 'manager* in the 
Iraqi grading codes. 15 departments initially included in the sample 
were, after the first interviews, found not to be eligible for 
inclusion for the following reasons :
a. Ihe non-existence of some departments which appear on the 
organizational charts since they were in reality small units.
b. Some departments had no original managers, but instead, it 
was run by a manager from another section who was already included in 
the study population.
c. Sane managers were not available at the time, i.e., they 
were on leave, thus other members were managing their department 
temporarily.
d. Seme managers had been transferred to other ministries 
before their second interview.
e. Certain departments were managed by aids to top managers 
temporarily until a permanent manager was selected.
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B. Field Work Design :
%is study is concerned with a wide range of variables and 
aspects which required a great deal of information. As Iraq suffers 
extremely from a lack of empirical and exploratory studies able to 
provide essential ground information relevant to this research, data 
on a wide variety of subjects had to be collected within a limited 
period of time and under difficult field work conditions. Thus in 
designing the research methodology it was necessary to balance 
between the research requirements and the reality of availability of 
research resources, access to research sites, restrictions on using 
some methods and the availability of time. Consequently, the 
following methodology was chosen for this field work:
1 - Field work instruments : 
a - Questionnaire :
Appendix No. 2 presents the questionnaire that was used as the 
main instrument in the field work study. In designing this 
questionnaire the researcher's previous work observations were used 
widely as a basis from which many questions were constructed or 
generated. Before printing and distributing the final form of the 
questionnaire, a pilot survey was conducted in order to become aware 
of biases which may have been concealed within the questionnaire's 
words, phrases or grouping of particular questions and the method of 
subject response. In this survey eight middle managers from the 
general office of the state trade establishment participated. In 
fact this survey helped in validating some questions and in re­
structuring, clarifying and amending the tone of others. Also as the 
questionnaire was first constructed in English and then translated 
into Arabic, the researcher, after the pilot survey, re-translated 
all the questions that were subject to changes in order to ensure
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that the concepts of the questionnaire remained the same. After 
that, the questionnaire was finalized, typed and prepared with the 
required copies before moving to distribution to the research 
subjects.
b - Supplementary interview method :
The purpose of the first interview with the middle managers was 
mainly to give them the questionnaire personally and to seek 
clarifications and real-life examples of the situation he or she 
depicts in his or her responses to the questionnaire items. It was 
also important to convince them to be very frank in answering the 
questionnaire, and that there would be no consequences based on their 
answers; also to inform them that there was no one correct answer as 
such. The purpose of the second interview was to check that the 
questionnaire was answered conpletely and adequately. Sometimes some 
questions were not answered properly. So clarifications were sought, 
especially concerning common facts and action procedures.
3 - Additional data from available records and written sources 
had been collected to be used mainly as background material.
4 - During the interview, notes were taken concerning my 
observations and discussions with these people. Itiis was done to 
assist my analysis of the people's attitudes and actions.
2. Data collection :
Before moving to the stage of collecting data from the research 
population I had to obtain the formal agreement from my organization 
to commence the field work. Also it was necessary to get formal 
approval from the top management of each company in both 
establishments and have it relayed to the people concerned in the 
field work to induce them to co-operate.
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In collecting data for this research every possible step was 
taken to eliminate or at least minimize 'bias', mainly arising fron 
the fear of giving the right answer and of "social desirability" 
which can distort questionnaire data (Phillips 1973), particularly 
when it deals with sensitive aspects of the respondent's life. In 
this matter Maccoby and Maccoby (1954) state that "When people are 
being interviewed or are filling out questionnaires directly 
"concerning behaviour about which there is a strong expectation of 
social approval or disapproval and in which there is considerable 
ego-involvarient, they tend to err in the direction of idealizing 
their behavior", (p. 482). In fact in administering the final form 
of the questionnaire, the researcher followed the two techniques of 
spacing related questions when it is possible arrd inclusion of items 
that could be checked against one another in some parts of this 
instrument. Also a vacant space was left at the end of some 
questions for additional answers and carments. But above all the 
researcher, during the stage of collecting the data, followed 
different strategies to eliminate, or at least minimize, 
such 'bias' :
a - Distributing the questionnaire personally ; this was done 
during the first interview with each middle manager included in the 
field work sample. Through such face-to-face interaction, the 
researcher tried to create rapport and trust, to stress the 
importance of honest answers and emphasize that there were no right 
or wrong answers and thus there was no reason for them to discuss or 
check their answers with other subjects. Also dealing with the 
questionnaire personally gave me the opportunity to ensure that the 
sample population understood the objective of the questionnaire and 
the reasons behind it.
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b - During the first and the second interviews the researcher 
tried to generate a friendly, informal atmosphere with the subjects 
and to motivate them (in a typical Iraqi way) to give their honest 
answers. This was done particularly to minimize the emotional fear 
and suspicions that the sending of formal instructions by top 
management to answer the questionnaire might have generated. In fact 
these instructions were aimed at facilitating the researcher's task 
and obtaining the sanction of the middle managers under study and 
gaining their assistance.
c - To assure the anonimity of the subjects, they were not asked 
to state their names or mention the names of their departments in the 
questionnaire. Also they were requested to place the completed 
questionnaire in an ordinary unidentifiable envelope that was
personally handed to each one of them. This was done so that they 
had the feeling that they need not fear or hesitate when answering 
the questions because nobody would know their individual identity.
d - Assurance was given that each individual subjects* responses 
would be treated privately and in confidence, and the researcher was 
not bound to submit it or show them to any authority inside or 
outside the organizations concerned. They were told that their 
responses were for research puroposes only, and only generalized data 
would be reported on without any kind of reference to their
identities.
e - In each company I visited I tried to bypass some people whom 
I knew personally or who were my colleagues in the University or in 
organizations that I had worked in. I found that an introduction by 
one of them to the research subjects helped to gain their trust and 
generate a feeling of informality and shared understanding. Luckily,
some of the subjects themselves were my old colleagues. Also the
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fact that I am a woman and a post-graduate student in a Western 
University helped me or gave me a green light in many cases.
At the end of each first interview, during which I distributed 
the questionnaire to the research sample population, they were 
informed that they could take the questionnaire home if need be, so 
as to have sufficient time to complete them; also that I would 
interview them again after a period of 3-6 days to answer any 
questions or discuss issues that may arise from their answering the 
questionnaire. Once the first interviews were held at a certain 
company I moved to the next one, then after approximately five days I 
returned to the first company for the second interviews during which 
I received the completed questionnaires, and so on for the rest of 
the companies. This was done to utilize my time efficiently. 
Although the questionnaire was the basic instrument for providing 
primary data for verifying the research hypotheses, due to the nature 
of this research it was essential to explore the more subtle 
information that provides special insight into middle managers 
behaviour. The researcher, in the second interviews, tried to 
overcome another problem usually associated with answering a 
questionnaire - that of some respondents checking alternatives in a 
careless manner - through reviewing each subject's answers and 
stimulating a free conversation and an exchange of point of views. 
Through such conversations the researcher took notes regarding all 
the important coirments, explanations, and remarks that they provided. 
Also knowing from experience the value of observing behaviour as it 
occurs in the natural order of events, I tried, during the second 
interviews, to observe and analyze the subjects actions in answering 
the questionnaire, being disturbed by subordinates seeking some 
advice and having to communicate with them, replying to a telephone
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call with superiors.. .etc. Even the time that I had to wait for a 
subject to return from a meeting or finish something at hand, I used 
to observe the surrounding atmosphere and relevant issues. In other 
words I tried to go beyond the obvious, to explore the meaning of a 
statement rather than just simply record it. In fact I found that 
these observations and the notes I took provided me with first-hand 
data which was free from factors that usually influenced other types 
of data gathering, and which was of great value in exploring their 
unanticipated responses. These observations and notes increasingly 
put me in the position of discovering more, which later enriched my 
previous work observations and became the occasion for extending the 
research outlook.
The researcher also followed the method of gathering relevant 
written sources from documents, articles, books, working papers and 
dissertations. These written sources were collected from 
documentâticxi centers and libraries, including Baghdad University 
Library; the National Library; the Central Library and the Libraries 
of the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Trade and Ministry of 
Planning.
C. Operational Measures of Variables :
1 - Measures of bureaucratic-feudal orientation ;
In this research, 'compliance' was studied as suggested by 
Etzioni (1969) to refer to "both to a relation in which an actor 
behaves in accordance with directive supported by another actor's 
power, and to the orientation of the subordinated actor to the power 
applied" (p. 59). In other words, middle managers' compliance in 
relation to top managers was not only studies in terms of their 
'actions' but also in terms of their 'orientation' (i.e. 'shoulds' 
and 'beliefs in').
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Bureaucratic-feudal orientation refers to the commitment to the 
set of values, norms, and attitudes that characterize the relevant 
environment. To this end, two scales including ten items were 
aggregated to measure middle manager's bureaucratic-feudal 
orientation ;
a - bureaucratic orientation scale ; this scale was constructed 
and used by Gorden (1970) according to a schema of five categories, 
parallel to those of Weber (1946), but describing individual rather 
than organizational characteristics :
Self-subord ination :
 a willingness to comply fully with the stated wishes of
superior and to have decisions made for one by higher authority. 
Ccmpartmentalization :
 complété confidence in expert judgement and a need to
restrict one's concern to one's own area of specialization. 
Impersonalization :
 a preference for impersonal or formal relationships with
others on the job, particularly with individuals at different 
organizational levels.
Rule conformity :
 a desire for the security that the following of rules,
regulations and standard operating procedures affords.
Trad itionalism ;
 a need for the security provided by organizational
identification and conformity to the in-group norm.
The above schema served as a guide for developing the scale's 
five items presented in question No. 1 of the questionnaire 
(Appendix 2). A sample representative items are :
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"A superior should expect subordinates to carry out his orders 
without question or deviation".
"A person should not volunteer opinicais to his superior outside 
his own area of specialization".
b - Feudal orientation scale ; This scale was constructed by the 
researcher according to a set of five main concepts derived from the 
work of very few writers and the researcher's observations about the 
nature and characteristics of feudal structure in Iraqi Society : 
Respect for authority ;
 a great amount of respect for an individual in a position of
highest authority within the organization, and acceptance of his 
domination and reliance on his orders and direct intervention. 
Personal loyalty ;
 an obligation to superiors personally within the
organization, and staying loyal to meet their expectations. 
Discipline conformity :
 a need for the security provided by conforming to work
discipline, established through superiors' orders and 
instructions.
Dependent action ;
 a tendency not to take independent action and
responsibility, without specific approval from higher authority. 
Consideration of social norms and values ;
 an obligation to social norms and values and a need
to conform to their implications within the organization. 
According to the above concepts, the five scale items presented 
in question No. 2 of the research questionnaire were developed.
An example of these items is :
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"A top person in an organization should be respected and 
followed as a representative of higher authority",
"Subordinates in an organization should be loyal towards 
superiors and always act to meet their expectations and orders". 
Each item of the above two scales was worded so that agreement 
would reflect acceptance of the bureaucratic-feudal norms. Responses 
to both scales were to be made on a five-choice Likert scale ;
' Strongly agree - Agree - Very slightly agree - Disagree - Strongly 
disagree'. The 'bureaucratic-feudal orientation' was scored by 
assigning a weight of '5' for 'Strongly agree' and downwards to '1'
for 'Strongly disagree'.
2 - Measures of compliant behaviour :
A behaviour is 'compliant' "if it conforms to an expectation 
held or enunciated by another" (Biddle 1979, p. 384). IVo 'imaginary
situations were employed to measure middle manager's compliant
behaviour'action' in relation to authority (i.e. top management) in 
Iraqi organizations ;
a - The first imaginary situation ;
This situation, as it appears in question No. 3, Appendix 2, 
was originally constructed and used by Berger (1957) in Egypt. It 
was adopted in this research because its context was similar to many 
real cases observed formerly by the researcher in Iraqi
organizations. In phases 'A' and 'B' of this imaginary situation,
respondents were asked in each phase to indicate their own opinion by
choosing between two alternatives of action, 
b - The second imaginary situation :
Ihis situation, as it appears in question No. 4, Appendix 2, was 
in reality an illustration of many real cases witnessed and 
experienced by the researcher while working within Iraqi
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organizations. In this situation the respondents became more 
involved and they had in phase 'A' to state the action they would 
take in facing with such a situation from three alternatives. In 
phase 'B' they had to choose between two types of actions.
The alternative actions that the respondent's were provided with 
in the above two imaginary situations were constructed in a way to 
permit significant qualitative discriminations, 
c - Measures of individuality factors :
a - Age : this factor was measured by 'Q.5' -
"What is your date of birth"? 
a - Geographical area of living ; by 'Q.6' -
"Where did you live most of the time ; a) up to the age of
10 years, b) up to the age of 20 years"? 
c - Father's occupation : by 'Q.7' -
"What was/were your father's (or guardian) main job 
occupations"? 
d - Level of father's formal education ; by 'Q.8* -
"How much formal education did your father (or guardian)
complete"?
e - Level of mother's formal education ; by 'Q.9* -
"How much formal education did your mother complete"?
Fathers' and mothers' educational levels were assessed by 
responses to the following six alternatives :
- Primary School Level
- Medium (equivalent to 'O' Level)
- Secondary (equivalent to 'A' Level)




f - Childhood experiences : Five questions (Qs.10-14) were
constructed to measure childhood experiences. Three questions 
(Qs. 10-12) refer to the degree of authoritarianism 
in the father-child relationship with its connected 
familial values. These questions were generated by refering 
to the researcher's experiences and observations as an Iraqi 
person and to the relevant study about Iraqi and Arabic 
societies. Two questions (Qs. 10 & 11) consisted of two 
alternatives, each one designed to reveal different types 
of father-child relationship. Question '12' consisted of 
five statements describing many Iraqi familial values, 
and respondents were asked to indicate if they received 
such values in their childhood using 'No ' or 'Yes' 
alternatives, I being for 'No' and 2 for 'Yes'. Examples of 
these statements are :
"It is not acceptable to inform our father that he is wrong in 
his actions".
"The father has the right to teach his children manners the way 
he likes".
The second aspect of childhood experiences refer to the 
'Constant vs. Intermittent' use of punishment and reasoning. TWo 
questions (Qs. 13 & 14) were generated with reference to Harvey et al 
(1961). In each of these two questions respondents were provided 
with three, worded alternatives reflecting the frequency of using 
punishment vs. reward (Q. 13) and reasoning (Q. 14).
g - Level and place of formal education : by 'Q.15 ' - 
"What is your level and place of formal education"?
Possible responses are:
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Level of Education Place of Education
- Primary School Level Name of the place
- Medium (equivalent to 'O' Level) (i.e.) Country) of
- Secondary (equivalent to 'A' Level) formal education
- Certificate Diploma Level
- University Level
- Post-Graduate Level
h - Work experience ; this factor refers to -
1 - length of service : it was measured by 'Q.16' -
"How many years have you spent as a governmental official 
and what positions have you held prior to your present 
one"?
Possible responses were;
'Title of position; title of organization and the years 
spent'.
2 - Years in managerial positions in present organization ; this 
was measured by 'Q.17* -
"How many years have you spent in middle management 
position in your present organization"?
Possible responses are ;
- Less than 4 years
- 4 - less than 8 years
- 8 and more years
4 - Measures of organizational factors :
a - Nature of the relationship between top and middle 
managers :
Questions assigned to measure this factor aimed to discover the 
nature of such a relationship as it was preceived by middle managers. 
Although their answers represent a subjective description of boss
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(top manager) behaviour, as Hofstede (1980) states, "In order to 
understand the boss' impact on subordinate behaviour, a subjective 
description by the subordinate is probably more relevant than would 
be any objective description" (p. 101). This factor was measured 
from two aspects ;
1 - Top manager leadership behaviour in relation with middle
managers ;
This behaviour was measured on the dimension of 'supportive - 
autocratic ' Leadership. As such behaviour can be gauged by a number 
of questions designed to measure the degree of consideration, trust 
and supportiveness of the respondent boss, '12' questions were 
aggregated to indicate the style of a top manager's leadership 
behaviour as it was perceived by middle managers. These '12* 
questions (Qs. 18-29) were adopted with reference to the literature 
(e.g. Likert 1961, 1967; Read 1962; Tannenbaum et al. 1977).
Examples of these questions are ;
"To what extent does the top manager in your organization try 
to understand your work problems and do something about them"?
"To what extent does your top manager seem interested in 
listening to your suggestions and ideas"?
"To what extent do you feel that your top manager is backing 
and supporting you with your responsibilities"?
Items were scored on a Likert scale from 'None* (1) to 'Very 
great' (6). The higher the score, the more supportive was the style 
of top management, or the lower the score, the more autocratic was 
the top manager's leadership behaviour.
2 - Middle managers participation in decision-making :
Thirteen questions were adopted with reference to the literature
(e.g. Likert 1961, 1967; Vbocm 1960; Tannenbaum et al. 1977). Two
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questions (Qs. 30 & 31) were employed to provide Iraqi middle
managers under study with equipment to draw on to profile the
decision-making style of their organizations. This in turn would 
indicate what the term 'participation' refers to in their minds when 
these respondents state 'Yes, we do participate'. In each of these 
questions, respondents had four alternatives with which to indicate 
significant qualitative distinctions.
The degree of middle manager's 'participation' in decision­
making will reflect how participatively-oriented the top management 
ideology and style are - such degrees were measured using
three terms ; 'formal participation'; 'psychological participation'; 
and 'delegation'.
Three questions (Qs. 32-34) were employed to measure the degree 
of 'formal participation' that middle managers felt their
organizations provided them with. Examples of these questions are ;
"Do you participate in making important decisions related to 
general organizational problems"?
TWD of these questions (Qs. 32, 34) were scored on a scale from 
'Not at all' (1) to 'Always' (6), and in the other question (Q. 33) 
respondents were provided with a dichotoroous alternative, 1 being 
coded for 'No' and 2 for 'Yes'.
'Psychological participation or influence' was measured by six 
questions ; two were generated with reference to literature on this 
concept and the other questions (Qs. 37-40) used the four-item 
subscale constructed and used by Vrocm (1960) for this purpose, but 
with slight changes in the wording of some of the items to fit the 
job situation of the managers in the sample. Examples of these items 
were ;
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"In general, how much say or influence do you feel you 
have on what goes on in your office"?
"TO what degree do you think you can influence the decisions of 
your top manager regarding things about which you are 
concerned"?
Three questions (Qs. 41-43) were employed to measure 
participation in terms of 'delegation' (Vroom and Yetton 1973). An 
examples of these questions is;
"Do you take the important decisions related to your
job"?
Respondents in all these questions were given a scale of six 
alternatives but with slightly different wording to suit each 
question.
b - Middle managers role conflict and ambiguity ;
Question 44 was aggregated with phrases 'C and 'D' of the 
second imaginary situation (Q. 4) to measure middle managers'
feelings of role conflict. In Q. 44, respondents had to indicate the 
frequency of being subject to conflictuel demands, scoring one of six 
alternatives. A dichotomous alternative was provided in phase 'C of 
the first imaginary situation, 1 being for 'No' and 2 for 'Yes', and 
each item in phase 'D' of the same situation was scored on a scale 
from 'Under very little stress' (1), to 'Under very great stress' 
(5).
Eight questions (Qs. 45-52) were either adapted from Kahn et al.
&Legge
(1964) or generated with reference to the literature (Qowler 1̂975) to 
measure middle managers' feelings of role ambiguity. Q. 45 was 
employed to indicate the extent to which middle managers' jobs are 
clearly defined. Respondents were provided with four alternatives 
stating different degrees of job definition, and each respondent had
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to choose one to show his own case. Q. 46 consisted of 4 statements 
aimed to measure the degree of ambiguity that respondents have about 
work objectives and was done by giving their agreements or 
disagreements to statements which describe what exists in their
organizations. An example of these statements is :
"No one is really clear where we are going"
Each itean or statement was scored on a Likert scale from 
'Strongly disagree' (1) to 'Strongly agree' (5). In addition to this 
question, six other questions were used to reveal the degree of 
ambiguity that each respondent had about different aspects of his 
role as a middle manager. A sample item is ;
"How clear are you about the limits of your authority in your 
present position"?
Items from these six questions were scored cn a scale from 'Very
clear' (1) to 'Not at all clear' (6).
c - Middle managers job satisfaction ;
The measures of job satisfaction in the present study consisted 
of '13' items (Qs. 53-65) related to satisfaction on a variety of 
dimensions, mainly those suggested by Herzberg (1966). These items 
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A sample item is ;
"To what extent are you satisfied with the amount of security in 
your position"?
Each item was scored on a Likert scale from 'Not satisfied' (1) 
to 'Extremely satisfied' (5). The higher the overall score, the more 
satisfied the respondent was. In addition, one item (Q. 66) was used 
to measure overall job satisfaction :
"All things considered, how satisfied are you with your job"?
This item was scored in the same way as the other satisfaction 
items.
D - Processing and Classifying the Data ;
Although the researcher distributed 85 copies of the 
questionnaire during the first interviews, four of them were not 
received, and one respondent refused to answer most of its questions. 
Ttius only 80 middle managers have been the subjects of this study.
After the field work, the next step was processing, classifying 
and tabulating the collected data. The researcher gave each of the 
80 copies of the questionnaire a 'code number' which referred to the 
respondent (i.e. middle manager). This enabled the researcher to 
follow each individual case when analyzing and presenting the field 
work results. Although the collection of field work data had 
followed a clear pattern, the overall picture was distorted by a 
great deal of material, marginal comments, notes and observations. 
Thus before starting to analyze the collected data, classifying and 
sorting this data was necessary.
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2 - DESK WORK SlUPg
After the research field work study, the researcher conducted an 
extensive 'desk work study' on the socio-histroical evolution and the 
contemporary settings of Iraqi Society and its social institutions. 
The Holy Quran, books and articles in many various fields of the 
knowledge, written documents, old sayings, proverbs, the researcher's 
observations and experiences as a member of Iraqi society and as a 
former governmental official in Iraqi organizations and the field 
work study were all employed in providing data for this study. As 
the aim of this study was to discover the 'identity' of Iraqi culture 
and consequently to provide a ' reflection on culture ', the historical 
method that was used in this study, marked by an emphasis on the 
'meaning' of historical activities and events in a social context, 
more than on historical 'facts' themselves.
3 - DATA ANALYSIS
Data analysis in this research was a continuous process of 
problem-solving and developing strategies of handling and 
interpreting the data, because of the nature of the research and the 
development in the research outlook over time. However, I do not 
intend in the following pages, to describe the evolution of this 
stage of the research but to present the method and the basic 
principles of interpretation.
As will be noted in the following chapters, data analysis and 
interpretation has benefited from both 'quantitative' and 
'qualitative' methods but with an essential role being given to the 
qualitative methods. By nature, the 'desk work study' of 'culture' 
was based on exploratory qualitative analysis. With respect to the 
fieldwork data, quantitative methods were used as tools to provide
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regularity or a dimensional framework to the questionnaire material, 
while qualitative methods were employed to go beyond this framework 
to search out meanings, concepts and implications. Regarding the use 
of the quantitative methods in analyzing the affect of individual and 
organizational factors on middle managers' behaviour, the researcher 
followed an extensive series of 'Elaborated Cross-Tabulations' (i.e. 
introducing a third factor into the association between two other 
variables through cross-classifying the three variables) (Eknory 
1980). Statistical analysis to find 'significant statistical 
correlations' between middle managers' orientation and behaviour and 
the assumed affecting factors was excluded from the analysis. This is 
partly bacause in societies such as Iraq, Hofstede (1980) emphasizes 
that "where the culture imposes strong behavioral norms, certain 
attitudes and behaviors show such small variance that they do not 
correlate with other attitudes and behaviors; this is the case for 
some of the F-scale items in Turkey" (pp. 28-29). This could mean 
that within-society variations would hold very small or no 
statistical significance. Thus, in these countries, the reliance of 
statistical analysis in studying various types of correlations 
between certain attitudes or behaviours and individuality or 
organizational factors, may lead, as it did in the case of Al- 
Atiyyah's (1975) study of top management in Iraq, to a false and 
unrealistic conclusion. She found no statistical significance to 
these correlations and concluded that the above factors do not affect 
top managers leadership behaviour. Within-society variations do 
exist and they are significant in themselves and in their influence 
on society's members, even if this influence has not been found to be 
statistically significant. Thus the researcher decided to go beyond 
the numbers and try to explore such variations through a descriptive
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analysis of the association of variables. The researcher used 
'percentages' to simplify the data and to translate it into standard 
form, with a base of 100 for relative comparisons (Emory 1980), which 
helped the researcher in displaying conparisons between variables and 
in describing the tendencies of the factors under study. In fact, 
although going beyond the numbers was a long exhausting journey, it 
enabled the researcher to trace general tendencies within the 
association of factors under study. Also such a journey allowed the 
researcher to live with the data and follow specific cases and 
implications, which has supported the generation of concepts used to 
explain the phenomenon under study.
Collection of data, and more the interpretation of research 
findings have benefited from the fact that the researcher was dealing 
with her own native culture and fran drawing upon her experiences, 
both in wider society and in work organizations. Also acquiring 
another version of culture through living in a Western country 
provided the researcher with a degree of detachment or alienation 
from her native culture, which has the advantage of reducing the 
subjectivity of seeing the world through the glasses of the native 
cuture. Having these two versions of culture has enabled the 
researcher to identify and explain, through getting 'inside the 
subject's head', the behavioural differences between what the Western 
theories have assumed and what the reality is in non-Western 
oountires (e.g. Iraq).
Instead of imposing a preconceived theoretical framework upon 
the data, the concepts that were used in describing and interpreting 
the phenomenon under study were mostly derived from the data. Thus 
the research's conceptual framework was mainly generated, as 
suggested by Glaser and Strauss (1967), through the research
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strategies of handling the data by "providing modes of 
conceptualization for describing and explaining" (p.3). But one 
cannot deny the value of the basic initial discovery of theorical 
concepts derived from existing frameworks, or the researcher's 
previous work experience in building the research model and forming 
working hypotheses.
Although specific data was devoted to describing and explaining 
an aspect of the phenomenon under study, any necessary data in any 
chapter was used to justify the researcher's point of view when 




THE CUMULATIVE SOCIETAL NORMS AND PERCEPTIONS 
OF POWER AND AUTHORITY THROUGH THE 
EVOLUTION OF IRAQI CULTURE
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INTODOCTICM
In the Arab world, history and the present are Intimately 
related. So if it is true that a proper assessment of the present 
will help us to understand the past, it is even more true that to 
understand the present it is helpful to understand the past, 
tradition and early societal experiences. All these must have had a 
lasting impact on today's culture in a manner which is similar to the 
impact of childhood experiences on the individual personality.
Iraq is known as one of the most ancient cradles of 
civilization. Fran the very earliest time Iraq has been a fusion pot 
for successive cultures; the Sumerians, the Chaldeans, the Assyrians, 
the Persians, the Greeks, the Arabs, the Turks, and recently the 
British have all made their impression on the country ((Main 1935).
A nunher of forces have contributed to the crystallization of 
Iraq's cultural traits. Ihe most important of these forces is the 
'value' system of the nomadic Bedouins of the Arabian peninsula. 
Many of today's Arabic cultural traits have their roots in Bedouin 
origin. So in order to understand the Iraqi cultural traits, it is 
fundamental to go back to Bedouin culture, which stems from the 
following ;
1) - Bedouin ism (means inhabitants of the desert. In Arabia, it 
has come to be applied only to those tribesmen whose decent is 
recognized as pure) has affected Iraqi history, its social structure, 
values and norms. Iraq's position on the border of one abundant 
source of nomadism - the Arabian peninsula and its topography, which 
offers easy access to all ambitious conquerors, along with the 
richness of the land, has made it attractive to many nomadic waves, 
who one by one since prehistory have entered the river valleys as 
invaders or iitmigrants and have particpated in forming the Iraqi
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community (Alwardi 1965). Naturally, that nomadic expansion had its 
effect on the cultural traits of the settled areas through a wide and 
frequent diffusion of Bedouin values and norms.
The society of Iraq had to follow two contradictory directions 
at the same time, Bedouinism and existing civilization, hovering 
between their conflicting values. It is true to say that Iraqi 
society, during the struggle between the two directions, was 
suffering from the "ebb and flow" pheronenon between Bedouinism and 
the values of the existing civilization. When Bedouinism flowed, its 
values dominated social life (e.g. during the Ottoman Bnnpire), while 
in the ebb period civilization values started to flow (e.g. during 
the Abbas id period when Baghdad was a great centre of civilzation). 
Ihe society, after any ebb of Bedouinism, held onto its values for 
long or short periods depending on many environmental factors. As 
society's members got accustomed to certain values it became 
difficult to relinquish those values but, no doubt, they weaken 
gradually eilthough they need quite a long time during which the 
struggle between the old and new values occurs, leading to a 
situation where a lot of social problems can potentially arise 
(Alwardi 1965).
The effect of Bedouin values has never been limited to Bedouin 
society alone, but extended to the settled rural inhabitants who had 
been living in a similar social setting to that of the Bedouins, 
especially as many thousands of Bedouins settled on the land and were 
in time, economically involved with agricultural life. With the 
advent of the oil industry and other industries, and the improvement 
in oornmunications, Bedouins have had an increasing number of direct 
relations with urban areas; many nomads in the process of becoming 
sedentary were bypassing agricultural life and going directly from 
nomadic to urban industrial communities (Al-Dahirie 1969).
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So the population of towns, by their frequent contact with the 
Bedouins and rural tribes, were also affected by the nomadic values 
and norms to a great extent. Particularly, the Bedouins' tendency to 
revolt against the idea of settlement and to look down on settled 
people and their way of life disappeared in time, and gradually most 
of them became part of the settled population, breaking away from 
their nomadic life by adapting themselves to the city way of life. 
In fact, as Jamali stated, "many of the culture traits of the town 
dwellers of Iraq today cannot be well understood without tracing it 
back to desert life, for many of the town dwellers of Iraq are of 
tribal descent. They still retain vestiges of desert cultural 
traits. They take pride in the fact that they descend from a well- 
known tribe" (Jamali 1934, p. 15).
It is interesting to note that Iraq's population in 1867 
consisted of the following groups :
1 - Bedouin tribes 35%
2 - Rural tribes 41%
3 - Town Population (Urban) 24%
If we realize that the rural tribes were originally Bedouins, we 
could say that the Bedouins formed 76% of the whole population of 
Iraq at that time (950,000 out of 1,250,000) (Alwardi 1965).
The influence of Bedouinism was increased by the continuous 
immigration from the rural areas to the towns and cities 
(particularly Baghdad). While in 1947 the rural population was 64% 
of the total population the figure dropped to become 36.3% in 1975 
(Alnassar 1977), showing that 27.7% of them immigrated to the towns 
and cities whilst still holding to their norms and values. 
Originally these values were Bedouin in nature, but were gradually 
diluted.
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2) - The Arabs before Islam were mostly Bedouins in the desert
(O'Leary 1927) and it was in the seventh century under the leadership 
of the Prophet Muhammad and his immediate successors that a unified 
and growing Islamic community was established.
Islamic values and principles clashes often with Bedouinism. 
Those clashes led to a sort of social struggle between the two 
values, implicitly or explicitly (Alwardi 1954, pp. 45-6). Although 
Islam became the most important basic theme of the Arab community's 
life, and Bedouin society played a declining role in the modernizing 
Arab world, certain Bedouin values have persisted through the changes 
but in a modified form, which affected the way of practising the 
principles of Islam.
I will attempt in the following pages to outline the evolution 
of the Iraqi culture, but the main concern will be on societal norms 
and perceptions of power and authority, and societal experiences in 
relation to authority and power. F o r this purpose the following 
socio-histroical stages have been devised ;
1 - Power and authority and their societal norms in Bedouin
culture.
2 - Power and authority and their societal norms in Islamic
culture.
3 - Power and authority and their societal norms during the
Ottoman Bnnpire (1534-1917).
4 - Pover and authority and their societal norms during the
British influence (1920-1958).
1. POWER AND AUTHORiry AND THEIR SOCIETAL NORMS IN BEDOUIN CÜLIÜRE
In order to understand the influences of Bedouin culture, we 
need to study the social life of the Bedouin tribes in Iraq and the
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changes which have taken place in their life under the conditions 
existing in the settled areas in Iraq, and the consequences of that 
on Iraqi society. However, it is necessary to first present the 
outstanding features and sane sociological facts about Bedouin 
culture in Arabia. For after all, it is from Arabia that all the 
Arabic Bedouins of Iraq have originated.
Bedouin culture affords a typical example of the fact that the 
local cultures in the past were greatly dependent upon the 
geographical environment. Arabia had been subjected to prolonged 
periods of drought but before that there were many towns and cities 
which flourished (Jamali 1934). As a result of the gradual climatic 
changes and drought, Arabia has turned into a dry country which could 
hardly support its population: "The people of Arabia have had to 
resort to the nomadic mode of life, with all its hardship>s and 
precariousness and to struggle for existence". (Jamali 1934,pp. 18- 
19). The Bedouin is no gypsy roaming aimlessly but, as Hitti states : 
.represents the best adaptation of human life to desert 
conditions. Wherever verdant land is found, there he goes seeking 
pasture. Nomadism is as much a scientific mode of living in the 
Nufud as idustrialism is in Detroit or Manchester."(Hitti 1970, 
p. 33).
So the Bedouin character and tradition are a faithful reflection 
of the aridity of their desert habitat. Their values, norms and 
institutions are deeply rooted in their social structure which has 
evolved out of long experiences and inherited tradition.
Alwardi, by studying the nature of Iraqi society, particularly 
his study of Bedouin culture, has distinguished the 'superiority 
propensity' in the complexes of that culture. The Bedouin, as he 
notes, likes himself and his tribe to be powerful and not powerless ;
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he wants his tribe to be strong and powerful among other tribes, and 
to glorify its power to vanquish others; he also wants to impress 
others by his chivalry, bravery and defiance, and to prevail over 
others through his muruwwa (manliness, virtue) which consists mainly 
of generosity and hospitality (Alwardi 1965).
This 'superiority propensity' became embedded in the Bedouin's 
cultural complexes, as we will see in the following analysis of the 
main complexes.
A. 'Asabiydk' (trihall.«=an, or zealotry of the tribe)
Asabiyah as Hitti says, "Is the spirit of the clan. It inplies 
boundless and unconditional loyalty to follow clansmen and 
corresponds in general to patriotism of the passionate, chauvinistic 
type," (Hitti 1970, p. 27).
The tribe or qabilah of a Bedouin is more or less analogous to 
the 'nation' of the modem world. Essentially the tribal unit is 
supposed to have its basis in a blood relationship which is the 
essential element of group feeling. In fact the blood ties, fictions 
or real, furnish the adhesive element of the tribal organization. 
The tribe is composed of homogeneous groups linked together.
The Bedouin finds his safety and security in his tribe. Without 
belonging to a tribe in the desert he would feel jeopardized, 
whatever his bravery and defiance, and thus his identity is through 
his tribe identity. Hitti says ; "No worse calamity could befall a 
Bedouin than to lose his tribal affiliation. A tribeless man, in a 
land where stranger and enemy are synonymous, like a landless man in 
feudal England, is practically helpless. His status is that of an 
outlaw, one beyond the pale of protection and safety" (Hitti 1970, 
pp. 26-27).
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The requirements of nomadic life make the person and family 
dependent upon clan and tribe. Berger (1962) remarks that : "one of
the basic features of Bedouin society is the assumption by family
and tribe of responsibility for the conduct of its individual 
members", (p. 65). The tribe secures its members in any place they 
go to in the desert through the desert law of "an eye for an eye" and 
by "blood-vengeance". Punishment for wrongs is inçosed by a tribe 
upon its own members. Punishment is retributive and equalitarian, 
that is, it aims to inflict upon the offender the same damage he 
inflicted upon his victim to avoid further crime. Crimes, insults 
and wrongs place a heavy burden upon the group to which the offender
belongs (Berger 1962). Thus the individual is subject to close
supervision and discipline from his group, because his behaviour so 
seriously involves his whole community, This way of dealing with 
offenders in desert communities enables such a social order to 
maintain the balance necessary for survival in the desert, where the 
rules are easy to break and where there are no institutional means to 
treat offenders, such as jails, courts and others.
For the Bedouin, the victim of a wrong must be satisfied, and 
the community is concerned largely with the feelings of the victim 
and his kin, before any consideration may be shown to the person who 
wronged him; it is a matter of honour to them : "It is honour and not 
any feeling of friendship, which bids a Bedouin to undertake a blood 
feud against enemies" (Almaney 1981, p. 14). In fact honour plays an 
m^rtant part in the Bedouins' life to the extent that is related to 
almost all of their daily activités. Honour in Bedouin society is 
not derived from wealth or power over others only, but it can exist 
independently due to the fact that Bedouins can manage without any of 
these things (Almaney 1981).
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Thus the Bedouin wants to ioelong to a strong tribe, and as his 
tribe gets stronger, he will be more secure, and his status in the 
desert society will be enhanced. His relationship with his tribe is 
an interdependent one - his tribe gives him a wide protection, 
security and defence; in return he gives the tribe unconditional 
loyalty and the willingness to fight for its defence. Thus the 
Bedouin is strenghtened by his tribe's power, and his tribe is in 
turn strengthened by him.
In Bedouin tribalism, the descent nasab plays an important role. 
nasab is of tremendous importance in Bedouins life. Hitti (1970) 
quoted that ; "No people, other than the Arabians, have ever raised 
genealogy to the dignity of a science" (p. 28). By the nasab the 
Bedouin could distinguish his tribe members from the other tribes and 
be aware of whom to revenge. A Bedouin with unknown ancestry in the 
desert is like one without tribe. He is also proud of his purity of 
blood and his noble ancestry; Bedouin women disdain to marry cowardly 
men and Bedouin men disdain to marry women without a well-known nasab 
(Alwardi 1965).
B. *Ghazw* {cr raiding)
Bedouins, in their adaptation to the economic and social 
conditions of desert life, have resorted to raiding one another for 
water and pasture to support their livelihood.
The Bedouin, through his struggle with the harsh nomadic life, 
was trained to raid, and it became a part of his mentality. Hitti 
wrote ; "In a desert land, whose inhabitants were normally in a 
condition of semi-starvation and [where] the fighting mood is a 
chronic mental condition, raiding is one of the few manly occupations" 
(Hitti 1970, p. 89).
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Raiding is a legitimate behaviour from the view point of the 
Bedouins, and it is ; "a recognized institution among the desert 
tribes and whatever is thus gained is a legitimate possession of the 
raider" (Jamali 1934, p. 29).
For Bedouins raiding is something quite different from stealing 
or theiving ; very often it happens that the Bedouin gives much more 
of his wealth than he gains, so as to enhance his reputation for 
courage and chivalry in society. Raiding, as Hitti (1970) notes, is 
not a productive method of acquiring wealth, it does not actually 
increase the sum total of available supplies but it does help, to a 
certain extent, to keep down the number of mouths to feed.
The Bedouin, because of his 'superiority propensity', likes to 
surpass other tribes with his own tribe's power. Also he likes to be 
supreme over others personally, to surpass his peers by his defiance, 
bravery and chivalry when his tribe is at war or is raiding. Such 
personal characteristics are Bedouin ideals and are glorified in their 
society. For the Bedouin these characteristics are things to boast 
about; in his view life in the desert cannot tolerate the weak and the 
cowardly, the one who stays behind his group when they fight. He 
disdains to attack or raid weak people, but instead protects and 
defends them when they have recourse to him - it is a part of his 
generosity (Alwardi 1965). Thus, through meeting his society's ideals 
the Bedouin finds his respect and status, and he will be highly 
honoured in his society when he acquires a good reputation by having 
one of the above characteristics. He has as much infinite pride in 
his courage, his horse, his sword and his generosity as he does in his 
noble ancestry, and in the purity of his blood.
His 'superiority propensity' dominates all his activités; he 
respects keeping promises, and he considers his words as a debt he
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should pay, but he will not keep his promise if that makes him indulge 
in weakness or subordination. He likes to do that of his own free 
will, not because he is forced or pushed to do so (Alwardi 1965).
C. 'Muruwuxx ' (manliness, virtues)
In any social life in all its kinds and evolution, the two sides, 
that of 'struggle' and 'cooperation', must be in equilibrium. There 
is no difference between Bedouin culture or any other culture in this 
respect; the difference is in the nature of that equilibrium.
As we have seen in the previous pages the Bedouin likes to raid, 
defeat and revenge. But he also likes to protect others, to be very 
generous, and to give his hospitality to any who may seek it. He is 
characterized by excessive politeness. He offers his protection 
'dakhala' to any one who seeks such a relationship as a prot^^ 
(dakhil) (Hitti 1970) (p. 27).
Muruwwa, the Arab's idea of morality, consists mainly of courage 
and generosity. The Bedouin's courage is shown not only by defending 
his tribe, and his bravery and defiance, but also by the chivalrous 
treatment of his foes very much akin to that of the mediaeval knight. 
His generosity manifests itself in being always ready to join in the 
fray than to share in the spoil; in his readiness to slaughter his 
camels for his guest and for the poor and the helpless ; and in being 
generally more willing to give rather than to receive (Almaney 1981).
Hospitality or diyafah is considered one of the greatest virtues 
of the Bedouin (Berger 1962). However poor he is, or scant his food 
may be, he must feed his guest. However dreadful an enemy may be, the 
Bedouin is also within the laws of friendship, a loyal and generous 
friend. As hosts. Bedouins are entirely charming and the generosity 
of their hospitality is almost unlimited. Hospitality does not mean 
food to the guest and a place to stay for a while, but it is an
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establishment of a life long friendship. It also means giving 
protection to his guest and not allowing anybody to molest him.
If any ham befalls the guest after declaring that he has been a 
certain person's guest, the aggressor will invite the challenge of the 
host, and might lead the whole tribe if necessary to war (Jamali 
1934). The guest, Berger (1962) says ; "is considered almost a 
sacred trust, to be treated, if he is friendly or from one's own 
tribe, as well as or better than one's own immediate family" (p. 67). 
Ttiere is no doubt that hospitality is the result of adaptation to the 
physical environment. A traveller's life would be in constant peril 
without such institutions. In desert society where there are no inns 
or hotels for the travellers, hospitality is connected with personal 
safety and the established mores and honour, but even more with the 
protection of God (Hitti 1970). A Bedouin who may be known for not 
extending his guest a hearty welcome, will be infamous and news of him 
will be carried from camp to camp and he will have a hard time dealing 
with other tribes. Hospitality is granted not only to travellers but 
also to those in need of protection or dakhala from an avenger or an 
oppressor. The Bedouin, during the protection period which usually 
lasts three days, tries to settle the dispute, and no one can ham the 
pursued while he is under his protection (Jamali 1934).
Muruwwa (manliness, virtues), as Alwardi asserts, also indicates 
the Bedouin 'superiority propensity' as he is always willing to give 
but not to be given to; he is the host and the protector, but not the 
one who seeks the protection and hospitality. It is very difficult 
for the Bedouin to ask others for anything, but it is his pleasure to 
be asked by others. For him to ask for others protection and 
hospitality will indicate his subordination, but to give protection 
and hospitality to others reflects his superiority (Alwardi 1965). In
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fact this 'superiority propensity' dominates Bedouin life, and we can 
find it in most of their social activities and in their mental traits.
Equality, individuality, sheikhdom :
In Bedouin social organization, each tribe is subdivided into 
clans, and there is a sheikh at the head of each clan. At the head 
of the whole tribe there is a great sheikh, who is usually the head 
of one of the powerful clans. Theoretically, the sheikh of the tribe 
is the one to whom all the lesser sheikhs submit, but it is not 
always true that all clans' sheikhs yield to the great sheikh. 
Jamali (1934) stated that the : "Sheikh in a clan or a tribe is the 
head of the legislative, judicial, and executive affairs of the
tribal government; he is the oomivander-general in war; he is the
spokesman and the guardian of the honour and prestige of the tribe"
(p. 27).
The sheikh is chosen for his capacity, seniority in age, 
personal qualities such as courage tempered by caution and wisdom, 
wealth (which will enable him to be generous) and a fatherly attitude 
in dealing with his people; in other words a sheikh should be firm 
but just and kind (Berger 1962). Usually, the eldest son of the 
sheikh succeeds him, if he is acceptable to members of the tribe; if 
not, someone else in the sheikh's family (brother or uncle) will
occupy the post. But if the sheikh or one unacceptable to the 
members of the tribe cannot continue to hold his post for a long 
time, he is sometimes overpowered by another person who occupies the 
post. So for the sheikh to be worthy of his post as a leader of his 
tribe, he needs to have a strong personality, and to show a great 
capacity for leadership (Jamali 1934). The sheikh has been described 
by Hitti (1970) as follows ;
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"the senior member of the tribe whose leadership 
asserts itself in sober counsel, in generosity and in 
course" (p. 28).
The tribal sheikh is not an autocrat : theoretically he has 
considerable power, but his actions and decisions are always guided 
by the public opinion of the tribe. In exercising his povær and 
authority, he must do so within the bounds of tribal custom, and in 
accordance with the tribe's traditional interpretation of its 
interests (Jamali 1934; Berger 1962). In judicial, military and 
other affairs of cannon concern, the sheikh is not the absolute 
authority; before embarking upon any course of action he must consult 
the tribal council, which expresses tribal opinion. The tribe's 
council is composed of elders from the various clans and heads of the 
component families. All matters of tribal policy are discussed 
during the council meeting in the sheikh's great reception tent 
(majlis). In some tribes, as Jamali notes : "judicial matters are 
not dealt with by the sheikh himself but by a man whose honesty and 
good judgement is well known" (Jamali 1934, pp. 27-28).
From the above, it is obvious that the apparent absolutism of 
the sheikh's power is only relative since it is always checked and 
balanced by the opinion of members of the tribe. Furthermore, if 
they believe that the sheikh had violated justice or broken the code 
of honour of the tribe, or even shown poor leadership in a raid or a 
move, they would either exile or assassinate him, and a new sheikh 
would take his place (Jamali 1934). The sheikh's tenure of office 
lasts while the good-will of his constituency exists. He is 
therefore, as Ibn Khaldun asserted : "forced to rule them kindly and
to avoid antagonizing them. Otherwise, he would have trouble with 
the group spirit, and (such trouble) would be his undoing and theirs"
(Itxi-Khaldun 1958, p. 306). On the other hand, the sheikh as a
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leader must be able to exercise a restraining influence by force, but 
he : "must at the same time 'humour* than and avoid a show of force,
which might cause so much rebellion as to destroy the power of the 
leaders and unity of the group itself." (Berger 1962, p. 63).
"Discipline, respect for order and authority are no idols in 
desert life" Hitti quotes (Hitti 1970, p. 24). The Arab in general 
and the Bedouin in particular has been described by Berger (1962) as 
a "strong individualist and believer in equality" (p.63). Also 
Hitti (1970) describes them as "bom democrats" : Bedouins are not 
obedient subjects, the humblest Bedouin meets his sheikh on an equal 
footing. He has free access to the sheikh's council tent or majlis. 
He argues and sits with his sheikh without any heed of the sheikh's 
power; he does not flatter him (Main 1935). Very often the Bedouins 
treat their sheikh to sharp criticism and harsh words. In describing 
seme of the traits of their mentality, Jamali (1934) states : "[in] 
passing a judgement or making a decision the Bedouin is quick and 
frank" (p. 53). Philby (1922) remarks ; "Simple and direct are the 
arguments of the Arab..." (p. 239) In others words the Bedouin's 
impulsiveness, intelligence, courage and individuality all play their 
role in making a decision or passing a judgement. In fact, the 
Bedouin is characterized by plainness, frankness, pride and dignity. 
They disdain lying or deceit, as they consider these manners as the 
characteristics of the civilized people. It is, as Ibn Khaldun says 
; "Very difficult for them to subordinate themselves to each 
other" (Ibn Khaldun 1958, p. 150). Their tendency toward powsr is to 
be the commander but not the commanded, to overrule others but not to 
subject to others overruling, in other words to be superior but not 
subordinate. They love power, but to be in power not subject to it 
(Alwardi 1965) and that is what Ibn Khaldun (1958) describes as;
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"Compétition for superiority" (p. 150). The Bedouin is full of a 
strong sense of his own dignity, and he has, as O'Leary (1927) notes ; 
"a passionate urge towards personal freedom which impedes his 
individual liberty, and he does so regardless of his own interests" 
(p. 21). Therefore the Bedouin revolts against any povrer which seeks 
to control his freedom; thus he does not take easily to the restraints 
of government. When Fr. Lammens describes the Arab as the "typical 
democrat", O'Leary comments on that description, and says that : "We
must recognise that in this character are some of the salient 
characteristics of democracy in a somewhat exaggerated form" (O'Leary 
1927, p. 20).
In fact, the type of democracy within the Bedouins society
differs from that of modem democracy; it stems from the nature of 
their life and culture. For them it is a very familiar phenomenon, 
and they practice it as naturally as any other activity in their life.
Despite the Bedouin's feeling of individualism and
equal i tar ian ism, he is loyal and obedient to the ancient traditions of 
his tribe; their society hardly recognizes the individual but 
subordinates him to the family, clan and tribe, and the Bedouin, as 
Berger (1962) notes : "sees no coercion in following their ways. He
begins to balk and to display his recalcitrance only at those efforts 
to control him which ccme from beyond the tribe, from states and 
enpires" (p. 64). Individuality within the Bedouin society has a 
special characteristic, it has become a tendency conceming the group 
(tribe) interactions with others from outside the tribe, exemplified 
by the Bedouin usage of the term "we" instead of "I". But the Bedouin
also indicates his individuality very strongly when he interacts with
other men within the tribe.
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Although the Bedouins are democratic by nature, they have an 
aristocratic attitude in their communications with others (Alwardi 
1965). The Bedouin is a very proud person, and is unwilling to 
acknowledge another's superiority. The Bedouin, as described by Hitti 
(1970) : "Looks upon himself as the embodiment of a consunmate
pattern of creation. To him the Arabian nation is the noblest of all 
nations (afkar-al-uman) " (p. 28). There is democracy among the
Bedouin societies in the desert, but they have an aristocratic 
attitude tov^rd others such as certain nomadic tribes like the sulubba 
who are not considered Bedouins. Also they have the same attitude 
toward the civilized man, as they view him as being less happy and far 
more inferior (Hitti 1970).
They are very loyal to their tribe and their accepted sheikhs, 
but they are not loyal to strange powers or authority from outside 
their tribes.
From the preceding, we can now reach a conclusion about the 
nature of the social norms, and the perception of power and authority 
in Bedouin culture. Power in their society is the basic elanent and 
it is the backbone of its structure. Their social norms lead them 
strongly to be the powerful but not the powerless ; to exercise the 
power but not to be subject to that power, or more precisely to be the 
superior but not the subordinate. The power-distance in Bedouin 
society is very small, and there is a great amount of equality in 
their social life. Their social structure is based on the tribe and 
not on social class; there is no inequality in wealth and the Bedouins 
have no private ownership of the land, since most of their property is 
owned by the whole tribe (Jamali 1934). Their qualities of 
fearlessness, chivalry, self-reliance, love of freedon, individuality, 
and independence make them irrepressible in their attitudes. Although
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they are democrats, they have an aristocratic tendency. Even their 
personal names reflect their belief in power, such as Gazy (invader). 
Fat Ik (Assassin), Tariq ( nightccroer ),... etc. Or the names of wild 
animals such as tiger, lion, leopard,...etc.
2. POWER AND AUTHORITY AND THEIR 90CIE3M. NORMS IN ISIAMIC COUORE
Islam is the second basis for the societal norms and values and 
feelings of identity and commonality in Iraq. Socially even the non- 
muslim Arab who lives in an Islamic environment has been influenced by 
Islamic tradition for more than 1400 years.
Islamic philosophy stems from the fact that Islam is not simply a 
religion, 'It is a way of life'. Islamic teachings and laws cover the 
relationship with man and God, men's relationships with each other, as 
well as man's perception of himself. The principles, values, rights 
and duties of man towards the ccxnmunity and tiwDse of the community 
towards man, are described and prescribed by Islæiic teachings.
A. Pre-Islamic Society :
In the seventh century (in 610) Islam arose in Mecca in Hejaz, 
In that area of the desert the Oasis provided a more permanent version 
of the Arabs' tribal life to those who settled there. Mecca during 
the jahiliyah (pre-Islamic) period was the halt on the trade route 
which had been chosen by the Arabs as their business headquarters 
(O'Leary 1927).
The sedentary population of al-Hijaz allowed commercial relations 
with their civilized neighbours. By such trade Mecca became a wealthy 
merchant city. The leading tribe to which the Prophet himself 
belonged was that of the Qataysh so called "from trading and getting 
profit". The Quraysh held the powerful and supreme position in Mecca 
as it was the only merchant tribe and the kaaba keepers (Alwardi 
1954).
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In Mecca's society, each tribe retained its tribal constitution 
and was self-governing in the same way as a desert tribe, so Mecca was 
rather a collection of tribal camps than a city in the ordinary sense, 
but all joined together in a confederacy for the entertainment of 
visitors. Although the sedentary population in Mecca were originally 
a part of Arab Bedouin society they were, at the same time, citizens 
(O'Leary 1927; Hitti 1970). Many aspects of their way of life, social 
structure and values and norms developed differently than that of 
Bedouins in the desert. While this society was based upon tribalism, 
there was a large amount of inequality, social constraints and 
superordination in different areas and in appropriation and wealth. 
There were very rich and poor; in status there were master classes and 
slaves; in family structure the man was despotic and had the powerful 
supreme position, while women in general were oppressed and had no 
rights but were regarded as chattels (Shalabi 1963). They were, as 
Ibn Khaldun expalined, much concerned with all kinds of pleasures, and
accustomed to luxury and success in worldly occupations and to
indulgence in worldly desires (Ibn-Khaldun 1958). The basic element 
in that society was power ; it was their law as Shalabi (1963)
indicates.
B. Islam and Islamic Society :
Islam, when it arose in Mecca, cancelled the past at one stroke;
it cut the most vital bond of Arab relationship, that of tribal
kinship and replaced it by a new bond, that of faith. All the
contrasts between the old order and the new were vividly drawn.
Prophet Mohammed has attacked the traditional basis of the class
system and inequality among the Arabs, by depreciating noble birth and 
considering it of no value before God, and by asserting the equality 
of all the faithful in view of the new religicm, which did not allow
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the existence of any distinction between the Arab and the non-Arab or
between a free man and a slave who adopted Islam. Also, it rejected
the tribalism and class belongingness. Islam refers to pre-Islamic
society as the age of 'ignorance'; ignorance as opposed, not to
knowledge but, basically, to justice. Fundamentally Islam came to
apply the word Jahiliyah (or injustice) to racial discrimination in
all its manifestations including excessive deference of lineage,
tribal convention and economic situation. Thus Islam changed the
focus of belongingness from those of tribal and social classes to the
belongingness to the whole of mankind as it appears in the Quran in
the following words :
"O Mankind, we have created you from a single male 
and female and made you nations and tribes so that you 
may get to know one another. Wrily the most honoured of 
you in the sight of God is the most righteous of you..."
(The Holy Quran, Surat Al-HUjurat, Ayah No. 13).
This concept has been affirmed by the Prophet Mohammed, who says :
"He is not from us, who propagates the 'ignorance* 
concept".
Also Islam has rejected the idea of classes and wealth supremacy,
and the racial discrimination based on nationality, race or colour.
Islam regards all people as equal, except for the degree of piety and
righteousness.
The Prophet Mohammed says :
"People are equal like the prongs of the comb".
He also says ;
"O Mankind, you are the children of Adam. And Adam 
is from soil. There is no superiority of an Arab over a 
non-Arab or a Non-nArab over an Arab, or a white over a 
black or a black over a white person except through 
righteousness and piety" (Shalabi 1963, p. 43).
Also Islam stipulated that excercising authority must be
paralleled with the consultative principle ;
"Consult them in the affairs of the moment, then.
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when thou hast taken a decision, put thy trust in God*
(The Holy Quran, Surat Al-Bnran, Ayah No. 159).
At the beginning of the Islamic religion, Mohamned won little 
support, mainly from some of his family members, but very few of the 
Arabs in Mecca except among the poor and slaves. But he and his 
followers were subject to great oppression and animosity from in 
particular the Quraysh, the powerful tribe with representatives of the 
aristocratic and influential Unayyad branch, who opposed them. This 
was because for them Islam seemed, as Hitti (1970) explained, to run 
counter to the best economic interests of the Quraysh as custodians of 
al-kaabah, the pantheon of multitudinous deities and centre of a pan- 
Arabian pilgramage. They did not wish to abandon their old goals, 
their ancient customs and their powerful and glorious position, as 
they were holding the reins of authority, power and wealth in pre- 
Islamic days. Iliey disliked the idea of being equal with their poor 
slaves and the lower classes, and being subordinate to one spiritual 
God. Also they disliked the ideas of Islam because it does not 
recognize the idea of a chosen people (Alwardi 1954). Under the 
oppression the Prophet with his followers had to flee Hijra to Medina 
in 622, which was the starting point of the Moslem calendar. In 
Medina, Mohammed became the ruler, able to practice the religion and 
develop the Islamic community. Then in 630 Moslems were able to 
enter Mecca again, and defeat the Quraysh and destroy the pagan Gods. 
This led all the aristocratic and powerful members of the Quraysh such 
as Ibo-sofuan and his clan Umayya to join Islam (Hitti 1970). And 
then Mohammed was able to found a state and nation upon the basis of 
religious faith.
During these events, most of the nomadic Arab tribes in the 
desert around Mecca were not believers in the Prophet and the new 
religion, but as it was growing in strength among the Moslems, under
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Mohammed's leadership, they were impressed, especially after he had 
entered Mecca. They converted to Islam in large numbers; those 
nomadic tribes looked upon these events as a sign that God was on the 
side of Mohammed and the new religion. Also it is in their nature, as 
already explained, not to join a weak and powerless group, because 
they love power and they are strong believers in it (Alwardi 1954). 
At the start of Islam, many of those nomadic Arab tribes who joined 
Islam were not real believers in Islam, and the Quran shows scepticism 
of them, as follows ;
"The Arabs of the desert declare : "We are true
believers’ say you are not? Bather say : ’we profess 
Islam,’ for faith has not yet found its way into your 
hearts” (The Holy Quran, Surat Al-Hujurat, Ayah No. 14).
Some of those tribes, after the death of the Prophet, fell away
from the faith of Islam, and had to be converted to Islam again,
because they assumed that their previous adherence was only in
accordance with a contract with the Prophet which expired upon his
death (Berger 1962; Hitti 1970).
The Bedouin has been observed as being hardly affected 
by Islam's purely religious precepts, and Islam as a religion for the 
Bedouin has flown over their heads (Berger 1962). But Ibn Khaldun 
insisted tJiat the Bedouins, because of their simple, uncorrupted ways, 
are the : "quickest of peoples to follow the call to truth and
righteousness" (Ibn-Khaldun 1958, p. 306). Berger (1962) statos that: 
" th e  desert is believed to be the natural home of religion" (p. 
68). The uncertainty of desert life and its hardships leads the 
Bedouin to "put his trust in the one God who alone can protect him 
from the enemy, hunger, sickness and death. Who can order the 
seasons, who can grant him water and rain" (Dickson 1949, p. 45)
In fact, we need to realize that the way tihe Bedouins perceive 
and practise Islam is different tlian in any other society. Recently,
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observations in this matter (as Berger 1962 quoted) show that Bedouins 
believe deeply in the one God whose messenger is Mohararamed; to the 
Bedouin, Allah is the one supernatural power who rules the world by 
His will, and all events which he cannot explain are referred to 
Allah, for he designs everything.
Bedouins "do not allow religion to come to rest on earth, upon 
the shoulders of other men" ; as Berger puts it, "the Bedouin does not 
take to rules of religion as prescribed by formal religious agencies" 
(Berger 1962, p. 69). They rarely bother with philosophizing about 
the nature or the existence of Allah. Religion to them is more a 
matter of feeling and passion than a matter of argument and 
philosophy. How much their feeling of reverence and awe for Allah 
affects their daily conduct is a personal matter, as there are those 
who commit the most atrocious cruelties without being thus influenced. 
Although Bedouins are deep believers, this does not prevent many of 
them from blood-revenge, raiding, tribalism, pride...etc. (Jamali 
1934); they may never bother to recognize the clashes between these 
activities and their beliefs in Islam.
In the Islamic society under the leadership of the Prophet 
Mohammed, there was a closeness between the Islamic ideal and reality 
and there was a very small power-d is tance between the ruler and the 
ruled. Mohammed and his family lived a very simple life; he abstained 
from and was indifferent to all aspects of privelege, prestige or 
luxurious life ; Hitti describes him as follows ;
"He was often seen mending his own clothes and %#as at 
all times within the reach of his people. The little he 
left, he regarded as state property" (p. 102).
Islam for Mohammed is a message of mercy, equality, social justice,
virtue and benevolence. He did not consider himself a king or emperor
and he "was never in the position of an arbitrary, patrimonial
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leader" (Turner 1974, p. 83); his leadership was mainly based on 
consultative methods. So he was not an autocratic ruler over his 
people, and he exhorted them not to obey such a ruler. One of his 
teachings is the following :
"The best way to strive (Jihad) towards God is a 
truthful word given to an arbitrary sultan or prince 
(i.e. ruler)"
The psychological closeness between rulers and ruled continued 
under Mohammed's successors (Abu-Baker and Umar) (Alwardi 1954). The 
ideal Moslem state was actually realized or very nearly so, by 
Mohammed's immediate successors. In fact for many Moslems this period 
of the four Orthodox (rashidun) Caliphs was the period in which the 
lustre of the Prophet's life had not ceased to shed its light and 
influence over the thoughts and acts of the Caliphs.
The first p^chological gap between ruler and ruled that arose 
within Islamic society and manifested itself clearly was during the 
last part of the lifetime of the third Caliph Uthman. That was 
because he gave to certain persons of his clan grants of land in Iraq, 
also some of the most important governorships to men of his family or 
his clan Umayya (Watt 1973; Alwardi 1954), who had failed to 
aknowledge Mohammed until the entering of Mecca and whose Islam was 
therefore considered to be of convenience rather than conviction. 
They became more wealthy and they imposed themselves on the others. 
In fact a wealthy aristiocratic class arose in the society at that 
time, and the inequality in different areas started to get larger 
(Alwardi 1954). For the ordinary Moslem this was against the 
principles of equality and justice in Islam, and led them to an 
increased struggle but with the help of another underlying factor, the 
conflict between Islamic values and that of Bedouinism. TTiat conflict 
did not appear clearly during the leadership of the first two orthodox
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Caliphs because the Bedouins were engaged in the Holy war with
Byzantine and Perisia which finished during the lifetime of Uthman 
(Alwardi 1954). The conflict between the old life in the desert with 
its nature of freedom and values, and the new life under the Islamic 
values with all the new discipline and control, led support to the
first factor and led in the end to revolt against Uthman and his being
put to death (Watt 1973). This meant that the struggles of Umayya 
clan for pcwer were brought to a head, specially after Ali was
proclaimed fourth Caliph, "who inaugurated his regime by dismissing 
most of the provincial governors appointed by his predecessor" (Hitti 
1970, p. 180). Also he tried strongly to practise the Islamic 
principles of equality and social justice until his death after a 
civil war with Muawiya ibn-abi-Sufyan, the head of the llnayya 
family, (Hitti 1970; Alwardi 1954).
Politically, the death of the fourth Caliph marked the end of 
what may be termed the republican period of the Caliphate (632-661), 
and the beginning of the Unayyad dynasty when Muawiya became the first 
Umayyad Caliph.
While the first four Orthodox Caliphates were all chosen or 
'elected* by notables, following the triple principles of taking 
counsel, designation, and acclamation (bay'a) (Turner 1974) without 
any regard to the issue of hereditary succession, the hereditary 
principle was introduced into Caliphal succession by the first Umayyad 
Caliph. This herediatry principle was followed after the Unayyads by 
other Moslem dynasties, including the Abbasids (Berger 1962), thus 
preserving the myth of genuine election. So, an extraordinary gulf 
between fact and doctrine developed in the matter of reaching 
authority. Berger quoted the following from Emile Tyan ; "The 
hereditary and dynastic principle spread throughout the Moslem world.
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Every autonomous authority which established itself, in whichever part 
of the vast empire, tended immediately to become settled in dynasty" 
(Berger 1962, p. 303).
The Unayyad not only marked the foundation of dynasties (mulk) 
and bureaucratic domination (Turner 1974) but more, their rule was a 
relapse which constituted a setback for the Moslem nation. Many 
aspects of social life, values and norms of this period were close to 
that of the Jahiliyah age (pre-Islamic) (Nicholson 1941; Hitti 1970). 
Power-distance and inequality got larger and larger in Islamic 
society. From the Unayya's aristocratic attitude arose class 
discrimination between the Arab and Mawali (non-Arab Moslim). The 
first class consisted naturally of the wealthy ruling aristocraties, 
headed by the Caliphal household and the Mawali, who were in Islamic 
theory equal, were mostly treated as second class (Alwardi 1954). The 
aristocratic attitude was strong among those who were still irû ired 
by the pre-Islamic spirit. Taha Housen indicates, as mentioned by 
Alwardi (1954), that the Arabs in general returned during the Umayyad 
period to their Bedouin tribal pride and rivalry more than they did in 
pre-Islamic times. Life became more luxurious for the ruling 
aristocracy, "the old connections with the goddesses of wine, song 
and poetry were re-established, the palaces arose in the cities, 
swarming with servants and slaves to provide their occupants with 
every variety of luxury" (Hitti 1970, pp. 250 and 267).
During this period Iraq was the base for many leading opposition 
figures to Umayyad rule. These were people who had been associated 
with the Prophet and had suffered oppression or fought with him. They 
went around encouraging people to oppose the Umayyad *s rule and fight 
for the Islamic teachings concerning equality and justice (Alwardi 
1954). While the umayyad rule was very stable and strong in Syria,
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Iraq was in a great opposition which resulted in being ruled by 
aggressive Umayyad governors, such as Al-Hajjaj whose policy showed 
the "Iraqi's from the very start that his would be [a] no kid-glove 
method of dealing with a disloyal populace" (Hitti 1970, p. 307).
Alwardi indicates that Iraqis at that time were suffering 
strongly fron a 'psychological contest' between the long established 
Bedouin values and the newly established Islamic ones; their practical 
day-to-day life came under the influence of the old values which 
conflicted with Islamic values and teachings which affected to a large 
extent and even shaped their mentality, and this presented a great 
contradiction between what they felt and what they actually did. This 
contradiction manifested itself clearly in the recurrent revolts 
against authority during Unayyad rule (Alwardi 1954). In fact in 
Islam there was no legislated formal function or committee to judge on 
actions of authority, thus that judgement was left to individuals 
themselves. While some of those individuals, in turn, left it to God, 
others believed that they should revolt against authority, and that is 
what happened in Iraq.
When the Umayyad state settled down, efforts were paid towards 
the administration of the provinces which came under its control. The 
people started to realize what benefits and advantages they would get 
from occupying posts in the administration of one of those provinces. 
In order to obtain such posts people gathered round the princes who 
had the power to appoint them and they tried their best to satisfy 
them (Al-Ali 1969).
The Abbas id came to power (750-1258) after the Unayyad by their 
premise of a return to orthodoxy and the principles of Islam, and 
through the support of many dissatisfied parties, especially the non- 
Arabian Moslems (Alwardi 1954). They soon established, in Baghdad, an
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Islamic economic empire. At the time of its achievement the Abbas id 
victory was generally hailed as representing the substitution of the 
true conception of the Caliphate, the idea of a theocratic state. 
They tried to close the gulf that had arisen between the state and 
religion during Unayyad rule. The Caliph, Hitti remarks, marked his 
exalted office by its religious character and as such, surrounded 
himself with men versed in Canon law whom he patronized and whose 
advice on matters of state affairs he sought (Hitti 1970).
The change that happened in this period was marked with a 
religious character, and the Abbasids promoted this change in public 
in order to gain favour, but the fact is that "religious change was 
more apparent than real; although unlike his Unayyad predecessor he 
assumed piety and feigned religiosity, the Baghdad Caliph proved as 
wordly-minded as he of Damascus who he had displaced" (Hitti 1970, p. 
289). A great amount of extensive authority was concentrated in the 
hands of the Caliph (Turner 1974, Hitti 1970). The Abbas id Caliph’s 
life became more luxurious than ever before. In particular the city 
Baghdad reached its golden age where the arts and sciences flourished 
and it became at that time a great centre of learning and civilization 
to all students from all parts of the world.
The hereditary principle of succession instituted by the Unayyad 
Caliphs was followed throughout the Abbas id regime with the same bad 
results (Turner 1974). The Abbasid, like the Umayyad, gained 
supremacy over the opposing parties through the policy of the iron- 
hand, but the Abbas id now cleverly directed toward permanently 
entrenching themselves in public favour, precisely by being marked 
with religious character. In fact for the Moslems the post of the 
Caliphate is a spiritual centre. In later years, the Abbasid's 
emphasis on the Caliph's office as an imamate, increased their actual
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power and they began to assume honorific titles compounded with Allah 
and their subjects started to shower on them extravagant titles, which 
persisted until the end of the Ottoman Caliphate (Hitti 1970).
The Abbas id was an empire of international races (neo-Moslems) of 
which the Arabs formed one of many. The Kurasannians formed the 
Caliphal bodyguard and Persians occupied the chief posts in the 
government (Hitti 1970). The Arabs suffered a lot from a kind of 
racial discrimination, which forced many of them to return to their 
nomadic life in the desert (Alwardi 1954).
The society in Iraq during that time instituted a period of 
strong adherence to religious ritual, which became one of its famous 
characteristics. But while the intellectual side of society was under 
the strong influence of the religious preachers, everday life was 
under a contradictory influence, since the values and norms which 
dominated the reality of that society were to respect and honour 
power, influence, wealth, and all aspects of luxury. Thus Iraqi 
society from that time started to suffer from a "cultural ambivalent 
phenomenon" (Alwardi 1954).
The period of the Abbas id Caliphs ended when in A.D. 1258 Hulagu 
Kahn, at the head of his Mongol hordes, seized and sacked Baghdad and 
put to death the last Caliph. Sykes wrote that ;
"No invasion in historical times can conpare in its 
accumulated horrors or in its far reaching consequences 
with that of the Mongols" (Sykes 1930, p. 70).
Baghdad was given over to plunder and flames, the majority of its
population were massacred. In one week one million of its inhabitants
were wiped out of existence (Hitti 1970). The great irrigation
systems were destroyed. The country became the abomination of
desolation. Not until recently, says Main "did Baghdad begin to
recover" (Main 1935, p. 15). "Moslem civilzation was at that period
the shining light in the world and it has never recovered from the
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deadly blow" Sykes stated (Sykes 1930, p. 98).
3. POWER AND AUlHORnY AND THEIR SOCIEIAL NCWMS PORING
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1534-1917)
After the Mongol invasion, which is considered as the great 
turning point in the intellectual as well as in the political history 
of Islam, "Iraq was long since habituated to disorders, to poverty, 
to change and bloodshed, to alien rulers, ... for eight generations 
each year had seen the country sink further back into tribalism, 
insecurity, dependence. Each month had brought news of dynastic rise 
and fall, to herald a fresh governor to Baghdad" (Longrigg 1968, p. 
18).
By 1508 Iraq had become a permanent part of the new Perisan 
kingdom. But contemporary with the revival of Persia was the 
establishment of the Ottoman Turkish Empire in Asia Minor. Iraq was 
the borderland between the two powers. Their struggle for Iraq soon 
ended in favour of the Turks, and the Ottoman sultan, Suleiman 
occupied Baghdad in 1534. He announced to the Arabs that he came to 
free them and to protect the Islamic world (Inalcik 1973). The sultan 
was first welcomed by the inhabitants : "Many a flattering tongue
foretold that the sultan would revive and surpass the former glories. 
The appeal to religion was yet more poignant" (Longrigg 1968, p. 24). 
Succeeding Pashas of Baghdad maintained the appearance of religious 
charater and rituals to the public.
In Iraq, after being for many centuries ruled by oppressive 
governments, the sultan might well be greeted as delivering, as he 
claimed, the sacred position of Caliph, vicar of the Prophet of God. 
The scattered families of Turkish blood through the provinces were 
elements of assured loyalty to the sultan (Longrigg 1968).
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Gradually, Iraq's hopes of œntented inclusion in the Ottoman 
Empire were to be disappointed. In anyway Ottoman rule was foreign 
and military. The very conception of Turkish dominion condemned the 
government to selfish and partial rule ; the principle of government 
was that the people were rayah or cattle to be exploited, not by the 
sultan himself or to his ambitious governors, but the rule was for the 
benefit of the ruled. Longrigg (1968) writes ; "As the government of 
the Empire was an autocratic monarchy with religious sanction, so the 
government of each province was absolute. In the remoter provinces 
especially there existed little to prevent the Pashas governing, as a 
traveller says, 'at their own will and pleasure' (pp. 48-49).
Hie Daftardars who were appointed from Istanbul to where they
rendered their accounts in practice supported the Pasha who held their
lives in his hand (Longrigg 1968, p. 49).
The Ottoman Empire was ruled by Turkish royalty, maintained by a
military-administrative force. That empire was a bureaucratic state . 
Inalcik (1973) states that the :
"Ottomans administrative and bureaucratic practise 
originated from and continued the ancient traditions of 
pre-Islamic necir eastern states" pp. 100-102).
Under the Ottoman Empire rule (four centuries down to World War
1) Iraq made hardly any progress of mind and spirit. Its natural
resources were much neglected, and its human resources even more so
(Jamali 1934). Ottoman governors established a very rigid pattern of
bureaucratic administration and contrived direct control over all
Iraq. The control of the provinces was effected by the Wilayet system
; each Wilayet or province was under a Wali or governor (known as
Pasha) responsible direct to Istanbul (Hassen 1975). The sultan and
his governors held the political power besides the centralized
authority of the government administration, minute decisions were
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constantly referred to the provincial governor and often to 
headquarters in Constantinople (Langley, 1961). The sultan had the 
full authority to appoint or remove from office any person according 
to his will, "his palace was the source of all power,...Government 
was conducted at gate and its officials were his slaves" (Inalcik 
1973, p. 76). The important officials were appointed by the central 
authority in Istanbul, while the lesser one by the local provincial 
governor (Langley 1961), (p. 134). Inalcik explains that there were 
powerful factors working in favour of Ottoman centralized 
administration; he states that the "most potent factor was the ottoman 
kul-slave-system. In particular the Janissary Corps... (who) gave the 
Ottoman sultan an undisputed superiority over his rivals. In the 
provinces the Ottomans created a Corps of Military administrators of 
slave origins and an army of siphahis, who greatly strengthened the 
Central Authority which they represented and which guaranteed their 
own status.... A final factor was the immense prestige of the Ottoman 
sultan in the eyes of the Muslim [sic.] population" (Inalcik 1973, p. 
18); he was the holder of the Islamic Caliphate post, which brought
with it important moral and material advantages.
The Ottoman's aim of provincial administration was to provide 
central government with taxes for its treasury and manpower for its 
army, and to maintain internal provincial security. The
administration system in general and the taxation system in particular 
offered fertile ground for abuse, corruption, dissensions and 
rebellion. Also capricious promotion of a favourite might bring to 
Baghdad a governor very unsuitable. Also in practise the highest 
officers sometimes could not be displaced, some of them were too loyal 
and valuable, while some had bought the post for a long term.
Longrigg states ; " [the] tax form, which was the government of the
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province fell to the highest bidder. The costly presents necesary to 
retain a lucrative office must themselves be provided by the 
provincial victims, who thus not only suffered but paid for ill 
government" (Longrigg 1968, p. 28).
Furthermore, by the very remoteness of the provinces, the 
excesses of governors were less visible from Istanbul, and appeared 
more difficult, so the vast opprotunities for self-enrichment offered 
by the distant provinces soon made them a marketable asset. For the 
Turkish officers banishment to Iraq [they called it "Hie Siberia of 
Turkey" (Alwardi 1965, p. 128) because of its bad inner situation and 
problens] was regarded as a hated duty or a rich opportunity (Longrigg 
1968). The Turkish governors of Iraq were preoccupied with collecting 
heavy taxes from the population, as the higher the taxes collected the 
higher salaries they got, because there was no specific system to fix 
salaries of civil servants, but it depended mostly on the amount of 
taxation the officials and government could get from their subjects 
(Al-Shamsie 1979). In fact the first duty of the incoming governor, 
for more than three centuries, was to divide up the lands of his 
province into a number of farmable units, and lease the lands and 
taxes to the highest reasonable bidder who in his turn employed his 
own forces in stimulating payment, or hiring them out to the rapacious 
collectors.
The civil service under the Ottoman rule not only suffered from 
too much centralization of authority, but also from instability. The 
succession of many governors in short periods led the administrative 
body to undergo many alterations in compliance with the governor's 
will and style (Alhaidari 1963). The civil servants were also 
Inefficient and poorly trained, while the civil code was slow and 
oonplicated and had little relevance to the realities of life in Iraq.
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The civil service was no better; there was a lack of law or 
regulations to organize many functions related to the civil servants 
such as selection, recruitment, transfer, and the salary system. The 
greatest weakness was the inefficiency and corruption of government 
and administrative body. Nearly all officials, judicial or 
administrators, had their price. Also many serious problems emerged 
concerning the management of people, such as nepotism, favouritism, 
bribes and sale of government posts (Al-Shamsie 1979). The civil 
servants were raised firstly frcm the ranks of slaves or Mamluks from 
Georgia and organized in grades for different duties of household or 
state affairs, which were in turn arranged in chambers or companies 
(similar to departments). The trainees were provided with training 
and promotion prospects, and so it was also common for some sons of 
Turkish officials and famous Iraqis to be recruited as well. After 
qualifying they were appointed as civil servants (Longrigg 1968). The 
public officers emerged in Iraq as followers of the central Ottoman 
government in Turkey. This came about by 1750, when the Turkish 
governor of Iraq Sulaiman Pasha formed a small, reliable fighting 
force of two hundred boys who were trained under his supervision and 
then used widely in such public offices as writers, collectors, 
garrison-oommanders, as well as in his own personal staff (Longrigg 
1968, p. 170).
To consolidate their control over Iraq, the Ottoman rulers 
introduced the policy of Ottomanization. They applied the Turkish 
Civil Code or nizamiya and Turkish methods in addition to splitting 
the country into administrative divisions. In government, courts and 
schools Turkish was the main language, and every day correspondence 
and records were written in Turkish; consequently Iraqi's who could 
understand Turkish grew up unable to write their own tongue (Longrigg
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1968). In the government departments and administrative organs, 
significant positions were restricted to Ottoman people and relatives 
of governmental personnel without any regard to the merit or 
competence of applicants. Iraqis filled only the lower grades, as 
they were not allowed to occupy a top management position (Ireland 
1937 ). The personnel who were recruited for different top management 
positions were selected to occupy vacant positions from those whom it 
was believed had the greatest influence in society (Al-Shamsie 1979).
The period after 1842 witnessed the growth of a new, influential 
bureaucratic class of regular officials, the Effendis, as a result of 
some administrative reforms (Longrigg 1953). The Effendis were 
conplacently urban and frcm middle and secular classes; many of them 
were Jews and Christians with an increasing parc^rtion of Moslems 
(Main 1935). They formed a great part of the social element which was 
receptive to Turkish culture as they spoke Turkish and acted as the 
main bridge between the Turk and Arab. Longrigg (1968) describes them 
as follows ;
"Literate, but otherwise educated, backward but 
decorous in social habit,... exact and over-refined in 
the letter of officialdom, oonpletely remote from a 
spirit of public service, identi^ing the body public 
with their own class, contemptous of tribe and 
cultivates, persistent speakers of Turkish among Arabs, 
almost universally oorrrpt and venal..." (pp. 281-282) 
"Ill-paid, and ambitious, they could not prudently rely 
on merit alone; nepotism was rampant, no intrigue or 
appeal neglected" (p. 36).
The Effendis were uniform in their travesty of European dress; 
they assumed that anyone who was well-dressed must be educated and so 
entitled to this form of dress ; for them it was shameful to soil their 
hands or to engage in menial work (Main 1935). They were eager to 
characterize themselves with magnificent titles in their 
communications with others. They liked to enjoy the company of their 
fellows, to talk politics in their special coffee-shops. They had
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their distinguished manners and accent, also they had their private 
meetings and clubs (Alwardi 1965).
The Effendis in city society ranked themselves above the ordinary 
people - they saw themselves as a high-ranking class. The people in 
turn tried to win the Effendis approval and be friendly to them in the 
hopes that this would increase their own respect and influence among 
others in society. Thus to accompnay the Effendis or to associate 
with them, or even frequent the same governmental offices became a 
great source of pride for the individuals concerned, who were 
respected as such by other pec^le (Alwardi 1965).
However, Alwardi (1965) sees the inhabitants of the cities as 
showing their rulers a kind of behaviour quite different from that 
concealed in their minds. They disliked those haughty rulers despite 
the exaggerated respect given to them. This kind of norm in dealing
with the people who have the power in society became a part of many
individuals' mentality, to the degree that they started to assume that 
the (respected) person is the one who exhibits pride and haughtiness 
and who seldom speaks to them, but if he behaves humbly this induces 
them to consider him as one of them or even to despise him. They used 
to view the Effendi as haughty, but they respected him in spite of 
that. By and large, to many people's perception, haughtiness and
high-ranking posts or classes are coupled.
Indeed, the city inhabitants have inherited from Bedouin culture
a contradictory value from what they were accustomed to displaying
toward their rulers. They, like the Bedouins, dislike those who 
exhibit haughtiness; on the other hand their very long subordination 
and submission to their rulers has led them to respect the haughty man 
even though they dislike him. In their private meetings, for example, 
they criticized the arrogant one but whenever he was present they
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Stood respectfully, smiled and tried their best to satisfy him. In 
fact this kind of behaviour toward the powerful became a social 
phenomenon and people became accustomed to it. Consequently, the 
powerful person became a subject of respect and fear by the powerless, 
regardless of the merit, qualification and personality of the person 
in power; the concern of the powerless is to satisfy the powerful in 
order to protect or to obtain the benefits (Alwardi 1965).
During the Ottoman period, however, the cities witnessed a 
spreading of Bedouin values which were in conflict with urban values. 
This is mainly because the prime interest of the Ottoman governors was 
in taxation and in increasing the revenue, while they were unable to 
protect the people or to set up justice among them. This situation 
induced people to organize their cities according to tribal methods in 
order to protect themselves. So by adopting the tribal tradition, 
each city, especially at the end of the Ottoman period, began to elect 
its sheikh and demand blood revenge, ... and so forth (Alwardi 1865). 
Hence, each individual started to glorify power, to be ethnocentric or 
a zealot of his city, town and area of living, identically to Bedouin 
tribalism. What increased this state of affairs is that while the 
Bedouins love of power and 'superiority propensity' is satisfied by 
desert life, it is stifled in the life of the city, as the city 
inhabitants have lived under bondage and authoritarian rulers for 
generations.
Inhabitants of the cities during Ottoman rule suffered, as 
Alwardi says, from a "schizoid personality", their principles and 
ideals being derived from the religious teachings, while in their 
daily life they practised behaviours contradictory to those relgious 
teachings. In fact people in the cities adopted many Bedouin values, 
but distorted and metamorphosed them, thus taking those values further
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away from Islamic teachings than were originally (Alwardi 1965, p. 118 
and p. 142).
The Ottoman government was very concerned about keeping its 
powerful position in the eyes of the people, so it did not care what 
the people did with themselves as long as they showed obedience, 
respect and flattery to that government. This kind of behaviour 
became a part of the social values and norms of dealing with people 
who have power in society.
The growth of feudalism throughout changes in Bedouin culture
under the Ottoman rule :
Hie breakdown of government in the Mongol period had enabled the 
Bedouin tribes to encroach greatly upon the settled land and also 
permitted the entry of fresh tribes from Arabia to Iraq where the 
fertility of the land and availability of water was evident. This 
tribal immigration increased during Ottoman rule, especially when the 
government was not stable and strong enough to control the movement of 
the tribes (Alwardi 1965).
The Bedouins, on their arrival in Iraq, faced new conditions 
which affected their culture traits, and consequently this interaction 
had its influence on the culture traits of the settled areas. The 
Bedouin, as Jamali states ; "came in direct contact with settled 
people whose material life was quite different from his own, and whose 
social and religious institutions were much more complex. Last but 
not least he came within the sphere of influence of a state" (Jamali 
1934, p. 55).
Under the Ottoman rule, the Bedouin tribes - despite constituting 
a considerable proportion of the Iraqi population (as stated earlier 
in this chapter) - did not receive the attention and sympathy they 
deserved, and instead of being pacified and shown a better way of
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living, they were treated as subversive elements. The Ottoman Pashas, 
states Longrigg (1968) "strove to crush life frcm the tribes by 
weight of arms" (Longrigg 1968, p. 290). They aimed to making the 
tribesmen obedient citizens, without showing them a hint of the 
respect which would evoke obedience. The leaders of the tribes saw 
the Turkish rulers as perfidious, weak and brutal. They also ;"saw 
the oppresive treatment of the settled folk whom every tax-farmer 
robbed and every Dhabtiyyah bullied; they saw the contempt for 
themselves, the haughtiness, the scornful insolence of the Turk" 
(Longrigg 1968, p. 290). So they recoiled from the horrors of
government and its threat to rob their freedom.
The Ottoman government had no definite policy regarding the 
development of tribal societies; their policy of coping with the 
tribal problem was by alliances, dividing tribe against tribe,
supporting one tribal sheikh against his brother or uncle, and
vigorous punitive expeditions. So it was not unusual to see these 
tribal units waging war against one another, or clashing with the 
established government, which was mainly because of the imposition of 
taxes for which the tribes saw no legitimate reason (Jamali 1934).
The Bedouin tribes were, during Ottoman rule, independent or
nominal vassals ; while the tribal chiefs maintained order in their own 
regions, the tribesmen were treated by Turkish Walis as fellahin 
(cultivators) and the Walis tried to compel them by force of arms to 
accept regular taxation and conscription. Land in Iraq were subject 
to many claims; the tribes, in their concept of public ownership of 
the areas which they occupied, considered the land on which they had 
settled in Iraq as their own property. This concept of public 
ownership came into direct conflict with the Ottoman government's view 
that most of the land in Iraq belonged to the Ottoman state, by the
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right of conquest, according to which it could grant all non-owned 
lands to whomever it wished and for whatever purpose (Jamali 1934). 
In fact many Ottoman Walis bestowed lands in Iraq to many persons, so 
the descendants of the old landowners still clung to deeds of feudal 
title. The Walis also granted lands to those they preferred without 
regard to the claims of the occupants. On the other hand sale and 
purchase of state lands went on for generations without the knowledge 
or recognition of the government; some villagers and more so the 
sheikhs in tribal areas claimed their holding of the land through long 
possession of it. The denial of such claims by the government created 
many conflicts and much confusion. The result, as Longrigg says, was 
that ; "all agrarian improvement was checked by the absence of 
definite rights; and the tribes perceived that to settle merely 
exposed them to easier exaction [sic] and punishment" (Longrigg 1968, 
p. 306).
Things remained much the same until the coming of Midhat Pasha in 
1869. He saw that the tribesmen could only be brought within the 
framework of ordered civilization by settling them through landgrants, 
and through this the Bedouin would change his mode of life and become 
dependent upon the government. Midhat Pasha's land settlement policy 
was to sell by auction, on easy terms, the tenancy-right but not the 
ownership of the state lands to all the claimants; and most important 
to the sheikhs of tribes for their tribal areas (Longrigg 1968). In 
practise the land settlement policy was not successful; many tribes 
refused the bait, distrusting the change of status and fearing 
conscription. The tribes fully realized the dangers which would 
befall them once they were settled. But while the majority of tribal 
leaders feared and shunned the new status, many others accepted the 
new arrangements and began to settle, and obtained by the new
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settlement policy a tenancy-right to state land. Also by the 
ignorance and venality of the Tapu officials and the prevailing
corruption, many lands were sold to city speculators instead of to 
tribesmen. In certain areas, such as the Muntafiq, freehold titles 
over vague estates in the tribal area were bought: by many members of
Sad uns family. So the tribesmen became the fellahin and saw sheikhs
adopt rulers with Ottoman titles of office (Longrigg 1968; Jamali 
1934; Pool 1980), and were now asked to pay not only the government's 
but the landlord's crop-share. In fact the hope of the new Tapu 
settlement was to fix tribal cultivating tenure, which would transform 
sheikhs into landlords, and make them politcally dependant upon the 
government. At the same time Midhat Pasha had another policy of 
Ottcmanizing the sheikhs. He gave some tribal sheikhs official 
titles, such as Pashas and Beys, recognizing them as civil
administrative officials instead of tribal sheikhs; he also encouraged 
them to adopt Turkish manners and education (Jamali 1934; Pool 1980). 
Hie tribesmen were unwilling to see their sheikh turn into landlord 
and Pasha all at one, and divided into antagonistic sections. In fact 
the two lines of Ottoman tribal policy - settlement on the land and 
Ottomanization - had great effect on the Bedouin culture; tribalism 
itself weakened in the new environment of settled residence, and the 
many interests and relations of the new life began to overlay the old 
outlook of the tribe. By the end of Turkish rule the tribes were more 
subdivided and thus weakened; resistance to government by a united 
tribe vas always rare. The sheikhs became increasingly involved in 
town life and politics (Longrigg 1953).
The Bedouin, in coming from Arabia and settling down in Iraq, 
faced a very different envioronment which was conducive to a change in 
their mode of life and in their culture's traits.
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By taking up agriculture as a result of Midhat Pasha's policy - 
many Bedouin tribes became more rural - the sheikhs turned into the 
chiefs of agricultural communities; they became : "accessible,
because rooted; vunerable, by reason of government's power of water- 
control; taxable, since crops cannot be driven off nor wholly 
concealed; dependent on government as landlords.. (longrigg 1968, p. 
306).
The sheikh under Ottoman rule was given official authority by the 
government, and he became the man responsible to that government for 
collecting and paying the taxes due. Although the basis of 
landownership was the tribal dirah, titled in the name of the tribe 
as a whole, this land was registered in the Sheikh's name, who became 
the holder of freehold titles, who in time came to consider themselves 
as the real owners of state land (Warriner 1962). In fact, the basis 
of landownership as tribal dirah had no legal basis or protection frcm 
the law or state as the tribal lands were regarded as state land and 
the tribal occupants as tenants-at-will : ownership of the land was 
questionable on any grounds. In fact the Ottoman government exploited 
the rivalry between brothers or relatives over sheikhood by selecting 
the person who showed himself more submissive to its policy. Also the 
government "by virtue of the land-tenancy law deprived certain 
sheikhs and favoured others according to their political inclinations 
and obedience to the central authority, a fact which has made many new 
sheikhs rise to pover and has caused others to fall into oblivion" 
(Jamali 1934, p. 81).
In the desert, the mode of life led by a Bedouin sheikh is the 
same as that led by his tribesmen; the sheikh of a thousand tents has 
no carpet but the cheapest mat and no cushions but a camel-saddle ; 
there is no economic overlordship between a sheikh and his fellow
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tribesmen. The Bedouin tribe is described by Jamali (1934), 
especially from the economic point of view, as '"commonwealth of 
breathren' in the full sense of the word" (p. 82). But when the 
tribes settled on land in Iraq during recent generations, the economic 
distinction between the sheikhs and their tribesmen grew much sharper, 
and the relations of the sheikh with his tribesmen started to take on 
a feudal character (Warriner 1962). The Sheikh started to be more 
likely to live in luxury as a result of the increase in his income 
from tax collection, and he started to be more skilled at flattering 
the government, so he gradually ignored the Bedouin characteristics of 
frankness, honesty and inherent pride. Pretentious courtesy became 
prevalent among the sheikhs, and in communications with others who had 
a respected and influential position or power in the society. The 
sheikhs began to lose their ties with their Bedouin tradition; they 
built houses for themselves beside their reed-made guest-house or 
Medief. Some of them chose houses inside the cities. Although this 
new attitude happened only slowly during the Ottoman period, it was 
the start of further change in the nature of tribal sheikhdom, 
particularly after the land settlement law of 1932 (Alwardi 1965). 
The sheikh started to be seen as arbitrary and autocratic with his 
tribesmen, and in opposition to his ancestors. The Bedouin sheikh who 
was not able to be autocratic, insofar as his power was derived frcm 
the respect and cooperation of his tribesmen, had no force to impose 
his power on the tribesmen. But seme of the sheikhs, starting frcm 
Ottcman times, were able to be brutal by depending on the brutal 
support of the government, which became by the middle of the 
eighteenth century able to depose a sheikh and replace him with one 
more sympathetic to government policy (Alwardi 1965). So the sheikh 
had to be obedient to the government of the day. The government did
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not care about what the sheikh was doing within his tribes area, or 
how he treated his tribesmen, so long as he was collecting the taxes 
he promised to deliver, and showing his obedience and respect to its 
officials.
Despite changes in Bedouin culture, the tribesmen continued to 
show their loyalty to their sheikhs rather than to Turkish rulers. 
This was due to their strong attachment to tribal tradition, and their 
preferred way of life.
It has been explained previously that under the leadership of the 
Prophet Mohainned and his immediate successors, the four Orthodox 
Caliphs a unified and growing Islamic community was established, and 
the ideal Moslem state was actually realized or very nearly so by 
those Caliphs. Mohammed and his early elected successors, as 
explained by Berger (1962), were theoretically and practically the 
leaders of the faithful, but starting from the Unayyad rule the
holders of the post of Caliph in general acquired their authority by 
force, and the elective system of the four earliest Caliphs became a 
hereditary succession. The Ottoman maintained the hereditary
transmission of pov^r but without a fixed mode of succession; the 
sultans were selected in the same manner as the Caliphs. Berger 
states that the "hereditary principle of government has had two
strong supports in Islamic societies ; the fear of dissension and
consequent weakness in the political-military arm of the religion of 
Allah; and the desire of a ruling family to retain power" (Berger 
1962, p. 305). Ibn Khaldun, in explaining why the elective system of 
the four earliest Caliphs became a dynastic one, pointed out that 
during the time of the four Orthodox Caliphs, the "royal authority" 
was not yet in existence to act as a "restraining influence" upon the
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Islamic community. At that tune, religion was still the "restraining 
influence" which each believer exercised upon himself. Consequently, 
the first four Caliphs could be confident that their decision would be 
accepted. But when Muawiya, the first Umayyad Caliph came to power by 
force after the first civil war in Islam, the "restraining influence" 
of religion had weakened , and in its place "royal authority" had 
developed, for Muawiya had taken command of Islam by force as the head 
of the powerful Umayya family. Then when the time came to think of a 
successor to Muawiya,the Umayya family was too strong to be denied; 
they would agreee only to his son as successor, although there were 
others preferrable to him from the point of view of Islam (Ibn-Khaldun 
1958, p. 284). Berger (1962) says that while the elective principle 
had the sujport to a certain degree of tradition in Bedouin society 
and even more so in Islamic principles, the elective principle was 
replaced by a 'dynasty' (mulk) that was founded by Muawiya and
followed by his successors. So this principle was never genuinely
followed in the Islamic community, and thus the community did not
acquire the experience nonnally associated with that principle. The 
leadership in Islamic societies became more or less as expressed by 
popular saying ; "To him who has power over you, obedience is due", 
and as long as that leadership maintained itself in power, it is
legitimate for it to rule the community, (Berger 1962, p. 306).
On the other hand the orthodox theologians continued to teach the 
old view that Caliph was the commander of the Moslem community and 
thus the community must obey even the usuper who exercises power 
(Alwardi 1954). The political theory insisted (throughout the whole 
period of the Umayyad and Abbas id dynasties) that the Caliphate was an 
elective office, inspite of the fact that the post had for centuries 
remained within the same family (the Abbas id) who themselves were 
already designated by Turkish mercenary troops (Berger 1962).
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The role of tradition has continued to be influential in making 
it difficult to introduce innovations for ijtihad in Islamic society. 
Islamic beliefs have been few and simple, placing no great burden of 
doctrine upon the faithful. The Holy Koran holds the possiblity of 
varying interpretations which can be placed upon its holy scriptures 
(Alwardi 1954; Berger 1962), but traditionalists strongly sought the 
right to limit ijtihad (innovate) because this could lead to free 
interpretation, which may change accepted doctrines and practises 
(Shalabi 1963).
Iraqi society, particularly during the Ottoman period, started to 
become a fatalistic and static society, and with the prevalence of 
poverty and ignorance, many other concepts penetrated the life of that 
society, such as superstition, demonism and such like, arising from 
the sophisticated perception of many Islamic values. In fact Ottoman 
rule has resulted, to a great extent, in a misconception of Islamic 
principles among people in Iraqi society. Most people were not able 
to distinguish between the real principles of Islam, and the Ottoman 
interpretation of those principles and their adaptation of Islam as a 
means of upholding the rule and power of the sultan. (Munaf 1966).
From the evolution of Islamic society, it could be suggested that 
Islam became a religion which organizes the relationship with God much 
more than a political, economic and societal system which regulates 
the interrelationships within the society. Islamic law applies to the 
family, personal habits, diet and toilet, but this does not mean that 
Islam has always been scrupulously followed. Thus in Islamic society 
an extraordinary gulf had arisen between the Islamic ideal and 
reality. On the other hand there is resistance among fanatical 
religious thinkers to accommodating ideals with the reality of social 
life, and social life failed to be raised to the level of the ideal in 
Islam.
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Hie power-d is tance widened between the rulers and the ruled, and 
in other areas of social life. In fact during the Ottoman rule, which 
lasted for four centuries up to World War 1, the gulf between rulers 
and their subjects was wider than ever and seldom bridged. The Arab 
institutions and attitudes were shaped for a long time by this 
relatively recent Ottonan system. For the Arab, the Ottoman ruling 
class (who were represented as the upper-class in Iraqi society) were 
felt, as Berger states : "to be a foreign one; it maintained a rather
formal contact with the Arab community; it dominated through a partly- 
Arab provincial bureaucracy which both protected the masses from far- 
off rulers and joined in exploiting them as well" (Berger 1962, p. 
293).
The conception of the individual's value as a Moslem on a par 
with all others and equal before Allah, has not prevented or even 
mitigated sharp differences among the social classes, or authoritarian 
government, which has arisen in Islamic society beyond the desert. 
Islamic religion, against its principles through accumalated negative 
perception, interpretation and practises, with the help of other 
factors, has lent support to authoritarian tendencies and 
submissiveness in relation to authority in Arabic society.
4. POWER AND AUTHORITY AND THEIR 90CIEÜAL NC»MS DDRIMG BRITISH 
JNFLJDEMCE (BRITISH MANDATE AND IRAQI KINSDCM 1920-1958)
Hie Turks, after holding Iraq for nearly four centuries in the 
Sultan's name, left the country (after the First World War) a little 
less ignorant, but no less corrupt than it was in the sixteenth 
century. Iraq passed into the nineteenth century, still backward and 
undeveloped, still poor because its greater potentialities were 
neglected and its resources lay untouched, lawless and resentful of 
its rulers, still not set upon a pathway of progress (Longrigg 1968).
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The Ottomans ruled the country according to the principle that 
the rule of subjects is for the glory and benefit of the ruler, while 
millions of Iraqi people were starving, bullied and dissatisfied.
World War 1 put an end to the Ottoman Bnpire. That war ended a 
long period of Turkish sovereignity, but brought about another period 
of occupation when Iraq came under British sovereignity.
The British occupied Iraq step-by-step with their promises to 
free Iraqi people from the Turks and to give the Arabs a 'free 
choice ', that they might rise once more to greatness and renown 
(Akrawi 1936, Main 1935). In the beginning the Iraqi's (particularly 
those in the cities) welcomed the British because of what they had 
suffered under Turkish rule and due to British promises which made 
them believe that they would have their own national government 
(Alwardi 1969, Vol. 5). But that welcome turned very soon to a murmur 
when the Iraqians realized that the new rule which had rescued them 
from Turkish injustices and evils had brought them a new set of 
injustices and wrongs (Alwardi 1969, Vol. 5). Longrigg (1953) stated 
that in the beginning "Iraq was to witness a period of general public 
relief and confidence, followed too soon by the accumulation, at first 
invisibly then openly, of elements of discontent and disorder" (p. 
99), especially when people realized that the British promises were 
not going to be fulfilled. During the war the British made promises 
which Lady Bell interpreted as 'a regrettable necessity' for gaining 
domination over the country through the war period (Bell 1928). Hi is 
raised the people's hopes of attaining national government (Alwardi 
1969, vol.5 ; Wilson 1936). Also, before the legal institution of the 
British Mandate in 1922, there was a long period of delay by the 
British in settling the future status of Iraq. This delay gave time 
for the Iraqi people to realize that the British were weak and had no 
settled policy.
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From 1914 to 1920 the British set up a form of military 
government, with military governors, assistant political officers, and 
deputy governors and a few commissioners for special purposes, all 
responsible to the Chief Political Officer, who was himself 
responsible to the general officer commanding the forces. During that 
period the supervision of the civil administration was confined to a 
British military governor who was linked in his correspondance and 
communications with the State Minister for Indian Affairs (Bell 1928).
The British devised a new administrative system to fit their 
power purposes, and to face the administration's difficulties which 
increased with the departure of all Ottonan officials who had held 
responsible positions; when the latter left, they removed all the most 
important recent records and documents on which the administration 
depended and they spoilt and destroyed what remained (Bell 1928).
The British applied ideas used in India to the civilian Iraqi 
administration (Langley 1961). Hie employees in the provisional 
administration were mostly British and Indian personnel who were 
originally drawn from the army or borrowed from India, due to the lack 
of British civil servants in Iraq at that time (Ireland 1937; Bell 
1928). The Iraqians were recruited in a few low positions; their 
number among senior level government officials was, until 1920 not 
more than 20 out of 534 officials of the government, while 507 were 
British and 7 were Indian (Ireland 1937, p. 146). In fact, this was 
one of the reasons for Iraqi dissatisfaction with British rule in Iraq 
as their feeling was that it was their right to be employed in those 
offices (Akrawi 1936).
The administration of occupied Iraq remained, until 1920, the 
responsibility of the Ccxrmander- in-Ch ief of the British Forces 
exercised through his subordinates. Hie administration of social
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matters, the collection of revenue and relations with the army were 
the main functions of the Civil Commissioner's personal office, acting 
in the provinces through his political officers (Longrigg 1953). 
British judges were appointed to manage courts and the police force.
The military officials administered the country on the basis of 
the laws in force as far as was possible; their decisions regarding 
the law, the modification and adaption of Turkish Procedures, tribal 
policy, the structure of the administration and management of the 
people, directly or indirectly were to contribute to the shaping of 
the public life of the country (Longrigg 1953). Alwardi notes that 
Iraqis experienced a new style of rule different from that 
experienced under the Ottoman occiç>ation; the Turks had exerted a 
loose rule over the people except in some affairs such as taxes or 
keeping their power and occupation, but in public life the people had 
been left to do what they wanted as long as it had not harmed or 
affected Ottoman authority or their revenue. Hi is had led, 
consequently, to disorder in many aspects of the social and economic 
life of the individual and society. Also the Bedouin values had been 
revived again and the people had begun to solve their problems by 
themselves or through informal organizations rather than through the 
government's establishments to the degree that they had been 
disdainful of afpealing for justice through governmental courts. 
Added to that, the Turkish officials had been lax in applying the laws 
and regulations due to the influence of nepotism and bribery. Under 
the British occupation, the people faced a very rigid and rough system 
which disregarded people's feelings and their social prestige - a kind 
of system which was unfamiliar to the people and to the prevalent 
norms and values. The British police, or military men, for example, 
beat individuals in public who ignored traffic instructions, or who
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did not follow some desired rules such as according recognition to the 
military governor when he passed by in the way they stipulated. 
Alwardi continues by saying that the Iraqis were not satisfied with 
the British occupation as they saw that some people who were 
considered of low rank or common individuals were appointed by the 
British authorities to positions beside the Indians in many 
governmental positions. Hie employment of a considerable number of 
those individuals in the police force put them in frequent contact
with the people who saw them wearing short trousers and i^cial hats
as a uniform, all of which was strange and unfamiliar to the Iraqi's
at that time (Alwardi 1969, Vol. 5).
The British domination over Iraq had its influence on the social 
life and its structure and on peoples' mentality and their material 
life as they came under the impact of Western culture ; they had to 
face a new set of problems. Hie large expenditure by the British 
army, especially at the beginning of their occupation to fill army 
requirements for food, buildings, communications, etc., resulted in 
sharp inflation. Trade flourished and big profits were made in many 
areas. The people observed a lot of money being spent by British 
troops (Main 1935). Some individuals benefitted from this inflation, 
particularly the sheikhs and landlords, the merchants and the 
speculators. Thus, 'The made rich by war' group arose in Iraqi 
society at that time. The British government in Iraq benefitted too 
when its revenues from taxation increased iç> to three times in 
comparison with the amount during Ottoman rule. But, by and large, 
numerous people were harmed by the great increase in prices to the 
degree that they were almost starving (Alwardi 1969, Vol. 5).
British military control ended after the revolution of 1920 (Main 
1935), which is known as A1 Thawrat al Iraqieh. In fact, the
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effective reasons for that revolution were mainly the rigidity of 
British rules and insufficient consideration by certain British 
Political officers for the tribal and urban mentality. Also 
favouritism toward certain tribal sheikhs at the expense of others and 
the insubordination of the tribes to any control exacerbated the 
situation. But beside all this and several other factors was the Arab 
nationalist movement and the sujport of the mujtahids (religious 
leaders) for the Iraqi nationalists who strongly backed the tribes 
against British occupation (Jamali 1934; Akrawi 1936). After that 
revolution British authority felt the need to establish a civil 
administration, since the Iraqis were dissatisfied with the British 
military administration with its rigidity and the tense atmosphere 
created by military law. So in March 1921 it was decided by the 
British to create an hereditary kingship of Iraq and make Faisal a 
King of Iraq, under the British Mandate. In fact the British made it 
clear to Faisal before they made him King "That his candidature for 
the throne of Iraq must be conditional on his support of British 
policy" (Main 1935, pp. 87-88).
During the British Mandate (1920-1932) the civil administration 
was taken over by the new High Commissioner. A number of British 
political officers became the advisers of the new government ministers 
and the mutasarrifs (provinces governors). These advisers were 
responsible to the High Commissioner who had supreme control (Main 
1935). In the relationship between these advisers and the Iraqi 
government, there was "emphasis on the advance infonnation to be 
given by the Advisers through the High Commissioner to the British 
Government regarding any step proposed by the Iraqi Government which 
might affect the international and financial obligations of the 
British Government" (Main 1936, p. 86). Although the function of
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those advisers was not intended to be executive but advisory, in 
reality the executive functions were discovered when people realized 
that the real power was in the hands of the advisers and not the 
ministers, for although the ministers were the formal power holders 
and were supposed to be responsible to the Iraqi Parliament, the 
British advisers were operating the real power behind the scenes. So, 
the people preferred to go directly to the adviser, rather than to the 
minister in their communications because they were sure that their 
problems would not be solved without the approval of the adviser 
(Alwardi 1969, Vol. 6).
The administration of the Mandate with its system of Iraqi 
ministers and civil service and British advisers, says Langley (1961) 
"may have lacked clarity as far as local understanding of the source 
of power was concerned" (p. 133). In fact there was no clear-cut line 
separating the authorities and responsibilities of the the Mandate's 
authority from that of the Iraqi government (Alkhattab 1973).
The poNær during the British Occupation and Mandate of Iraq 
remained extremely centralized, as it had been under Turkish rule - 
but in Baghdad instead of Constantinople (Langley 1961). A special 
council - consisting of British and Indian members who were appointed 
with the approval of the British Commissioner and who held the major 
administrative assignments in the government - was the main authority 
to appoint officials to Iraqi government positions (Al-Shamsie 1979). 
The Iraqis were sensitive to the employment of British and Indian 
personnel, especially to key positions, while most of the efficient 
Iraqis at that time were expatriated to Syria and Hejaz (Al-raarayati 
1961). The strategic positions inside Iraqi administrative machinery 
were held by British officials in order to practise the actual 
supervision of government management and therefore to keep power in 
their hands (Al-Shamsie 1979).
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The Iraqi administrative body, half of which was inherited from 
the Turks and half established by the British military, suffered from 
many shortcomings and omissions. In fact one of the most important 
problems of the administrative body in Iraq of that time was mistrust 
between Iraqi officials and British advisers (AlKhattab 1973). As 
well as this, there were the added problems of the newness of the 
administrative system itself, the inter-weaving of responsibilities, 
the lack of civil service regulations which organized the processes of 
appointment and promotion in government service (Ireland 1937) and the 
diffemces in motives of both the Iraqi and the British officials in 
the administrative work. The fact is that the object of the High 
Commissioner during British Mandate of Iraq, was as Main stated, "to 
gain political advantages for Britain". The Advisers were specially 
selected with the view that British interests, especially financial 
ones, should be safeguarded (Main 1935, pp. 88-89). So the motives of 
the British officials and the advisers were concentrated on how to 
keep their government's interests safe, while the issues relating to 
the progress of the country or its peoples' needs were considered a 
secondary matter (Ireland 1937). Meantime, the Iraqi officials became 
increasingly aware of national feeling and of the fact that the real 
power in the country was in British hands. They began, with many 
other people, to point out that it was anomalous to have a double set 
of officials in each department paid by the Iraqi government. In 
addition the British adviser was receiving a salary very much bigger 
than that of an Iraqi executive. People also pointed out that in many 
cases British officials were abviously second-rate or even third-rate 
men, who had been chosen during the war, when the occupation 
authorities were looking for individuals of a particular military rank 
(Main 1935). So accordingly, the Iraqi official released himself from
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the advice of the British adviser whenever there was an increase in 
national feeling and opposition among the Iraqi people. As the 
British had appointed many of their patrons in administrative 
positions, so did the Iraqi officials favour their relatives or 
supporters (Alkattab 1973).
The Effendis (officials and officers who served during Turkish 
rule) remained loyal to the Turks during the First World War and 
British occupation. Their attitude was anti-British and called for 
the immediate creation of an extensive Arab officialdom. Most of them 
during that period had lost their jobs and did not have the financial 
resources to support themselves. Their influence in the society and 
politics of Baghdad was considerable as they had the respect of the 
people because of their general knowledge, even though what they 
really had was merely a shallow acquaintance, it was considered 
considerable at that time and useful for the domination of the 
ignorant. The British, up to the revolution of 1920, neglected the 
Effendis, but during the Mandate, after they realized the influence of 
the Effendis on the people, they appointed them widely in different 
positions in the administrative body and worked to gain their loyalty 
(Alwardi 1969, Vol. 5).
With the passing of time, two contrasting points of view appeared 
among the Iraqi officials; on one hand there was a demand for a 
complete, national administration regardless of British advice, whilst 
on the other hand there was a demand for more co-operation with 
Britain (Alkhattab 1973).
The British began to eliminate some Iraqi officials in higher 
ranks who opposed British policy and were disloyal to them (as 
happened in Hilla and Dewaneya provinces) (Alkhattab 1973).
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After the establishment of the new Kingdom of Iraq in 1921, some 
tribes of southern Iraq, who had taken an active part in the 
revolution of 1920, showed discontent tovard the formation of a 
government which they believed was made up of Effendis fron the cities 
and who were thought to be hostile to tribal interests (Jamali 1934). 
From the very beginning the term Mandate was offensive to nationalist 
leaders as it indicated a sense of 'command ' instead of 'trusteeship' ; 
they also felt that the real power in their government was in British 
hands. This dissatisfaction contributed to the growth of anti^ritish 
feeling amongst different kinds of people in Iraqi society.
Iraq, by the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1930 became independent in 
1932, thereafter becoming a member of the League of Nations. But the 
attitude of the Iraqi opposition nationalists was that the 1932 
independence was neither real nor complete. Britiain's policy, which 
negotiated and agreed to Iraqi independence, especially politically 
and militarily, was as Main puts it "to hold to essentials and let 
the rest go" (Main 1935, p. 101). The 1930 treaty gave Britain 
certain political, economic and strategic advantages at a relatively 
low cost. The influence of the British continued in Iraq even after 
' independence ' but in another form and through the treaty of 1930 and 
all its agreements.
Iraq progressed a little during the inter-war period - from 
British Mandate to the independence of 1932 - but its economic 
development during the twenties or the depression years of the early 
thirties was very limited and mainly in specific areas such as 
agriculture, transport and communication, construction and social 
services. The government's role in business and its intervention in 
economic life started to increase after the establishment of an Iraqi 
government in 1921, but that role expanded more after independence for
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many social, political and economical reasons, and became more 
extensive after 1950, when income from the oil trade increased and the 
public sector grew (Aboona 1975). After the revolution of 1958 the 
role of the government in economic life became more positive in order 
to achieve the economic independence of Iraq through the strengthening 
of the public sector, but the private sector still dominated 
particularly in local industry and trade, and was expected to play an 
important role in economic development. Later the replacement of 
'old' regimes by more 'nationalist' ones with the desire for greater 
control of the nations' wealth and resources and fairer distribution 
of them lead in 1964 to a new policy, known as 'Arab Socialism'. By 
that policy, the public sector started to play a dominant role which 
it had never done before. When the revenue from oil sharply increased 
during the early fifties, government expenditure on economic 
development increased greatly. But very little was spent on social 
welfare, and the effect of development expenditure, as Warriner noted, 
was : "to make the contrast between rich and poor more striking. The
great increase in imports benefitted chiefly the rich, whose 
consumption of cars, air-conditioning and luxurious new houses is very 
conspicuous. The sarifa (mud hut) slums were growing fast without 
sewage or drinking-water" (Warriner 1962, p. 125).
Consequently, through the extension of the government's role, the 
government administration, or public services started to play a vital 
role in social life and all levels of society expected leadership from 
the government and hence from government officials.
The period between 1932-1958 was distinguished first by the 
political instability, many revolts and rebellion movements, for 
example 1936, in May 1948 and in 1948-1953; and secondly, by an 
increase in the struggle for power and authority, particularly in the 
Cabinet, which was formed for the first time in 1920-1921.
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The Monarchy system in Iraq between 1920 and 1958 had imprinted 
on its structure the behaviour and relations of its individuals, 
manifestations of a "Bureaucratic Polity", as Alhasso (1979) remarks. 
In that system the political authority (the Parliament) was weak and 
not able to direct and control the administrative body (the executive 
authority). Theoretically the legislative authority (Parliament) was 
responsible for policy-making and following-up the executive authority 
(the Cabinet) which represented the top of the administrative 
apparatus. In reality the Monarchy system suffered a lot from the 
absence of any effective political constitution (Parliament, parties) 
capable of directing the administrative body and its leaders towards 
meeting the public benefit. On the contrary, the Cabinet played a 
dominant role in the political system (Alhasani 1953). Meantime, a 
contradictory phenomenon distinguished that period. This was the 
weakness of the formal authority of the ministerial positions (which 
appeared in rapid succession in the Cabinet, i.e. a change of Cabinet 
nearly every 8 months) (Alhasso 1979, p. 22). This was due to 
different political, economic and social factors, such as the 
existence of informal pressure groups (tribes, civilian and military 
cliques) which were increasing their influence over the governmental 
body. This weakness in formal authority increased the tendency 
towards more dependence upon the informal sources of power, viz, 
allied relations with the tribes, blood ties and wealth.
In fact, wealth became an important source of power and a 
political motivator in Iraqi administration and society during the 
Monarchy. High ranking administrative officials (the elite) were 
appointed in political circles, who paid little attention to serving 
the needs of the people. By such engagements 'powers centres' emerged 
which were continuously batteling in an attempt to protect or ensure
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their own interests in reaching the high-ranking positions in the 
administrative apparatus (particularly the Ministerial positions), and 
in protecting such positions whenever possible if they were already 
occupying them. In fact that struggle for power was motivated by the 
unsatisfied 'superiority propensity' the inhabitants of the cities 
inherited from the Bedouin culture and was encouraged by traditional 
respect for povær.
As has been said before, this period displayed an absence of 
strong political constitutions. Dower was concentrated in the hands 
of high-ranking officials at the top of the administration, many of 
whom did not consider authority as a means to serve and develop the 
interests of the people but as a means (and end in itself) to serve 
their own interests (Alhasso 1979).
The period of Kingdom rule, also encouraged taking advantage of 
the authority attached to governmental positions for personal benefit 
and interests, particularly in gaining an illiegal income. The high- 
ranking positions in the administrative body became a source of wealth 
for some of those individuals who occupied these positions, especially 
the Ministerial positions. Examples of abuse of authority could be 
seen in different ways, for example they misused the personnel to the 
degree that some of their subordinates were employed as personal 
gardeners or servants in private houses (Alhasani 1953). Also they 
utilized the public domain for their own benefit and many of them 
became wealthy individuals and owners of property and farms within a 
short period of time. More features of this corruption could be seen 
in their relationship with their clients. The public and especially 
some sections of society were subject to that corruption; the 
merchants, for example, were under continuous pressure either to bribe 
influential people or under threat of being denied governmental-
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controlled import licenses (Alhasani 1953). It is necessary to point 
out here that the corruption was a way of getting legal rights. 
Unfortunately the phenomenon of corruption gradually penetrated other 
levels in the administrative hierarchy. In fact during that period 
civil servants in Iraq were basically under-paid; also, as Main states 
"they have had their salaries cut and their complements reduced, while 
British and Indian officials, on contracts, have seen their rates of 
pay maintained if not increased" (p. 168). Another factor which led 
to the corruption was that Iraqis of the official class adopted far 
too high a standard of living through the influence of the British and 
the Western way of life (Main 1935).
In the previous pages, it has been shown that formal authority 
was abused for personal benefit by some of the high-ranking officials 
at the top of the administration. But at the same time the collecting 
of wealth was not merely an end in itself, but more a means of 
obtaining power. Wealth in this period became an important dimension 
for gaining power and for realizing wider objectives, e.g. for 
developing and protecting the social, economic and political position 
and prestige of many individuals at the top of the administration, 
politicians and influential people (Alhasso 1979). Wealth was 
considered as a means in itself in order to keep a high standard of 
living, which was in its turn, a reflection of having and maintaining 
power, thus serving the iirmediate, short and long term objectives of 
those individuals in the service or those who are looking for high- 
ranking positions or willing to re-enter such positions. The 
luxurious life-style was an important symbol of wealth and 
consequently of powsr in the eyes of the people. Wealth was one of 
the means used to support the basis of authority by developing the 
informal power of the politicians, whether they were inside or outside
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the governmental service. 'Strategic spending' was a device for long­
term objectives by which individuals spent money on followers and 
supporters in order to gain their loyalty and support when necessary, 
and to prevent them from moving to other rivals (Alhasso 1979).
The phenomenon of using wealth for getting more power has often 
been dressed up in different shapes but, by and large, it benefitted 
from some of the social traditions and values inherited from Bedouin 
culture, such as generosity and hospitality. Such values have an 
especially high respect in most of the Arab world, where the 
individual's social evaluation and prestige is according to the degree 
of his obligation to the traditional cultural framework. Such 
traditions and values have, unfortunately, been diverted from their 
original meanings by those individuals who have used them as a means 
for getting and maintaining their own personal power, illegeil wealth 
and more alliances and followers (Alhasani 1953). The higher the 
political and official position of the individual, the more important 
was wealth for him to gain alliances, especially if his family's 
wealth and his formal income (salary) were limited and not sufficient 
for his strategic spending. So some of those individuals had recourse 
to corruption to obtain wealth. As they were mostly at the top of 
their ministerial hierarchy, it was not easy for them to reach the 
sources of wealth directly within their organizations because of the 
structural and geographical distribution of their organizational 
hierarchy; these resources were under the direct supervision of other 
individuals who occupied lower levels in the hierarchy in different 
parts in the country. Such being the case, those high-ranking 
occupiers were keen to avoid scandals and accusations of corruption 
from their society so they established informal links with the 
individuals in the lower levels who supervised the resources and who
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themselves had a predisposition to oo-pperate willingly in the 
direction of unlawful appropriation. In fact that kind of informal 
and personal work-relat ionsh ip played an important role in 
administration and politics in Iraq at that time (Alhaidari 1963). 
Low-ranking officials, who were serving the personal objectives of the 
high-ranking officials, secured for their loyalty adavantages and 
privileges such as financial rewards, leaves, promotions and higher 
positions, etc. (Alhasso 1979).
As has been previously described, the economic dimension was an 
important reason for the emergence of the 'cliques' in the
administrative context. The relationship between the position and the 
financial availability increased the struggle for authority and power 
in high-ranking governmental positions at that time.
Those individuals at the top of the administration were
interested in disclosing their relationships and in being associated 
with persons who were regarded as socially important and powerful, 
such as clergymen and tribal sheikhs. The significance of showing 
this kind of relationship is of giving others the impression of power 
and of gaining support from important people who have a certain 
prestige in the society. So it was very important for these high- 
ranking officials to build personal relationships through social
meetings, invitations for dinner or lunch,...etc. As they perceived 
it, the higher the number of one's guests and social activities, the 
higher one's prestige and impression of generosity and influence will 
be in society. This was consequently very important in power
calculations (Alhasso 1979).
The entry of wealth as an important dimension for power was one 
of the reasons for stimulating the rivalry and divisions between high- 
ranking officials. The struggle increased in the administrative body
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as each minister or influential person tried to hold the positions of 
his alliances and followers. This increased the dependency on the 
subjective criteria in the appointments and shifting in positions. In 
particular ministerial changes usually brought about a redistribution 
of the posts of all grades. Also a government appointment became, 
after 1920, attractive and was regarded by most Iraqis as the goal of 
their education. This was partially a legacy of Turkish times, when 
the traditionally-held jobs for educated men were in the government, 
and the post of government official was the highest position a non- 
Turk could attain (Main 1935).
Because of oversupply of candidates for the civil service and the 
consequent creation of jobs, several unsuitable people were a^Jointed 
to the administrative body. Underemployment became endemic with 
apathy, nepotism, rigid and inflexible regulations, shifting 
responsibility, preoccupation with security, status, prestige, 
formalities rather than performance and level of service, and extreme 
centralization, which was brought about partly because most of those 
who reached the ministerial positions between 1923-1941 were graduated 
from military schools (Alhussrie 1960). All these factors, along with 
many other shortcomings, contributed to ineffectiveness and 
inefficiency in the administration. Also there was a lack of serious 
interest in the detailed administratioi of the country and its 
development, while office and pov^r continued to be largely confined 
to a narrow circle of some influential families, who were supporting 
the government on condition that their wealth and privileges remained 
untouched (Warriner 1962).
In fact the British, in the formation of the first Iraqi Cabinet 
in 1920, were keen to choose those who had social power and prestige 
to occupy ministerial positions, in order to use their informal and 
power to boost the monarchy rule in Iraq (Alwardi 1969, Vol. 6).
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Meantime, governmental positions acquired and increasing 
importance as a potential source of power during the Mandatory and the 
Monarchial periods, and the influential and the power-seekers 
struggled to obtain it. Thus, the position was considered prestigeous 
and to be acquired, rather than a duty and responsibility. This, 
along with other factors, led subordinates and other individuals 
outside the governmental jobs to show more personal loyalty to the 
occupiers of high-ranking positions.
Akrawi (1936) described the civil servants at that time as
considering themselves a privileged and a bureaucratic class above the 
mass of the people. They tried to make themselves respected and their 
presence felt. This was possible because the people themselves 
accorded the civil servant full respect and honour. What increased 
the distance between the civil servants and the people was that the 
civil service was, in Turkish days, the preserve of the town Arabs, 
who tended to ignore the basic agricultural needs and interests of a 
greater part of the population. In fact, the ministries and
parliament were dominated by the big landowners from the town and even 
more by the feudal sheikhs who were against any movement which could 
threaten their political and social power.
The growth of feudalism under British Mandate and Monarchy :
The changes that happened within Bedouin society as a result of 
the Ottoman policy of dealing with the tribes and their adaptation to 
the new environment's conditions in their coming to Iraq have already 
been dealt with.
Since the First World War, the impact of Western influences made
the Iraqi people face a new set of problems and a new culture.
Bedouin tribes, no less than the town population, were affected. In
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fact imperceptibly these changes had been under way for a long time 
before the days of Midhat Pash, but these changes became even more 
pronounced during the period after the First World War (Jamali 1934).
British influence was making itself felt among the tribal 
population of Iraq. The Ottonan government was at no time able to win 
the sympathy of all the tibes. The British before and during the war 
tried to win, by money and arms, the allegiance of the tribes against 
the Ottoman, or at least to keep them neutral. The Ottonan 
government, on the other hand, tried to arouse the religious emotions 
of the tribes. The result was a perplexing situation for the tribes, 
some of the tribal sheikhs giving the allegiance to the British, while 
others opposed the British as infidels. Still others wavered bewteen 
the British and the Turks (Jamali 1934). In fact, by the last days of 
the Ottoman Einpire before World War 1, the tribes were weakened in 
their resistance to government and the sheikhs increasingly became 
involved in town life and politics (Longrigg 1953). So among the 
tribes there was a feeling of uncertainty; they feared those who had 
allied themselves to one power or the other with respect to their own 
future when the war was over. The First World War not only affected 
the tribes psychologically but also their material life, and 
stimulated their political thoughts and shaped their attitudes (Jamali 
1934).
The British administration, Jamali (1934) remarks, had the 
Ottoman policy and its shortcomings in mind, especially when it began 
to deal with the tribes. They tried to impress the tribes with their 
strength and greatness, and they adopted definite policies which 
utilized the powsr of the sheikhs for British objectives. They 
followed similar methods of Turkish administraticai in exerting their 
control over the Bedouin tribes through the influence of the prominent
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sheikhs. Instead of instituting a single unified system of law for 
all the people, the British recognized tribal customary law and 
treated the tribes as a separate category of people to be governed 
under a separate body of laws known as the "Tribal Disputes 
Regulation" issued in 1916, which continued to exist until the 
revolution of 1958. So Iraq not only faced duality in its social 
structure due to the existence of tribes within the larger society, 
but until quite recently was facing these historic issues of duality 
in law and all the conflicts and tensions rising out of it (Al-Wahab
1964). In fact this law gave the sheikhs more power as they became 
legally responsible for controlling disputes among tribesmen.
The British authorities employed the most important shiekh in 
each area in Iraq, as a government representative to his area or as a 
Mudir (manager) and supported him with money and arms (Jamali 1934). 
In fact they chose only those who shoved their loyalty and friendship, 
or who had old relationships with them from Turkish days (Alwardi 
1969, Vol. 5). Wilson notes that those sheikhs soon appreciated the 
value of an official position with the title of Mudir and a salary, so 
they were willing to obey any order sooner than risk losing it (Wilson 
1930).
The British favouritism toward certain tribal sheikhs at the 
expense of others, the insufficient consideration for tribal 
mentality, and the British rigidity were factors in bringing about the 
Iraqi revolution in 1920. The period after 1920 witnessed a greater 
growth of feudalism; the British authorites started to support and 
reward those sheikhs who did not participate in the Iraqi revolution 
of 1920 and thus made it easy for them to acquire lands as their own 
property (Althahir 1946). Some sheikhs came to own land exceeding 
1 million donums (donum = 2500 sq. meters) Warriner 1962. As a source
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of wealth they depended partly on investment in pumps or machinery, 
partly on the exploitation of the cultivators.
Many sheiks had a tenancy-right to state land through Midhat 
Pasha's land settlement policy, and those sheikhs eventually began to 
consider themselves the real owners of the tribal dirah which 
originally was state land. In fact these were consolidated by the land 
settlement of title to land carried out from 1933 under the 
supervision of British officials and by the settlement law of 1932 
which made the sheikhs the landholders since they became the legal 
owners of the dirah. The great sheikhs became the owners of vast 
areas of land on which they anployed hundreds of tribesmen as share- 
cropping fellah in, with no rights or status (Warriner 1962). The 
fellah (who was merely a peasant labourer) was, by the law of 1932, 
tied to the land. He could not leave the land as long as he was in 
debt to the landowner and as he was usually in debt, he was in effect 
a serf, and had no security or freedom of action. Also the 1940 law 
for the sale of land greatly accelerated the process of assigining 
tribal land to large landowners, especially in the flow-irrigated 
regions. In fact as in the kingdom state, the large landowners were 
powerful, thus the strong pressure to introduce the system of land 
registration of 1932 came from the sheikh landholders, who in the past 
had resisted the central government in its efforts to register land in 
individual holdings in the names of the cultivators. So under that 
system the wealthy used the state against the cultivators, the state 
was not aimed at securing the rights of the cultivators against the 
wealthy (Warriner 1962).
The sheikhs under Ottoman rule, British Mandate and the Monarchy 
were all powerful, and their power increased enormously because they 
became the largest feudal landowners. Issawi (1966 a) remarks that
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" [by] the 1950's, some 85 percent of the arable land was owned by only 
33,000 persons and the bulk of the rural population was landless" (p. 
145). Sane Sheikhs starting from Ottoman tiines, became cruel and 
autocratic. Each of them surrounded himself with a body of armed 
ruffians from his own tribe to act as his bodyguards and keep the 
peasants in subjection. The sheikh was able to control the peasants 
with the support of his bodyguards, the official police force and the 
government machinery. Some sheikhs even had insanitory prisons, into 
which their victims would be thrown until they promised to obey their 
master and no peasant dared to complain or tried to prevent the sheikh 
from stealing his produce or refuse to work on his land (Alwardi
1965). The sheikh who became a feudal landlord collected an enormous 
amount of wealth for which he had not worked at aill. They became 
more involved in city life, most of them lived in Baghdad or their 
local province headquarters and departed far from tribal austerity in 
their addiction to city pleasures. It became usual to find sheikhs 
owning private motor cars manufactured in the United States and 
residing in 'palaces' while their sons could go, and went, to higher 
education and Western sophistication in Beirut, Cambridge or Colmbia 
(Longrigg 1953). While the sheikh lived in luxury and extravagance, 
the fallah was in dire poverty and ignorance. In fact the fallah was 
not only at the mercy of the powerful sheikh, but also at the mercy of 
the new fuedal class consisting of townsmen (i.e. the Effendis) as 
they were the owners of pumps installed in their land (Althahir 1946).
The prestige of the sheikhs rested on their formal function as 
leaders in a tribal society. The foundation of the new kingdom 
strengthened them, giving them legal ownership of land and 
représentâticn in Parliament, but at the same time weakened them by 
removing the need for tribal wars and tribal rule, through the
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creation of a national army and a national administration. Thus the 
sheikhs secured a position of privilege in the state, without 
obligation to it (Warriner 1562). They became involved in city life 
and associated socially with the Effendis. They became involved in 
politics and sought ministerial positions in order to influence the 
government for their own benefit. There was no social or political 
force which could challenge the power of the sheikhs. Sane said that 
three pillars were the real government of Iraq at that time - King 
Faisal, General t-laude (British), and Sad un (i.e. the landowners) 
(Warriner 1962). The policy was that the conventions of independence 
must be maintained, in particular the facade of parliamentary 
sovereignty, to show that Britain did not intervene. 'The sheikhs', 
says Warriner (1962), "of course, have power and prestige outside 
this facade, of which they are the other main support... Government 
policy is never initiated by the sheikhs, but by the Prime Minister 
supported on the two-fold base of British influence and the large 
landowners" (p. 173).
Hie sheikh in the village, however, was trying his best to 
emulate the values, ethics and tradition of the Bedouin sheikh, ffe 
still wanted to be brave and generous, and wished to give his 
protection or dakhala to those who sought protection from him, but he 
was not able to do so because of the government authority which 
pressurized him into giving up the protected person to them. The 
sheikh in doing so came under two conflicting pressures, one his 
Bedouin norms, and the other the government. So the sheikh in the 
settlement environment, as Alwardi (1965) notes, was under a "cultural 
ambivalence" and started to suffer from a "schizoid personality" as 
his tradition pushed him towards Bedouin values and norms oi the one 
side, and the new environment with the authority of the government and
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its domination forced him to be autocratic and arbitrary on the other. 
But the sheikhs were not all on the same level of duality; seme of 
them tended to be chivalrous while others tended to be authoritative 
(p. 201). In general the sheikh became self-centered rather than 
tribe-centered.
Nevertheless, the Bedouin values, such as hospitality and having 
the mudhif (the guest-house and civic and social centre), which were 
not contradictory to the new environment's requirements, continued to 
exist strongly within tribal life. The tribesmen like the sheikhs 
were under great pressures in the settlement environment in Iraq, 
which pushed them gradually away from many Bedouin characteristics. 
Through their old tradition, their sheikh had to maintain the tribal 
militia and keep the mudhif open to welcome guests, so revenues to 
enable the sheikh to carry out these duties were collected from the 
tribesmen by the sirkals (sheikh agents). The tribesmen also had to 
provide the sheikh with large portions of their crops as his income 
fran the land, in addition to paying taxes to the government. The 
fellah was unable to meet all these heavy demands, because it meant 
more poverty and starvation. Thus, his living difficulties pushed him 
to submit to the sheikh's agents (sirkals) and the government tax 
collectors (Alwardi 1965) in the hope that this submission would gain 
their pity and protect him from giving them most of his low income or 
crop. He submitted to the will of master in the hope that this 
submission would satisfy the sheikh and leave him some kind of 
existence. Also he tried to avoid paying the tax collectors by 
providing them with false information. But at the same time in his 
relationship with other tribesmen or his peers, he continued to follow 
the Bedouin characteristics of pride, dignity, etc. In fact, these 
circumstances on one side and the ties with Bedouin tradition on the
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Other have only deepened the phenomenon of schizoid personality and 
the duality in norms and values in fellah life (Alwardi 1965). 
However, it is important to realize that the Bedouin (who became 
fellah) with his desert heritage of freedom and independence hardly 
bowed to the material riches of his sheikh. Starvation and poverty 
were not new to him. Thus his loyalty to his tribe and his respect 
for the tribal leadership of the sheikh did not break down, but no 
doubt the sheikh's prestige and bonds with his followers weakened 
gradually.
In Iraqi society, like any other agricultural economy, respect 
for power is traditional. Also people associate leadership (i.e. the 
government) with a paternalistic attitude : leadership and power are 
accepted as synonymous.
The feudal system was originally a deviation of the tribal system 
through the negative change of the Bedouin culture under the 
conditions of the settlement's environment in Iraq and the influence 
of the Ottoman and British powers. Thus it was not merely an economic 
relationship system, but more it was the backbone of the whole social 
structure on which the social, political, educational and even 
religious systems were based (Kubba 1957). Main noticed this 
phenomenon in Iraqi society at this time (Mandate and Independence 
period) when he remarked that in villages and towns the "social 
structure is feudal" (Main 1935, p. 25).
Iraqi nationalists remained dissatisfied with the Iraqi kingdom 
system and British influence. They tended to concur with a Pan-Arab 
movement, and aimed at freeing all the Arab world from European 
control and to achieve a full independence. The Iraqi army came to be 
regarded as a chosen instrument for this policy and began to acquire 
an unforeseen influence in Iraqi politics which lead the latter to
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cone to pov^r in the revolution of 14th July 1958 which overthrew the 
monarchy system, and set up the new Iraqi republican system.
After that revolution, during the sixties, the country witnessed 
a period of continuous changes in political regimes until 1968, and 
political instability which dominated the social and economical life 
as well. Meantime, civil administration was conducted largely along 
military lines because many militants had been appointed to top 
management positions. Thus, because of their educational and work 
background, these army officers began to adopt and apply the military 
style of behaviour in the civil organizations which they headed, (Al- 
Atiyyah, 1977). This behaviour was evident in the superior- 
subordinate relationship practiced by those militants where they 
expected absolute unquestioning obedience from their subordinates. 
Inconsistent behaviour with such expectations usually resulted in 
severe punishment, in different ways, for disobedience. In addition, 
these militants were inefficient and incompetent in civil 
administration and the only merit which entitled them for these 
positions was their loyalty to the dominating political authority. 
Consequently, the administrative body deteriorated both in it's 
effectiveness and efficiency and in its personal morale. Moreover, 
political considerations doninated the administrative milieu, 
(Al-Atiyyah, 1977). Particularly in the early years of the regimes,
'loyalty' was given precedence to 'efficiency' in order to give the 
regime a greater foundation. It has been stated, that during the 
sixties, most managerial leaders in top positions were those whose 
scientific and practical qualifications and experiences did not suit 
the nature of jobs and positions assigned to them, (Aljawishli, 1967). 
Ihe result of this, was their complete dependence on middle and junior 
managerial levels, and the conversion of the leadership into a
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bureaucratic and inefficient force. The political appointments, 
instability, high turnover, and insecurity and uncertainty lead the 
managerial leaders to comply with the authority and to show their 
loyalty by following their instructions strictly (Al-Atiyyah 1977), 
thus emphasizing urgent and immediate tasks, even at the expense of 
long term plans. This was done in order to secure themselves 
positions. Iraq, like most developing countries who were embarking on 
state ownership on a large scale, has suffered from a severe shortage 
of national experts who have sufficient scientific and technical 
qualifications to occupy the administrative positions particularly in 
the leadership positions. This shortage has been increased by the 
"Governmental Purification Law" which led the administration to lose 
many qualified and efficient persons (Al-Aisamie 1969).
Since the 1958 revolution, there has been a fundamental change in 
econmic activity and political economy, especially the agrarian land 
reform which effectively terminated the prevailing feudal system 
through a greater role for the government in land expropriation and 
distribution, and the strongest growth in the size and influence of 
the public sector after the extensive nationalization move in 1964. 
All private banks and insurance companies, the three trading 
companies, and 27 industrial companies were nationalized. Also by 
1961 the first move towards the nationalization of oil was taken; by 
1972 and 1973 the most important economic sector has been brought 
under virtually full national control (Aboona 1975). The country 
since the 1958 revolution has started to move extensively toward 
industrialization which is regarded as the main hope for economic 
development and military and political powsr.
Before the sixties, management did not receive the same degree of 
attention as other activities. There was a lack of recognition of
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management as a profession or subject; little or no attention was paid 
to the issue of efficiency, quality requirements, management, 
education and training. As a result management became more of a 
bottle-neck to national development than technology, capital, labour 
and other factors.
The first signs of a serious recognition of the need for 
management improvement was in the early sixties. Since the late 
sixties and particularly in more recent years, there has been a 
widespread awareness of the need for management improvements, 
particularly in the public sector.
Although many steps have been taken since the fifties to meet the 
need for rapid improvement which was recognized by international 
consultants and experts, Iraq still suffers from a large number of 
shortccmings and managerial problems with some variations in type and 
degree. Ihe underdevelopment, even today, of Iraqi managament and 
administration is still recognized as being one of the main obstacles 
to rapid economic and social progress.
Since 1970 management development has begun to be considered as 
an integral part of economic development and in 1972 a new step was 
taken by declaring, through the Resolution No. (333), a plan for 
Management Development in Iraq. The Industrial Management Development 
Centre which was established in 1962 and reorganized and expanded in 
1970, became the National Centre for Consultancy and Management 
Development (NCCMD) (Al-Rubaie 1983). This centre became the focal 
point of all management and administrative development or reform 
activities. The government's formal support was given to the NCCMD 
and also to the "organisation and methods units" which have been 
established according to Resolution No. (333) which provided a legal 
framework for their activities. But the change is still seen as too
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slow and ineffective. Many of these problems, such as 'bureaucracy' 
and ' routine ' upon which war was declared many tiroes by many public 
figures or government ministers, still obviously exist strongly in the 
administrative body. Also the tendency is to deal with superficial 
synptoms rather than root causes and to emphasize minor immediate 
problems rather than major long-term ones. Moreover, all the 
management and administrative development effort has been concentrated 
on the structural framework for development, such as organizational 
structure, precedures, laws, regulations, economical aspects, etc. 
These efforts do not take into account the gap that exists in the 
whole life of the country between the development of the physical 
framework and that in the social structure, norms and values, and 
social relationships. Iraqi society during the fifties, with its 
half-tribal, half-urban structure was facing, as Warriner notes : 
"the task of constructing the physical framework for development and 
also the social structure for expansion" (Warriner 1962, p. 175). 
Since that time the physical framework has received major emphasis on 
the development particularly after the nationalization in 1972 of the 
main international oil operations in Iraq and the sharp increasing of 
oil revenue and the emphasis on economic development, which is 
considered necessary for the national strength and high standards of 
living. The social structure has not received the same efforts in 
development in order to suit the development of the physical framework 
and its requirements. In fact the gap between the economic potential 
of Iraq and the social structure has been clear since the fifties when 
Warriner commented on the change that started to occur in society by 
saying ; "it is inaccurate to speak of conflict between the old and 
new society, for the old society is collapsing, and if the new society 
is represented by the urban agglomeration of Baghdad, then it is
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taking the imprint of the West like wax - the superficial imprint, 
without the things that the Western world believes to be its best".
SUMABY AND CONCLUSION
An attempt has been made in this chapter to identify as well as 
account for the societal norms and values that are historically 
embedded in the evolution of Iraqi's social and institutional 
development particularly in relation to authority. In studying this 
evolution, four stages have been devised which cumulatively have 
crystalized Iraqi culture, particularly its societal norms of power 
and authority. Ihese stages deal with power and authority and their 
societal norms in the Bedouin culture, in Islamic culture, during the 
Ottoman Empire, and during British Influence. By referring to the 
historical development of Iraqi political, social, economic and other 
instituticxis through the above stages and by the manner in which 
basic events and crises have been handled, it becomes possible to 
assess the original identity of Iraqi culture and the identity that 
this culture has acquired through evolution. Despite the fact that 
principles of 'equality', 'justice' and 'democracy' lie at the heart 
of Bedouin culture and Islam which are the most important elements in 
the crystallization of Iraqi culture, this culture has through a very 
long history of suffering, acquired an identity which is far away 
from such principles. So neither Bedouin small pover-d is tance and 
principles of democracy and strong equality nor those of Islam have 
been able to exist in Iraqi culture and to prevent the large power- 
distance, inequality and authoritarian tendencies which have shaped a 
great part of Iraqi culture. Moreover, the distorted development of 
Bedouin culture during Ottanan and British influences and of the 
interpretation and practices of some Islamic relevant teachings have
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lent fundamental support to such authoritarianism in power or 
authority relationship in Iraqi culture. Islam, which is meant to be 
a social revolution against inequality, injustice, and all kinds of 
arbitrariness, started to depart from these principles, particularly 
in reaching and exercising power and authority since the Umnayed 
rule. Also starting from that time the power-distance in Islamic 
culture got wider and wider between rulers and ruled, but to various 
degrees from one period to another, but it was wider than ever and 
was seldom bridged during the Ottoman period. In fact Ottoman rule 
has resulted, to a great extent, in a misconception of the Islamic 
teachings among people in Iraqi society, as the Ottomans interpreted 
and practiced these teachings as a means of upholding authority and 
power. This distorted development of the interpretation and 
practices of Islam have an important impact on social life since 
religious influences extend to all social institutions, and govern 
people's thinking. Also most fanatical religious thinkers justify 
submission to power and authority regardless of its just or unjust 
nature in many different ways and they limit the right to ijtihad 
(i.e. innovaticxis) because for than it may change accepted doctrines 
and practices, and result in confusion. Thus an extraordinary gulf 
has arisen between the Islamic ideal and reality, and Islam which is 
meant to be a 'way of life' became a religion that organizes the 
relation with God much more than a political, economical, and social 
system which organizes the interrelationships within the society. 
While traditionalists resist accommodating the ideals in the reality 
of social life, social life failed to be raised to the ideal of 
Islam.
The distorted development of Bedouin tribal culture under 
Ottanan and British occupations has also highly supported the
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authoritarian tendencies in pover-relationships in Iraqi society. 
The Bedouin traditional power and authority relationship, with its 
sense of democracy and extreme equality have changed, under the 
impact of Ottoman and British policies, to a 'feudal-type' of 
relationship with a dominant-submissive authoritarian pattern. The 
growth of the feudal system has had an important impact on Iraqi 
societal norms, because this system was not simply an economic system 
but rather a social one, as it was a distorted development of Bedouin 
culture in the desert, which is one of the basic components of Iraqi 
culture. Thus this system ccmbined the basic features of all 
patterns of power relationships and their norms and values in Iraqi 
society. So the two-way communication of Bedouin traditional- 
charismatic authority with its sense of 'rational agreement ' 
deviated, as happened with that of the very early Islamic society, to 
become an authoritarian one-way type of coimunications.
'Power' continues to be, as it was in the Bedouin culture, an 
essential element and a great motivator to satisfy individual's 
inherited traditional 'superiority propensity'. But this cultural 
concern for power has moved in practice fran a "socialized" Bedouin 
democratic type to a "personal" authoritarian one (McClelland and 
Burnham 1980, p. 288). This personal type of power manifests itself 
clearly in the Iraqi administrative body, half of which was inherited 
from Turks, and half established by the British military rulers. 
Also this personal type of power manifests itself in the extreme 
struggle for power and influence that characterizes many different 
periods of Iraqi contençorary society, as was very clear during 
British influence, particularly in the period of the Monarchy system. 
Here formal authority was abused for personal benefit and wealth 
became an important means for getting power and personal loyalty. In
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fact the British domination over Iraq had its influence on social 
life and its structure and peoples' mentality and their material 
life: they came under the impact of Western culture, which brought a 
new set of problems.
Also such concern with a personal type of power appeared in the 
continuous changes in political regimes until 1968, and in the 
political instability which dominated the social and economical life 
in Iraqi society. The managing of the civil administration by 
military who were appointed to top management positions also 
contributed to the large power-d istance between superiors and 
subordinates in Iraqi work organizations. Also the political
considerations dominated organizational life, which generated
instability, insecurity and uncertainty, and led to more compliant
hierarchical relationships. Despite the recognition in the early
sixties of the need for management development, the effort has been 
concentrated on the structural framework or on the organizational 
'hard' aspects, rather than 'soft' aspects, while totally ignoring 
the culture of wider society and of organizations.
CHAPTER (5)
THE DOMINANT VALDE-ORIENTATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY IRAQI 
SOCIETY RELATED TO IRAQI ORGANIZATIONAL SETTINGS
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INTRDDOCnCW
It is difficult to study the socio-historical evolution of Iraqi 
societal norms because of the scarcity of data and the types of 
studies which deal with such evolution; most of what is available is 
either out of date or is of a purely historical nature. The same is 
true regarding the studies about individuals' general traits in Iraqi 
society; most of what is available is either about the Arab society 
as a whole or Middle Eastern societies in general. In addition, a 
great many of these studies was written by foreigners who view the 
society from the outside and through their own cultural concepts. 
Also, these studies have not taken into account the changes that have 
been occurring in social ideologies, principles and cultural 
revivals. Most of the social-psychological studies dealing with the 
'basic Arab personality' have been criticised for their reliance on 
anecdotal reports, and as has already been stated, for their 
inadequacy in explaining Arab collective behaviour (Moughrabi 1978). 
In fact many of the traits that have contributed to the Arabic 
personality, as well as many cultural phenomena and socialization 
patterns - particularly the dominant child-rearing practices that 
have been distinguished in the Arab world - become extremely 
difficult (with the new evidences) to categorize as typical of Arab 
societies or typical characteristics of Arabs only. Evidence is 
available that similar cultural phencanena and some socialization 
practices - i.e. in child-rearing - that can be recognized in the 
Arab world also exist in the non-Arabic Moslim countries e.g. Iran 
(Tayeb 1981), and Turkey (Kagitabasi 1970). While all these studies 
would suggest the crucial influence of Islam and its interpretation 
in shaping the cultural phenanena and the socialization practices in 
Arabic or non-Arabic Islamic societies, once again we cannot consider
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all these phenomena and practices as typical of Islamic societies 
only. There is much evidence of similar phenomena and practices to 
varying degrees in many European countries (Hofstede 1980), such as 
Italy (Ferraratti 1959). Similar cultural phenomena that were 
observed and studied in my field work in Iraqi organizations in 1980 
have distinguished in organizations in other Islamic countries - Iran 
(Tayeb 1981) - and also in organizations in France (Grozier 1964, 
1969), and England (Bate 1982), as will be shown later.
Thus, it is quite possible to find cultural phenomena and 
characteristics similar to those of Arabic and Islamic societies in 
any other society, particularly in those countries who rank 'high' in 
the cultural dimensions, as applied by Hofstede (1980) in his 
international study. But this similarity or universality in 
dimensions is associated with cultural variaticxi, and thus cultures 
would rank, in any cultural dimension, to a different degree - high, 
medium, low. In fact all these evidences gives more recognition to 
the 'universal but variable' theory of culture (Kluckhohn 1964).
However, it is true that Iraq is after all, part of Arab society 
and a close socio-historical examination of the 'Arab' would reveal 
the presence of cormonalities among them, such as common language 
(Arabic), coromon faith (Islam), common historical and cultural 
traditicxi, as well as the same heritage, architecture, passions and 
temperaments. Also, the Middle East is referred to as a 'culture 
area' in which the people "share a way of life which is recognizably 
common in important respects, and recognizably different from the way 
of life in surrounding areas" (Gardener 1959, p. 20). But despite 
all the commonalities, still each society in the Arab world and the 
Middle East has its peculiar settings, environment, conditions, 
historical events and way of thinking. At the same time, the Arabs
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of today are not the Arabs of a hundred years ago or, even more so, 
today, their attitudes, values, personalities and social institutions 
are changing under the impact of many factors and events.
But above all this variety and change, there are extremely 
influential elements that have played don inant and concrete implicit 
and explicit roles in constructing important common features in the 
indentity of Arabic culture; these are - nomadic values, the Islamic 
religion, and a long history of subordination. This identity has 
been reinforced by the basic structure of social institutions and the 
socialization pattern. Arab societies are different in certain 
aspects and at the same time similar to each other. Such societies 
are described in terms of being "prismatic" (Riggs 1964, p. 38), 
where the differentiation process may remain indefinitely incomplete. 
Hofstede (1980) remarks that among five Arabic countries that were 
surveyed in the large multinational corporation study "Hermes", there 
were small differences in the cultural dimensions which were under 
study. Also Patai (1973) points out the striking similarities in 
social structure, social behaviour and child-rearing practices among 
different Arab countries. These similarities can be recognized from 
many investigations covering such countries as Lebanon, Egypt, 
Palestine, Algeria, Morocco and Iraq, which all suggests a general 
all-Arab pattern of social behaviour.
So the cultural and individual characteristics which will be 
detailed in this chapter will indicate the dominant value- 
orien tat ions which are behind the observable modes of behaviour in 
Iraqi society. The same characteristics are likely to be found in 
varying degrees in any other society that has been through similar 
influences or similar situations where the population has had to 
confront similar historical realities to that of the Iraqi people.
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Klukhohn (1964) emphasizes that if we aim to understand better 
the relationship of cultural factors within either the structuring of 
social groups or the personalities of the individuals who comprise 
the social groups, the generalized meanings or dominant values 
should be the major or at least the first concern ratlier than the 
'individuals differences'.
Before moving to study these dominant value-orientations in 
Iraqi society, the researcher will provide a general review about 
Iraqi social structure in terms of its diversity and major loyalties. 
Such a review will be very useful in understanding the dominance and 
variation of individuals' cultural make-up.
GQ^ERAL REVIEW OF IRAQI SOCIAL STOOCIORE;
The Arab and Middle Eastern societies have been subject to heavy 
influences of Western culture and way of life. Modem technology has 
been introduced to most of these countries, as is the case in Iraq, 
where the population has become familiar with modem communication 
and information systems (telephone, telex, computers, and so on). 
People nowadays receive higher education, and changes have occurred 
in medical practices, national dress, housing and the standard as 
well as the type of living, which in many areas rose very high. But 
all these changes are taking place within a social structure and 
cultural norms and values which have not substantially changed. In 
particular, individuals in many of these societies have started to 
find themselves in a situation where neither their old tradition nor 
Westem ideologies and institutions provide them with a complete and 
suitable 'formula' for a 'way of life' which they would find 
satisfactory. The individual becomes a mixture of traditional ity and 
modernity but without a clear identity, varying in degrees from one
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individual to another. The deeply rooted Bedouin traits, despite 
their modification, continue to exert their influence on attitudes 
and behaviours even in the more Westernized Arab areas. These 
embedded traits tend to be more visible when moving fran the cities 
to rural areas, but this varies in degrees from one Arabic country to 
another. So the individual in Iraq, despite his surface modernity, 
may still be traditional in his outlook; he values belonging to a 
family, tribe, ethnic or religious group more than his membership in 
a newly established entity, the nation state. In many ways, his 
attitudes and behaviour are still conditioned by the norms and 
customs of his traditional reference groups. His loyalty is to his 
personal goals, family, cliques, friends, and religious group more 
than to the organization.
The societies of the Middle East and the Arabic world have been 
characterized by a 'mosaic' social structure. Such a structure has 
been recognized by many investigators (Gardener 1959; Bill and Leiden 
1974; Muna 1980). For any investigator who may view the Middle East, 
a clear picture of amazing variety and the contrasts of people living 
within that area will be drawn to his attention, specifically such a 
picture signifies both unity and variety. Bill and Leiden (1974) 
describe the Middle Eastern social structure as follows;
"The overall social structure might best be viewed as 
a grid or creased mosaic in which the intricate web of 
groups is partially partitioned by class lines. Both group 
and class structures relate to one another reciprocally, 
and it is this reciprocity that builds coherence in to the 
sophisticated system ... Group fissures within classes are 
numerous and deep enough to weaken class cohesion and to 
retard class consciousness. Loyalty to primordial groups 
such as family takes preference over loyalty to class."
(p. 89)
Thus we can find within that mosaic social structure a complex 
web of group rivalries and a deep sense of loyalty to ethnic groups 
which provide the individual with his basic identity. We can also
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see the failure to develop a broad sense of community identification. 
People have a social and religious multi-group affiliation which 
links them differently. People are proud of their differences which 
are maintained throughout history but which vary in degree from one 
period to another; in the period of the Ottoman Empire, for example, 
such differences were formally institutionalized in the "Millet 
system" as an administrative technique to organize the great variety 
of Middle East groups (Gardener 1959).
The mosaic social structure of the Middle East is especially 
clear in some of the Arab Middle Eastern countries such as Iraq. In 
addition to its original inhabitants, a great variety of people from 
Asia, Africa and Europe have moved into Iraq throughout history,
either to settle or occupy, sometimes for generations, bringing with 
them and keeping their traditional ways of life. The physical
geography of Iraq, with all its varied conditions, has helped to 
produce that mosaic social structure; there are mountains, where the 
'Kurds' mostly live, and who are influenced by mountain tribes much 
more than by the Bedouin desert tribes; there are areas of grassland, 
desert, semi-desert and sedimentary areas, where mainly Arabs live, 
but with varying degrees of attachment to the Bedouin culture and 
values. The desert and semi-desert areas are inhabited by the 
Bedouin tribes and those tribes are strongly attached to Bedouin 
values more than the tribes who inhabit the sedimentary areas, where 
a very old civilization flourished and for many reasons, the 
'cultural construct' is clear and strong. On the other hand, people 
in the grassland areas, such as Basra, are much less attached to the 
Bedouin values. Also there are other 'minorities' who inhabit
different areas, e.g. Turks, Chaldeans, Persians, Assyrians and
Armenians (Alwardi 1965). Iraqi society also displays a clear
219
Structure of religious denominations; within the dominant religion of 
Islam there are Shiite Moslems and Sunni Moslems. Within the 
Christian religion there are Catholic Christians and Protestant 
Christians and in addition other minority Christian groups. There 
are also fringe religious groups and sects such as Sabians and 
Yasid'hians. The above divisions have helped preserve group 
differences within Iraqi society.
The individual in Iraq lives and works in a society whose social 
structure, with its contrasts, diversity and gross-loyalties, has 
some distinctive features which have considerable impact on him. In 
that social structure the individual is governed by a number of 
institutions with primordial ties which provide the basis upon which 
society is formed. The strongest of these ties are those of the 
family, religious and regional groups, tribes, and also the 
neighbourhood and friendships. This is in addition to other
competing ties and loyalties in other institutions, such as 
political, economic and professional institutions. Using all those 
institutions, affiliations and loyalties, the individual would 
introduce himself by identifying his various affiliations; he may 
nane his ethnic origin, tribe, clan, family, as well as stating the 
location of his residence in Baghadad or one of the other provinces 
or cities, and he may also refer to his or his family's original 
quarter of residence. In addition he may specify that he is a true 
Arab assil (i.e. his family lineage is known) from one of the 
original tribes, not from those who were arabicized when they joined 
the original tribes under different conditions throughout 
generations. People are very proud of their original affiliations to 
their tribes and most of their 'surnames' are in fact names relating 
to a tribe or clan. Thus the individual in Iraqi society is under
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great socio-cultural pressures where his loyalty and identity are 
divided among his country, traditional ties as well as newer 
institutions, and his own self image. His societal norms and values 
are derived from a mixture of three original communities (tribal, 
rural, urban) and their interaction and coexistence under different 
historical realities. Moreover, as a result of many influences such 
as 'urbanization', economic factors, the feudal system, and easy 
access to the town, the tribal and rural communities have been 
subject to a kind of dissolving process within the urban cormunity, 
but to different degrees; the old tribal society nowadays has become 
a very small ineffective community in small semi-remote areas in the 
desert near the Iraqi westem borders. A considerable part of rural 
society, through the immigration to the towns, has become part of the 
urban community, while the rest still have an interdependent 
relationship with the urban community. This does not mean that the 
three ccnmunities are the same nowadays, but rather each has remained 
distinct in its demographic characteristics and economic life style 
and in its peculiar setting. At the same time, the three communities 
have many socio-cultural traits and customs in common with a clear 
influence of tribal Bedouin values and traits; for example, 
individuals from the three communities have strong kinship 
relationships and they value loyalty to the clan, family, pride, 
manliness and hospitality. The changes that happened in the old 
tribal society strengthened the 'extended family' in the rural and 
urban communities, which plays the same important role of the 'clan' 
in tribal society. But the extended family continues to value its 
original affiliation to the clan and tribe, particularly in the rural 
cormunity.
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So the dominant cultural values that were built-up and 
reinforced within such social structures containing such contrasts, 
diversity and gross-loyalties could have their effect on the way 
individuals construct their behaviour, as well as on their 
expectations and relationships within the organization.
Following Kluckhohn (1964), in this chapter my concern will be in 
highlighting some of those generalized or dominant values, meanings 
and ideas relevant to this research. These are shared by the 
majority of individuals and deeply rooted in their societal norms and 
form broad or general dispositions or tendencies to behave in 
particular ways. In other words the concern in this chapter will be 
with the dominant value - orientations within contemporary Iraqi 
society, which characterize the culture as well as the individuals, 
and which have been acquired cumulatively through the confrontation 
and coping mechanisms within the historical realities and situations 
of the evolution of this society.
In order to highlight these value-or ientations, which are 
historically enbedded within Iraqi society and its institutional
structures, I will employ on the one hand, the previous chapter
regarding the socio-historical evolution of Iraqi culture which 
provides the identity of this culture that has been acquired over 
successive generations and on the other hand, I will use the
available data about individual characteristics and their observed 
general traits. In fact personality traits have a substantial 
relevance for the internalization of culturally preferred values, and 
thus provide a concrete insight into the underlying personality 
process by being directly and readily observable (Herbert 1976).
What will be studied in this chapter will provide a basic
framework for more important steps in our journey to arrive at a
222
better understanding of the orientations, meanings and styles of 
relationships that members of Iraqi society derive fran their 
socialization in wider society and are likely to reflect when they 
join an organization.
To understand the relationships between the dominant cultural 
values and the individuals' general traits in one hand and the
organizational setting in the other hand, the following analytical 
conceptual tools will be used. These provide a linkage between the 
characteristics of culture, individuals and organizations, especially 
those related to man's relationship to other men in work
organizations in Iraq;
1. Power-distance or relation to authority.
2. Egotism and open confrontaticn.
3. Formality and informality.
4. Conformity and security.
5. Dependence and taking responsibility.
1. PCWER DISTANCE OR RELftTICN TQ AÜTBORITY
Power-d istance is the relationship, together with its canponent 
values, between those who hold power or authority and those who are 
subject to that power or authority, or between a superior and a 
subordinate in a hierarchy; it is the degree of inequality in power
between the less powerful individual and the more powerful one, and
the extent to which each of them could determine the behaviour of the 
other (Hofstede 1980).
The dominant values or group norms within any society concerning 
' inequality', which are coiç>led with their values and norms about 
power, are behind the degree of ' power-d is tance ' in that society. 
Consequently these values affect the way members of society construct
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their relationships with authority or people In power, as well as the 
way power holders construct their behaviour in exercising power or 
authority.
Patterns of Inequality between groups within society relate to 
the value systems of both the powerful and the powerless. So 
patterns of power inequality and the modes of boss-subordinate 
relationship within the organization reflect the value systems of 
both bosses and subordinates and relate to their collective values.
By reviewing the socio-historical evolution of Iraqi culture, as 
was done previously, we can distinguish the pattern of societal norms 
(shared value-systems) of power and authority which the individuals 
are provided with, and which have been reinforced throughout history. 
This pattern, which is shared by the majority of the population, 
consists of two kinds of contradictory sets of values. Ihe first set 
are the 'superiority values' which are strongly embedded in the minds 
of the people, and are socially required as an important feature of 
'manliness'. Hiese values stem mainly from nomadic Bedouin culture 
which emphasizes power, dominance, having influence over others, 
pride and prestige. The second kind are 'submission values', which 
stem from the very old agricultural civilization of Iraq, a very long 
history of subordination, centuries of crushing poverty and 
uncertainty of life, and the misinterpretaticai and negative practices 
of some significant principles of Islam. These values call for blind 
obedience, subordination, extreme conformity, and flattery of the 
powerful and influential.
Such sets of values, which are at the heart of 
'authoritarianism', underpin the large power-distance that Iraqi 
society has maintained in different areas. Through these 
authoritarian societal norms, which have been reinforced by the
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Structure of social institutions and patterns of socialization, the 
customary mode of superior - subordinate relationships in different 
role-taking situations where individuals are involved (God-man, 
ruler-subject, parent-child, teacher-pupi], man-wcmen,...etc.) is a 
'dominant-submissive' pattern. In fact, such an authoritarian 
cultural pattern is clearly the most conspicuous contribution to the 
power relationships and beliefs of most political systems throughout 
generations. In addition, the political systems, backed by religious 
doctrines, have acted upon society in a way that reinforce the 
dominant-submissive role pattern in interpersonal relationships (as 
has been demonstrated previously). Also this pattern is perpetuated 
and reinforced through the family and the educational system, as will 
be seen later in this research.
From these kinds of ' authoritarian ' societal norms, the 
individual personality derives two major, parallel sources of values, 
'dominance' and 'submission' which are reinforced by the patterns of 
socializaticm and the structure of social institutions; individuals 
within Iraqi society are socialized to perceive themselves as either 
the wielders of authority or the objects of others authority, where 
they became predisposed to the values of daninance and canmand when 
they are in positions of power, or submissive and obedient when they 
are powerless (Alwardi 1951; Berger 1962). Such a value system was 
also found by Melikian (1977) to exist among Saudi Arabian college 
students; among those students who shared a general willingness to 
accept the authority of a 'boss' and to esteem it, it was discovered 
that these attitudes were accompanied by a willingness to be in that 
position themselves. In fact many investigators have remarked on the 
high degree of authoritarianism in Middle Eastern societies (Gardner 
1959; Tayab 1981 - Iran; Kagitcibasi 1970 - Turkey) as well as in
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Arabic society and individual personal make-up (Alwardi 1951 - Iraq; 
Prathro and Melikian 1953, Melikian 1959 - Egypt; Zayaor 1978 - 
Lebanon; Berger 1962, Khadduri 1970 - Arabic world).
In Iraqi society, authoritarian social institutions and 
authoritarian tendencies in personality have reinforced one another 
in conforming to authoritarian societal norms, thereby œnstructing 
the general cultural pattern. In fact authoritarianism within the 
individuals' orientation in any authoritarian culture and society, 
such as Middle Eastern and Arabic society, is likely to be a healthy 
psychological adjustment to the general cultural pattern and societal 
norms. These attitudes are accumulated through the socio-historical 
evolution of society and do not necessarily imply an unhealthy 
authoritarian personality, such as the F-scale (devloped by Adorno et 
al. 1950) for example would indicate (see Kagitcibasi 1970 in her 
study of the United States and Turkey). Melikian (1959) in his study 
of young adults in Egypt and the United States, also using the F- 
scale and in addition the questionnaire measure of adjustment, 
concludes:
■The relationship between positive attributes of 
personality and authoritarianism tends to be opposite in 
Egypt and the ttiited States. They suggest that in Egypt
the authoritarian Moslem may be more healthy
pychologically, this perfacps because he is conforming to
the general cultural pattern. On the other hand the
Egyptian Christian who is authoritarian, whose subculture 
is more fluid, presents a less healthy picture. Similarly 
in the united States, the more authoritarian Catholic may 
be somewhat better adjusted than the Protestant 
authoritarian whose subculture tends to be more liberal.
Thus it appears that when the personality picture of the 
authoritarian is taken into account, the general culture as 
well as the religious context must be defined." (p. 68)
The relationship to authority In Iraqi society is not only
dominated by authoritarian norms but also by the prevailence of
'paternalism' which stems from the strong role and influence of the
family within Arabian society. As has been previously shown the
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paternalistic attitude was demanded by the Bedouin from their 
Sheikhs. In contemporary society the paternalistic and familiar 
nature of the social structure have a double effect. When the old 
tribal society breaks down, the extended family - in addition to its 
original importance - becomes the basic unit and plays the same 
important role as the clan in the tribal society. The long history 
of harsh treatment and long-term insecurity has increased the 
individual's identification with traditional groups, specifically 
with his family, in a natural reaction to find security care and 
support. The individual, in Arab society defers to the authority of 
the father or the head of the family, but he also at the same time 
depends and expects a lot from than. He may have the same attitude 
and expectations in his relationships with people in power or the 
government. In particular, the individual's need for a 
'paternalistic' relationship with those in power has been emphasized 
because the latter have not satisfied such needs and provided a 
familial nature of relationship with him, which to him means care, 
support, love and security. So such need has been unsatisfied 
throughout generations, despite the fact that those in power realize 
the paternalistic demands of their people. However, these are 
perceived as negative expectations, as is shown in the following 
statement made by an Egyptian journalist, Mansour (1977):
"People are like children who expect miracles from 
their fathers and the government is father and mother to 
the people."
In fact such paternalistic expectations by individuals in their 
relationships to those in power have a negative component because 
although individuals expect a great deal from their government, they 
are unwilling to take responsibility and work in co-operation, as a 
result of their negative individualism, as we will see later. Berger
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(1962) quoted the following statement from Dr Jamil Saliba (1958) 
which describes the Arab's (Syrians and Lebanese) expectations in 
their relation to their governments;
"They ask their governments to plant their deserts 
with figs and olives, to make their wells gush forth, to 
revive the land for them, and to guarantee their 
livelihood. But whenever they are called upon to work in 
co-operation, they object and each one prefers to do the 
work individually." (p. 157)
In Iraq, as well as in most Arab societies, the authoritarian 
and paternalistic societal norms of power and authority through 
different historical realities produce the following interacting 
influences:
A - Traditional respect of authority
B - Personalism, or 'personalized possessing of authority'.
A. Traditional respect of authority in Iraqi Society: the
individual from his early childhood is instilled with the value of 
respecting, or at least showing respect toward his parents, elders, 
religious men, ... etc. In effect 'respecting authority' for members 
of society means: be obedient, and do what you've been told and if 
you do, you will be rewarded. This is achieved firstly, by being 
accepted into the community which means security and affiliation; and 
secondly, by not feeling guilty as they meet some of their 
obligations toward parents, society and above all, to God - religion 
strongly emphasizes such values in man's relationship with his God, 
parents and benevolent leaders. Such positive motivation in 
respecting authority was emphasized more in the past through the 
'Caliph system'. The post of the Caliphate was a 'spiritual central' 
and the Caliphate was not only a secular but also a religious guide, 
a role that imparted a certain degree of sanctity to his person. 
Moreover, because of the experience of many centuries of political 
instability, which was perceived as a threat to the unity of the
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Moslem people and the strength of the religion, many Moslim Ulama or 
theorists have stressed the principle of obedience to any kind of 
ruler, particularly to those who promised to respect the religious 
law of Islam, in preference to the confusion which might result from 
attenpts to overturn the ruler (Berger 1962; Issawi 1966 b; Alwardi 
1954; Khadduri 1970).
Throughout the long history of arbitrary rulers who dominated 
Iraq (mainly by introducing 'fear' during which the individual's only 
concerns were survival and security), people became accustomed to 
showing respect to the holders of power and authority, even if they 
did not really feel it, not only to protect themselves but to gain 
the security and rewards of just being accepted by the powerful, and 
to be in the shadow of their power and have the privilege of being 
associated with them. This is so, especially when those in power 
hold a type of power which is positively evaluated, and can effect 
one's standing or respect in the community; an example is the 
bureaucratic Effendis, who wen people's respect because of the povær 
of education or rather information, and their position in the 
government's administrative body. This was at a time when ignorance 
prevailed, and when education and a government position was, for a 
lot of people, the way to move iç> from their social class and gain 
respect and power within their society. Hie Effend is also gave the 
impression that haughtiness and respect were linked.
B. The second influence in relation to authority is 
'personalism': the individual's perception of those who hold power 
and authority is affected by the inherited impression of what could 
be called 'personalized possession of authority' by those who hold 
power and authority in society. For generations the people have 
experienced authority as the right and privilege of their ruler who
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either inherited from their fathers and thus could pass authority to 
their sons, or acquired it by force or through the right of conquest. 
This is the case with all the foreign rulers who occupied the 
country, one-by-one, for hundreds of years. Thus it does not matter 
how the ruler came to power; he would hold authority in his hand as 
long as he could keep it, whether he was just or unjust, qualified or 
unqualified, and the only way to take the authority fron him was 
either on his death or by the force of another more powerful person. 
Thus individuals grow up in a culture where authority is perceived by 
people as not only a personalized, but also a cruel exercise of power 
to be avoided or to be manipulated to mitigate Its harshness. One of 
the most recent examples which still remains in the 'memory' of 
people is the Ottoman conquest, which perpetuated foreign 
administration of a servile character for more than four centuries; 
there was little connection between the rulers (Sultans) who 
inherited their authority, and the ruled, except through the exercise 
of force and the collecting of taxes by provincial officials, who 
used their governmental positions for personal ends. These 
provincial rulers - by their bribery and corrupt administration, as 
well as through the Ottoman general policy of extreme centralization, 
suspicion and high turnover in positions - used their positions 
chiefly as an opportunity tx> get as much as they could for 
themselves. Ottoman policy encouraged a combination of subservience 
to one's boss and tyranny over one's subordinates.
The British provided a different example in some respects, but 
as foreigners they also gained the authority to rule the country by 
force when they occupied Iraq after the First World War. They 
followed the same policy of extreme centralization and as Berger 
(1959) stated, "encouraged sycophancy dissimulation, and distrust
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when their word was carried out ultimately by force although 
nominally by advice" (p. 121). The monarchical system gave another 
example; this was one of the most effective in social structure and 
combined the basic features of all patterns of power relationships 
and their norms and values, that is the 'feudal system', where the 
feudal sheiks, in addition to the traditional leadership of their 
tribes, acquired the power of possessing land and wealth, which they 
passed on to their sons. This became part of their legal rights, 
along with a position in Parliament and in the government 
administrative body. Associated with this were the examples of the 
bureaucratic class Effendis and the new political elite, who both had 
the power of education, wealth and land. Many of them became wealthy 
feudal landlords, in addition to occupying many high ranking posts in 
the governmental administration and the parliament as well as in the 
political world. In that hereditary kingdom, posts in the 
administrative body were inherited in a functional sense rather than 
in the usual traditional manner of succession of office, title and 
wealth, and through education and belonging to cliques that dependent 
on personal loyalty. Finally, there is the example of military 
regimes who also obtained authority by force, and who in many cases 
applied the military system to managing people.
Personal loyalty played a dominant role in men's relationship to 
other men in Iraqi society. The population grew to expect that 
authority meant not only a legitimate power, but also a display of 
harshness and violence; it accepted authority as a form of special 
privilege, not merely as a form of defined power and that authority 
belonged to the office and not the incumbent. Authority is dealt 
with mainly by showing respect, personal loyalty and subordination. 
In such a society where personal connections, belonging to
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traditional groups, group and personal rivalry and the competitive 
spirit are crucial elements (Berger 1962), personal loyalty is an 
important element in getting and keeping power and authority.
The dominant values of authority and power are a combination of 
three fundamental influences; tradition, blind faith and fear. In 
traditional authority, obedience is owed to the person of the chief 
who occupies a traditionally sanctioned position of authority. In 
the Bedouin culture, traditional authority is not a simple impersonal 
system, but rather a combination of "traditional" and "charismatic" 
authority (Weber 1953); because the Bedouin or the Arab in general is 
highly individualistic, the traditional authority in their culture is 
influenced by the blind faith of the 'charismatic', where the people 
respond to the leader who has characteristics they admire, or the 
person who is a 'super model' of vdiat they themselves would like to 
be. The leader tries to generate faith and loyalty among his men, to 
expand his personal power. In fact, occupying the traditional 
position of authority increases the personal power of the incumbent 
among the people; for example, this was the case with many people who 
occupied the post of the Caliphate, or the feudal sheikhs. The 
traditional charismatic authority within Bedouin society was 
conditional on the sheikh's ability to meet his tribe's expectations, 
but if a series of failures occurred they refused to accept him and 
chose another leader. Also the Bedouin's kind of authority had to 
some degree an important component of 'rational agreement' ; the 
leaders tried to use their referent and expert powers to persuade 
their tribesmen rather than order them. As a result, the Bedouin 
felt that he was sharing power rather than being dominated by it. As 
the Islamic 'shura principle' (i.e. consultation practice) is based 
on two-way conversations, thus the rational agreement played an
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important role in the very early times of Islam when such a principle 
was applied. But throughout history the situations became more one­
way authoritarian types of conversations, as a result of changes in 
the nature of the traditional-charismatic leadership and the 
weakening or rather disappearance of the old Bedouin 'rational 
agreement ' for very long time through the evolution of the society, 
as it was replaced by the strong influence of 'fear' and 'coercive 
and reward power'. But despite this change, 'charisma' is still the 
most effective leadership in the Arabic world, where leaders must 
have dynamic, dominant and overpowering personalities, in other 
words, the effective leader must be firey and charismatic, trusted 
for his integrity, straight forwardness and strength of character 
(Khadduri 1970; Pezeshkpur 1978).
Fear, blind faith and tradition are judged to be essentially 
signs of authoritarian situations (Hampton et al. 1978), as they are 
one-way communications. In this respect the Bedouin traditional- 
charismatic authority and the early Islamic Caliphis gave different 
examples. They both contain some elements of a two-way communication 
process because of the influence of the ' rational agreement ', but 
gradually such examples deviated to become authoritarian situations.
Hie response of individuals in Iraqi society to authoritarian 
situations combines rational elements, personality predispositions 
and strategic elements; it reflects their belief that obedience 
serves their interests in avoiding pain, sustaining life, renaming a 
member, and getting rewards. On the other hand, individuals are 
predisposed to submission as they learned such behaviour during their 
socialization process, which in fact reflects the dominant cultural 
values in their society. Also obedience in authoritarian situations 
appears to be, within Iraqi society, one of the limited strategies
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available to the powerless to cope with the powerful. Individuals in 
Iraqi society, as we have seen previously, have had to ingratiate 
themselves with different arbitrary rulers. By their subordination, 
which induced obsequiousness, they aimed to please and satisfy the 
powerful or the person in authority and thus manipulate his 
reactions. It became part of the peoples' philosophy for dealing 
with authority and power, as can be recognized from many old 
proverbs.
Such a philosophy for obtaining the favour of others to serve 
one's interests arises through the individual's search for the best 
ways to cope with different, difficult situations throughout the 
historical realities of society. This philosophy could be behind the 
observation of the Arab being an "oriented-person" (Berger 1962); 
Pezeshkpur 1978) or being a Fahlawi (Al-Azm 1968). Hamady (1960) 
describes the first characteristic of the "oriented-person" 
attributed to the Arab as follows;
•Hie Arab changes his idaitity with little reluctance.
With the Asiatics he is an oriental# with pecple from the 
West he is an occidental, with the old societies he is a 
traditional man, with the new a modem. The Arab is 
ready and able to form an in-group on relatively meagre 
bases for identification," (p, 67)
Also, Al-Asm's Fahlawi, according to Baaklini (1974) and 
Moughrabi (1978), is a highly adaptive person who is characterized by 
always being ready to express superficial agreement, belittling 
difficulties and fleeting amiability. He is quick-witted, 
exaggerated and self-assertive to an extent which is not based on 
self-confidence but rather derives from a loss of confidence and lack 
of desire to assess situations objectively. The Fahlawi also lacks 
qualities of perseverance, endurance and the ability to work 
systematically. He justifies an embarrassing situation by a 'removal 
and relegation' technique as he shies away from responsibility and
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blames others for his failure, or relegates it to an area outside his 
own sphere.
It seems that the underlying concept of the power-relationship 
that was previously demonstrated is an exchange bargain. Here the 
powerless give respect and subordination to satisfy the powerful 
person's needs for dominance and keeping power; in return, the 
powerful helps the powerless to satisfy the latter's need for 
security and more, assisting them to require some resources of power.
Authority, as has been explained, in most people perceptions (as 
it arises out of their interactions and as I have indicated) is a 
phenomenon attached to a person rather than to the post or position 
occupied by that person. This concept of perceiving authority has 
been distinguished in many developing societies (Braibanti 1966) such 
as in Egyptian society (Berger 1957). Also a similar way of 
perceiving has been recognized in Italy (Ferrarotti 1959) where 
authority in Italian society (e.g. family, enterprise) is highly 
centralized and personalized, and reflects the paternalistic 
orientation and the rigidly hierarchial pattern of structure. Thus 
Italian managers tend to think of their authority in terms of 
personal power within a kind of private kingdom (the enterprise) 
rather than in terms of a necessary function related to the 
enterprise itself.
2. BQOnSM AND OPEN OGNFROWIMCKM
The Iraqis, or in general the Arab, as Berger (1962) remarked, 
seem "to harbour two major contradictory impulses; egotism and 
conformity. The first takes the forms of extreme self-assertion 
before others, pride, and sensitivity to criticism. The second is 
reflected in obedience to certain group norms which are resented, and
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an inability to assert independence as an individual with confidence 
or finality" (p. 155).
Egotism has strong roots in the Bedouin culture and many of its 
values are embedded in Iraqi culture. The Arabs in general have been 
conceived by different investigations as being characterized by an 
alternating pattern of extremes (Gardner 1959; Berger 1962; Patai 
1973; Sanua 1974) because different sets of contradictory values find 
an ambivalent mode of accommodation together. Those contradictory 
values are manifested in different characteristics - being extremely 
emotional on some occasions and exercising self-control on others, 
displaying dominance and then submission, and being as Gardner (1959) 
stated: "too hard or too soft, too level or too secretive, too
pushing or too submissive, fiercely sure of themselves at one moment 
and timidly insure at other moments" (p. 26). The Arab thus veers 
from one extreme to another, their excessive pride can quickly turn 
to self-condemnation, depression to exaltation, secretiveness to 
absolute openness and friendliness to hostility or the opposite way 
round (Sanua 1974).
In fact such contradictory characteristics are a reflection of 
the values and norms which have been built up through the diversity, 
richness and incredible contrasts of Arabic society, and which are 
accumulated through its confrontation with different soc io-h is tor ical 
realities throughout evolution. Bedouin culture on one side, Islam 
and the long history of subordination, particularly to foreign powers 
on the other, with the pattern of socialization, all intertwine to 
build modes of contradictory values in the context of Arabic culture. 
In fact seme old proverbs in Iraqi society, which are still used by 
the people, reflect these kinds of modes e.g. "Either with two lights 
or darkness". Thus individuals' contradictory characteristics are
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overccxnpensations for the people who are on the one hand refined, 
intelligent, sensitive, aware and proud of their past glories: Arab 
history has had a deep impact on their pride and inspiration, for 
Arabs have played in a certain episode in history, "a leading part, 
which was important not only for them but for the whole world, and in 
viture of which indeed they could claim to have been s o m e th in g in 
human history" (Hourani 1962, p. 2; Hourani's emphasis). But, on the 
other hand, they have been humiliated by being cut off from their own 
past, subjugated for too long to foreign decayed empires, having to 
adapt to the ways of their conquerors, frustrated in their efforts to 
direct their own affairs, exposed too soon to the corruption of 
wealth and power, and being politically disunited, as well as 
suffering economic backwardness (Gardner 1959). So as a result, they 
suffer from a de^ inferiority, which has grown out of long history 
of foreign domination and thus they are described as displaying a 
'wounded pride ' or "wounded Arabic ego" (Zayaor 1978, p. 156). Hius 
they are highly sensitive to criticism and they "display the double 
effect of wounded pride, self-exaltation and self-condemnation" 
(Berger 1962, p. 155). In fact, the creation of Israel and the Arab- 
Israeli conflict have had a great impact on the Arabic wounded pride. 
However, at this point we should say that in most social- 
psychological studies, there is an impression that the Arab is over­
sensitive to criticism in his personal relationships outside the 
family, in matters concerning his dignity, honour, standing in the 
community (Hamady 1960; Khadduri 1970; Pezeshkpur 1978; Alwardi 
1965). As Arabs are intensely sensitive and very concerned about 
their own egos, so they are careful not to offend another's. 
Individuals in Arabic society are, as Khadduri (1970) observes, 
"contrary to their submissive appearance and pacifist manners ...,
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robust, violent, highly sensitive people whose volatile emotions may 
rise to a very high pitch in moments of excitement" (p. 24).
Avoidance of open confrontation is a general tendency in 
individual communications in Arabic society (Berger 1962; Muna 1980). 
Generally, they try through their politeness to maintain enough 
distance to control the aggressive tendencies of others, which is an 
accepted attitude in a society containing interpersonal rivalry, 
conflict and sensitivity. Hospitality and generosity, which are 
highly valued, also provide a means of demonstrating friendliness and 
serve to avoid aggressiveness.
Individuals in Arabic society are observed on the one hand as 
having a tendency to avoid the expression of differences and avoid 
controversial issues, and on the other hand, they are constrained by 
a certain rigidity of thought and behaviour. While the individual is 
ready to offer personal opinions on whatever subject, he tends to 
reject the facts that demonstrate that his opinion may have been 
incorrect and consider such facts as invalid or inapplicable when 
confronted with contradictory evidence (Sanua 1974; Pezeshkpur 1978). 
The individual, as Berger (1962) quoted from Saliba, "holds fiercely 
to his own opinion and would like to impose it upon everyone; and if 
people disageree with him, he will intrigue against them and consider 
them inimical" (1962, p. 162). Differences or opposing beliefs and 
opinions are expressed using a few informal mechanisms, and when they 
are discussed, people do so without letting them lead to states of 
unmanageable discord which could result from any simple verbal 
disagreement. So individuals tend, in their interactions, to talk 
very shrewdly about insubstantial subjects to make sure that harmony 
prevails and avoid expression of opinions on controversial issues, 
which could be "perceived as an attempt to impose another's authority
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on one’s self. Not being predisposed to compromise, the automatic 
reaction is to impose one's own ideas on other, and the continuation 
of this process would inevitable lead to diagreements" (Pezeshkpur 
1978, p. 52), which could be considered a personal insult. Such 
tendencies are a distortion of Bedouin desert culture; avoiding open 
confrontation or the expression of differences are ways of avoiding 
ill-feeling and outright hostilities. In other words the Bedouins 
were careful not to offend or insult others fron other clans or 
tribes where it was a question of avoiding hostilities and war. But 
the Bedouins were also characterized by directness, frankness and 
confrontation in their communications, particularly within their 
tribe. The individuals started to lose such characteristics through 
their suffering and fear along with the harsh historical realities 
and centuries of subordinaticxi. The stance of 'not to offending 
others' took the form, in the new society, of avoiding open 
confrontation or expression of differences, rather than keeping its 
old nature and forms of desert life which were used to avoid wars and 
bloodshed between the tribes. On the other hand, the Bedouin through 
his 'superiority propensity' was willing to assert himself and 
prevail over others by impressing them with his chivalry, bravery, 
defiance, virtue, manliness and ccffistruction and telling of poetry. 
So the individual in the new society, is also willing to impress 
others with his opinions and ideals, but this will is associated with 
a tendency to impose his own rigid opinions upon others as a result 
of the unsatisfied need of self assertion. The old desert ways of 
satisfying such needs became impossible because of the requirements 
of the new scx:iety and the individuals sufferes from ignorance, 
humiliation and subjection through long periods of history under 
different kinds of arbitrarly rulers.
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Thus people in Arab society are, as Muna (1980) state, "very 
sensitive to criticism, open confrontation, directness and frankness, 
especially when in front of a group. Deference to authority, face- 
saving, manliness, pride and loyalty - all of these act as serious 
obstacles to open confrontation" (p. 18). Such characteristics are 
also recognized in Iraqi society by Alwardi (1965).
3. POBMALTIY AND INPOBMALITy
The Arab in general, as has been previously demonstrated, gives 
the impression of having a special constellation of influences, which 
lead to contradictory extremes in interpersonal relations and rapid 
alternating behaviours, such as friendship and enmity, suspicion and 
ingrety, intimacy and formality. Although secretive about facts in 
their personal lives, Arabs are emotional individuals, quick to 
express their feelings, and there is little reticence by them in 
revealing their emotional state, especially in pain or sorrow. They 
will show their friendliness even to strangers who they happended to 
meet briefly (Berger 1962; Pezeshkpur 1978).
The Arabic language helps greatly to increase the informality in 
social relationships, as it allows highly emotional expressions to be 
used, which provide people with an effective means to engage in small 
but deep talks. Arabic language, writes Almany (1981) "is beautiful 
and resonant language, rich in vocabulary, images, smiles, unusual 
metaphors, ornate, expressions, elegance, and sonority" (p. 11).
Hardly any language, says Hitti (1970) "seems capable of exercising 
over the minds of its user such an ir res is table influence as Arabic" 
(p. 90).
Thus Arabs basically prefer informality in their commun ica t ions 
because of the very strong primordial ties with traditional groups
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(Muna 1981), e.g. the family, neighbours, friends, members of one's 
clan or tribe, as well as other ties, such as 'school mate'.
Arab social gatherings are full of trivalities, jokes and 
pleasantries. Even in business meetings they open and close the
communication with small, informal, polite, initial exchange talk.
People usually rely very strongly on their personal ties
(family, friendship, neighbourhoods, etc.) to get things done, and
they feel a strong obligation toward their primordial ties. In fact 
traditional ties of family, tribe, ethnic group and neighbourhood 
have always provided the individual with a strong sense of 
affiliation, beyond any other change within the society. The
retention of traditonal attitudes towards family and ethnic group has 
been found even among young Arabs studying in the American University 
of Beirut; no significant differences were found between 1957 and 
1971 in the importance given by those Arab students to 'family' which 
continued to be ranked first in commanding their loyalties, followed 
by national (ethnic) affiliation as the second in importance 
(Melikian and Diab 1974). The view that is held of Arabic society is 
that the family expects from the individual absolute loyalty, and 
thereby sacrifices autonomy and self reliance in favour of obedience 
and reliance on others (e.g. father, parent, elders) with acceptance 
of tlieir authority (Barakat 1974). But the other side of the com 
is, as Moughrabi (1978) describes, that in "times of crisis and of 
social upheaval, the persistence of the family as a tight-knit 
organization has served a very significant purpose among various 
groups of people. Were it not for the family structure, countless 
hundreds in various Arab countries would have never received a 
University education, so that their younger brothers or sisters could 
receive one. Furthermore the family has helped maintain the identity 
of many whose very existence was rejected by many" (p. 111).
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Thus the family's affiliation provides the individual with 
social security, identity, care and support. So the individuals in 
Iraqi society are highly self- and family-centred people for self- 
and family-orientations have strong roots in the cultural 
characteristics of Iraqi society. People are socialized in a way 
that reflects such characteristics; through being suspicious and 
mistrustful of others and the development of negative individualism, 
individuals are brought up to believe that the world outside the 
family circle is hostile to his interests and is after something from 
him if it is nice to him. Thus the individual tends to look after 
himself and his family, even at the expense of others in the 
community. In the Arabic world, self- and family-orientations have 
been recognised, through different perspectives, by many studies 
(Berger 1962; Barakat 1974; Muna 1980), as well as in some Middle 
Eastern countries (Tayeb 1981). In fact the way the individual has 
been treated by authorities in most of these countries, emphasizes 
and justifies the value of his affiliation to traditional groups, 
primarily the family which gives him a lot of personal security and 
support.
Islamic principles of co-operation, humbleness and equality give 
support to informality within Arabic society. This is clearer in 
rural areas and among traditional people than in modem Arabic 
cities; Antoun (1965) observed that in the Arabic villages (such as 
the case in Jordan), the "day to day superordinate-subordinate 
relationship that prevails between a daily agricultural wage labourer 
and his employer is modified by social relations of a more friendly 
and informal sort. The men of the wealthiest and most respected 
families plow land and quarry rock alongside the labourer they have 
hired" (p. 71).
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Informality in Iraqi society is associated with formality; Arabs 
are strongly attached to their traditions; and the individual is 
recognized as having the characteristics of indulging in a seal for 
ceremony, formalism and rigidity (Berger 1962; Sanua 1974). 
Conservatism, quietism and traditionalism are characteristics of the 
culture and the individuals in Arabic society, in different periods 
to different degrees and in different forms. Hie role of tradition 
had been important within Bedouin culture and continued to be so in 
Islamic society, particularly in making it difficult to accept the 
introduction of innovations and new interpretations of the words of 
the Koran. Such influences of tradition, conservatism and quietism 
are clearer among traditional pecple who have been relatively 
secluded from the influences of other cultures and especially those 
in rural areas (see Antoun 1965; Zayaor 1978).
Hie Arabic language helps in maintaining formality by providing 
individuals with stereotyped or a 'ready-made' phrases for exchange 
in greetings and courtesies, which encourages every situation to be 
treated in a traditional or familiar manner. Hie old proverbs, folk 
sayings, stereotyped phrases, as well as the Koranic verses, and the 
Prophet's words, which are usually included in ordinary conversation, 
all maintain the impersonal type of intercourse. These methods of 
formality, are useful in expressing differences, opposing views, 
making criticisms and refusals with a minimum of disagreeableness and 
personal offence, and also in avoiding a show of hostility and 
directness. This is true for the Arabs who are sensitive to 
criticism which may depreciate their lionour, courage, generosity and 
standing in the community. Also in Iraqi society, and generally in 
the Arabic world; "Personalities superimpose themselves on issues to 
such an extent that personalities and issues cannot be separated"
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(Pezeshkpur 1978, p. 53). Iraqi society values politeness, and 
ceremonial forms, and requires them as a part of a show of good 
manners. Thus people generally tend to give weight to politeness, 
form, agreeableness, seriousness and looking and behaving 
respectfully at the expense of the accuracy, directness and behaving 
naturally. Formality becomes a sheild where many characteristics are 
hidden underneath such as haughtiness, pride, willingness to look 
powerful, sensitivity, fear of negative judgements, and covering up 
personal weaknesses. It is feared that once a certain degree of 
informality was permitted the individual "would trespass on any 
privacy, he would ask the most personal inpertinent questions, he 
would lay bare his opinions and feelings, and would expect many 
services from and strong ties with the others" (Hamady 1960, p. 71). 
In fact this manner, as I see it, is basically derived from the 
Arab's inherited obligation towards the concept of unlimited 
hospitality, which basically means establishing a long and deep 
friendly relationship with those to whom they give their hospitality. 
Thus they tend to treat their friends or guests, even if they have 
just met them, as equal or even better than one's immediate family. 
In social relationships, they dislike formality, haughtiness, and 
being subject to other's superiority, but they have been forced by a 
long history of subordination to accept and respect those who seeks 
formality and haughtiness. So when they are treated in a familiar 
way, particularly by those who usually seek formality, they move 
quickly to build and deepen the informality with him, where 
informality provides the opportunity for the feeling of equality.
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4. OGNFOBMnY AND SECURETY
The Arabs, as some studies suggest, suffer from a lack of 
personal security resulting from a number of different factors; a 
long history of subordination and poverty, uncertainty, political 
instability and the pattern of child-rearing.
The individual's feeling of insecurity shows itself in 
suspicious attitudes, certain kinds of extremism, a preference for 
oral communication on one hand and dictating on the other. Such a 
feeling is also appears in his adherance to rules and traditional 
general agreements which is reflected in his conformity to certain 
groups' norms and values (Berger 1969). Individuals learn to conform 
in a society which exerts a strong pressure on its members to 
conform, and where conformity is required and rewarded. They conform 
to others expectations, even to those with whom they do not interact, 
because they fear being 'found out' and sanctioned by those others. 
Thus part of their conformity is to secure a good reputation - often 
a family reputation - in the community. Also conformity to others' 
expectations (compliance) especially the significant others, is 
induced through their customs, values, habits and love of others 
(i.e. parents, leaders etc.). The individual in Arabic society in 
general depends on his traditional groups, and devotes to the 
stereotypical and mannered relationship, because he can control 
matters within the bounds of the known and the predictable. Thus the 
individual is observed by many investigators as accepting his lot in 
life and being content with events as they are and with his own way 
of doing things. His attitude, in general is to accept things as 
they are and not to be concerned about change (Hourani 1956; Berger 
1962; Barakat 1971; Tomeh 1974; Pezeshlq̂ ur 1978). Free forms of 
relationships, risk, uncertainty, scientific exploration, philosophic
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speculation, the questioning of systems of government and of 
authority - all these, says Berger (1962) "are leaps into unknown and 
hence challenges to fate, to what has been laid down by religious and
secular authority.. (p. 175). In fact nowadays, such observation
is more true about people in the rural areas, as Amnar (1954) shows 
and with very traditional people who have been relatively secluded 
frcxn the influences of other cultures. If the individual is 
indifferent to things which affect his present or future, this is not 
only because of his lack of perception or because of his 
conservatism, but also because such an attitude results from a 
history of harsh, brutal regimes, and feelings of insecurity. His 
participation in starting changes or discussions about them have in 
the past not been required or taken into account.
In general the individual in Iraq as well as in Arabic society 
does not see himself as the master of his surroundings (Alwardi 1965; 
Barakat 1971; Tomeh 1974). Thus , his feelings of lack of control in 
his situation or not being master of his envircmment has led him to 
feel ' helpless ', to the degree that he takes great satisfaction in 
pretending helplessness in order either to lessen the risk of others 
trying to take advantage of him, or to be used as a source of power 
(Pezeshkpur 1978). In Arabic society, the individual's being fated 
to be what he is must not be attributed to the teachings of Islam, as 
Patai (1973) claimed to be the case, for as usual Islamic religion is 
often blamed for a belief in fate and predestination which is said to
exert a great influence on the Arab personality. In fact, Islamic
teachings encourage initiative, activity and self-change rather than 
restraining them; this encouragement appears clearly in different 
places in the Koran, such as the following verse; "Verily never will 
God change the condition of a people until they change it themselves"
246
(The Koran, Sura XIII; A Y Ali's translation). Also It appears in 
different words or Hadith of the Prophet, e.g.; "The heavens do not 
rain gold or silver". Even the expression Ensha Allah which means 
"If God is willing", could be interpreted not as a sign of inactivity 
and complete reliance on God, but rather as "I will do that (whatever 
is required) with the will of God". In fact such an expression, as 
Muna (1980) explains, is a part of religious custom and similar ones 
could be found in other religions, such as the Christian Lord's 
Prayer ; "Give us this day our daily bread"; or the words that 
appeared in Time Magazine, September 1978, to express the shock of 
the death of Pc^ John Paul I; "God has willed it, as painful as his 
will is". But that does not mean that the 'fatalism' becomes 'myth' 
in the Arabic society, as Muna (1980) says, for as he found in his 
study, Arab executives are not fatalistic. These Arab executives, as 
Muna himself indicated (1980, p. 310), have quite a good educational 
background - 50 per cent of them received their University degrees 
from the West, and 35 per cent obtained their degrees from 
Universities in the Arab world. In addition, they are exposed to the 
West through business or personal travel and all of them spoke at 
least one foreign language. Also, they were either owners or top 
managers of organization, which are mostly family-owned or owned by 
two or more partners. These executives deal with many companies or 
businesses in different Western countries and they need to plan ahead 
if they want to succeed and obtain profits. But we cannot generalize 
from the lack of fatalism of these Arab executives to other groups in 
different parts of the Arabic world. Thus when we talk about 
fatalism in the Arabic world, we should consider a variety of social, 
economic and political factors. If Arabs become very 'passive and 
fatalistic' (Patai 1973) it is mainly the result of the experience of
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very long periods of intense hardship and extreme uncertainty, during 
which the individual had to struggle for his very existence and 
security. This was particularly so in rural areas in recent years, 
where people were dominated by ignorance, poverty and disease. 
Moreover, they were usually at the mercy of nature because of the 
conditions of the land. Thus religion becomes a useful escape 
mechanism which provides psychological relaxation and security in the 
midst of surrounding uncertainty, poverty and suspicion. Because of 
this escape mechanism many negative interpretations and 
misunderstandings of Islamic teachings grew and accumulated in Arabic 
society, which considerably disguised the real teachings of Islam 
(Jurjis 1973; Darwish and Takila 1976). This tendency increased to 
the extent that, as in the case of Iraq, people in rural areas did 
indeed become very fatalistic to the degree that seme of them did not 
plan anything in detail because it contradicts with the will of God 
(Al-Dahiri 1969).
Thus, the individual in Iraqi society does not in general use a 
•passive defence' to cope with uncertainty; the collectively-shared 
values of his culture tend to emphasize avoiding uncertainty and risk 
taking rather than confrontation and attack. Such values can be 
distinguished in many old proverbs, as expressed in the following:
'Do walk for a month but do not cross a river. '
'A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.'
Certain values are emphasized which encourage the individuals 
reliance on luck, whatever their personal abilities, can be 
recognized in the following proverb:
'Seven trades but no luck' (i.e. 'Jack of all trades and master 
of none').
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The individual's experience in different stages of his life, 
within such societal norms which are reinforced by the socialization 
process and the collectively shared characteristics of people among 
whan he has been brought up, does not provide him with a high 
tolerance for ambiguity. So he finds in 'authoritarianism' and 
'fatalism' a buffering mechanism within which he could shield himself 
and escape from uncertainty (Berger 1962). Thus individuals respond 
to the anxiety which freedom may bring by avoiding risky decisions, 
and with a low tolerance of ambiguity.
Another trait which is found to be current among individuals in 
Arabic society in different regions is that of extreme suspiciousness 
and distrust (Hamady 1960; Berger 1962; Sanua 1974; Pezeshkpur 1978). 
In fact such extreme suspicion is mainly the result of individuals' 
experiences throughout different harsh and difficult historical 
periods. Arabs were originally very self-confident and trusted 
anyone who asked for their hospitality, even their enemies. Thus 
they would give their protection and hospitality easily, which means 
a commitment to a long and friendly relationship. The reasons behind 
Arabic distrust and suspiciousness are many. Pezeshkpur (1978) 
indicated two particular reasons for Middle Eastern distrust; first, 
people in these areas are generally of an emotional make-up and their 
actions are guided more by feelings than by cool, calculating 
reasoning. This makes behaviour unpredictable and unstable, and it 
becomes difficult to develop trust when one sees no stability or 
predictability in his own behaviour or that of other human beings. 
Secondly, as Arabic society is in a state of transition and continues 
to change, stability and predictability become difficult to sustain 
in a society where almost nothing can be taken for granted. The 
Arabs particularly in traditional areas tend to cover up their
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personal problems and are reluctant to contribute information about 
themselves and their families. They are like the Bedouin, highly 
concerned about their 'reputations in the community', since this 
reputation - often the family reputation - is an important base from 
which the individual works to reach many of personal goals. They 
would like to avoid negative judgements, which may put their 
reputation at stake, where they want to or have to continue to be 
part of its membership. So any information about themselves or their 
families is considered a private matter and part of one's person, and 
thus giving any information about such matters, according to their 
ccxnmunity's norms, is considered as something ayb (shameful). This 
accusation of 'shame' is a strong motive for behaviour in Arabic 
society. In addition attitudes of distrust of others and fear of 
revealing perscxial facts such as wealth, and number of males in the 
family arises from the experience of this and other kinds of 
information being used by authorities over the centuries against 
them, such as in setting tax rates or conscripting youth for the 
military. The other reason for covering up personal facts (wealth, 
number of males, etc.) is the fear of the 'evil eye' and the envy of 
others. In particular, to previous tribal societies before the 
establishment of the relatively strong national government, such 
items (wealth and number of males) were very significant to people 
for defensive purposes, security and strength. Thus the above 
personal details were crucial to families which lived under threat to 
their lives.
'Human nature ' in Islam is conceived as 'mixed ' - it could be 
good or evil; human beings are bom into any situation naturally 
sinless, and it is man's deeds that make him good or evil. But it is 
clear that Iraqi culture through different historical realities has
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acquired a dominant value-orientation which conceived 'human nature ' 
generally evil and dangerous, thus others outside the family are 
distrusted. Part of the people's philosophy states only God can be 
trusted fully because only God can give love, protection and guidance 
without asking for anything in return. A similar kind of trusting 
relationship can be found within the family, especially towards 
parents. But everyone else wants some tiling in return for his good 
intentions and care, so it is very hard to trust others. Individuals 
may be willing to trust others but their experience leads them not to 
do so. In Iraqi society we can find a very strong and long 
relationship between neighbours, friends and relatives but at the 
same time, people in general shift from trust to distrust, even when 
simple mistakes or misunderstandings occur. Individuals not only 
generally distrust others but also cxi many occasions distrust their 
own ability to recognize 'good' frcm 'bad'. In fact, feelings of 
suspiciousness and mistrust mainly result from insecurity, fear, 
rivalry in interpersonal relationships, ignorance and the inability 
to master either the present or the future, all of which have been 
experienced throughout the passage of history. Societal norms which 
grew because of such feelings have shaped the pattern of the 
socialization in a way that reflects the same feelings and norms of 
suspicion and distrust.
The heavy legacy of suffering and subordination throughout 
history which the Arab has undergone is the main factor in developing 
what is called "negative individualism" (Berger 1962, p. 157). 
Originally, individualism was deeply ingrained in general Arabic 
attitudes, and this becomes much clearer within those groups who were 
influenced by Bedouin ism, as is the case with the pecple in Iraqi 
society. For generations under different historical factors, and
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with the influence of the particular patterns of socialization, the
individual has been unable to satisfy his inherited sense of
individualism, as was possible in past tribal society in the desert.
In particular, the most common attitude toward the individual which
could be recognized in most Arabic countries is that the individual
is not important, or perhaps he is only the cheapest element and his
life is already perscribed (Barakat 1971). Thus strong individualism
continues to exist, but unsatisfied. Especially as Fayerweather
(1977) explains, the authoritarian systems in political, religious,
educational, and family life, usually encourage subordinates to
conpete excessively for the favour of superiors and to escape their
approbation by lies and evasion. All this encourages the development
of the individualistic personality - a man views the world as
dangerous and tries to obtain enough skills to get the most he can at
the expense of others.
Through all this negative development, the individual manifests
his individualism as Hamady (1960) describes:
"in the unique sense of self esteem, in his wish to assert 
differences, in [a] lack of social consciousness and civic
responsibility, in an unruly spirit and disobedience of
authority, and in the absence of co-operation with and
trust in other" (p. 87) (my emphasis).
Fayerweather (1977) remarks that the individualistic personality 
walls himself off as much as possible from those around him and he 
is:
"distrustful, subjecting them of predatory intentions 
towards him; and he feels a sense of hostility towards him.
In any relationship he is intensely concerned %fith his own 
position and not very conscious of the attitudes of others 
except as he pjerceives their inpact on him. As the size of 
circles indicates, he gives much more attention to those 
above him than those below." (p. 17)
So one of the ways that individuals indicate their 'negative 
individualism' is by unwillingness to work in co-operation and
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preferring to work individually, which has resulted in a lack of 
teairwork and group participation. The group in Arabic society, as 
Pezeshkpur (1978) describes it, is really not more than a number of 
individuals gathering together, who have not come together for mutual 
benefit but each individual playing his part as a member of another 
group. Thus they are prone at any moment to break away and act on 
their own, and groi%:> goals become as varied as the number of 
individuals in the group.
In fact, the extended family plays the same important role as 
that of the clan in tribal society and the individual's fami 1 ism has 
the same sense as the old tribalism. We have demonstrated previously 
that distrust and suspicion are directed towards those outside the 
family. In the same way 'co-operation' is largely a family affair or 
based on blood group, especially in the village. But little can be 
found outside these areas as there is not sufficient trust to co­
operate with others outside the traditional groups.
Despite this, a strong exchange of help and favours has been 
well established within the co-operating units in society such as 
among friends cind neighbours. In Iraq such an attitude was clearer 
some years ago, particularly among traditional rather modern people. 
Generally, generosity to the needy and mutual aid among various 
groups are highly valued and well-established, inspite of feelings of 
distrust and fear of negative judgements. In fact the Islamic 
principles of 'co-operation' have strongly sup^rted such exchanges 
of help and assistance toward others, particularly the poor and 
needy.
Such 'co-operation' has two distinguishing features; first, the 
inherent 'give-and-take' obligation in the exchange of good deeds, 
help and favours. Since such co-operation is maialy derived from
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feelings of generosity and part of the inherent 'hospitality' which 
everyone understands as an impluse towards everyone else, each person 
is constrained not only to offer but also to receive hospitality. It 
is very difficult for the individual to receive help, favours and 
good deeds from others without repaying the same and perhaps more, in 
order to feel free of any obligation or, I would say, to be like the 
Bedouin in the desert, the giver more than the receiver, in other 
words to satisfy his 'superiority propensity'. Anyone who fails to 
repay a good deed or procrastinates in doing so, becomes subject to 
criticism and ma-yara (shaming). The second feature of co-operation 
between individuals is that as long as generosity is seen to be 
valued strongly, the individual will do it, but in general people are 
more willing to help the weak and those who display dependence upon 
the benefactor, than to be generous to an equal person, unless 
exchanging an obligation (Berger 1962).
5. DEPEMffiMCE AND TAKING RESPONSZBILTIY
The picture that emerges from most available studies and from 
what has been previously demonstrated is that Arabic culture, such as 
in Iraq, emphasizes conformity and compliance towards others' 
expectations, especially to significant others and that the 
patriarchal family encourages subordination to authority, discipline 
and stressed emotional dependence rather than fostering individual 
autonomy (Amner 1954; Khadduri 1970; Hamadi 1960; Darwish and Takila 
1976; Pezeshkpur 1978; Prothro 1969; Berger 1962; Alwardi 1965; Patai 
1973; Nahas 1969). The Arab's traditional family structure and 
pattern of child-rearing require a substantial family dependence from 
the individual; the father protects and provides for the entire 
family. In return, the family members have to respect all the
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father's wishes and remain psychologically and often physically under 
his domain.
Thus childrem remain totally dependent on parental, authority 
for many years, which may last until their adolescence. The father 
usually takes all the important decisions for the family and thus 
independent activity and responsibility are fostered or expected to a 
lesser degree. Tomeh (1970) in his study about reference-group 
support in making decisions about an academic future among Arabs 
college students, remarks that "decisions on specific and general 
academic matters in the Middle Eastern society are basically handled 
by the family". He found some evidence of the influence of 
traditional ' father doninance', and that the influence of the family 
including kin is most pronounced among seme Middle Easterners such as 
Iraq (p. 158).
Through the pattern of socialization through which the children 
have passed in their child-rearing, school and reinforcement by other 
social and political institutions, individuals grow up lacking self- 
confidence and a healthy individual autonomy. They are brought up to 
be dependent on their seniors for direction, and within their family 
they are perceived as an extension of their parental egos. Within 
this kind of socialization, individuals are not experienced in 
problem-solving and analyticaJ. thinking, they are not trained for 
self-independence, participation in decision-inaking, taking 
initiatives and learning by discovery. Their relationship with their 
socialization agents (father, elders, teachers, etc. ...) is in 
general an authoritarian pattern with a high degree of conform!ty and 
dependency. All this plus the prevalence of suspiciousness and 
mistrust, lack of a co-operative spirit, searching for safety and 
security, fear of negative judgement, and low tolerance of
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uncertainty, have produced a tendency to avoid accepting
responsibility and a willingness to let decisions be made by others, 
thereby removing responsibility from oneself to others.
SUM4ARY AND CONCUUSIGN
To summarize the previous 'dominant value-orientations ' which 
have been suggested to be constituted within the Iraqi cultural 
system, it is useful to use the 'five 1 if e-problems' orientations 
given by Kluckhohn and Stradtbeck (1961); then in addition, to use 
another orientation, that of "relation to authority" (Inkeles and 
Levinson 1969, p. 447), or what has been termed the "Power Distance" 
(Hofstede 1980) as follows;
1. Dominant orientation in relation to authority:
- an authoritarian relationship associated with 
submission, ingratiation, personalization, respect for 
authority and power, which maintains a large power 
distance. An expectation of paternalistic familism 
about authority figures, dignity, strategic compliance, 
and great willingness to be in a power position.
2. Dominant orientation towards human nature:
- mainly evil and dangerous, and thus distrust others, 
secretive, avoiding cçen confrontation, and being 
sensitive to criticism.
3. Dominant orientation of man to nature:
- mainly subjugation to nature thus 'fatistic' in 
general, feeling helpless, and avoiding uncertainty and 
risk taking.
4. Dominant time-orientation :
- mainly towards the past, and somewhat toward the 
present.
5. Dominant activity orientation:
- mainly being, being-in-becoming, and a weak 
orientation towards doing.
6. Dominant relational orientation:
- hierarchical relations, negative individualism, lack of
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teamwork and co-c^ration, self- and family- 
orientation, informality and high obligation toward 
traditional personal ties, formality and ceremony, 
rigidity and conservatism, seriousness and manliness, 
and pride. Also politeness, agreeableness, conformity 
to certain groups' norms and to others expectations, 
and stereotypical and mannered relationships.
Insofar if the people in Iraqi society do share the previous 
value-orientations in their societal norms and collective
characteristics, it is reasonable to influence the conduct of
organizations located in Iraq, especially in regard to individual 
behaviour, style of interpersonal relationships and the expectations
about the legitimate use and manifestation of authority. When
individuals enter the organization with their cultural values and
norms, they construct their behaviour according to how they see and
understand their situation through concepts and meanings derived frcm 
their culture : "Thus just as they reflect their culture, so it is 
argued will their organisation" (Child 1981, p. 335).
So if the power structure in Iraqi society is such that it
contributes to the gap between the powerful and the powerless and
thus maintains a large power-distance, and hence the authoritarian 
relationship is the prevalent pattern of power relationship within 
the influence of 'traditional respect ' and ' personal i zat ion ' of 
authority, then logically, organizations too in that society would 
have a relatively authoritarian structure. The organizational member 
would have perceived those in organizational authority through the 
underlying concepts of traditional 'respect', 'personali zat ion' and 
fear; hence members would never challenge those in authority and 
always wait for them to take the initiative and have decisions made 
by them, and then the only responsibility one could expect is to 
carry out the instructions.
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Individualism, sensitivity to criticism and frankness, 
especially in front of a group, extreme suspiciousness and distrust, 
face-saving, manliness, rigidity of thought, expected hostility, the 
superimposing of personalities on issues, personal loyalty, and 
deference to authority - all those characteristics act as serious 
obstacles to open confrontation and act in the same way by avoiding 
open confrontation in group commun ica t ions and discussions of 
organizational 'negatives'. Ihe organizational members will avoid 
showing or sharing feelings, emotions, and criticism, as well as 
trying to isolate themselves frcm each other. Each one will avoid 
criticizing issues related to others, justifying this in terms of 
"everyone should concern himself with his own affairs and let others 
concern themselves with their own business." They will avoid 
criticism in discussing important organizational issues that could 
have an effect on someone else if it could be perceived as an attempt 
to reveal personal weaknesses or negative judgements of others for 
some personal purpose. Such avoidance is emphasized by the 
obligation of individuals towards their traditional personal ties 
with others. So in reaction to these ties, people would tend to 
depersonalize the issues and not implicate anyone specifically, and 
avoid hostilities by generalizing matters. If distrust is the 
prevalent value-orientation or the 'rule of the game' in Iraqi 
culture, as we have seen in this chapter, then the structure of the 
organization embedded in that culture is more than likely to be 
centralized, and thus authority would be in the hands of a few 
members.
'Fatalism' and excessive 'authoritarianism' stand as kinds of 
buffering mechanisms within which people in wider society can escape 
frcm uncertainty and the ambiguity of 'freedom' (Fromm 1941), as this
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chapter shows. So we and others (Tayeb 1981) could argue that the 
organizational structure will tend to reflect the degree of ambiguity 
offered and toJ.erated by the organizational members; such reflection 
will be in terms of 'tightening' or 'loosing' the structure.
In the same way, the above characteristics coupled with the lack 
of co-operative spirit, negative individualism, self- and family- 
orientation, a need for safety and security, dependence, and lack of 
autonomy, all of which are prevalent in the wider society, would have 
influenced the conduct of the organization. Such characteristics are 
assumed to discourage the ccmmitment and acceptance of 
responsibility, participation in decision-making and leadership, 
teamwork and organizational belongness.
Finally, Iraqi culture and the individuals within that culture 
are characterized in general by traditional values arrf conservatism, 
as well as a willingness and a sense of obligation to conform to the 
community's norms and expectations. So organizational members would 
have inherent conservative views about organizational life and the 
ways they fulfill their jobs; this can be summed up in the following 
proverb; "Better the mad man you know, than the normal person you 
don't". At the same time, they would still have a strong obligaticxi 
to their traditional values within their organizational 
relationships.
CHAPTER (6)
THE CULTURAL SETTING AND CHARACTERISTICS 




In the research model, it has been argued that not only a basic 
understanding of individual characteristics is of direct importance 
to organizational behaviour, but also a basic understanding of the 
nature of the formal organization. In the previous chapter the 
dominant value-orientations that characterize the culture and
individuals in Iraqi society were indicated. But not only the
'culture' and 'socialization' of wider society have an indirect,
enormous, fundamental, impact in constructing individual 
organizational behaviour, but organizational 'sub-culture' and 
structure also have a great and more direct impact on the ways
individuals behave within organizations (Copper 1979). Using the 
cultural approach of 'organization within society' it has been argued 
that logically organizations within Iraqi society would reflect in 
their characteristics and 'sub-culture ' partly the value-orientations 
of wider society and partly their peculiar setting, structure and 
experiences.
So in our journey to understand the middle managers' behaviour 
toward top management in Iraqi organizations, I believe now is the 
time to return to the organization. In fact, as was stated earlier 
in the research model, the journey began with the organization itself 
and we moved to study the culture in wider society in order to 
understand and explain the kind of behaviour that has been observed 
and studied by the researcher and the meanings that stand behind that 
behaviour within Iraqi organizations.
In this chapter the researcher will study the characteristics 
and nature of 'Iraqi bureaucracy' that has been acquired through its 
historical experiences within Iraqi society. Such a study will 
indicate the deep, structural characteristics that reflect the
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organizational values and norms and the model of reality that is held 
by individuals in Iraqi organizations. In doing so the researcher 
will use the previous two chapters, some relevant studies and the 
researcher's previous work experiences within seme Iraqi 
organizations.
1. THE CHARACIERIgnCS AND NATURE OF IRAQI BUREAUCRACY THROUGH ITS
HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES WITHIN IRAQI SOCIETY
In Iraq and in many developing countries, the efforts and trends 
one could recognize through the evolution of their bureaucracies have 
been aimed at reaching the 'rationality' of Weber's model of 
bureaucracy. The emphasis on organizational rationality appeared 
strcmgly within these countries after the Second World War and after 
most of these countries, as with Iraq, gained their independence 
(Hanmdi 1977). The British Colonial rulers set-up their classical 
model of bureaucracy in Iraq and the national organizational 
designers have continued the 'bureaucratization process' since that 
time by applying exactly and literally as much as they can the 
Weberian type of bureaucracy through rules, regulations, 
instractions, structuring activities, building a pyramidal hierarchy 
of authority relationships and emphasizing formality and 
impersonality. These designers have not taken into consideration the 
values, norms, orientations, social settings and structure of wider 
society. They forgot that the human being cannot be something else, 
but Œily a human being; he cannot be absolutely impersonal, 
especially if he belongs to a society full of personal ties and 
loyalties, as is the case in Iraq and generally in Arabic Society. 
They conceive human beings in the same mode as Weber for whom the 
human being, as quoted by Mouzelis (1975), is as follows;
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"In a great majority of cases he (the bureaucrat) 
is only a simple cog in an ever-moving mechanism 
which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route 
of march" (p.41).
In fact, Weber did not construct a model of bureaucracy to be
followed as much as possible in concrete reality. Rather he tried to
identify the common elements which bureaucratic organizational forms
may manifest regardless of era or region, then be built his ideal
model. Weber himself was aware of the necessity to compare the ideal
with the real in order to understand organizational reality (Mouzelis
1975). Weber's type is meant to be an analytic tool contributing
directly to the explanation and interpretation of social phenomena.
Although this type was constructed through a wide historical
comparative analysis of administrative systems, Weber, as Gouldner
(1960) states, "has constructed his type of bureaucratic organization
out of elements which may be constant, regardless of varying social
structures" (p. 48). Thus Weber was concerned with universality or
generality rather than with variations in bureaucratic forms, and
thus he did not give attention to the manner in which the common
characteristics designated as bureaucratic are interrelated with
historically specific social structures (Gouldner 1960).
Weber (1946) himself realized the consequences of his
mechanistic assumption when he states, as quoted by Mangham ( 1979 ) :
"It is horrible to think that the world oould one 
day be filled with nothing but these little c o g s ,  
little men clinging to little jobs and striving 
toward bigger ones - a state of affairs which is 
to be seen ..... it is such an evolution that we 
are already caught up in, and the great question
i s  what can %#e oppose to this m a c h in e ry in
order to keep a portion of mankind free from this 
parcelling-out of the same, from the supreme 
manifestation of the bureaucratic way of life"
(p. 8).
Weber's type, gives as he meant, the functional aspects, that of 
"rationality, reliability, and predictability", which are one side of
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the bureaucratic picture. The other side, that of "dysfunctional 
aspects", has been pointed out by many writers mainly Merton (1940; 
Gouldner (1955; 1960); Selznick (1949) Blau and Scott (1962), and 
Thompson (1961) who terras these aspects "bureaupathologies". Modem 
writers on bureaucracy, although influenced by Weber's construction 
of bureaucracy have ignored the problems of development and cross- 
cultural comparison of organizations. Bureaucratic theory as 
Mouzelis (1975) states "has become 'predominantly ethnocentric, 
nonhistorical and microscopic in orientation'" (p.53). So these
efforts to indicate the dysfunctional aspects of bureaucratic 
organization are also concerned with the universalistic model and 
gives, as appears in the work of Merten (1940), a one-sided picture, 
that of the effect of bureaucratic stucture on individual personality 
and his behaviour within the organization. These studies ignore the 
other side of the picture, that of what the individual brings from 
his cultural norms and values in wider society, and its effect cn 
bureaucratic organizational settings. Crozier's model arose out of 
this second view as he relates cultural patterns of a specific 
country (France) to the pattern of bureaucratic organizational 
behaviour within that country. But also he only concerns himself 
with the impact of culture on organizations, which is also a one­
sided picture, although the most influential one.
The 'bureaucracy' in Iraq and other developing countries has 
acquired an opprobrious meaning, and odious connotations. The term 
'bureaucracy' became used only as a synonym for inefficiency; lack of 
initiative; un-intelligent rigidity in the approach to human 
problems; undue fussiness and bossiness on the part of officials and 
downright stubbornness. In other words the term 'bureaucracy' 
appears to be coupled only with 'dysfunctional aspects'.
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In fact many studies conducted on public administration in 
developing countries (Riggs 1962, 1964; Berger 1957; Braibanti 1966, 
1969) clearly revealed the inadequacies and ineffectiveness of this 
type of administration, despite (a) the technical assistance provided 
to those countries by the transfer of technology in order to follow 
the Western example; (b) the efforts to improve public administration 
and planning for economic growth; and (c) the aid of wealth in some 
of these countries, e.g. many Arabic and Middle Eastern countries.
The case of developing countries reveals the crucial effect of 
culture on organizational effectivenes. Cultural obstacles, said 
Milne (1970) do not permit either mechanistic or organic 
organizations to work effectively, and disturb informal as well as 
formal organizations. People in countries such as Iraq live and 
think in some ways which are radically inconsistent with the 
requirements of formal organizations. In most of those countries the 
political and bureaucratic recruitments are still, to various 
degrees, governed by tradition rather than the merit principle, and 
legal codes have not completely displaced tribal and religious 
customs. Thus the human element of organizations in those countries 
cannot be permeated with the same behavioural norms and criterias of 
Western organizations. Cultural factors, particularly in developing 
countries, affect management practice and its develcçxnent (Akinmayowa 
1981) and these factors are the organization's boundries to 
responding to envircfimental demands. This response is to a large 
extent determined by the values and attitudes of organizational 
members (Tayeb 1981).
As the main concern of this research is with Iraqi 
organizaticffis, whose bureaucratic nature and characteristics have 
been taken for granted by most Iraqi writers, I will in the following
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pages, try to study the main characteristics of Iraqi bureaucracy in 
its 'hard' and 'soft' aspects. Iraqi bureaucracy has acquired its 
characteristics through its historical experiences, not as formal 
organizations with an identity separate from their environment, but 
as a part of wider society.
The most important historical influences upon Iraqi 
organizations of today, as we have seen previously, were the Ottoman 
and then the British occupation and administration. The emergence 
and evolution of Iraqi bureaucracy were originally shaped by these 
two streams of influences, and then its characteristics were 
crystalized during the following historical experiences.
Iraqi bureaucratic administration, half of which is inherited 
from the Turks and half of which was set up b y British Colonial 
rulers, has, as in the case of most developing countries, certain 
special features (Dube 1971). These kind of features shaped and 
deeply affected the nature and the extent of the existence of Weber's 
characteristics of bureaucracy within Iraqi organizations. 
Understanding these features of Iraqi bureaucracy is significant in 
revealing the deep and subconscious level of Iraqi organizational 
structures, and the deep elements of culture that constitute 
contemporary organizations. The main important features of Iraqi 
bureaucracy are;
A - Duality in identification or the existence in a twilight 
zone of cultures.
B - The heavy involvement in politics.
C - Its organizational structure and settings are constructed 
through the congruence and clashing between bureaucratic 
components and Iraqi cultural components.
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A - The Duality in Identification of Iraqi Bureaucracy
Fran reviewing the evolution of Iraqi culture and Iraqi social 
structure, we can recognize that Iraqi bureaucracy in its emergence 
and evolution has existed largely in a twilight zone of cultures; 
partly traditional and partly modem. Moreover, the bureaucratic 
administration that was established by the Ottoman and much more so 
by the British, and the culture in wider society negatively affected 
each other under the impact of Ottoman and British policies with the 
help of many social, economic and political factors.
During the Ottoman and British administrations, the traditional 
Bedouin culture changed for the worst. One of the most important 
changes that happened within this culture was the nature of power or 
authority-relationships between the tribal sheikh and his tribesmen, 
as well as the type of the traditional sheikh functions. The 
traditional Bedouin relationship between the sheikh and the 
tribesmen, with its sense of democracy and equality, changed to 
become a feudal one between generally an authoritarian autocratic 
sheikh and submissive followers. Ottoman and British policies not 
only increased the power of the sheikhs enormously but more 
importantly changed its base and nature ; they became the largest 
legal feudal landowners and their tribesmen their submitted 
fellah ins. The powers of the sheikh were utilized by the Ottoman and 
British authorities for their own objectives. A number of sheikhs 
became the Ottoman governments' men in their tribal areas, and 
collected the required taxes for the government. Also a number of 
powerful sheikhs under the British policy became legally responsible 
for controlling disputes among their tribesmen. The sheikhs' 
functions started to have a duality in nature since they were given 
by the Ottanans, an official authority and such titles as Pasha and
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Bey thus constituting them as civil administrative officials. 
Furthermore, the British employed a number of the most important 
sheikhs who shoved their loyalty to the British as government 
representatives to their own areas, and gave each of them a 
bureaucratic position mudir (i.e. manager) with a salary and 
supported them with money and arms. While those sheikhs retained 
their traditional leadership of the tribes, they became the legal 
landowners of vast areas and involved in politics. Many of them 
became members in Parliament seeking ministerial positions. They 
held a political and social power and formed one of the most powerful 
pressure groups in the governmental administrative body.
Thus, inequality and power-d is tance between the sheikh and his 
tribesmen became greater especially from the sheikhs points of view, 
as the tribesmen (fellahins) were living in dire poverty and 
ignorance, working for the sheikh as peasant labourers under a system 
of unequal share-cropping, which offered them no rights or status and 
tied them to the land. On the other hand, the sheikhs collected 
enormous amounts of wealth for which they had not worked at all, and 
they moved to 'palaces' in Baghdad or other cities, adopting a 
Western style of living with a high level of luxury and extravagance. 
They involved themselves in city pleasures and associated socially 
with the Ef fend is who formed the bureaucratic class of that period. 
So the feudal sheikhs started to adopt the elements of modernity, in 
addition to their strong traditional elements. The Bedouin's 
charasmatic type of authority with its element of ' rational 
agreement' changed to a pure authoriterian system of 'the one 
(sheikh) over the many (tribesmen) ' rather than 'the many over the 
one'. The feudal sheikh became self-centred rather than tribe- 
centred, and his power derived mainly from the support of central
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authority and the possession of land, wealth and political or/and 
bureaucratic positions, more than from the respect and cooperation of 
his tribesmen. Seme of them became able to keep their tribesmen 
(fellahins) in subjection with the support of their bodyguards as 
well as the official police and the government machinery.
Despite these changes, the prestige of the sheikhs continued to 
rest on their function as leaders of their tribes. The sheikhs 
secured positions of privilege in the state, but without obligation 
to it. Also the loyalty of tribesmen, who became fellahins living in 
extreme poverty, to their tribes and their respect for the 
traditional leadership of the sheikhs, did not break down as 
starvation and poverty were not new to them, but no doubt the old 
bonds between the sheikh and his followers weakened gradually.
It is important to keep in mind that 'feudalism* in Iraqi 
society was not an economic system only, but also and mainly a social 
one, as it was a deviation of Bedouin culture. The fact that Bedouin 
culture enormously affects the whole culture in Iraqi society, 
feudalism in a social sense (values, norms, structure) was not 
limited to the rural areas, but rather affected the whole society in 
towns and villages but to varying degrees. Many urban figures and 
members of the administrative body (the political elite and the 
bureaucratic Effendis) also became feudal landowners, associating 
socially with feudal sheikhs. The mode of values and norms which 
Iraqi culture acquired through its socio-historical evolution 
supports the above factors in crystalizing the dominant social 
structure in Iraqi society as a 'feudal one'. These values and 
norms, as seen previously, stemmed from different sources, mainly 
Bedouin culture, misinterpretations of some Islamic teachings, harsh 
experiences under colonial powers, and the high uncertainty of life 
as well as instability in political life.
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Duality in function was not limited to the feudal sheikhs, but 
rather appeared among the bureacratic class of Ef fend is and the 
political elite of that period. While members of these two 
categories occupied different ranks in the administrative body, 
mainly in management and holding or looking for influential political 
positions, most of them were also feudal landlords. The fallahin 
were at their mercy also because those urban landlords were the 
owners of the pumps which were installed in the rural areas. Many of 
them became very wealthy and lived at a high level of luxury. Many 
of them used their personal connections, traditional values of 
hospitality, wealth, association with powerful figures like the 
sheikhs, and formal positions to gain and maintain their social and 
political positions and prestige.
These bureaucratic officials who were at the same time feudal 
landlords, also presented both elements of modernity and tradition. 
They were partly absolved from their traditional obligations of 
having to share communal attitudes, sentiments, and ways of thinking. 
Although they were influenced by Western culture, they were not able 
to break away from tradition and adopt the ideals and values of the 
modern world.
While the prestige of the feudal sheikhs was essentially derived 
from their traditional positions as leaders of their tribal society, 
the prestige of the political elite and the bureaucratic Ef fend is was 
mainly derived from their bureaucratic formal positions in the 
governmental body.
So the duality in identity and nature has been embedded in Iraqi 
bureaucracy since its emergence during the Ottoman and especially the 
British ruling periods, thus the doninant mode of organizational 
culture in Iraq acquired the identity of being a bureaucratic- 
feudal one.
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B - The Heavy Involvement in Politics
In Iraq, as in the case of most Arab and developing countries, 
the connection between bureaucracy and politics has been much closer 
than in the West (see Dube 1971; Berger 1957). This connection has 
been in Iraqi bureaucracy since its emergence through the influence 
of the following two factors ;
1 - The bureaucratic administrative body has been an instrument 
for political influence and control, especially for nation-building.
2 - The close connection between economic and political power.
1 - The bureauccactlc administrative body as an instrument for
political control and nation-building
The bureaucratice administration, when first emerging under the 
Ottoman power, was an instrument for direct control over Iraq in 
order to collect and provide the central government with taxes and 
land revenue for the treasury, manpower for the army, and to maintain 
governmental supremacy. The sultan and his govemers held the 
political power besides the centralized authority of the government 
administration. The Ottoman government, in its relationship to the 
Iraqi people was very concerned about keeping a superior position in 
the eyes of the people, thereby enjoying obedience and respect, and 
the people's flattery.
The new administrative system that the British devised was aimed 
at suiting their colonial purposes in their political struggle for 
complete control over Iraq. This administration was first under
military supervision and the main responsibility lay with the
Commander--in-Chief of the British forces, who acted in the provinces 
through his political officers. The governmental administrative body 
was not only an instrument for ruling the country and political
control, but more a focus of much local political struggle and
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nationalist agitation against the British. It was a weapon of 
partisanship among Iraqi political groups in their struggle against 
British power.
The period between 1920-1958 witnessed the formation of the 
Iraqi state by Mandate. This state not only became a new centre from 
which power could be exercised, but this power was concentrated in 
the hands of a new Iraqi political elite which consisted of two major 
wings; the Sharifians who were originally Ottoman army officers, and 
the tribes' sheikhs. In the new order and as a consequence of the 
social and economic vacuum, the political elite was transformed into 
a class interest, rather than a disparate collection of ruling groups 
of divergent former Ottoman army officers and tribal leaders (Pool 
1980). They played a dominant role in Iraqi political life at that 
time as they occupied a wide array of political positions.
This period was characterized mainly by the fluidity of politics 
and the struggle for power, influence and status. Through this 
fluidity the governmental officials, especially those in high-ranking 
positions, who were mostly members of the political elite or 
Ef fend is, i.e. former Ottoman bureaucrats, were heavily involved. 
Politics, through the above struggle which led to personality 
conflicts and tensions, centred round individuals who formed with 
their followers many 'power centres'. Also 'cliques', formed around 
key personalities through personal loyalty and exchange of personal 
benefits. In fact personal loyalty played an important part in the 
process of political identification and dec is ion-making (Pool 1980). 
The political elite and the administrative high-ranking officials 
used in their struggle for power, status, and influence, all their 
formal positions, wealth, traditional values such as 'hospitality' 
and 'generosity', association with powerful figures... etc. Thus 
administration under such leadership could not be wholly impersonal.
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In the Middle East and Arabic world, the government is the major 
source of any organized social power and the dominant source of 
political and economic power; no class wields much power outside it 
(Berger 1969). Through harsh and long experiences under different 
historical realities, the government and those who speak for it or 
who are symbols of its power are respected and feared, especially in 
Iraq the government was associated for hundreds of years with foreign 
conquerors. The prestige of the civil servant in Iraq was, until the 
1960's, very high because of the above reasons, and because the 
government service was the goal of the educated men who were likely 
to come from high socio-economic and traditionally privilaged groups. 
Such groups were able to provide the necessary general background and 
more, the expensive education required for entrance into the high 
prestige bureaucratic strata of Iraqi society at that period.
After the revolution of 1958 and much more after that of 1968, 
the supremacy of the bureaucracy has been replaced by the sovereignty 
of politics which has become the most inçortant activity. As the new 
leaders have new ideologies or belief systems for nation-building and 
economic development and new political attitudes, the bureaucracy 
found itself subject to political authority and had to follow the 
direction and policies that are set by political power. While the 
bureaucracy's power and prestige in the new order have been 
decreasing, its burdens and responsibilities have been increasing. 
The bureaucracy has been called upon to assume major responsibilities 
in the implementation of national plans for economic development and 
social change. The main areas in which bureaucracy in Iraq, as well 
in other transitional societies, found itself forced to redifine and 
readjust its position and responsibilities were, as Dube (1971) 
states, firstly; the culture of politics; secondly; the emerging
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ethos; and thirdly: the expanding sphere of state activities and the 
new institutional arrangements. The bureaucracy started to find 
itself in a difficult and uncomfortable position, always receiving 
attacks frcm several sides with mounting pressures to modify its 
structure, values, and work habits, and to adapt itself to the idicm 
of the fast changing situation. But the fact remains that 
bureaucracy mostly adjusts itself to new pressure by accepting the 
new elements only theoretically. This is true, not only because the 
bureaucracy in Iraq was carefully trained in classical administrative 
procedure and routine during the Ottoman and British colonial 
periods, but also because it contains deeply embedded values and 
structures which are the continuation of many well-established 
societal norms in wider society.
The post-independence period has been characterized by violent 
political changes and political instability, particularly during the 
sixties. Such instability, with the latent effect of the past 
struggle for independence, lead to high levels of anxiety and 
insecurity. These experiences of the previous struggle for 
independence have sane times manifested themselves in ways such as 
seeing a colonialist or new-imperialist behind every bush, and 
suspecting nationals of aiding neo-imperialists, all of which can 
generate feelings of insecurity, especially among those who are not 
loyal to the ruling party or leadership group. Political 
considerations during post-indenpendence have dominated 
organizational life; loyalty to the ruling group or party has been 
looked upon as potential leadership points. Political leaders who 
aspire to change their societies rapidly, sometimes regard changing 
the administrators as part of the revolution. Al-Aisamie (1969) and 
Alkubaissi (1974) point to the negative consequences of the practice
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of 'purging' the government administration of employees whose 
retention in office is considered, under the influence of political 
considerations, to constitute a threat to public interest. In some
developing countries which follow the one-party system, the 
'outsiders' i.e. those who do not belong to the ruling group or 
party, are not likely to be appointed to important positions in the 
administrative body. They are sometimes subjected to pressures to 
join the loyalist party; those who are non-carmittal or who are not 
willing to join the loyalist party may lose many advantages and face 
many difficulties. Thus members of organizations are not assured of 
job security, careers or promotions even if they prove their ability 
on the job. Also the formal authority of their bureaucratic 
hierarchical positions is sometimes challenged and undermined by the 
political hierarchy; thus they leam from experience that joining a 
political party in power can better serve their interests in the 
organization.
2 - The close connection between eooncmic and political power
As has been demonstrated, the government has always been the 
dominant economic and political power in Iraq.
The governmental post was, during Ottoman rule, British mandate 
and Monarchy system, one of the few outlets for Iraqi educated youth, 
and the goal of the middle classes and the ambitious poor. This was 
because of the depressed state of the vast majority of the population 
who lived in poverty, lacked work opportunities in private business 
because of economic stagnation and lack of private capital, 
especially after the depression of the thirties, and the domination 
of the government as a major source of economic and political power.
The econonic power of the 'political elite*, who became the 
upper economic class in Iraqi society during the Monarchy system, was
274
not mainly a private independent economic power as it is in the West 
but, even when based on land or trade, was derived from holding 
political power in the state or a close relationship with the holders 
of political power. In fact this is clearer in the case of the 
modern educated wing of the Iraqi political elite of that time, 
particularly those 'ambitious poor' and those who came from middle 
and upper level bureaucratic families, the great majority of whom 
depended on the state for their daily bread. Also they had no
traditional power and 'natural' followers, as did the tribal sheikhs 
who were the other wing of the political elite of that time (Pool 
1980).
The connection between economic and political power has 
increased enormously since the 1950's and particularly after the 
fundamental changes of political economy since the revolution of 
1958. These changes are mainly the initiation of agrarian reform 
which terminated the prevailing feudal system, nationalization of 
most private industrial and commercial enterprises and the highly 
iirçortant 'oil sector'. These changes meant a great growth and 
extension in size and influence of the public sector which became and 
still is by far the largest employer in the country. This created a 
central role for the government in planning for economic development, 
encouraged by the increased inflow of oil revenues. This has been 
especially in the case since the nationalization movement, and 
through the recent socialist, political-economic beliefs of 
controlling economic activities of the country and in using its 
resources.
In fact during the last ten years and particularly the last six, 
employment within the state has lost its attractiveness, not only 
because governmental officials are no longer symbols of government
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power as this power now rests on a political basis, but also because 
the income from it has become unsatisfactory as a result of high 
inflation and the flourishing of the private sector, including new 
employment by foreign companies working in Iraq to execute many 
public projects.
C - The Construction of Iraqi Bureaucratic Structure and Settings 
Through the Congruence and Clashing between the Bureaucratic 
Components and Cultural Components
Iraqi bureaucracy has been influenced structurally by its 
Western counterpart (Britain). But its nature is a product of the 
interaction between Iraqi cultural elements and bureaucratic 
elements. The bureaucratic pattern in Iraq, and the Middle East and 
Arabic world in general has been in many aspects the opposite of the 
Weberian organization (Pezeshkpur 1978; Wright 1981). Thus there is 
a need to understand the nature of Iraqi bureaucracy and its deep 
level of culture, which are constructed through congruent and 
clashing interactions between culture in the wider society and the 
required characteristic of bureaucracy. In doing so, it is useful to 
use the basic characteristics of Weber's type of bureaucracy as a 
tool which will help to throw light on the reality of Iraqi 
bureaucracy. The data I will use in this part are the preceeding 
chapters, which presented the socio-historical documentary data, my 
work experience and observation within some Iraqi organizations, some 
relevant studies, and the general indications of this research's 
field work.
276
1 - Hierarchical authority structure with impersonal authority 
relations
Weber's model of organization is based on "legal" authority as 
contrasted with that of "tradition" (custom) or "charisma" ('the gift 
of grace')(Weber 1949, p. 328). Bureaucratic authority structure is 
characterized by a pyramid consisting of positions which are ordered 
into a hierarchical system of super-and subordination resulting in a 
chain of command (the scalar principle). The individual officials 
follow the principle of hierarchy; that is, each lower office is 
under the control and supervision of a higher one. The nature of 
authority relations within this bureaucratic hierarchy, as explained 
by Blau and Scott (1962); and Mouzellis (1975), is 'impersonal' and 
through the exercise of legal authority which resides in the office 
not the occupant. Within bureaucratic authority relations, obedience 
is not owed to a person such as a traditional chief or a charismatic 
leader, but to the impersonal authority of an office. Also loyalty 
of the bureaucrat is oriented to an impersonal order, to a superior 
position, not to the person who holds it.
Iraqi bureaucracy maintains a pyramid hierarchy authority 
structure, but with centralizing excessive authority at the top, 
while relatively less is vested in the base of the triangle (shamaa 
1978; Al-douri 1976). Such a kind of hierarchy structure of 
authority relation is congruous with the type of authority relations 
in Iraqi society, which is based upon the same hierarchy structure 
with a very great amount of authority at the top as in the family, 
school, and all other institutions. If the inevitable result of 
bureaucratization is centralization of authority and control, the 
dominant value-orientations in Iraqi culture make it more excessive 
and construct its latent functions. The value-orientations of
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•distrust' outside the family group, the lack of personal security 
and avoiding risk-taking, personalization of authority, deference to 
authority and 'superiority propensity' all have their great effect on 
centralizing authority in Iraqi organizations. Through these types 
of value-orientât ions, not only are the top level unwilling to 
delegate authority to other lower levels of managers, but lower level
managers themselves fear accepting it, and they would try to
distribute responsibilities away from themselves by pushing the 
issues up the ladder for top level decisions. In fact greater 
centralization is found to characterize the organizations in all 
"high PDI" countries than those in "low PDI" countries (Hofstede
1980) as a consequence of the large power- distance that exists in
national culture.
Ihe nature of authority relations in Iraqi bureaucracy develops 
differently than that of Weber's type, through the clash between 
bureaucratic impersonality and 'personalization' of Iraqi culture. 
This nature is not ' impersonal ' but rather a combination of personal 
and impersonal elements with special consequences. The picture which 
Iraqi organizations try to give is of everything being very formal 
and impersonal, while personal elements are deeply embedded within 
the bowels of the organizational culture. If Weberian Western 
organizations tend, as Pezeshkpur (1978) suggested, to accommodate 
the executives to the organization, the Iraqi bureaucratic 
organization tends to accarmodate or adapt the organization to the 
executives. Iraqi organization follows the personal tendencies of 
its top boss or manager, and the power and duties shift with his 
decisions. As authority and control are centralized at the top, even 
insignificant matters are often pushed up for top-level decisions. 
Thus Iraqi organizations have had relatively frequent changes in
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their structures and functions in order to adapt to their transitory 
leaders. The personality of the top manager or the head of the 
organization is superimposed on the organization which often is 
moulded and remoulded around his personality. The dominant belief is 
that organizations need strong leaders who are willing to force their 
wills on their organizations. Thus success or failure of any Iraqi 
organization is thought to be determined primarily by the individuals 
who occupy top positions. If anything goes wrong with the 
functioning of an organization, criticism is directed at the head of 
the organization and his personality rather than to the policies or 
the system of the organization. The philosophy which is predominant 
in Iraq and all other "high PDI" countries is as stated by Hofstede 
(1980): "change the top person and you change the system" (p. 121). 
In fact this is a popular solution in Iraq for organizational 
problems, although in reality problems often survive after tcç> 
persons fall. Such changes may only influence, as often happens, the 
formal surface of the organizational structure, while its deep 
culture would not change in the planned direction.
This top-man syndrome is also found by Muna ( 1980) in many 
organizations in five Arabic countries, where 23(44%) Arab executives 
described themselves or their role within the organizations that they 
headed as "the motor of the company; the decision maker; the person 
who is responsible for the profitability and growth of the 
company;... etc" (p.39), while 29(56%) executives perceived their 
role as a "head of a family" (p.40). This top-man syndrome is also 
found in Islamic firms by Wright (1981).
Loyalty within Iraqi bureaucracy is not impersonal and simply 
orientated to a superior post ion and not to the person who holds it. 
Through the "personalization" of Iraqi culture, loyalty can only or
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at least mostly be felt toward people. Wright (1981) suggests that 
in Western countries, "the concept of loyalty can also apply to non­
human and non-spiritual entities like the organization", and thus the 
Western employee, "would be more prone to uphold organizational 
interests when those interests cross the personal interests of the 
boss or the very person of the employee" (p.89). If this is true in 
Western organization, it is quite unlikely to be so in Iraqi 
organization where personalization of loyalty is deeply embedded in 
its culture. Personal relations and loyalty play an important role 
and affect different aspects of organizational life. Personal 
loyalty and goodwill toward superiors are highly valued, and 
subordinates tend to be aware of the influence of such loyalty on 
promotion and upward mobility. Through personal loyalty, 
subordinates serve as a buffer for their superiors who gain power by 
accepting loyal retainers who can in the long run contribute 
substantially to the success or failure of their superiors. The 
loyal subordinate will do his best to protect his superior when 
something goes wrong, and he will try to blame other variables for 
the problem at hand, not the boss, even if the boss caused the 
problem (Pezeshkpur 1978). In return, superiors will promote the 
interests of loyal subordinates and move them up the hierarchy when 
the opportunity comes, even if those members have poor 
qual i f ications.
Loyalty has always been of paramount importance in Arab 
societies and is a highly valued personality trait. This loyalty has 
strong connotations of trust, faithfulness and obligations. Arab 
executives who were investigated by Muna (1980) valued loyalty more 
highly than efficiency for all levels of employees (p.79). This 
attitude of 'loyalty first, efficiency second' within organizations
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is in accordance with the dominant societal norms and values of 
' personal ization ' and 'paternalism' of wider society in the Arabic 
World.
Employees within Iraqi organization are highly dependent on 
their superiors for decisions and directions, and they rarely 
exercise personal iniative, sonetimes not even within the permitted 
degree of bureaucratic rules. "Discretion" is defined as "an 
emphasis upon personal judgement and initiative, acceptance of 
responsibility and full use of discretionary powers within the rules" 
(Mouzelis 1975, p.40). In fact Weber's type in this matter holds an 
ambivalent position; for some writers such as Blau (1962) and 
Mouzelis (1975) this type, as well as the theory that is adopted by 
the theorists and practioners of scientific management, deprives the 
individual of every iniative or at least limits it to a minimum 
degree, and thus the only way for these theories to make someone 
behave rationally as is required by the organization is to tell him 
exactly what to do through strict rational rules and top level 
instructions. But for Berger (1957), Weber's type of bureaucratic 
rules left room for a high degree of 'discretion' and permitted a 
degree of personal judgement and iniative. In fact in the case of 
Iraq, as in Egypt where Berger (1957) found a low degree of 
discretion, the culture in the wider society, where organization 
members have been socialized before joining the organization, 
provides them with a set of value-orientations which do not enable 
them to exercise a high degree of 'discretion'. The prevalent value- 
orientation in their society - such as extreme suspiciousness and 
distrust, avoiding acceptance of responsibility and search for safety 
and security, dependence on others for directions and guidance, and 
authoritarianism with a high need for escape frcm uncertainty and
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ambiguity - have all prevented an exercise of personal judgement or 
initiative, and acceptance of responsibility.
'Formality', that is what derives from bureaucratic impersonal 
rules which prescribe relations between various offices, makes a 
sharp distinction between the administrators and the administered 
(Stewart 1970), or puts a clearly defined social distance between the 
occupants of various bureaucratic positions. This formality is 
manifested by means of social ritual which symbolizes and supports 
the hierarchical power structure or the "pecking order" of the 
various offices (Merton 1940).
This social distance or sharp distinction provided by 
bureaucratic formality is in congruity with the large power-distance 
or 'inequality' between those who hold power or authority and those 
who are subject to that power which Iraqi culture has maintained. 
Formality makes it possible to practice, in its latent function, the 
authoriterian conception of authority, haughtiness and the 
traditional respect of authority. Thus formality within Iraqi 
bureaucracy serves as a modem means of satisfying the old inherited 
'superiority propensity' vAere a formal position becomes a privilege 
rather than simply a function to serve the public, and where 
authority is guarded jealously to maintain status. The bureaucrats, 
especially in high rank positions, enjoy supremacy and generally try 
to look powerful as much as they can. Their exercise of formal 
authority is authoritarian in tone and content. In fact, occupying 
the top of the bureaucratic pyramid and holding the higher legal 
authority, often increases the personal authority or power of the top 
person in Iraqi bureaucracy. Itie subordinates must always keep a gap 
or distance between themselves and their superiors, and 
accountability is demanded by superiors from subordinates.
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Exercising power within Iraqi bureaucratic organizations is 
different frcm that within Western organization. Managers in both 
organizations desire power, but European managers in those countries 
of 'low PDI' (Hofstede 1980) would consider power as something they 
would almost be ashamed of or as being socially unacceptable to 
desire, and which they try to underplay (French and Raven, 1960). 
ïhus managers in these countries would try to look less powerful than 
they really are, or deny having power, and their exercise of power is 
usually done discretly. Seeking power and using it is done openly in 
Iraqi organizations, as is the case in other developing countries 
(Pezeshkpur 1978; Wright 1981), and managers or powerful people in 
general, as was found by Hofstede (1980) in other 'high PDI' 
countries try to look as powerful as possible.
From what has been indicated previously, it is clear that Iraqi 
bureaucracy through its historical experiences within the wider 
society has been moving frcm the model of ' traditional-charismatic 
authority' with its personal type of relations to that of 'legal 
authority' and those vestiges of the older model persist strongly to 
this day and are deeply embedded within Iraqi organizational culture. 
The formal nature of hierarchical bureaucratic structures are 
supposed to rationalize or impersonalize the relationship between 
organizational members, but the nature and psychological mode of this 
structure develops, in the case of Iraqi bureaucracy, to be not very 
different from that of the 'traditional and charismatic' model. This 
model is found within traditional and feudal systems where the 
authoritarian relation between master who commands by virtue of his 
inherited status, and subjects who obey orders, and where there is 
personal loyalty to the charismatic or traditional leader. In fact 
if the 'Bedouin traditional model ' gives a different example of
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traditional charismatic authority relations with its strong sense of 
equality and democracy, the bureaucratic model of Iraqi organization 
gives a kind of authoritarian legal relation with deeply embedded 
charismatic-traditional elements, but without the old sense of 
equality and democracy. Furthermore, if the nature of charismatic- 
traditional domination which consists of an authoritarian mode, is 
very loose and unstable (Mowzelis 1975), the bureaucratic domination 
within Iraqi organization and many other countries, develops more 
stable and permenant authoritarian modes under the call for 
organizational rationality. As was the case with traditional and 
feudal models, the status of the individuals within Iraqi society 
outside the organization is coupled or judged according to their 
status within the bureaucratic hierarchy. The top manager is 
treated, in most of his day-to-day cormunications outside the 
organization, on the basis that he is the top person in an 
organizational hierarchy.
The bureaucratic setting through its clash with culture in Iraqi 
wider society has had a hostile relationship with many cultural 
elements and thus failed to use them to serve organizational 
objectives. While this bureaucracy has allowed the authoritarian 
societal norms of authority and power, with its traditional respect 
of authority, personalism, and fear, to enter the organization, the 
paternalistic mode has failed to do so under the influence of 
organizational rationality. It has been mentioned previously that 
the 'family' is one of the dominating social institutions not only in 
Iraq but in all Arabic countries, where the extended family is still 
very strong. The authoritarian pattern of relation to authority and 
its corresponding norms and values which is one side of the ' father- 
children relationship' or head-family members has always been able to
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exist within Iraqi work organizations. But the paternalistic 
attitude - in terms of care, love, support and help in personal 
matters, which is the other side of authority relation within the 
family - has failed to survive within Iraqi organizations in contrast 
to the case of Japanese organizations. Under the call for 
'rationality', the individuals have been socialized within Iraqi 
organizations through the notion that there is no consideration for 
private matters, the organization is not their home but a place to 
conduct formal activities; thus any personal issues must be left to 
be dealt with outside the organization; a formal relationship is the 
ideal one. So it is very normal for any subordinate to receive a 
formal statement objecting to his behaviour, saying "where do you 
think you are ... , do you think you are sitting at your home". 
Despite this hostility between Iraqi bureaucracy and the cultural 
paternalistic mode, Iraqi and Arabic organizations continue to be
influenced by 'paternalism' (Muna 1980). EJnployees' expectations and 
behaviour towards their superiors stems frcm this 'paternalism' and 
thus for them the ideal siiperior is the one who performs his role as 
a 'good father' or older brother, in other words, one who has a
fatherly attitude toward them which means 'love, care, and help in 
personal matters'. In fact having such an attitude toward
subordinates in Iraqi organization becomes a matter of personal 
choice, rather than a well established mode, and within the emphasis 
on formality and rationality, this attitude is very rarely found in 
Iraqi organizations, unless it is a part of personal strategies for 
expanding power and influence.
2 - A spirit of fonnalistic impersoncLlity
In the Weberian model of bureaucracy, as explained by Blau 
(1956), the "ideal official conducts his office in a spirit of
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formalistic impersonality sine ira et studio, without hatred or 
passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm" (p.30). In order 
to reach this dehumanization or impersonal ization, rational standards 
must govern operations, detached from any personal considerations. 
Bureaucratic rules should be uniformly applied in all bureaucrat- 
clients relationships as well as between bureaucratic hierarchical 
levels. Thus the official must not let his personal feelings, which 
might develop about some organizational members or clients, influence 
his official decisions concerning them.
It is not difficult to realize how strongly the bureaucratic 
impersonality has clashed with the 'personalization' of Iraqi culture 
as well as of Arabic culture in general. If it is true that Western 
organizations have, to some degree, gained the 'rational 
organizational man' who becomes able to separate his personal 
relationships and obligations from his official or formal 
relationship within the organization, this man has not yet been found 
for Arabic and most Middle Eastern organizations. In fact it is more 
true to say that Western organizations and Arabic and Middle Eastern 
organizations vary in the degree of ' irrationality ' as there is 
likely to be high irrationality within the latter compared with the 
former. In fact because of the very early movement of Western 
societies toward industrialization, the social structure and norms 
and values in these societies have changed to cope with new 
conditions and requirements. This along with other factors, have 
weakened family life and personal obligation toward members of the 
extended family, relatives, neighbours, and other traditional groups, 
all which provide a degree of rationality in the terms of 
'impersonality' in Western organizations. But in Arabic and Middle 
Eastern societies, who have very recently started to move toward
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industrialization, because of many cultural, religious and historical 
factors, most of a person's role relations are still to great extent 
set within traditional groups (extended family, tribes, religious 
groups, neighbours, friends, ..etc). The rights and duties in this 
society are defined in terms of personal relationships. Personal 
ties and obligations to kin and friends are part of the individual's 
identity and form a strong soc io-cultural pressure in these countries
(Muna 1980). So it has been extremely hard for a human being who
lives in such society where life outside the organization is full of 
personal ties and obligations, to be a rational, impersonal
organizational man. This is simply because he cannot put his 'social 
skin' away each morning when he enters his work organization and then 
put it back on again when he leaves. To reach a healthy balance 
between the ' personal izat ion ' of his culture and the
impersonal ization of bureaucratic work organizations he needs to have 
a 'schizophrenic* or ambivalent personality which is not healthy in 
itself, or he needs to find another way to cope with such a conflict 
of expectations. Thus the ' personal izat ion ' of Iraqi culture in 
reaction to the hostility o£ bureaucratic impersonality has had to 
find a means by which to exist and hide deep within Iraqi 
organizaitonal life. This personal i zat ion appears in forms judged to 
be 'irrational' and negative, and thus must be fought and removed; 
such forms as nepotism, favouritism, personal consideration, and 
cliques which are based on charasmatic and traditional relationships 
and the exchange of benefits for personal objectives. These kind of 
forms strongly characterized the emergence and evolution of Iraqi 
modem bureaucracy during the period of Ottoman rule, the British 
Mandate and Monarchy system, as seen previously. In reaction to the 
strong appearance of these forms which are judged as irrational and
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dysfunctional, the bureaucracy in Iraq witnessed, particularly since 
the revolution of 1958, a tendency to enforce bureaucratic 
formalistic impersonality over informality, as it was considered to 
be a step in the direction of improving rationality.
Not only 'informality' but also 'formality' within Iraqi 
bureaucracy has many dysfunctional aspects which were constructed 
through the interaction between the cultural meanings that 
organizational members bring from their society and the specific
meanings they find within the bureaucratic rules. The nature of 
'formality' makes it possible for many value-orientations of Iraqi 
culture to exist and function behind it. Formality, states Merton 
(1940), "facilitates the interaction of the offices despite their 
(possibly hostile) private attitudes toward one another" (p.560). 
This nature of formality is very useful to people, such as the
Iraqis, who are very sensitive to critisism, directness and 
frankness, dignity and open confrontation. Negative individualism, 
rigidity, suspiciousness and distrust, manliness, a high concern with 
ego, expected aggressiveness or hostility, superimposition of
personalities over issues, respect and deference to authority, 
dependence and lack of iniative and unwillingness to take 
responsibility, uncertainty avoidance, and a need for security and 
safety, fear of negative judgements - all which characterize Iraqi 
culture in wider society - function through Iraqi bureaucratic 
formality. Formality within Iraqi bureaucracy takes the form of what 
Ihompson (1961) terms "cold aloofness" (p.357) which he considers as 
a kind of bureaupathic behaviour stemming from personal insecurity. 
This formality as Merton (1940) explains, gives rise to the
"arrogance" and "haughtiness" of the bureaucrat, especially in a 
society such as Iraq, where haughtiness and respect are often coupled 
and where individuals have a great need to be powerful and respected.
288
The bureaucrats, from their adaptation to different bureaucratic 
situations, learn how to use both aspects of 'formality' and 
'informality' for their own ends; they widely use formality as a 
"defensive strategy" (Silverman 1970) to protect themselves and avoid 
the dangers of critisism and punishment. The bureaucrats within 
Iraqi organization find that when they do not maintain social 
distance and let their personal considerations influence their 
dealing with cases of clients or of organizational members, 
especially their subordinates, they are very often accused, and may 
be punished, for being partial in their treatment and favouring some 
individuals over others to gain personal objectives. This would 
encourage them to defend themselves by stereotyped, formal treatment 
of affairs, even when they may realize that this treatment does not 
provide a reasonable or just resolution of specific problems. When 
they apply the bureaucratic rules formally and universally, they are 
often criticized for being characterized by un-intelligent rigidity 
in their approach to human problems, inefficiency and maybe hostility 
to the public. Also when the bureaucrat in Iraq follows such formal 
treatment, he may be faced with the anger of his relatives or friends 
for his formality with them when they hajpen to have cause to 
interact with him or to require his help as an official within the 
bureaucracy. As such treatment often means failing to meet one's 
personal obligations, and maintaining social distance and a cold 
relationship, so he may lose many of his important personal 
relationships, and would not recieve any personal consideration and 
support when he needs them.
Within Iraqi bureaucracy aie can note that formality is mainly 
demanded by superiors rather than subordinates, members with high 
rather than low insecurity feelings. In general subordinates try to
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establish informal friendly relationships with superiors as such a 
relationship gives a greater feeling of equality and allows them to 
gain some powar and influence, especially when they have independent 
resources of power. Superiors may find formality, which in their 
culture is coupled with respect, provides them with a clear power- 
distance and a greater satisfaction of their superiority propensity. 
Also this formality provides security, especially to the insecure 
superior and could hide lack of ability and cover up personal 
weakness.
3 - A system of rules (Standardization)
A system of rules is the third basic characteristic of 
bureaucracy which is strongly related to 'impersonality', since the 
aim of the rules is an efficient and impersonal operation (Stewart 
1970). In Weber's type of bureaucracy, operations are governed "by a 
consistent system of abstract rules .... [and] consist of the 
application of these rules to particular cases" (Blau 1956, p.29). 
Ihe bureaucratic system of rules defines the responsibilities of each 
member and his relationship with other members at different levels 
within the organizational hierarchy as well as with clients. 
Bureaucracy not only should be impersonal but should be seen to be 
impersonal.
When we talk about Iraqi bureaucracy we should distinguish 
between ' formalization ' which refers to the extent to which 
procedures, rules, instructions, and communications are written down, 
and 'standardization' which is the extent to which activities are 
subject to standard regular procedures, which deal with rules and 
definitions that purport to cover all circumstances (Pugh et al, 
1968). Also we need to clear lç> the confusion which often appears in 
Iraq from understanding 'standardization' as linked to the phenomenon 
of ' red tape '.
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In Iraqi bureaucracy a wide area of execution of jobs and 
relating to each other is governed by formally prescribed written 
rules, laws, and regulations. Some aspects of organizational 
activities such as 'accounting' or 'personnel' are highly structured
and apply many long-established rules, laws, and regulations from
which little variation is possible. Also one may note the tendency 
toward uniformity and structuring of activities as far as possible. 
But frcm my work experience within sane Iraqi organizations, and my 
observations through dealing with other organizations, I have 
realized that in reality formal written rules and regulations are not 
always applied in conducting the jobs, at least not to the same 
degree in different organizational activities.
Rigges (1964) observes a great discrepancy between the formally 
prescribed laws and procedures and the effectively practiced or the
actual behaviour of individuals within many organizations in
developing countries. Rigges (1962) remarks that techniques are 
followed by developing countries as an end in themselves, 
irrespective of their relevance to the context of the culture and 
environment in which they are introduced. And that the phenomenon of 
'apparent standards' in developing countries could be attributed to 
the constant pressure to satisfy the requirements set by developed 
countries when providing technical aid. In fact the discrepancy 
between organizational rules and procedures and the actual behaviour, 
particularly of top and middle level managers, has been found by Muna 
(1980) in many Arabic organizations. Also Rigges observation about 
this phenomenon has been supported by Al-Awaji (1971) in his study 
about bureaucracy and society in Saudi Arabia.
In addition to the cultural dislike of 'formality' which stands 
behind the lack of 'standardization' in Iraqi organization, several
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reasons have also contributed to the existence of this phenomenon; in 
appointing individuals to jobs in Iraqi organizations a knowledge of 
bureaucratic rules and regulations as well as organizational 
objectives are not required or provided in training before taking up 
the job. The newcomer usually leams his job and the required way to 
fulfill it through the teaching by older members; 'that is how we do 
the job here'. The newcomer may conduct his work in a 'routine way' 
or through his superiors instructions without even knowing of the
many bureaucratic rules and regulations which govern his job. He may
leam some rules as a part of his routine work rather than as a part 
of his organization's rules system, which should be applied by 
following a standard procedure. Lack of clear programmed objectives 
may also participate in the lack of effective standards. In Iraqi 
organizations the organizational goals are neither clearly stated nor 
do the organizational members have a clear understanding or 
internalizing of their organization's objectives (Abona 1975; Al-
Shamsie 1979). The proliferation of rules, regulations and
instructions, in addition to frequent modification and elimination, 
have added more difficulties to remembering and following them, 
especially when they are contradictory. Within Iraqi bureaucracy 
through the impact of cultural personalization, the authority of the 
person is, as in French bureaucracy (Crozier 1964), above the system 
of rules. Formal rules and regulations are usually subject to 
definition of their meanings or the situations to which they apply by 
the top person. In fact organizational members in Iraq generally 
work according to the top person's or superiors order and 
instructions more than by standard procedure. They follow the top 
person's instructions, especially when they have a good relationship 
with him or are trying to develop one, even when they may realize
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that the instructions which are sometimes oral, are contradictory to 
the written bureaucratic rules or regulations. For many it is only a 
matter of security; if it is a written instruction, the author 
(superior) will be responsible, not them, for not applying the rules 
or regulations. But if he gives his instructions orally, seme of 
them, especially those with high insecurity feelings, would try to 
have these instructions written down, to provide absolution frcm any 
responsibility. Working on orders and instructions frcm those at the 
top and the consequent lack of standardization within Iraqi 
organizations also stems from the following reasons; First; the lack 
of role definition, as there are no job descriptions or terms of 
reference for jobs within Iraqi bureaucracy (Al-Shams ie 1979). 
Second; the lack of job classification and performance appraisal and 
the subjectivity of promotions and advancements based on personal 
factors and arbitrary judgements, and the personal inclinations of 
immediate supervisors and the top person within the organization. 
The third reason is that authority is seldom delegated down the 
organizational structure so all other managers, except the top level, 
are left with little authority. Except for the strictly routine work 
which has been done throughout the years, the little delegated 
authority in other types of work is in reality often subject to top 
management approval. Furthermore, it is subject to arbitrary 
freezing or withdrawal by the top person. Thus the middle-level 
managers and lower-level supervisors do not know the parameters of 
their levels of authority as they do not perceive their jobs through 
preciseley fixed responsibilities and authorities, so they play the 
role of assistants to the heads of their organization.
Although rules cannot be openly ignored in Iraqi organizations, 
they are sometimes used selectively or manipulated in a way to get
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sane advantages. The confusion, generality, and contrariness of many 
bureaucratic rules and regulations in Iraqi organizations leaves room 
for individual interpretations of the rules and which rule is to be 
applied to the situation they encounter. Although organizational
members in Iraq follow the top managements' definitions of the 
meanings of rules, there still may be some aspects related to the 
situation not covered by the rule or by the definition of its 
meaning. Also in other aspects the actors may have no previous 
definition, or it could be defined in more than one way. Thus 
knowledge of the rules, ability to use them selectively and 
manipulate them or their meanings through using the space sometimes 
available for individual interpretation, has been part of the power 
resources in Iraqi organizations. Such knowledge and ability has 
also been useful as a tactic for protecting or expanding power, even 
outside the organization, by being able to find a way to solve 
client's problems through what seems like an exception to the rules 
and regulations. In fact one of the important reasons for the 
discrepancy between the formally prescribed laws and rules and those 
effectively practiced, are the many exceptions for influential 
people, relatives, friends, political considerations... etc.
At this point, we could say that ' formalization ' and 
'standardization' within the structure of Iraqi bureaucracy do not 
exist to the same degree, nor are they as closely related as in the 
case in other organizations (Pugh et al 1968; Child 1972). Within 
Iraqi organization, as well as within many Arabic and developing 
countries, the degree of 'standardization' is much lower than the 
degree of ' formalization ' but it varies between one country and 
another.
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Applying rules and regulations within Iraqi bureaucracy, 
particularly in the traditional service departments, is characterized 
by the phenomenon of ' red tape ' and the strict adherence to the 
implementations of rules. This phenomenon means that in many aspects 
of work, there are long complicated and tedious procedures, and 
excessive routine, which very often includes delays, frustrations, 
narrow-mindedness, inefficiencies, and ritualistic procedures. This 
kind of bureaucratic mode appears mainly within activities where work 
is well established and where few disturbances interrupt the routine 
of the work, i.e. where the area of the job is covered by long 
established rules and procedures. In such activities the bureaucrat 
is seen by the public as a pompous and arrogant pedant who rigidly 
sticks to the 'letter of the law' in applying the rules and 
regulations that cover his job. Within bureaucracy, rules, as Merten 
(1940) explains, and as it is the case in Iraq, acquire a symbolic 
significance on their own and become ends rather than means to ends, 
which leads to the situation in which past decisions are blindly 
repeated with no appreciation or concern for changed conditions.
This phenomenon of 'red tape' and strict adherence to formal 
rules is not only the consequence of bureaucratic emphasis on 
obedience and conformity to rules, which extremely limits individual 
personal freedom and spontaneity (Merton 1940), but is rather the 
consequence of the interaction between this emphasis and the dominant 
value-or ientat ions in wider society. Extreme suspisc iousness and 
distrust, rigidity of thought, dependency and avoidance of taking 
responsibility, fear of negative judgement, oversensitivity, 
uncertainty avoidance, and search for safety and security - all 
characterize the culture and individuals in Iraq and are behind the 
existance of this phenomenon.
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It is true that the excessive 'routine' in Iraqi adminstration 
was originally introduced by Ottoman and British occupying powers to 
the extent that it has becmce part of Iraqi administrative tradition. 
But this 'red tape' and the meanings behind it are strongly related 
to the dominant value-or ientat ions within Iraqi culture. Also the 
long period of connection between bureaucracy and politics in Iraq, 
and the violent political struggles after the revolution of 1958 have 
added more uncertainty to the organizational evnironment and thus 
increased officials adherence to the established rules and routine 
procedures in order to secure posts. So formal bureaucratic rules 
perform a "screening function" (Gouldner 1955) within Iraqi 
organizations, as individuals can, through their adherence to these 
rules, avoid the risk and uncertainty of an independent judgement or 
action. Members of organizations, remarks Selznik (1949), become 
aware just how little they can do and still remain secure, because 
bureaucratic rules not only define in detail the unacceptable 
behaviour but also serve to specify a minimum level of acceptable 
behaviour.
Many aspects of 'ritual ' appear on the surface of Iraqi 
bureaucracy which stem from seeking security and superiority and 
avoiding uncertainty, rather than from organizational effectiveness 
and productivity. These ritualistic aspects appear in the extreme 
insistence tçon formal channels; a stress on rights rather than 
abilities; the insistence upon the full-rights of the superordinate 
role which means 'close supervision', and the emphasis on protocol 
and procedure. Another clear ritualist aspect, is the use of memos 
and dictated notes, even sometimes between two sections of one 
department, which often contain no information that any one will act 
upon and are not more than a device to 'stop time' for a moment
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(Hofstede 1980) or to remove responsibility. These ritualistic 
aspects, are considered by Thompson (1961) as bureaupathic responses 
to insecurity and doubts about the loyalty or ability of 
subordinates.
Poor managerial practices, lack of ability to organize and 
administer, ignorance about managerial education and training needs, 
overlaps in individual responsibilities, and the managers heavy 
involvement in details, all give strong support to the phenomenon of 
excessive routine or 'red tape' in Iraqi bureaucracy.
4 - High degree of specialization and departmentalization
According to Weber's model, bureaucracy is characterized by a 
high degree of division of labour and specialization of employees. 
The regular activities required by the organization are divided in a 
fixed way as official duties, so that the responsibilities of each 
member are clearly defined and legitimized as official duties. 
Therefore the individual who fills it must have the experience and 
education required for that post. By the clear-cut division of 
labour, bureaucracy employs specialized experts in each particular 
position where every cxie is responsible for the effective performance 
of his duties. Bureaucracy means fundamentally the exercise of 
control on the basis of knowledge not on tradition or charasmatic 
personality, as it is within feudal and traditional administrations 
(Mouzelis 1975).
Western organizations have evolved in response to modem science 
and technology, thus the trend toward departmentalization has 
received a strong impetus fran the tremendous advancements in 
scientific and technological breakthroughs. These organizations have 
incorporated departmentalization and specialization in order to 
improve productivity and hence profitability (Wright 1981).
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Specialization and departmentalization within Iraqi 
organizations have different features than that of Western 
organizeitons. One could distinguish two phenomena; first; the low 
degree of specialization; second; the high belief in experts and 
their knowledge. Iraqi organization has suffered from lack of 
specialized personnel. Originally this was due to the small number 
of educational and training establishments and the ineffective system 
of supplying adequately educated and properly trained personnel. Up 
to 1972 the percentage of personnel who had the equivalent of a 
university degree (BA and BSc) and above, did not exceed 10.16%, 
compared with the much higher percentage of individuals who had only 
finished secondary or even primary school. The situation within 
Iraqi organizations has not changed radically despite the huge 
increase in university graduates who entered these organizations as a 
direct result of the political leadership decision to absorb all the 
university and technical college graduates into the administrative 
body (Maaroof 1977). The employment of those graduates did not come 
about because of their specialization but simply because they had a 
university degree. The educational system in Iraq lacks the 
coordination and integration with organizations and thus this systaii 
is poorly oriented towards organizational requirements in numbers and 
types. In fact management or business education was largely 
neglected in Iraq while other forms of scientific, technical, arid 
economic education were being developed. Despite the recent 
development in sane courses in business administration and in the 
field of public administration and sane other related areas within 
Iraqi universities, there is still a lairge gap between the quality 
and content of these courses and the organizational needs, especially 
in developing and improving the abilities and practices of managerial
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systems. Also the lack of 'Apprenticeship Training' before 
employment and the shortcomings of training during employment inside 
the organization or in special institutions, have constributed to the 
lack of specialists within Iraqi organizations. The new employees 
are mostly dependent on their inadequate or irrelevant previous 
education and experience, and gradually pick-up the prevalent 
practices and attitudes which are often wrong.
As a result of the previous mentioned points the administrative 
body in Iraq has ended up with large numbers of graduates who are not 
necessarily of the right specialization. The lack of manpower 
planning and low efficiency of the allocation methods used, with the 
phenomena of 'nepotism' and 'mediation' (Wastah) have resulted in the 
employment of people who have the wrong specialization, where they 
fill positions or hold jobs which are not of their educational and 
experiential background. In addition, while some departments lack 
staff, over-employment exists in many other departments with its 
inevitable Parkinsonian results. Thus to meet this over-employment, 
division of labour becomes a matter of dividing a job into smaller 
and smaller tasks in order to create jobs. Ccxisequently 'disguised 
unemployment ' becomes endemic within Iraqi organizations
(governmental organizations and semi-autoncmous organization)(Aboona 
1975).
The accumulated experience which personnel in Iraq may acquire 
through doing specific work for seme time is also reduced or wasted 
through the effect of a high rate of transfer of personnel among 
different departments within one organization, or between different 
organizations. Such transferring is in many cases done as a 
punishment or because of over-staffing, or to 'solve' conflict 
between superiors and subordinates or among subordinates themselves.
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or for many other reasons unrelated to specialization or specific 
areas of expertise. In other words the transferring criteria are not 
oriented to 'fit the right person into the right job'.
The personnel in Iraqi organizations in general cover a wide 
variation in the standard of qualifications, which coupled with the 
absence of suitable working criteria in many cases means that 
qualified people end up with very routine and uninteresting jobs with 
very little responsibility. People with very low qualifications may 
hold very important jobs, which leads to the lowering of 
organizational specialization standards. Thus 'specialization' in 
Iraqi organizations is mainly the result of doing the job repeatedly 
and probably having some related education or training background and 
sonetimes some previous experience.
Iraqi organizations have not evolved in response to modem 
science and technology, as is the case in Western organizations, but 
rather these organizations, as in most developing countries, have 
responded only to a limited degree within their deep structure and 
working practices to scientific and technological developments. In 
fact, as Rigges (1962) has noticed within many developing countries, 
technology is followed as an end in itself rather than as a means by 
which productivity and consequently profitability could be increased. 
Complex technology has been imported for use in Iraqi organizations, 
but there is a need for specialists with high skills to operate such 
technology. The emphasis of these organizations, as Wright (1981) 
says, is not on 'productivity ' as it is with Western organizations, 
but rather on various factors only one of which may be productivity.
Cultural value-orientations have handicapped these organizations 
from responding to science and technology. Fatalistic outlooks and 
feelings of helplessness in mastering the surroundings, avoidance of
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uncertainty, feeling insecure, have all destroyed an appreciation of 
the need for planning. These orientations have perpetuated an 
unbalanced emphasis on the spirit of other-worldliness, obstructed an 
appreciation of the value of time, and above all, impeded the spirit 
of inquiry and logical reasoning which is a basic ingredient of 
education for change. Also the low social status of manual work in 
Iraq has fostered class consciousness and inhibited cooperation, 
conrnun icat ion and opportunities for advancement.
In Iraqi organizations the approach to management is more 
through ' personal izat ion ', not departmentalization or specialization, 
as these organizations have remained essentially charasmatic, despite 
its movement toward a legal bureaucratic model. Because of this 
'personalization' the individual with specialist or expert knowledge 
or who demonstrates an adequate technical training is not necessarily 
appointed to the right post and often specialization and expert 
knowledge have little to do with who moves t{) to occupy higher 
positions. Also many heads or top managers in Iraq are appointed not 
for their expert knowledge but for many other political or 
traditional considerations. Thus the head or top manager may quite 
likely lack any expert knowledge related to the position he occupies, 
while others who are specialists or have expert knowledge may stay 
lower down in the hierarchy.
Managers in middle and lowsr level lack confidence and 
incentive, and have a narrow concept of their roles, which results 
partly from the very nature of centralized decision-making which is 
dominant within Iraqi bureaucracy. This also lowers the standard of 
specialization, where the individual has relatively few alternative 
courses of action to choose among, and where there is little need for 
planning and generating ideas regarding alternative courses of action
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involving the organization since such activities are executed only at 
the top level.
Departmentalization and specialization becomes a cover for many 
cultural orientations. Secretiveness, distrust, sensitivity to 
criticism, avoidance of open confrontation, lack of teamwork and 
cooperation, expected hostility and superimposition of personalities 
on issues, all function behind departmentalization and 
specialization. Organization members sometimes make use of 
departmentalization to distance themselves from other departments and 
also they make recourse to specialization to isolate themselves as 
individuals from one another. Thus they avoid criticizing issues 
relating to other departments or to other peoples ' areas of 
specialization justifying this in terms of 'each one should concern 
himself only with his own affairs'. As criticizing issues is 
perceived, through expected hostility and superimposing of 
personalities over issues, as an attempt to fault-find and reveal 
personal weakness, so individuals within organizations try to 
depersonalize the issues or each cxie restricts his concern to his 
area of specialization which often means his routine job. Thus one 
can note the absence of adequate coordination between departments and 
of critical analysis of major issues within Iraqi organizations.
The second phenomenon (the first being low specialization), 
which has been previously suggested to be noted in Iraqi 
organizations, is the high belief in experts and their specialized 
knowledge. In fact this belief not only involves uncertainty- 
avoiding rituals (Hofstede 1980), but also reflects the notion of 
'power'. The 'expert' or 'specialist' is perceived by people in Iraq 
as indicating a high degree of knowledge which is highly valued in 
itself. Through the evolution of Iraqi culture, education or knowlege
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cxDupled with respect and powsr. Thus individuals within 
organizations realize that their special knowledge of work 
information which is often accumulated from their work experiences, 
provides them with power inside the organization; especially because 
this knowledge or information has been concentrated in a limited 
number of individuals for the previous mentioned reasons. In fact 
such information or knowledge is often used as a powerful weapon 
either for job and position protection, or for expanding personal 
power. Thus bureaucrats may keep information secret if they find it 
suitable for their purposes (Abrahamsson 1977), or they may not 
transfer their experiences and knowledge to others if they feel this 
would endanger their positions within the organization.
5 - A system of impersonal criteria for enployment
The basic characteristic of Weber's type of bureaucracy is 
impersonal criteria in employment. Organizational members are to be 
selected on the basis of technical qualifications through formal 
examinations or by virtue of training or education; thus employment 
in bureaucracy is protected against arbitrary dismissal (Blau 1956). 
Administrative officials work for fixed salaries and they are 
'career' officials. "There is a system of promotions according to 
seniority or to achievement, or both" (Weber 1946, p.334). These 
policies for employment will develop loyalty to the organization and 
members identification with it, which motivates them to act in ways 
and expend greater efforts in advancing the interest of their conpany 
and their country.
In Iraqi organizations, the 'education certificate' has been the 
basic criteria for individuals' recruitment and selection. Thus, the 
applicant should hold an authorized school, institution, college or 
university certificate as required in order to fulfil the vacant
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position. The absence of job description and the lack of training 
before employment - 'Apprenticeship Training ' - have resulted in many 
cases in which the individual may be appointed to an organization as 
long as there is a vacant position available in its 'approval cadre' 
without consideration to the real need for his job or of his type of 
qualifications. Furthermore, through the lack of distributing 
personnel plans, the newcomer may be put to work in the same 
department where the 'approved cadre' indicates a vacant position 
even if there is no need for him, or he may be located or affiliated 
to work with other departments despite the fact that the vacant 
position, for which the individual was recruited in the first place, 
is within another department. Thus the newcomer may work with a 
department where there is no need for him, and quite possibly at the 
beginning of his a^^intment, he may stay for sometime without any 
work to do until the head of the department finds some for him, which 
often læans redistributing the same activities of the department 
between its members to provide the newcomer with some work.
In fact recruiting individuals to occupy the bureaucratic 
positions on the impersonal criteria of an 'educational certificate' 
and 'availability of a vacant position in an organization approved 
cadre' has left a great deal of room for nepotism, mediation, 
personal connections and political consideration to play a great role 
in selecting individuals among many applicants who may apply for a 
vacancy. all these reasons have contributed to the phenomenon of 
'disguised unemployment ' in addition to the desire of some managers 
for empire-building in the administrative sense of the word. Within 
this phenomenon, one could note that while adminstrative posts suffer 
from highly disguised unemployment, there is a crucial lack of 
manpower within industrial and agricultural sectors, to the degree
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that labour force has been imported from other Arabic and some 
foreign countries to fill this gap. This not only results from a 
lack of accurate manpower planning, but relates strongly to the Iraqi 
culture value-orientation of valuing white-collar jobs much more than 
blue-collar and manual work which appread frcsn the time of the 
Ef fend is. In fact such a value-orientation is also found by Hofstede 
(1980) in all countries with high power-distance.
'Salary' in the Iraqi administrative system, is linked with 
educational certificates, years of study, and years of service. This 
system 'prices the educational certificates and seniority' rather 
than 'prices the job responsibilities and performance ' as they are 
the only criteria available to this system through the absence of job 
descriptions, job evaluation, performance appraisals, incentive 
plans, and scientific ways of recruitment, selection, and promotion. 
In 1975 a high committee was established to undertake the task of 
preparing a unified public service law. The NCCMD was authorized to 
formulate work teams to prepare the draft of this law. In the 
preparation process of this law, job descriptions were used for the 
first time to define all jobs within the body of public service in 
the country and to correlate jobs performed and salaries paid. Also 
part of this process included efforts to prepare job analyses and job 
classifications for all job titles within Iraqi public service 
organizations. Rules for performance appraisals and advancements 
were also designed. Although the researcher, as a previous member of 
one of the teams which worked in part of the preparation process of 
this law, is able with some others to take issue with some aspects of 
this preparation process, the fact remains that this law was the 
first real attempt to follow the principle of pricing jobs and 
performance rather than educational certificates and years of
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service. Nevertheless, up to now no action has been taken to enact 
the suggested new law.
In fact for organizations and individuals with a high degree of 
uncertainty avoidance, suspicion and distrust, obligation toward 
traditional personal ties, and personalization, the criterias of 
educational certificates and years of service provide organizational 
members in Iraq with more certainty and security in their 'careers' 
than the criteria of abilities, skills, performance and 
responsibilities.
Tttie promotional system in Iraq is more or less a routine 
procedure which, in its bureaucratic sense, is based on 'seniority', 
as there is no job description, performance appraisals and personnel 
evaluation system. Promoting personnel in terms of giving them the 
annual increments is mainly a routine procedure which is based on 
period of service. Even the amount of evaluation that may be done 
for this purpose, as Al-Shamsie (1979) states "[is] handled 
exclusively by direct supervisors and agency heads. No other party 
is involved in this process v^ich may require professional expertise 
to study itons of the forms and to analyze data... .factors inside the 
efficiency reports are subject to arbitrary judgements and personal 
inclinations of direct supervisors and heads of departments" (p.46). 
Thus employees learn how to get their promotions by satisfying their 
supervisors and to be cn the safe side by following their 
instructions and orders and to mind their own business. By doing so 
their performance is very likely to be evaluated as good or at the 
minimum acceptable.
Formally, promotion in terms of moving up to occupy a higher 
positicai, was also based cxi 'seniority'. Performance, initiative and 
abilities has little to do with who moves up in the hierarchy of
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Iraqi bureaucracy. This is not only because of the previously 
mentioned points, but also for many personal factors and political 
considerations. As such, promotion is not based on performance and 
initiative but determined largely at the will of superiors of heads 
of organizations. The ambitious individual who seeks to be chosen by 
a top person for a higher position learns how to satisfy him and how 
to cultivate the 'right' people for such purposes.
The evaluation of subordinates within Iraqi organizations as in 
most Middle Eastern countries, is not simply based on looking at the 
employees in a categorizing way and assessing their strengths versus 
their weaknesess and, emphasis on job performance, as Wright (1981) 
said is the case in Western organizations, but rather on the 
personality of the subordinate. The former evaluation takes into 
consideration the subordinates as a total person with related 
personal factors, personality characteristics, political 
considerations, and loyalty and goodwill to superiors which are the 
supreme criteria in moving up for higher and higher positions. If 
western superiors promote a subordinate who is talented, but rates 
low with him in personal aspects (Wright 19B1), it is unlikely to be 
so for the Iraqi superior because the later one evaluates a 
subordinate as a total person. Thus it is not suprising to find that 
individual qualifications have little relation to job functions and 
offical titles in many Iraqi organizations.
SUMMARY AND OOMCUODING RBiARKS
The characteristics and settings of Iraqi organizations, as is 
the case in most developing countries, reveal the crucial impact of 
national culture on organizational structure and behaviour. This 
impact is the consequence of the interaction between the culture in
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wider society and the peculiar bureaucratic settings and 
requirements. Iraqi organizational culture is a socio-historical 
product which was obtained through the evolution of organizations 
within the wider society under different historical realities. In 
the evolution of Iraqi bureaucracy there has emerged an increasing 
emphasis on 'organizational rationality'. Thus this bureaucracy has 
been trying on the surface to present a picture that everything is 
impersonal, while its underlying character reveals the 
'personalization' of Iraqi culture in wider society. Cultural impact 
appears within the latent function of many apparently dysfunctional 
activities in both aspects of 'formality' and 'informality' of Iraqi 
bureaucracy. This bureaucracy, through its historical interaction 
with culture in Iraqi society, has gained certain special features 
which has shaped and deeply affected the nature and the extent of the 
existence of Weber's characteristics of bureaucracy within Iraqi 
organizations. These features, which would help to reveal the 
doninant social or organizational meanings and the deep elements of 
culture, structure, and behaviour within contemporary organizations 
in Iraq, are as follows :
A - Duality in identification or the existence in a twilight 
zone of cultures.
B - Heavy involvement in politics.
C - Organizational structure and settings of Iraqi bureaucracy 
constructed through the congruence and clashing between 
bureaucratic and cultural canponents.
In order to sum up the previously indicated characteristics of 
the structure and nature of Iraqi bureaucracy, it is useful to use 
the five basic concepts of Weber's type as follows : -
1. Hierarchical authority structure with impersonal authority
relations :
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- bureaucracy in Iraq maintains a hierarchical structure with 
great centralization of authority at the top; its nature is an 
authoriterian legal-charistmatic-trad i tional type of authority
relation, with strong elements of ' personal i zat ion ' of authority and 
loyalty. Subordination, rigidity, and concern for hierarchical 
differentiation by status and privilege.
2. A spirit of formalistic impersonality;
- a predominance of formality over informality under the name 
for 'rationality', rigidity, using formality as a defensive strategy 
and a shield behind which many dominant value-orientations exist and 
function, such as fear of negative judgements, unwillingness to  take 
responsibility, need for security and safety, expected hostility, 
willingness to look powerful and respectful and sensitivity to 
criticism, directness and confrontation. Personalization of Iraqi
culture in its reaction to tdie hostility of bureaucratic formality 
found ways to hide within the deep levels of organizational culture. 
This personalization appears in forms judged to be ' irrational' and 
must be fought.
3. A system of rules (standardization):
- a great discrepancy between the formally prescribed laws and 
procedures and those effectively practiced. Lack of training before 
and during employment, lack of clear objectives, working on tpp- 
person orders and instructions, oontralizing authority, and many 
exceptions for influential people, relatives, friends, political 
considerations, thus low standardization. Strict adherence to the 
implementations of rules, 'red tape' phenomenon behind which many 
cultural value-orientâtions function, such is the need for safety and 
security, avoidance of uncertainty and risk-taking, antipathy and 
rigidity.
4. A degree of specialization and departmentalization:
- the approach to management is more through ' personal izat ion ' 
not departmentalization or speicalization. Low specialization and
high belief in experts and their knowledge. The use of knowledge or 
information as a weapon for protecting position or expanding personal 
power. Specialization and departmentalization function as a shield 
for ' isolationism' and 'unemotionality '.
5. A system of impersonal criteria for employment:
- recruitment, salary, and promotion all based on pricing 
educational certificates and seniority, not job responsibilities and 
performance. Absence of job description, job evaluation, and 
performance appraisals, thus evaluation of individuals is subject to 
the arbitrary judgements and personal inclinations of superiors. 
Personal connections and loyalty, and political consideration have a 
lot to do with who moves up for higher positions.
PART THREE 
RESEARCH FIELDWORK FINDINGS
[It should be noted that all tables including 
the cross-tabulation analysis are to be 
found in Appendix 1 referred to in this part]
CHAPTER (7)
MIDDLE MANAGERS' DOMINANT ORIENTATION AND 




One of the first basic assumption of the research model proposed 
earlier, was that the middle manager's canpliant behaviour arises out 
of shared definitions or 'meaning' which they hold in common, by 
v^ich managers conceive the role of the top managers. These meanings 
can be inferred from norms, values, and observed actions.
As was commented previously, working for a long period within 
various Iraqi organizations before the formal study enabled the 
researcher to identify many of these meanings. The researcher's 
first hypothesis describes the dominant mode of middle managers' 
behaviour toward the top manager and the recurring meanings which 
were identified within it, as follows:
'Middle managers' behaviour toward the top manager 
tend to comply with and conform to his eaqaectations as a 
person who possesses the authority and power rather than as 
a leader %#ith whom they share the (%ganizational leadership 
and responsibilities'.
Ihe primary cxxicem of the research field work was to explore 
the middle managers' 'shoulds' (norms) and 'beliefs in' (values) as 
well as their mode of action in relation to top managers. In other 
words, to measure their 'orientations' and 'behaviour'.
It has been found (Chapter 6) that the Iraqi organizational 
culture is a 'bureaucratic-feudal' culture; in other words, a mixture 
of "role and power cultures" (Handy 1976). So measuring the 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation and compliant behaviour of the middle 
managers under study would indicate their commitment to the set of 
attitudes, values, and behavioural modes that characterize their 
relevant environment through which they have been socialized. Above 
all, this orientation and behaviour would enable us to infer the 
shared or dominant cultural meanings that they hold in relation to 
authority figures (the top manager) in common which have been 
identified and hypothesized by the researcher.
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To measure the middle managers' 'orientation' and 'behaviour' 
and consequently verify the first hypothesis, two scales including 10 
items were used to assess the ' bureaucratic-feudal orientation ' side- 
by-side with two 'imaginary situations' (based on real situations 
which the researcher witnessed in Iraqi organizations) to measure 
compliant behaviour. The scoring of the 80 middle managers on both 
scales (i.e. bureaucratic and feudal orientations scales) were tested 
statistically (Pearson correlations) in order to ensure the different 
items interdependency. It was found that the items in each scale 
were significantly correlated as shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
Bureaucratic orientation as well as feudal orientation were scored by 
assigning a weighing scale which ranged from the weight of 5 for 
'Strongly agree' to weight of 1 for 'Strongly disagree'. By adding 
the weights of each middle manager scoring on each scale, the degrees 
of bureaucratic orientation and of feudal orientation were obtained. 
In the remaining pages of this chapter, the research findings 
obtained from studying middle managers orientation and behaviour will 
be demonstrated and discussed.
1. RESEAROB FINDINGS 
A - The Bureaucratic Scale
As mentioned previously (Chapter 3) this scale was set up 
according to a schema containing five categories specifying the 






Trad 11 ional ism.
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Table 3 shows the distribution displayed by 80 middle managers 
which is sunmarised as follows:




Very high 35 44%
N = 80
The above Table shows that all the 80 middle managers displayed 
considerable bureaucratic orientation, but to various degrees. 
Whilst no-one scored 'low* on the scale, cxily 8 (10%) scored 'middle' 
compared with 37 (46%) 'high' and 35 (44%) 'very high'.
These results show that these individuals endorsed the 
attitudes, values, and behavioural patterns that characterise their 
work environments, and that they are apt to behave in a bureaucratic 
mode that consists of applying rules and procedures inflexibility, 
and treat compliance as an end in itself.
B - The Feudal Scale
This scale was prepared according to a set consisting of the 
following five categories, which are based on the concept of a feudal 
mode, described in the relevant literature, which as a social system 
contains the social concept of:
Respect for authority 
Personal loyalty 
Disciplined conformity 
Dependency in action 
Consideration of social norms.
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Table 4 shqws the distribution on the feudal orientation scale 





Very high 29 38%
N = 80
While no-one scored 'low' on the scale, only 9 (11%) scored 
'middle', compared with 42 (53%) 'high' and 29 (36%) 'very high'. 
Ihis result indicates that these 80 middle managers are not only 
oriented toward a 'bureaucratic mode' but also a 'feudal mode'. They 
generally tend to respect the authority figure and comply with him as 
a person who possesses authority and power within their work 
organization. Also they are ^ t  to conform strongly to the 
discipline of work, social norms and values, and they prefer not to 
be responsible for taking independent actions.
In fact, by examining the scoring of the 80 middle managers on 
the feudal orientation scale, one notes that the distribution on four 
items of the scale (items nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5) showed that the 
majority were in the high and very high degrees (agree and strongly 
agree), whilst item no. 4 (not taking independent action) showed, to 
an extent, diverging results, with 45 out of 80 disagreeing (32 in 
disagree and 13 in strongly disagree) with not taking independent 
action (see Table 5). Nevertheless, this item shows a statistically 
significant relationship in a positive direction with the total 
feudal scale, as shown in Table 2, where the correlation between item
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no. 4 (VAR. 9) and the total of the scale is 0.6484. Thus it was 
concluded that the scale items all showed a sufficient correlation 
relationship to justify using the scale as an indicator of the feudal 
orientation held by the middle managers under consideration.
The relatively incompatible distribution between item no. 4 and 
the other items on the feudal orientation scale could have many 
implications. One factor that might have influenced this response is 
the willingness of those middle managers to appear powerful, or to 
expand their power in the organization and overcome their lack of 
influence in decision-making. By accepting the taking of initiative, 
they are willing to gain the influence and power that might be 
associated with them.
One of the major factors for explaining the somewhat high 
percentage of middle managers (45 out of 80) who responded in favour 
of taking independent action could be the impact of the very recent 
ideological emphasis by the highest political authority in the 
country on the ideas of 'employee participation in management and 
sharing with superiors the responsibility for initiatives inside the 
organization' (a series of newspaper articles on the administrative 
system talked about "Condemned phenomena that will (sic) not 
pass without reckoning", 1976). This was followed by a communique 
issued by the supreme leadership council, declaring that there is a 
definite backwardness in democratic practices between superiors and 
subordinates, and a lack of acceptance of work responsibilities 
(Conference on Low Productivity in the Government Agencies, 1976). 
The immediate accountability that was carried out in the above 
conference resulted in punishment for those managers who were judged 
as failing to take on responsibility and take the required actions. 
Conversely, this accountability produced some promotions and
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advancements for those who appeared to have taken necessary 
initiatives related to their jobs. This might explain why those 45 
middle managers responded to item no. 4 in favour of taking 
independent action.
In fact, the above result could indicate the likely instability 
of the feudal relationship between superiors and subordinates; 
ambitious middle managers, in their efforts to rise up the promotion 
ladder, may try to impress higher authorities by showing their 
readiness to take responsibilities for independent action. These 
middle managers will use this strategy as long as their work 
atmosphere or environment is dominated by that particular ideological 
emphasis, and as long as they perceive such a strategy is effective 
in serving their objectives. This is especially true when we 
consider the age of those 45 middle managers who were in favour of 
taking independent action; while 38 out of 45 were aged less than 38 
years, only 7 of them were around 45 years old.
However, the favouring by 56% of the middle managers of taking 
independent action does not necessarily represent reality, or a 
permanent situation. The researcher believes that, by studying the 
nature of the Iraqi organizational setting, one could realize the 
contradiction between the new instructions that were issued by the 
political authority and the inherited bureaucratic and authoritarian 
norms and values held and practised by organizational members. Thus 
middle managers, in their daily interactions with superiors, would 
rather not take independent actions and accept responsibility for 
them. But because these new instructions were issued by a supreme 
political authority, those middle managers may have felt compelled to 
accept the new type of instructions, or rather to be seen as 
accepting them, since they fear criticism and punishment if they
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appear to be obstructing the implementation of these Instructions. 
In fact, the Iraqi administrative system has frequently shown quick 
and superficial responses to such pressures or ideological emphases, 
which were not congenial to Iraqi organizational culture. But, once 
time has passed and the pressure has diminished, the system usually 
returns to its previous positicn, even though the pressure might have 
managed to inject seme apparent reforms into the system.
Such an ideological emphasis, or even the policy of changing top 
managers and key middle managers, would influence the surface of 
organizations, but the deep culture will not necessarily change in 
the planned direction and at the same time, since there is a lag 
between formal changes on the instrumental surface and changes at the 
deeper levels of organizational culture. To transform an 
authoritarian culture to an open learning one, there is a great need
for group-questioning of the actions of top management, but Iraqi
organizational members are very weak in this activity.
This response by those middle managers who favoured ' taking 
independent action' could be not more than an 'ideological support 
for a wide distribution of capacity for leadership and initiative ' - 
a cultural phencraenon in high PDI countries, described by Hofstede 
(1980), who states that;
"People in higher PDI countries are more open to 
ideological solutions to an inequality which is felt as 
problematic, but for which daily interactions between more 
and less powerful people offer no alternative. Ideas of 
worker participation in management are more strongly 
endorsed on the "desirable" level. Managers in high PDI
countries are more ready to admit a wide distribution of 
capacities for leadership and initiative among people." (p.
120)
If the response of those 45 middle managers Is because of the 
impact of an ideological emphasis imposed by persons in high 
political authority, this response in itself could indicate the
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bureaucratic and, even more so, the feudal orientations of those 
managers. They move quickly in their overt behaviour to carry out or 
to be seen to be carrying out what has been injected into the 
administrative system by higher authority so as to show their 
obedience and good will. This is so, despite the fact that those 
managers might not feel that what has been injected is congenial to 
their organizational environment and its norms and values, through 
which they themselves have been socialized and under which they are 
likely to work more comfortably.
Finally, this response may have arisen because of the way the 
statement relating to item 4 was worded, which might have attracted 
the respondents' own cultural values or norms of 'pride' and 
'manliness' in a way that led them to assert themselves and thus 
react in this particular way. Therefore, in future research, more 
attention should be paid to the wording of such statements in any 
similar measurements and to the respondents ' cultural values and 
norms.
C - The Bureaucratic-PeudcJ. Orientation
Comparing the trends of the distribution scored by the 80 middle 
managers on the bureaucratic with that on the feudal orientation 
scales, one can clearly see that both exhibit the same trends. This 
indicates that as the two orientations co-exist together at the same 
level, they are very likely, through their interaction, to supplement 
and Influence each other.
By adding up the scoring of each middle manager on both scales, 
the total distribution of the 'bureaucratic-feudal orientation' that 
the 80 middle managers have shown can be produced (summarised from 
Table 6) as follows :
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Very high 33 41%
N = 80
The distribution shows that whilst no one rated 'low* and 9% (7 
out of 80) rated 'middle', 91% of the distribution is concentrated in 
the 'high' and 'very high' degrees which comprise 50% and 41% 
respectively.
As the rating of the 80 middle managers is concentrated in 
'high* and 'very high', widening the boundaries would allow the 
researcher to deal with their variation in more detail and derive 
further implications. So it was decided to deal with the range of 
the actual distribution that stretches between the lowest degree (26 
out of 50) and the highest degree (49 out of 50) produced by the 
research subjects. By classifying this range, we can obtain a more 

















This illustrates the middle managers' levels of bureaucratic- 
feudal orientation; those who appear in this distribution in the 
'low' level were previously 'middle' on the scale; likewise, some 
previous 'middles' and 'highs' moved down a level.
D - Conpliant Behaviour
As mentioned previously, the measurement of compliant behaviour 
by the Iraqi middle managers under study was mainly based on two 
' imaginary situations ', the purpose of which was to reveal the mode 
of middle managers' actions in relation to authority (top management) 
within their organizations.
1. The first imaginary situation;
In this imaginary situation, which is very similar to former 
real cases observed by the researcher within various Iraqi 
organizations, the respondents (80 middle managers) were asked to 
consider the following situation;
"A civil servant is employed in a post in which it is 
his duty to devise ways to improve sanitation and co­
operation in rural villages. After much study in the 
field, he prepares a memorandum presenting a full program 
towards this end. His superiors reject it. Instead they 
adept a program which in his opinion would not be in the 
interest of the villagers whose conditions he has studied 
in detail. His superiors, nevertheless, ask him to carry 
out this policy in the field."
The researcher aims, through this imaginary situation, to 
explore each middle manager's conceptions of the expectations of 
superiors and his loyalty to them, and the appropriate action to be 
taken on receiving these expectations. Through the story of this 
imaginary situation, the middle managers were confronted with a 
conflict between their loyalty to superiors in work organization and 
a conception of their duty to the public whose interests they are, as 
civil servants or governmental officials, supposed to serve.
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In phase 'A' of this imaginary situation, the middle managers 
were asked whether the superiors could expect the civil servant to 
carry out their policy despite his belief that it would not serve the 
villagers' interest. As is shown in Table 7, 51% (41 out of 80) of 
the respondents said "Yes, they can". The public interest 
(villagers), the civil servants's detailed knowledge about the 
villagers' conditions, and the fact that his individual initiative 
was within the framework of normal bureaucratic loyalties, were all 
supposed to influence the responses of the middle managers under 
study. But despite the confluence of these three factors, they admit 
to their superiors' right to expect conpliance from subordinates.
In fact, through the field work interviews, it was clear to the 
researcher that such an admission not only derives from the top 
manager's position of authority, which quite naturailly appears to be 
legitimate power giving access to organizational sanctions, but also 
from organizational norms and well-established practices; in other 
words, from organizational culture. Many middle managers put forward 
very similar explanations, to the effect that:
"It is something that has been taken for granted, that 
top manager's instructions ought to be carried out by 
subordinates, as he is the person who holds more authority 
and is responsible for determining organizational 
policies".
From such responses and comments, one could conclude that it is 
unlikely for those middle managers to perceive their organizational 
roles in relation with top managers as co-workers who participate 
with them in regard to organizational leadership and 
responsibilities. They would rather consider themselves more as 
followers who are only responsible for carrying out top management or 
higher authority's policy.
320
On the other hand, 49% (39 out of 80) of the middle managers did 
say that superiors could not expect the civil servant to carry out 
their policy. Asked 'why' during the field work interviews, many of 
them pointed out that the superiors would realize that as long as the 
civil servant's policy was rejected, he would try to escape from 
applying their policy. Here they mentioned the 'possibility' of 
acquiring compliance rather than the 'right' of superiors to expect 
it. Very few of them (only 2) said that superiors have no right to 
expect the civil servant to carry out their policy, when they had not 
studied the problem in detail and which would not be in the interests 
of the villagers.
In phase 'B' of this imaginary situation, when asked whether the 
civil servant should action his superior's policy or refuse to carry 
it out, 55% (44 out of 80) said 'yes', the civil servant should carry 
out the policy. In discussing why, in their opinion, this was so, 
the majority of them gave comments which can be grouped in the 
following way:
"He is only a governmental official charged with 
carrying out his superior's orders and instructions. He 
has expressed his viewpoint, so he will not be re^xxisible 
cifterwards for the consequence of applying his superiors' 
policy, but they will be re^xxisible foe it".
Some of them continued to say:
"He should use dictated notes or memoranda in his 
communications with his superiors so as to be prepared for 
any accountability required in the future".
Such comments clearly reveal the middle managers ' underlying 
cultural concepts which discourage commitment and acceptance of 
responsibility, risk-taking, and challenge to those in authority. 
But above all, these comments indicate middle managers' need for 
safety and security, their dependence, distrust, and lack of 
autonomy.
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Some of them offered another cotment:
"Although the civil servcint in his position in the 
field is closer to the villagers and their life conditions 
than his si^riors, this does not mean that he knows better 
than his superiors what is best for the public interests".
Here they reflect the concept of 'superiors know better than 
subordinates' which could be part of the societal norm - 
"subordinates consider superiors as being of a different kind" - 
which has been found to be cultural phenomenon in high power-distance 
countries (Hofstede 1980, p. 122).
Forty five percent (36 out of 80) of the respondents showed a 
tendency for non-ccnpliant behaviour toward superiors, by saying that 
the civil servant should refuse to carry out policy. But when they 
were asked during the interviews what they thought the civil servant 
should then do, they divided into five groups (see Table 8). The 
first and the largest group of 58% (21 out of 36) said 'he should try 
to discuss the issue with his superiors '. This group then sub­
divided about what he should do if his superiors refused to listen, 
71% (15 out of 21) said he should carry out his superiors' policy 
(the answer of 44 middle managers from the beginning). By adding the 
number of these 15 middle managers to those 44, one finds that 74% of 
the 80 middle managers believe that the civil servant should carry 
out his superiors' policy, which means 'complying with orders'. The 
15 middle managers of the first group justified their subsequent view 
(that the civil servant should carry out superiors' policy when they 
refuse to listen to him) in the same manner and with the same type of 
comments as those of the 44 middle managers described earlier. 
Although these 15 middle managers appear to have shown nothing more 
than a delay in their compliance, they also seem to favour a degree 
of personal initiative or non-compliant behaviour which neither in 
reality would they be capable of offering nor is expected or rewarded
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in their organizations. That is, 10% of the respondents of the first 
group (2 out of 21) said that the civil servant should raise the 
issue with the highest possible level of authority which was the main 
answer of the second group consisting of 6 middle managers (17%). At 
the same time, 19% (4 out of 21) of the first group identified with 
the third group (11%), that the civil servant should try to find 
another job.
From these answers (of those middle managers who said that the 
civil servant should raise the issue with the highest authority 
level), two things can be deduced; first, the hierarchical order of 
power and authority relationships, where higher levels have greater 
authority than the levels below; and second, the influence of the 
political ideological emphasis of what could be called 'the open 
door' policy. This means that the employees can go to the highest 
levels of authority to report negative practices, unsolved work 
problems, and some kinds of personal problems. This kind of policy 
has given the impression to employees in Iraqi organizations that 
there is a strong possibility of support by authority for raising 
issues up the hierarchy, especially if it concerns the public 
interest, when it is felt that their superiors are not dealing with 
the issues as they should. The influence of this kind of ideological 
political emphasis is also clear among the fourth group of 3 middle 
managers (8%) who said that the situation should be reported to the 
newspapers, which as a political and governmental form of mass media 
do have such a direction to publish.
Only two among 80 middle managers (6%) showed a tendency to a 
greater extent toward personal initiative, and a clearer 
understanding of civil servants' duties to serve the public interest: 
they said that the civil servant should try in every possible way to
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convince his superiors to do what was really for the benefit of the 
villagers. But the question is, to what extent does their 
environment welcome such behaviour, and will they, in reality, 
practice such a degree of initiative and commitment? From what has 
been studied and demonstrated, it is not likely to be so.
2. The second imaginary situation
The subject of compliance was touched upon in another imaginary 
situation which was constructed by the researcher from scxne real life 
former cases observed while working in Iraqi organizations. Through 
the story of this second imaginary situation, the 80 middle managers 
were drawn into more involvement or direct concern;
'The top manager of your organization has issued an 
order to the effect that all employees should work extra 
hours and also during weekends for an unspecified period of 
time to fulfill work which is believed to be delayed and 
needs to be done. At the same time, the employees in your 
department have already informed you that they feel over­
loaded and thus are not ready to work extra hours. '
In phase 'A' each of these 80 middle managers were asked which
one of three different kinds of action (stated in the questionnaire)
he would choose when faced with such a situation, 'keeping in mind
that you do not feel it is necessary for them to work extra hours '.
As shown in Table 9, 27% (22 out of 80) said they would "simply
inform their workers to stay and work as long as it is the order of
the top manager". Here these 22 middle managers indicate a readiness
for iimediate compliant behaviour and no personal initiative is used
at all.
One of this group had something to say on this issue :
"What is the point of saying that I will cfa£LLlenge the 
authority in my organization for the sake of my workers, 
when in reality I know very well I'm not allowed to do so; 
in such a sitiuation I can't do anything but just pass on 
orders of those who are responsible for tliis organization".
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Another said:
"You have worked in this organization ... do you think 
you would really be able to argue in such a case, or 
challenge the orders of the tcp authority, without causing 
yourself a lot of problems?"
49% (39 out of 80) indicated less compliant behaviour; they 
explained that in facing such a situation they would contact those in 
top management, asking about the need to stay, and informing them 
that there was no backlog of work in their departments. 24% (19 out 
of 80) selected the third type of action, which proposed discussing 
the issue with their workers and, subsequently, contacting those in 
top management, to argue with them about relieving workers from 
working extra hours.
In phase 'B' of this imaginary situation, all the 58 middle 
managers (39 of whom selected the second type and 19 the third type 
of actions) were asked what they would do if the top managers refused 
to rethink or cancel the order; either 'you allow your workers to 
leave' or 'you ask your workers to stay and work'. All of these 58 
middle managers stated that they would ask their workers to stay and 
work.
From the responses of those 22 middle managers who showed an 
immediate caipliance, it appears that the expectations of the 
subordinates, with their feelings of being over-loaded, plus the fact 
that there was no need to stay extra hours, did not impel their 
orientation in the direction of less compliant behaviour toward 
higher authority. These three factors (expectations, overloaded, no 
need) had some influence on persuading 49% (39 out of 80) of the 
respondents to show less compliant behaviour, or at least delay the 
moment of compliant behaviour. Its appearance was delayed as long as 
the managers perceived there was room, but not to the degree that 
would endanger their positions and Interests. In other words, these
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39 middle managers would comprcmise the situation by playing the role 
of 'transmitter* and/or mediator who requests, fran the top, some 
information (about the need to stay and work) and, at the same time, 
informs them about his subordinates' feelings.
By doing so, the middle manager would not only project conflict 
outwards from himself, but he may appease his workers by showing some 
consideration for their feelings. However, these middle managers 
will not go further and fight for their subordinates. Thus, in phase 
'B' of this imaginary situation, when they came into conditions of 
extreme conflict, they totally complied with top manger's 
expectations. In fact, as one of them mentioned, such an order to 
work extra hours was very frequently a part of the political ideology 
or policy of what it called 'the public voluntary work campaigns'. 
Thus, not carrying out such an order would create a lot of negative 
judgements about their good will and attitudes which would endanger 
their position and career. So, they tended to 'play it safe' and 
carry out the order by higher authority to work extra hours.
On the other hand, 24% (19 out of 80) tended not only to delay 
their conpliance but to favour a somewhat high degree of personal 
initiative and leadership, which is neither customary nor encouraged 
in Iraqi organizations. In fact, from personal observations in such 
cases, these 19 middle managers are very unlikely to practice such a 
degree of personal initiative and leadership in reality. Even if 
they would have really discussed the issue with their workers, it 
would be in a superficial way rather than actually practiced as 
something they believe in. Also, when contacting those in top 
management to argue the issue (which is doubtful) they would be very 
careful in their choice of words and way of talking, to 'play it 
safe ', and not to upset the top manager, or show personal
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disagreement or leave any unpleasant impression about their personal 
attitudes toward his policy. They would not use direct and clear 
expressions, but rather words phrased them in such a way as to allow 
them to probe or feel the boss's pulse, and rework their prepared 
words (in case of unpleasant impression) in terms of acceptable 
explanations, by saying, "Sorry, I didn't mean that; I was only 
trying to say ...". Such responses could be a part of the middle 
manager's efforts to be seen by his subordinates as their powerful 
leader who possesses influence with his chiefs, since "people like 
working under a respected chief" (Handy 1976, p. 166). Closeness to 
employees and supporting them, as Pelz (1952) has found, has a 
positive effect on worker morale and satisfaction only when the 
supervisor or manager has enough influence with his superiors to 
provide conditions which fulfill their expectations. The dileirma of 
these middle managers is that they cannot really fight for their men 
or take their side against the boss, because by doing so, they may 
lose their power and influence, which is contingent upon the backing 
of the boss. Thus when in phase 'B' of the second imaginary
situation, the situation developed into a state of extreme conflict 
and the middle managers had to take sides, those 19 middle managers 
took the side of the bosses rather than their subordinates.
E - Bureaucratic-Feudal Orientation by Oonpliant Behaviour
By examining the answers of each one of those 80 middle managers 
to the two imaginary situations, the researcher found that the total 
responses could be categorised into three general kinds of traits. 
As is shown in Table 10, while the actions of 17% (14 out of 80) of 
the respondents indicated a tendency towards complete compliant 
behaviour, 49% (39 out of 80) displayed a wavering behaviour tending
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toward canpliance, and 34% (27 out of 80) wavering behaviour towards 
non-caiç)l iance.
In order to obtain a complete picture of middle managers ' 
behaviour, a linkage will be presented, through gross-tabulation 
between levels of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and the modes of 
behaviour they indicated. As it shows in Table 11, the 80 middle 
managers who scored different degrees in bureaucratic-feudal 
orientation show various degrees of compliant behaviour, as follows:
1 - In the group rated 'low' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation
(8 middle managers), none of thorn showed complete compliant 
behaviour. All of them indicated wavering behaviour but 50% 
of them tended more to comply, and the other 50% not to.
2 - Complete compliant behaviour was clustered in very close
percentages (20%, 19%, 21%) by the three groups who rated 
'middle', 'high' and 'very high' in bureaucratic-feudal 
orientation.
3 - Groups who rated 'middle' and 'high' in bureaucratic-feudal
orientation displayed wavering behaviour, but while the 
majority of both groups (60% and 55%) tended more to comply, 
20% of the 'middle' and 26% of the 'high' tended more to 
non-compliance.
4 - Only two of the group who rated 'very high' in bureaucratic
- feudal orientation indicated a wavering behaviour 
tending to compliance. Ihe majority of them - 64% (9 out 
of 14) - showed wavering behaviour tending to less
compliance.
Although we should distinguish the 'behaviour' obtained from 
responses to questionnaires or interviews (verbal behaviour) from 
'deeds' or non-verbal behaviour (Ifofstede 1980), even within verbal
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behaviour, a discrepancy has been found between middle managers* 
'orientation* and their 'actions' or behaviour. An obvious and 
unexpected example of this discrepancy is between the very high 
bureaucratic - feudal orientation of 9 middle managers and their 
wavering behaviour tending not to comply. This result may appear 
surprising at first sight, because Gorden (1970) found that
"individuals who score high on ' bureaucratic orientation ' are 
inclined to place a high value on conformist behaviour and on being 
systematic and orderly, and a low value on having personal 
independence of action ..." (p. 6). But when we look at the deeper 
implications, the picture becomes different. 'Orientation' is a good 
predictor of behaviour, but behaviour depends on both the person and 
the situation, so people will not necessarily do what they say they 
will. When there is a conflict between orientation and social 
pressure, a person might act, as Triandis (1971) remarks, counter to 
his orientation to conform with social pressures. Norms, values, and 
actions all reflect the dominant conceptual structure in any given 
group, but because 'action' is, by nature, readily observable, so it 
is more subject to social pressures. As has been mentioned before, 
the natural order of events within Iraqi organizations has been 
subject to the political ideological emphasis on issues such as
sharing leadership and work responsibilities, fighting bureaucracy, 
taking necessary actions to serve the public interest, etc. This 
ideological emphasis is influential because it is linked with
accountability and sanctions against those whose previous actions 
were judged negatively by high political authority. Although such 
pressure has had a very limited effect on reality within the 
administrative system, during its heyday it dominated organizational 
life and influenced at least the superficial actions of
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organizational members, especially at managerial levels. It gave 
organizational members the impression that their superiors* authority 
was being questioned by those far higher up than them. Thus, this 
perceived degree of questioning authority could stand behind the 
verbal non-oonforming behaviour that those middle managers have
indicated.
This phenomenon may be, to a degree, what Mangham (1978) was
illustrating in the following passage:
"That which is taken for granted, unquestioned, part 
of the natural order of events, is nothing if not
constantly reaffirmed in the interpretation and actions of 
the social actors associated with it. Once the cues are 
questioned, the parts and lines siA>jected to scrutiny, the 
present order may be changed; where there is no 
questioning, no scrutiny, the script is performed normally 
and order is sustained." (p. 67)
Through the influence of such pressure, those 9 middle managers 
who rated 'very high' in bureaucratic - feudal orientation and many 
others ware perhaps keen, even in their verbal behaviour, not to be 
thought of as not willing to share work responsibilities, and
unwilling to take necessary action to serve the public interest. In 
fact, their ccnpliance and conformity become a question of to whcm 
should it be directed? When there is conflict between superiors' 
expectations and the expectations of those higher up in the hierarchy 
they are likely, and depending on their calculation of what and who 
will serve their interests better, to meet, or rather be seen to 
meet, the expectations of those higher and more powerful than their 
superiors.
Those 9 middle managers, as shown in Table 10, responded to the 
first 'imaginary situation' by saying that superiors cannot expect 
the civil servant in the story to carry out their policy and he 
should refuse to carry it out. 6 of them said he should try to 
discuss the issue with his superiors, and if they did not listen to
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him, he should comply with their policy. Such responses indicate 
their tendency to discuss issues when they see room for it and comply 
when such room is, no longer available. Such a tendency is also 
clear in their response to the second 'imaginary situation': they 
said that they would discuss or argue the matter with superiors and 
if the latter refused to rethink the orders, they would comply with 
them. Whether this tendency of discussing with superiors is 
practised in reality or not, it nevertheless here gives us an 
indication of another deeper implication of the responses of those 9 
middle managers.
From my observations and the notes that I took during my field 
work, such a tendency does not mean that those 9 middle managers 
would fight for their men or protect their role as leaders, but 
rather it shows their likely influence on superiors. Such influence 
could be derived from political or social power, or their technical 
skills and knowledge, or merely their personal abilities and tactics. 
Hirough this influence they are likely to possess an informal 
relationship with superiors which would make them feel less afraid or 
more able to argue or request something from the boss, and thus be 
seen by subordinates as powerful managers. Gorden (1970) found that 
individuals who score high on 'bureaucratic orientation' "tend to 
place a higher value on being treated as important, on taking care of 
their possessions, ..." (p. 6). Also, the trick for a person in the 
middle, says Kanter and Stein (1979) "is to be both firm and fair - 
to exercise authority but to be seen as justified in doing it" (p. 
93). But they are more than keen not to go further than the point at 
which their relationship with the boss could be endangered, which to 
a great extent determines their power and influence.
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It is also a cultural phenomenon in high PDI countries that 
mangers are more ready to admit a wide distribution of capacity for 
leadership and initiative among people (Hofstede 1980). It has been 
found in this research that such capacities are admitted to a greater 
extent by managers with 'very high' degrees of bureaucrat ic-feudal 
orientation than managers with 'lower levels'.
F - Further Implications
The preceding findings in this chapter show that the 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation and compliant behaviour are dominant 
among the 80 middle managers under study, but to varying degrees. 
What remains to be done is to reconsider these findings in terms of 
their cultural reflections which would give a clear idea of what and 
how certain cultural orientations have their impact in constructing 
organizational behaviour. Also, this will enable us to infer the 
dominant 'meanings' in relation to authority which are held in common 
by Iraqi middle managers, and out of which arise their compliant 
behaviour toward top managers.
In the following pages, I will reconsider each category of the
two scales that measured the bureaucrat ic-feudal orientation, in
order to see how and which Iraqi cultural value-orientations Iraqi 
organizational members (i.e. middle managers) reflect through each 
category, particularly the 'dominant relational orientation ' to 
authority, work, and to each other, which their organizations already 
reflect in their 'hard' and 'soft' aspects. For this purpose, I will 
use the same five categories of bureaucratic orientation (i.e.
self-subordination, compartmentalization, impersonal ization, rule 
conformity, and traditionalism) as they are parallel to those of
Weber, which have been used as the basis of this research to describe
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the organizational context. To this end I will widely use my
previous work experience and the observations obtained thereby to 
elaborate the field work findings and observations.
1 - Self-subord ination;
In this research field work, the middle managers under study 
have indicated their dominant value- orientation in relation to 
authority. They are willing to comply with the stated wishes of the 
authority figure (top manager) and to meet his expectations. They 
are also willing to absolve themselves from the need to take 
initiative and hold responsibility by having decisions made for them 
by higher authority. They depend on him as they perceive him as 
possessing the higher legitimate authority which gives him the right 
and responsibility of formulating organizational policies and making 
important decisions. They admit his right to expect compliance from 
subordinates. From their responses and comments, one can realize 
that for them the interface between them and their superiors or the 
'fellowship relationship' is more important that the leadership 
relationship between them and their subordinates. Most of them seem 
to be aware of the implications of their compliance and are 
preoccupied with what Leavitt (1972) termed as "short term prospects" 
(p. 127) which simply means that they will do whatever is asked of 
them by their superiors. One may realize from their responses and 
comments that they do not orient and act towards top management as if 
they are sharing the leadership and responsibility within the 
organization. In their responses to the two 'imaginary situations', 
as well as when I observed them, they submitted to the top manager's 
orders and policies, which were made without their input or 
contribution. In other words, none of those 80 middle managers said
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that he would refuse to carry out the top manager's policy or orders 
which directly concerned his department and men, simply because no 
one consulted him or even gave him an explanation. This would 
clearly give us an indication of the absence in middle managers' 
conceptualization of seeing themselves as 'leaders'. In fact, Gorden 
(1970) has found a highly consistent significant negatively- 
correlated relationship between 'bureaucratic orientation' and values 
of leadership, achievement, independence and variety. These findings 
also imply that Iraqi organizational culture, like national culture, 
does not encourage and reward the exercise of personal initiative or 
non-ccmpliant behaviour. Hierarchial responsibility has developed in 
Iraqi organization, as in the case of Egypt (Berger 1957) "at the 
expense of the growth of initiative and of responsibility to the post 
itself and to the public the government official is supposed to 
serve" (p. 166). Furthermore, these findings show that a large 
proportion of Iraqi middle managers themselves do not consistently or 
with full understanding defend the right to take initiative, but 
rather seek to 'play it safe'. Hiey tend to be reluctant to exercise 
even that degree of discretionary povær that is permitted by the 
formal distributicxi of functions in the bureaucracy. In fact v4ien I 
observed many Iraqi middle managers in action in their work daily 
life, they worked and acted on the boss's orders and instructions 
much more than according to predetermined rules, especially those who 
were very eager to get the backing and support of the top manager so 
as to increase or maintain their power and influence within the 
organization, Hius they used compliance as the most effective tactic 
of power expansion. Tîiis may support what Higgins (1975) states, 
that in upwardly organizaticxis, the more effective successful middle 
managers "show a high degree of responsiveness to superiors, 
displaying a fairly high need to defer to authority" (p. 344).
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Such a degree of compliance and a low degree of personal 
discretion were found in Egyptian organizations by Berger (1957). He 
refers to Lord Crcxner's observation, who stated that the Egyptian 
official "flies for refuge to the French system" and so shirks
responsibility, fears blame, and shrinks from the British 
administrative system which allows a considerable degree of personal 
discretion. Berger then stated that "just why the Egyptian civil 
service should follow the French rather than the British 
administrative tradition, despite the fact that the British 
controlled Egyptian administration from 1882 until well after 
Cromer's departure in 1906 is a question of historical development 
and cultural influence" (p. 164). In fact, this is more true in the 
case of Iraq which was occupied and controlled by the British and 
has not been influenced at any time by the French administrative 
system. This supports my earlier argument with Crozier (1964, 1973) 
that what he claims as uniquely French traits such as ' subordination ' 
can be found in other organizations in different countries where 
cultural components have similar dimensions to those of French
culture and stand behind the existence of such traits.
Muna ( 1980), in his study about Arab executives in many Arabic 
countries, found that these executives, in general, experienced 
relatively low opposition and resistance from their subordinates, 
although they occupied a high managerial level. He states that such 
"subordinate's over-ocmpliance could indeed be unhealthy" (p. 67). 
In fact, to find such degrees of compliance at high managerial
levels, who in the case of this research are the 'departments' heads' 
in Iraq, may appear as unhealthy, but when we introduce their
dominant cultural value-orientation in relation to authority and 
power, and their role dilemmas, particularly their 'power dilaima',
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their compliance becomes a more healthy adaptation. Their deference 
to authority and compliant behaviour appear to be quite congruent 
with their upwardly-oriented organizations and with their pov^rless 
situation. Also, such behaviour is a natural reflection of what they 
have learned through their socialization in a culture whose dominant 
value-orientations in relation to authority and power are 
authoritarian, associated with personalized possession of and 
traditional respect for authority and power, dependency, and 
avoidance of risk-taking. Such value-orientations have shaped and 
are reinforced by Iraqi organizational culture, which is a 
'bureaucratic-feudal' culture that maintains a hierarchical structure 
of authority and great centralization at the top. Also this culture 
contains 'legal-charismatic-traditional' types of authoritarian 
relationships, with strong elements of 'personalization' of authority 
and loyalty, subordination, rigidity, and concern for hierarchical 
differentiation by status and privilege.
In upwardly centralized organizations, in such as those in Iraq, 
Child (1977) found "a tendency for behavioural patterns actually 
perceived at the managerial level to be more cautious and conforming" 
(p. 37). If in upwardly oriented organizations there is no
relationship more inportant than that of the subordinate to his 
superior (Higgins 1975), this relationship becomes basically more 
important for the middle manager in his power position. In his 
striving for power he is more eager than other members to maintain 
and/or expand his power and influence, which is highly contingent 
upon the support and backing of the top manager or authority figure. 
Hie middle manager situation becomes more insecure in such upwardly 
organizations where accountability is demanded by superiors from 
subordinates, authority is rarely delegated, and matters are very
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frequently pushed up the organization by personnel for top level 
decisions. He needs to inform the top manager of what is happening 
at the work level and seek his approval, but at the same time he 
needs to ccxmiunicate his information in such a way that it does not 
bring unfavourable criticism cm himself for not doing his job 
correctly or adequately. Faced with this dilemma, each middle 
manager resolves that conflict in terms of his own individual past 
experience, personality, and expectations. As Roethlisberger (1945) 
notes, while some managers "become voluble in the face of this 
situation; other are reduced to stoney silence, feeling that anything 
they say will be held against them. Seme keep out of the boss's way, 
while others devise all sorts of ways for approaching him and trying 
to direct attention to certain things they have accomplished" (p. 
288 ). But above all, the middle manager wants to be secure, to 
maintain good relations with the boss by adjusting himself to the 
boss's demands and to seek approval.
It is not at all surprising to find those Iraqi middle managers 
in their orientations, actions and comments, reflecting their 
underlying cultural respect and personalization of authority. 
Personalization of authority and loyalties are deeply rooted in their 
culture and hence in their collective level of mentality. Also, the 
centralization of decision-making, as is the case in their 
organizations, implies a personal mode of control (Child 1977). 
Viewing legitimate authority with high respect as something that 
belongs or attaches to the person who holds this authority rather 
than to the office itself, has also been found in Egyptian 
organizations (Berger 1957). Muna (1980) found that compliance 
occurs in many Arabic organizations as a result of the manner in 
which 'power' is often wielded. This manner was described as
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follows: "Hie subordinate gets to know his boss so well he can 'read
his mind' - he is so eager to please his boss that he is unlikely to
think of or engage in activities which may displease the boss. Hie
result ... no opposition" (p. 67).
Hie power of the incumbent of the post of top manger is greatly
enhanced through respect and personalization of authority, much more
than by the authority itself which accrues to him by virtue of his
position. One of the norms which can be identified when working in
an Iraqi organization is that the department or section whose manager
builds a good relationship with and has the support and backing of
the top manger is often considered to be a good department by
organizational members, and many would like to work in it. Even the
location of the department on the same floor or near the top manger's
office gives it a kind of inportance in the eyes of organizational
members. The powerful atmosphere which surrounds the 'top person' is
increased by grandiose furniture and the way things are displayed in
his office. Psychologically, this would increase the subordinates'
feelings of awe, accompanied by some amount of fear toward the person
in the top position, which varies proportionally with the power-
d is tance between him and his subordinates. Those middle managers and
Iraqi in general, as part of their cultural value-orientations, are
highly self- and family-oriented rather than group-oriented people.
Such a self-oriented person, comments Fayerwaather ( 1977 ) :
"... views his suqperior with a mixture of awe and fear.
His chief concern is to ke^ the sLperior feeling
favourable towards him by being obedient or at least
appearing so, if he disagrees with the superior be is not
likely to say so. He will either follow instructions 
without question or, if he feels strongly about his own 
views, he may evade the instructions. He makes little 
effort to inform the superior about affairs in his
department, eqiecially if there are problems which may 
reflect to his discredit. His general attitude towards the 
superior is one of 'dealing with'. The superior is feared 
as a powerful force and tremendous effort is expended in 
keeping on the right side of him." (p. 120)
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The super ior-subordina te role-taking situation within Iraqi 
organizations where the middle manager plays the role of
'subordinate' to the top manager, does not differ in its fundamental 
construction from other customary situations which the middle manager 
has experienced individually, for instance, child-father, pupil- 
teacher, subject-ruler, ... etc. The top manager or the 'head' 
symbolically represents all the authority figures that either the 
middle manager as an individual was subjected to through his primary 
and secondary socialization as father, teacher or ruler, or has 
experienced their influences indirectly as feudal sheikh,
bureaucratic Effendi, ... etc.
2 - Ooppartmentalization ;
Compartmentalization in bureaucratic systems refers to the 
degree of departmentalization and specialization. It means running 
the organization in a certain prepared manner to ensure its 
effectiveness. In this category the 80 Iraqi middle managers showed 
their belief in expert judgements, and the need for each member to be 
only concerned with his own area of specialization and not to 
volunteer opinions to his superior outside his area of 
specialization. This does not mean that Iraqi organizations have 
incorporated departmentalization and specialization in order to 
improve productivity and efficiency, as is the case in Western
organizations. It may be introduced in the same way, but the fact is
that Iraqi organizations are managed through personal ization rather 
than by departmentalization or specialization. It has been indicated 
previously that the degree of specialization is low and is coiç>led 
with a lack of specialists and a high belief in experts and their 
knowledge. Thus possession of specialized knowledge gives the 
individual some power within the organization.
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Working within various Iraqi organizations as I did, it could be 
seen that specialization and departmentalization contained behind it 
many cultural value - orientations, such as secretiveness, distrust, 
sensitivity to criticism, avoidance of open confrontation and 
directness especially in front of a group, a lack of co-cperative 
spirit, and expected hostility and superimposition of personalities 
on issues. So, not only from my previous observations, but also from 
the comments gathered in my field work, it can be said that behind 
middle managers' preferenœ toward 'cxxnpartmentalization' stands the 
cultural orientations of "isolationism", "depersonalization", 
"unemotionality", and "antipathy" (Bate 1982). The existence of such 
cultural orientations is basically strong at the level of middle 
managers who are affected by their role dilemnas and situations 
wiithin the organization. Hieir isolationist orientation is more 
clearly seen in their responses to organizational insignificance; 
they often become more concerned with their divisions or departments, 
and insist on the need to restrict one's concern to one's own area of 
specialization. In other words, as Kanter and Stein (1979) put it, 
they:
■turn to their own small territory, their own piece of the 
system - their subordinates, their function, their 
expertise. They guard their demain jealously; They narrow 
their interests to focus exclusively on it. Th^ try to 
insulate and protect it and to prevent anyone else from 
engaging in similar activities without their approval as 
"the eaqaerts" in that domain." (p. 96)
Two middle managers brought to the picture, in their comments on 
this category during the field work, an old Iraqi proverb, saying :
"Who ever interferes in things which are none of his 
business will receive unpleasant consequences".
Another middle manager said:
"If anyone has something to say about another person's 
work and he really wants to help, he should go to the 
person concerned and tell him ... but not volixiteer his 
opinion in front of the others ..."
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Another said:
" one should not cause problems for others ..."
So, the middle manager, by drifting into 'compartmentalization', 
implicitly protects himself from the interference of people outside 
his department, not only because of the distrust, expected hostility, 
and secretiveness, but also because he is likely to feel that his 
department and specialist knowledge are important sources of power, 
and any interference may infringe upon this power. This state of 
affairs was confirmed by the NCQID in one of its reports which 
mentioned that middle managers strongly resist any interference in 
their work and delay making any changes that might be suggested by 
others (Al-Himyari 1977). Thus the middle manager needs, maybe more 
than any other member, to increase his 'power' by using his 
specialized information or knowledge and experience as a 'weapon' in 
his struggle for power. At the same time, the middle manager is not 
willing to interfere in other people's areas of specialization or to 
volunteer opinions, particularly in front of superiors or other 
people. This is because he would feel that others may consider such 
interference as a criticism of their performance, or even of them 
personally. So for him it means the less he interferes in other 
people's business, the less they would be inclined to interfere in 
his. Behind such methods of constructing relationships with others 
stands the cultural value - orientations of distrust, expected 
hostility, superimposition of personalities on issues, and avoidance 
of open confrontation, expression of differences, controversial 
issues and directness and frankness, especially in front of others. 
Also, as a reflection of his 'power deficiency', he is not ready to 
endanger his relationship with others while he can protect it. This 
occurs particularly in relation to those important others with whom
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he tries to develop a network of social relations in order to
surround himself with allies, to supply him with resources such as
information, as well as to conceal his shortcomings from his
opponents and thus expand his power (Nundi 1975). The higher
aggressiveness and emotional levels in Iraqi culture make conflict
and competition between people into something more threatening. So
the middle manager tries to avoid showing his emotions or feelings
and depersonalizes the issues in confrontation with others. This
state of affairs is very clear in Aboona's (1975) statements about
various practices in Iraqi organizations. He remarks that one of the
shortcomings found in these organizations is the absence of
■critical analysis of, or self-criticism in, major issues 
because of formal and personal relationships between
members, particularly with respect to the chief executive."
(p. 235)
So the middle manager, in his forbearance to interfere in
other's business, maintains peace with many social norms, by which 
means he considers such interference as an unfavourable activity.
3 - Inpersonalisation:
Here the 80 Iraqi middle managers show a preference for formal 
relationships between superiors and subordinates inside the 
organization. While observing middle managers' actions inside 
organizations, I noted that whilst there is a high emphasis on formal 
relationships, especially ideologically and on the surface of their 
interaction with others, the personal and informal considerations 
enter almost every conceivable interaction, whether occurring within
the same hierarchical level or between levels. As indicated
previously, impersonal and personal elements co-exist together inside 
Iraqi organizations. But through the hostile interaction between 
bureaucratic formality and cultural personalization, the co-existence
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of the two becomes defective and faulty, creating many of the 
dysfunctional characteristics of Iraqi bureaucratic systems. Despite 
the apparent prevailence of bureaucratic formality in Iraqi 
organizations in the short run, in the long run the inherant 
contradictions between this formality and cultural personalization 
can be expected to be made increasingly manifest and intensified, 
which on many occasions leads to a total breakdown of rational 
bureaucracy. What may appear as the practice of bureaucratic 
formality is, in its latent function, a reflection of imbedded 
cultural meanings.
When middle managers favour formal relationships between 
superiors and subordinates, they are in reality favouring the 
cultural implications or the 'meanings' that construct the latent 
functions of formal relationships within their organizations. 
Hirough their role dilemmas and situations within the organization, 
they leam how to use formality and informality politically, either 
to defend themselves or to expand their power and influence. As 
bureaucratic formality by its nature symbolizes and supports the 
'hierarchical power structure' of various offices and clearly defines 
the power-distance between superiors and subordinates (Merton 1940), 
middle managers are thus more oriented to demanding it from their 
subordinates than willing to establish it with their superiors. 
Formal relationships produce a clear power-distance between superiors 
and subordinates, which satisfy the middle manager's cultural 
'superiority propensity' and his willingness to be respectful; it 
also allows him to play the dominant role and have his subordinates 
play submissive roles; both their behaviours derive from their 
dominant-submissive customary role pattern. Iraqi middle managers 
would use formality or rather haughtiness to the point where it
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provides him with the respect and subordination of his men that he
wants, and a clear power-d is tance between him and them. Associating
with Iraqi middle managers in an organization, one may come across a
repeated expression; "One should not omit formality with
subordinates". Through such comments, the Iraqi middle manager
demonstrates his cultural fear that when a certain degree of
informality is permitted, the subordinates would lay bare their
opinions and feelings and expect strong ties which may obligate him.
Also, through such informality, he would not be able to satisfy
his cultural 'superiority propensity' and his strong organizational
need for power and influence. It may also make it difficult, in a
state of conflict, for him to stay aloof and project conflict
outwards from himself by playing the role of pure transmitter between
his superiors and subordinates. As formality provides security to
the insecure middle manager, it is often exaggerated, as Thomphson
(1961) explains, into a 'cold aloofness':
"(Fbooallty) protects an insecure superior from commitments 
to his subordinates which he fears %#ill be inconsistent 
witdi demands upon him from above. It makes it easier for 
him to mete out punishment or to perform other aspects of 
his hierarchical role, such as ratJng his subordinates. It 
protects him from the aggressions of his subordinates by 
naintaining a psychic distance between him and them.” (p.
357)
On the other hand, the middle manager is also aware of the 
importance of personal relationships in 'who gets what' in his 
organization, so he needs, with his uncertainty and insecure feelings 
more than any other to have personal contacts with influential 
others. Thus he joins informal groupings and cliques as a part of 
his tactic to secure and promote his interests and ward off threats, 
and above all, to expand his power (Nundi 1975). The dimensions of 
his likely personal relationship with his subordinates are related to 
the importance of their personal loyalty and to how to discriminate
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trusty employees fran others. This is especially true when his 
authority is challenged by one or more of his subordinates who may 
have better qualifications and abilities, or who outrank him on the 
extra-bureaucratic hierarchy, i.e. the political or social status 
hierarchy.
The informal pattern of relationships or interaction between
middle managers and superiors in Iraqi organizations has a special 
nature and goes further than the usual consultation or information- 
exchange patterns of Western organizations. As previously 
demonstrated, personal loyalty, obligations, ties and connections 
shape the underlying character of the interpersonal relationships 
within Iraqi organizations. Through the ' personal ization ' of Iraqi 
culture, loyalty can only or predcminently apply to or be felt
towards 'people' and religous matters. Thus in Iraqi organizations, 
as in other Arabic and Middle Eastern organizations (Wright 1981), an 
organizational member is unlikely to be prone to uphold
organizational interests when those interests cross with the personal
interests of the boss or the personal interests of the member.
Members in these organizations have the cultural notion that 
'superiors know better than subordinates', and they are somehow
convinced that their loyalty to superiors expresses indirectly their 
loyalty to the organization. 90% (72 out of 80) of the Iraqi middle 
managers in this research agreed with item no. 2 of the feudal
orientation scale (see Table 5) which measured 'loyalty to 
superiors ', and thus they agreed that each member in the organization 
should be loyal to his superiors and act to meet their expectations 
and according to their orders. Muna (1980) found that Arab 
executives working in different Arabic countries valued 'loyalty' 
more highly than efficiency, both in esiployees in general and in
their immediate subordinates in higher managerial levels.
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Hie Iraqi middle manager, not only because he has been 
socialized through such 'cultural personal izat ion of authority and 
loyalty' but also because of the peculiarity of his role, tries to 
establish social relationships with superiors and to demonstrate his 
loyalty to then, as well as to surround himself with allies as part 
of his tactics to secure and expand his power and influence. He may 
learn from experience that being friendly with superiors and joining 
a clique strengthens his shakey power position. But his success in 
building such a network of informal relationships depends on his 
independent resources of power and influence which he may bring with 
him to the organization, and particularly on his ability to use these 
resources to his advantage. But even if he develops such informal 
relationships with superiors which would give him a feeling of 
equality or at least allow him to be in the shadow of the powerful, 
he must always leave a formal gap between himself and them. By such 
a gap he assures the superiors of his subordination to them and shows 
his formal, traditional respect for their authority, particularly 
when confronting them in front of others. Formality, as Mouzelis 
(1975) quoted from Weber, "is easily made to function for anybody who 
knows how to gain control of it" (p. 25); thus, middle managers who 
do not have independent resources of power and influence or who lack 
the ability or fail to develop them, are more likely to feel insecure 
and thus more apt to rely on formality. Also, formality protects the 
insecure middle manager from the arbitrary action of his superior 
"since the actions of both are constrained by a mutually recognized 
set of rules" (Merton 1940, p. 50). Iraqi middle managers, 
especially ones who have high feelings of insecurity, are motivated 
by cultural value-orientations and by role dilemmas to seek defences 
and protection, to depersonalize issues, to avoid showing feelings or
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emotions, and to become isolated. By using formalities he would be 
able to defend and isolate himself, as well as depersonalize issues 
since formality "serves to minimise friction by largely restricting 
(official) contact to modes which are previously defined by rules of 
the organization" (Merton 1940, p. 50). The verbal preference of the 
Iraqi middle managers for formal relationships could also be a 
reaction to the dysfunctional characteristics of informal relations 
in their organizations. They may fear the possibility of other 
managers having an informal relationship with superiors which means 
more power and influence. They are careful not to be overtly related 
with any personal relationship that might bring accusations of 
favouritism and nepotism, which are ideologically condemned by 
political leaders and society in general.
4 - Rule-oonformity ;
Our 80 Iraqi middle managers shoved a desire for strict 
adherence to rules, regulations, and work discipline. Behind the 
rule-oonformity of Iraqi middle managers stands his need for 
security, lack of personal autonomy and initiative, low trust, 
isolationism, fear of negative judgement, rigidity, uncertainty, 
avoidance of risk-taking, and deference to authority - all of which 
are elaborated in his cultural value-orientations and role dilemmas. 
His culturally-produced lack of personal security and his dilemma of 
possessing a boss's responsibility but not a boss's authority, have 
shaped his 'play-it-safe' attitude. Kanter and Stein (1979) 
recognize this desire for security that rule-conformity affords to 
people in the middle, who are often put in, and put themselves in the 
position of "rule enforcer" (p. 94). The demand for strict adherence 
to the rules, as Nundi (1975) explains, "is one solution for the
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manager without power since it absolves him from the need to take 
initiative for which he lacks the structural and situational 
prerequisites" (p. 59). Middle managers, as do all other members in 
Iraqi organizations, leam from experience just how little they can 
do and still remain secure. Among them, as Aboona (1975) remarks, 
there is an implicit motto of "no action means no mistakes, no 
penalties, and hence promotion" (p. 243). Their desire for security 
and protection is increased by the prevailing lack of faith and 
distrust through which mistakes or failures are often unjustifiably 
attributed to ill-will and seriously penalized. They choose to play- 
it-safe and hence follow the rules rather than personal autonomy and 
risk-taking. Their rule-conformity is also a reflection of their 
cultural feelings of surrounding hostility and low tolerance of 
ambiguity and uncertainty, which were acquired through their 
socializational experiences, in addition to the fact that 'life in 
the middle' itself also "generates hostility and resentment" (Kanter 
and Stein 1979, p. 93).
Middle managers ' rule-conformity has a special nature or 
character which reflects part of Iraqi organizational culture. As 
previously mentioned, while this culture is partly a 'role culture' 
containing a high tendency for written rules and greater uniformity, 
there is a discrepancy between formally prescribed laws and 
procedures and those effectively practised. In addition, Iraqi 
organizational culture consists of another and more dominant part, a 
'power culture' with strong 'personalization'. These factors have 
produced the result that the authority of the person who is precisely 
at the top is over the whole system, and that employees conduct their 
work mostly through what they have learned from their seniors and by 
the boss's orders and instructions, without even knowing most of the
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rules and regulations that govern their jobs. Although they are 
likely to adopt a bureaucratic style that consists of applying rules 
and procedures inflexibly, they rely more on superiors* orders, 
instructions and direct intervention for getting things done. They 
choose to have actions prescribed for them, whether by bureaucratic 
rules and regulations and/or by superiors * orders and instructions. 
For them it is mainly a matter of security, avoidance of risk-taking 
and coping with uncertainty; thus, as long as they are doing their 
jobs according to the agreed bureaucratic rules, regulations or 
superiors* instructions, they need not be held responsible for any 
shortcomings that might occur. In fact, these concepts or ways of 
viewing reality were very clear in the responses and conments of most 
of the 80 Iraqi middle managers in the field work; they indicate 
their desire to narrow their responsibility to the inplemen tat ion of 
superior instructions and orders, and by doing so they deny any
accountability for the outcome.
Rule conformity, in terms of written formal rules and
regulations, is used as a defensive weapon, particularly by the 
insecure middle manager who fails to get the backing and support of the 
boss; He protects himself from superiors * criticism by limiting his 
responsibility to a strict interpretation of the letter of the law 
(Nundi 1975, p. 59). His rule-conformity in this sense may also give 
him a feeling of some equality with the boss as both are subject to 
the same rules which screen the superiority of the boss (Gouldner 
1955). Also, it allows him to feel the depersonalization of his 
subjection as he is conforming to rules rather than to the boss. In 
fact, this is implicitly what one of the Iraqi middle managers (a
head of an accountancy department) was trying to say in his comment
on the second 'imaginary situation* during the field work;
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"I will Ccirry out the top manager's instructions if 
they are %#bat the rules and regulations have defined".
5 - Traditionalism;
The Iraqi middle managers shov^ a need for the security 
provided by organizational identification, conforming to social 
values and the 'in-group* norm. The group norms, either within the 
organization or in wider society, are distinguished by a degree of 
stability and recognition, both by the personal and the social or 
organizational system. By his identification with group norms, the 
individual is trying to provide a shelter and stability for himself. 
This is boosted when his psychological and sociological needs are in 
harmony with the implications of those norms.
As Iraqi national culture, as well as organizational culture, 
contains the components of 'conservatism, quietism, and 
traditionalism*, so middle managers who have been socialized through 
this culture would have, to various degrees, shared traditional 
concepts and conservative views about organizational life and the 
obligation to conform to the group norms and to traditicxial values.
Part of the traditional norms of Iraqi organizational culture is 
the emphasis on ' seniority *. In this culture, which is partly a 
power culture, "the new man is expected to leam from his seniors and 
to model his behaviour on theirs" (Handy 1976, p. 287). Through the 
absence of scientific and logical schemes of appraisal, group norms 
and the system itself consider the 'length of service* as the primary 
criteria for increments and promotions. For the middle managers, 
length of service is the most important acquisitive right by which 
they secure a source of power and stability during service. This is 
more true in organizational cultures, such as that of Iraq, where the 
assessment is highly personal and subjective. When the majority of 
those 80 middle managers agreed, in the research field work, to give
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length of service a high rating, they may have feared that other 
appraisal tools, such as 'performance* may be subjected to and 
dominated by other people's personal views (i.e. their superiors). 
Accordingly, the performance might be evaluated positively or 
negatively, and hence would not guarantee his increment or promotion, 
especially in the absence of job-descriptions and personnel appraisal 
systems. Given the 'length of service' almost as much as or even 
more recognition of a good level of performance, it may reduce the 
hostility and resentment generated by the 'life in the middle', where 
older people "tend to resent younger people who are on the move, ... 
and people who never advance often resent anybody who's moving 
upwards. People still at the bottom may resent those in their ranks 
who get a chance to move up and are suddenly in a position superior
to them" (Kanter and Stein 1979, p. 93). On the other hand, by
demanding such importance and recognition for 'length of service', 
those Iraqi middle managers are seeking to stay on the safe side of 
the service. For them, it is through this traditional method that 
they are being paid, and their increments and promotions are due, 
like anybody elses, when the date is reached. In addition, such a 
method does not require any initiative, innovation, or high standard 
of performance, but rather simply obedience to the prevailing laws, 
regulations and superiors' instructions. In fact, this way of 
thinking is clear in Iraqi organizational group norms which are
evidenced in many of their sayings and proverbs, such as (Id Aiam
Wokhud Ratib) viz. "Count the days and receive your salary".
2. DISCOSSICW AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter the findings from the research support the first
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hypothesis. These findings indicate that Iraqi middle managers in
relation to the top manager conceive themselves and behave as
'followers' rather than as members in an organizational leadership. 
They display a style of behaviour that consists of acting in a
bureaucratic manner and showing compliance. They are highly 
concerned with defending their position and playing-it-safe 
strategies. In complying with an authority figure (the top manager), 
the attention of most of them was directed to 'objective' rather than 
'subjective' authority (Barnard 1938). In other words their 
compliance was not mainly because of their belief in the logic of the 
proposed action, but more because, as Simon (1957 b) explains, they 
set for themselves a general rule that permits the communicated
decision of the top person to serve as a premise for their choice, 
independent of their own judgement about the correctness or 
acceptability of the premise. Ihey do not contribute significantly 
to the dec is ion-making processes and are 'reactive' to the events 
rather than 'proactive'. These findings show that Iraqi middle 
manager is highly dependent on his superiors and tends to be a 'yes 
man'. The quality and implications of Iraqi middle managers' 
compliant behaviour in relation to the authority figure reflect their 
unconscious image or the deeply rooted cultural meaning of 
'personalization' of authority and loyalty. From their answers, 
comments and expressions, one could conclude that Iraqi 
organizational culture in general inhibits discussion of feelings and 
fears, and subordinates are expected to get on with what they have 
been told to do by superiors. Also 'loyalty' is equated with doing 
or meeting what the boss said to do and not 'rocking the boat'. So 
at the collective level of their "mental programmes" (Hofstede 1980) 
they have generalized meanings or dominant values which form their
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broad or general dispositions or tendencies which in their relations 
to authority figures (top manager) appeared to be; an authoritarian 
relationship associated with submission, ingratiation, 
personalization and respect for authority and power. Their 
compliance or bureaucratic-feudal modes of behaviour are not only 
typical reactions to their dilemmas, particularly their 
"powerlessness" as middle managers as Nundi (1975) claims, but also 
rational and strategic adaptions to the societal norms of their 
culture. This means that if the 'middle manager' in any given 
organization tends to be a 'yes man' or over-dependent on his 
superiors as the literature suggests, the degree of the 'yes' and the 
meanings behind it are culturally bounded. Despite the fact that
Iraq and Egypt belong to the national Arabic culture and despite the 
closeness in their historical development, the degree of subservience 
and the reluctance to exercise discretionary power that I found in 
Iraqi organizations is somewhat lower than that found by Berger 
(1957) in Egyptian organizations. This could be because Berger's 
study was carried out in the 1950s and mine in the 1980s and might 
indicate the influence of development between the two pjeriods. Also, 
and more likely, it could be due to the fact that Iraq has been 
influenced much more than Egypt by Bedouin culture which calls for 
superiority, power, dominance, etc., (Alwardi 1965). This would 
support my observation and argument that Iraqi organizational 
members, and precisely the middle managers, are highly politically 
minded in their relationship to authority because they have a 
cultural 'superiority propensity' and a willingness to be powerful 
but, at the same time, they must comply with the authority figure if 
they want to live within work organizations. So their compliant 
behaviour and ingratiation is more a strategy to handle the boss and
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expand their povær than a simple subservience in response to a 
stimuli or as a reflection of a personality disorder, as suggested by 
Merton (1949).
The research findings and their inplications in this chapter 
show the impact of culture in constructing the latent function of 
apparently dysfunctional activities. This supports Crozier's (1973) 
thesis of the bureaucratic mcxdel of organizational behaviour which 
suggests that organizational structure and patterns of action are to 
a large extent culture-bound, and thus dysfunctional patterns of 
"bureaupathology" take forms that are related to the culture where 
the sick bureaucracy is found. The researcher has found cultural 
traits such as subordination, isolationism, unemotionality, rigidity, 
a predominance of formal over informal, and concern for hierarchical 
differentiation by status and privilege in the Iraqi organizations 
under study. These findings (in addition to those of Hofstede 1980; 
Tayeb 1981; Child 1981; Bate 1982) give great support to the earlier 
argument of this research and some others with Crozier (1964, 1973), 
i.e. that what are uniquely French traits can be found within 
organizations in other countries but to varying degrees. Thus, as 
Bate (1981) states, the universal or 'dominant but variable' thesis 
of culture (Klukhohn 1964) equally well applies to organizational 
cultures; "while the choices facing organizations are universal, the 
solutions are infinitely variable" (Bate 1981, p. 35). The findings 
of this research have singled out this 'dominant but variable ' thesis 
of culture on the level of different individuals in one 
organizational level (i.e. middle managers) across different 
organizations in one country, viz Iraq. While these Iraqi middle 
managers hold a dominant cultural orientation ( i.e. bureaucratic- 
feudal orientaticxi) and common type and quality of behaviour in
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relation to authority (i.e. complying with the top manager as he 
possesses authority and power), they have rated different degrees of 
variation. Similar to Tayeb (1981) and Child (1981) but unlike Bate 
(1981) who only studied the cultural orientations on organization 
level without finding their relationship with the culture of the 
wider society, this research demonstrates how cultural orientation of 
Iraqi organizations have their origin in Iraqi national culture.
In this chapter the researcher has demonstrated the fieldwork 
findings of Iraqi middle managers' 'bureaucratic-feudal orientation' 
and their conpliant behaviour in relation to the top managers. All 
of the 80 middle managers under study displayed considerable 
bureaucratic orientation but to varying degrees ('low', 'middle', 
'high' and 'very high'). Also the common quality of their behaviour 
toward the top managers are to comply with him and conform to his 
expectations. The quality and implications of their ccnpliance 
reflect their unconscious image or their shared rooted cultural 
meaning of 'personalization' of authority and loyalty. But also they 
vary in the degree of their compliant behaviour; while some indicated 
complete conpliant behaviour, the majority showed wavering behaviour 
but some tending towards compliance and other towards non-compliance. 
Their shared ' bureaucratic-feudal orientation' consists of many 
cultural value-orien tat ions that are related to their national 
culture. These cultural orientations construct the latent function 
of the apparently dysfunctional aspects of their organizational 
behaviour. Their cultural value-orientations and their role dilemmas 
and situation within organizations, interact together, resulting in 
their compliant behaviour in relation to the top manager.
CHAPTER (8)
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES FACTORS AFFECTING MIDDLE 




Using the 'dominant but variable' thesis of culture (Kluckhohn, 
1964), one of the basic arguments in this research has been that 
although individuals belong to any given group hold a general or 
dominant conceptual structure in common, it is also at this dominant 
level that they perpetuate a degree of variation. Hypothesis II in 
this research puts forward the following set of individual 
differences factors which, from the researcher's previous work 
observation and the material found in some relevant studies, are 
assumed to effect middle managers' behaviour toward top management in 
Iraq;
'1 - Age.
2 - Family background and childhood socialization
a) geographical area of living
b) father's occupation
c) parents' level of education
d) childhood experiences.
3 - Educational background
a) level of formal education
b) nature of formal education (place of education).
4 - Wbrk experience
a) length of service
b) years in managerial job in the present organization'.
As the dominant value-orientation or 'meanings' and modes of 
engaging with others are built-up and learned through the 
socialization process, particularly early socialization by the family 
and school, studying individuals' past learning experiences during 
their socialization process is essential in understanding why they 
behave within the work organization as they do. Although individuals 
in any given society are socialized within the context of their 
dominant cultural norms or 'meanings', and despite all the basic 
similarities in the socialization process, there is always a wide
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individual variation within the framework of their societal norms. 
However much the cultural meanings are taken for granted, says
Mangham (1978), they are "always and inevitably influenced by the 
fine gauze of individual experience" (page 47).
In the previous chapter, Iraqi middle managers across different 
organizations located in Iraqi society indicated a shared collective 
pattern of orientation and behaviours in relation to the authority 
figures of their organizations (i.e. top managers) but to various
degrees. Their dominant bureaucratic-feudal orientation and 
compliant behaviour show the inequality of power or the power- 
d is tance that exists between themselves as middle managers, and those 
in top management positions. Such an orientation and behaviour
reflect the dominant conceptual structure of relation to authority
that they hold in common. At the same time their differing degrees 
of dominant bureaucratic-feudal orientation and compliant behaviour 
indicate their variation within the generalized conceptual structure.
In this chapter the researcher will be concerned with two 
dimensions: firstly, the way and the extent to which socialization 
within the family and educational system in Iraq builds up and 
reinforces the dominant value-orientations or the conceptual 
structure relevant to this study - in other words, to understand the 
role of such socialization in securing or producing compliance; and 
secondly, to understand the middle managers' variations on the 
dominant conceptual structure in terms of their 'individual 
differences'. This latter dimension has prompted the researcher to 
investigate the influence of the 'national subcultural distinctions' 
on individual learning experiences during their socialization process 
and the consequent impact on organizational behaviour. These 
subcultural distinctions, such as geographical area of residence and
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family background, are likely to be significant in the case of Iraq 
due to the 'mosaic' social structure of Iraqi society with all its 
diversity (as has been indicated previously).
1. RESEARCH FINDINGS
In this section the research findings obtained to verify the 
second hypothesis (to analyze the middle managers variations in terms 
of their individual differences) will be demonstrated and discussed. 
In order to verify this hypothesis, the degrees of bureaucratic- 
feudal orientation and levels of compliant behaviour have been cross­
tabulated against each of the individual difference factors, in order 
to examine the affect of each factor on middle managers' orientation 
and behaviour.
A - Age:
Table 12 shows that the majority of the middle managers under 
study are aged less than 45 (46% between 33 - 38 years old and 35% 
between 39 - 44). Only 19% of them (15 out of 80) are over 45 years 
old.
The data presented in Tables 13 and 14 and their analyses 
(Appendix 2) show that older managers are more ready to behave with 
compliance than younger ones. Furthermore, although the number of 
older managers is relatively small (15) compared with the younger 
ones (65), the distribution of the association between the 
orientation and behaviour of the older managers shows a kind of 
clear-cut or shift from compliance to non-compliance, or the other 
way round (as it is clear among the groups with 'middle' and 'very 
high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation). This result may 
show the insecurity feelings of older managers and, furthermore, the
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general tendency for older workers to be more favourably disposed 
than younger ones, or what is termed "favorable adjustment" 
(Tannenbaum et al, 1977, p. 14), despite the fact that they may be 
less happy with such adjustment.
B - Family Background and Childhood Socialization Experiences
1. Geographical area of living (i.e. urban vs. rural)
It is notable from Table 15 that the mjority (81%) of the Iraqi 
middle managers under study are from urban backgrounds, and only 19% 
of them have grown up in rural areas. But among 80 middle managers, 
43% (34 out of 80) grew up in Baghdad, 21% (17 out of 80) in other 
provincial capitals and cities, and 17% (14 out of 80) moved after 
the age of 10 from the provinces to Baghdad. In considering the 
affect of the type of residence (i.e. urban vs. rural). Tables 16 and 
17 and their analyses (Appendix 2) suggest that managers who come 
from a rural background are less oriented toward compliance and more 
inclined to behave in a less compliant way than those with an urban 
background. In fact the data presented in Table 16 shows that
managers who are socialized up to their 20s in rural areas scored 
both 'low' and 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation 
in percentages, higher than those of the urbanites. This would 
demonstrate what has been explained before, and what may be called a 
'cultural pattern of extremes', which results from the accommodation 
mode through which different sets of contradictory values exist 
together. Bedouin cultural values, which call for power and
superiority on the one hand, and the feudal system, the
misinterpretation of Islamic teachings, and the long history of
subordination - all of which call for submission and subordination - 
on the other hand, have produced such a pattern of extremes, which.
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as we have seen, influenced rural more than urban populations. But 
still the possibility of rural managers holding 'low* degrees of B-Po 
is much higher than holding the 'very high' degrees (see Table 16).
2. Father's occupation
Table 18 shows that the majority (60%) of the middle managers 
have been raised in homes where the fathers held entrepreneurial 
occupations. This may be because such occupations have been 
generally higher in income than bureaucratic occupations and thus 
allowed the fathers to meet the expenditures of their children's 
formal education, which is required for a post in the governmental 
administrative body. Also from a socio-historical perspective, 
entrepreneurial occupations are more rooted in the society, since 
they were the original occupations of the majority of the pc^lation 
in Iraq before the country entered the twentieth century, and before 
the impact of Westernization after the First World War. So it is 
natural to find the majority of managers' fathers holding such 
occupations, compared to the 40% holding bureaucratic occupations, 
which are historically new. Also among the bureaucratic occupations, 
we notice that the 'civil servant' category is the main one (22 
fathers out of 32 hold such positions, compared to 6 'army officers' 
and 4 'factory workers'). This could indicate the influence of the 
level of income of the factory worker, which was too low to allow him 
to spend on his children's education. On the other hand, it also 
indicates the influence of 'power'; the army officer was usually more 
willing to send his sons into the army, which provides him with a 
great deal of respect and power in society. The influence of the 
level of income is likely to be behind the situation of even the 
entrepreneurial occupations: only 5 fathers out of 48 were
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•craftsmen' on low incomes, compared with other entrepreneurial 
occupations which provided their children with the advantages of 
education. This is in addition to the fact that the 'craftsman' was 
usually training his sons to take over the same family career.
In respect of the affect of 'father's occupation on middle 
managers orientation and behaviour ', Tables 19 and 20 and their 
analyses, suggest that managers who came from entrepreneurial 
backgrounds in terns of their fathers' occupations are more likely to 
have a 'low' tendency toward compliance and more likely to behave 
with less compliance than those with bureaucratic fathers. In fact 
through a comparison of the above Tables it may be concluded that 
managers who are socialized by entrepreneurial fathers or parents (in 
terms of fathers' occupations) are more likely to hold 'low' as well 
as 'very high' bureaucratic-feudal orientations. In other words, 
both the two extremes (i.e. low and very high) can appear among them. 
Such extremes were not revealed by managers who were socialized in 
homes where fathers i:̂ ld bureaucratic occupations, but rather they 
exhibit their moderate orientation by centralizing in the 'middle' 
and 'high' degrees. This may indicate that managers with 
bureaucratic fathers could have been socialized by their parents not 
to take extreme sides, or to adopt a favourable adjustment, as a 
reflection of their father's experiences in working in bureaucratic 
organizations where such extremes are likely to bring unpleasant 
outcomes. Also they show a greater tendency to behave compliantly 
than managers with entrepreneurial fathers.
3. Parental levels of formal education
Parental level of education is another factor that the 
literature suggests has a significant affect on childhood
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socialization. Table 21 presents the levels of formal education that 
the mothers and fathers of the 80 middle managers acquired in their 
lifetime. On the basis of the data reported in this Table, it does 
seem clear that fathers had greater access to formal education than 
mothers (for example 69% of the mothers were ' illiterate', compared 
with 19% of fathers, and 12% of mothers could only 'read and write' 
compared with 39% of the fathers . Also, while 9% of mothers have 
had 'primary' education, compared with 18% of fathers, none of the 
mothers held a B.A. or B.Sc. degree, compared with 11% of fathers who 
held such degrees) . Such differences between mothers' and fathers' 
education are mainly because of the Iraqi societal norms which in the 
past have considered that female education was unnecessary and 
unfavourable for many different reasons.
By examining the data obtained in order to investigate the 
effect of parental level of education on middle managers' variations 
in orientation and behaviour, the researcher found that before 
dealing with this effect, one should first understand what kind of 
training and knowledge, or, rather, socialization, the Iraqi 
educational system provides for its practitioners. This
understanding will be necessary later on to study the effect of 
middle managers' own level of formal education on their orientation 
and behaviour.
The formal educational system in Iraq has been a centralized 
bureaucratically oriented system since its establishment during the 
Ottcman's rule and then British colonial occupation of Iraq (Al- 
Gibori 1970). During the Ottoman period, the aim of the formal 
educational system was to qualify mainly military men for the army, 
and officials for the government machinery. The teachers were mostly 
Turkish, borrowed from the army (Ireland 1937). Since that time and
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until recently, a government appointment was the goal of formal 
education holders. Despite the great quantitive development in this 
system - for example, in 1920, there were 88 primary schools, by 1958 
increased to 1700, in 1968 the number reached 4907, and in 1978 the 
number reached 8387 (Ministry of Planning 1978; Al-Atiyyah 1977) - 
its nature continued to display the same basic qualitative features.
As is the case in most Arabic and Middle Eastern educational 
systems (Al-Shahi 1980; Tayeb 1981), the teacher-pupil relationship 
in the Iraqi educational system is one of clear-cut inequality and a 
large power-d is tance, which represents the customary dominant- 
submissive role pattern. Through this mode of relationship, a 
student is expected to comply with the teacher's instructions and 
expectations, and work exactly as he is told by the teacher. The 
nature of the teacher's authority is a combination of traditional- 
charismatic-legal types of authority. As all authority figures in 
Iraqi society enjoy the traditional respect of authority and power, 
the teacher who holds the power of knowledge is no exception. This 
traditional respect, loyalty and obligation appears in one 
traditional saying; "he who teaches me a letter, has me as a slave", 
which nowadays is often used to exagerate such respect, as a reaction 
against the fact that teaching in school as a career, particularly 
for men, is not highly valued by society. This could be because of 
its relatively low income or because the power of knowledge is no 
longer limited to the 'teacher' only. After all, the power of 
knowledge is only practised on the very powerless (i.e. children or 
students) and is unlikely to open up other sources of power and 
influence. But within the teacher^xipil relationship, students are 
expected to obey and submit to the teacher as a person of knowledge 
and experience, who always knows better than they do. Contradicting
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a teacher or questioning his knowledge are not permitted, and even 
not expected. Although nowadays physical punishment is not often 
used and the educational authority advises against using it, such 
methods were employed in schools by teachers and its enforcement 
depended on the teacher's personal characteristics and style. Even 
parents, until recently, were not only aware of the use of such type 
of discipline, but also permitted its use by teachers in order to 
teach their children respect, discipline and manners. The father, 
says Alwardi (1965) when he put his son in the mulla (i.e. Qur'anic 
school) used to tell the teacher; "The flesh to you (the teacher) and 
the bone to me (the father)" (p. 301). The student, from his 
subordinate position in relation to superiors (i.e. teachers) is not 
encouraged to express his opinion to his teachers, and must be very 
careful in criticizing them. If students, says Al-Shahi (1980), 
attempt to question or criticize their teachers' opinions, then they 
face various measures of disapproval and unpleasantness. Al-Fakhry 
(1971) found that in Iraqi primary schools, the teacher's authority 
to use force and the pupil's fear of physical punishment or any other 
unpleasant outcome hinders the development of a spirit of solidarity 
among children. From the quotation of many children's relies to her 
questions, one can realize the preoccupation in these children's 
minds with complying with their teacher's expectations and with 
avoiding her physical punishment or gaining her rewards.
The educational pattern that is prevalent in Iraq as well as in 
Arabic and Middle Eastern countries (Al-Shahi 1980; Tayeb 1981) is a 
one-way process with limited knowledge and facts. The learning 
process is based on memorizing or learning by heart darrâk 
information and facts, as instructed by teachers and written in the 
assigned syllabus, rather than learning by discovery or encouraging
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further enquiry and introducing new opinions. This uniform system of 
instruction lacks independency training and does not encourage 
students to follow a logical and analytical way of thinking: 
"students are given a monotonous and mechanical education which 
emphasizes the passing of examinations rather than the gaining of 
understanding and the furthering of knowledge" (Al-Shahi 1980, 
p. 80). They are not trained to be active in discussion or 
participate in presenting arguments, but rather follow what the 
teacher selects and presents to than and what is written in their 
text books.
Lack of independency training and analytical thinking are not 
limited to the schools only, for even at university level one can 
find the same lack and the same type of superior-subordinate 
relationship between lecturers and the students. There are "no 
seminars or tutorials through which students can express their 
opinions, their reservations or their criticisms as to the subject 
matter of what is being taught" (Al-Shahi 1980, p. 84). In fact, the 
main characteristic which this educational system enforces is a 
'conformity* vhich appears in most aspects of the system as presented 
by Al-Shahi (1980). He states that:
"Students generally are cifraid to contradict their 
teachers lest they attain lower marks in examinations, in 
which event they fear ridicule in front of other students.
In other words, deviation from the main stream of teaching 
is discouraged, and students are not required to think for 
themselves since ideas, thoughts and solutions are provided 
for them. Students are not free to choose or argue: their 
outlook is guided and restricted not only by religion and 
cultural values, but also the system of instruction.
Just as pupils repeat what the teacher says, so also do 
teachers repeat what writers say %dthout giving their own 
opinions about the subject-matter passed on their students 
(p. 84) ... Tteachers are alike in following the same
methods of instruction. If a teacher attempts to change a 
syllabus or method of instruction, he is looked upon with 
di^leasure, and it is thought that he is creating 
difficulties not only for other teachers, but also for 
students ... Students are not encouraged or expected to
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read outside the set texts or lectures or to seek further 
information or various (pinions. Teachers regard their 
texts and lectures as the 'truth* and on the whole they do 
not follow up developments or consult recent publications 
in their field ... The system of examinations is closely 
(xxineched with the traditional system of instruction. 
Distinction in an examination dpends on the amount of 
information a student has leamt by heart, memorised and 
put down on paper ... What a student puts on paper is no 
more than what the teacher has taught him, and there should 
be nothing in the script either to contradict the teacher 
or to diplease him" (p. 85).
Thus, through such socialization which Iraqi educational 
institutions provide individuals with, education becomes an important 
source of honour and influence since education for most people is a 
matter of acquiring a degree rather than a process of seeking 
knowledge. Consequently one may find, as Al-Shahi (1980) has stated, 
that "creativity both in humanities and sciences is minimal in 
relation to the relatively high number of qualified people in certain 
countries ... Once a person acquires a higher degree, he is thought 
by himself and by others to have mastered his subject" (p. 88-89). 
So, the higher the formal education acquired by the individual, the 
greater is his powsr and respect in society.
In taking the effect of parents' level of formal education into 
ccxisideration, the researcher found that grouping both parents in 
different categories according to their level of education becomes 
extremely difficult and madequate because of the great differences 
between fathers' and mothers' levels of education. Thus, as appears 
in Table 22, parents are grouped according to the fathers' and 
mothers' levels of education and to the differences between fathers' 
and mothers' education. This Table indicates the following points in 
the relationship between parents' levels of formal education and the 
middle managers' orientation and behaviour:
- 'Low* degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation only appeared 
among managers with less educated parents (i.e. 'uneducated or
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very poorly educated parents' - 13%; 'fathers with sane
education, mothers uneducated or very poorly educated' - 13%). 
Managers with less educated parents (groups 1 and 3) have tended 
in their wavering behaviour toward non-ccmpliance in higher
percentages (33%; 33%) than those in group 4 (i.e. fathers with 
higher or better education, mothers uneducated or with some
education - 18%). This would indicate the effect of the nature
of the educational system and societal norms in Iraqi society 
through which education is more a source of power and honour 
than training for free and logical thinking, which would 
increase the individual's ability to bring a new interpretation 
and judgement to the world around him. Thus a degree in
education would add more power to the father, particularly when 
the mother is uneducated or very poorly educatied, especially 
those fathers who gained their education during those days when 
Iraqi society was highly respectful to those who held any 
education or information (e.g. the Ef fend is). In the past, many 
middle class and poor families tried hard to get their sons a 
degree in formal education which would lead them to hold a post 
in the government administrative body and enjoy all the honour 
and influence it confers within their society.
- Table 22 shows that in canparing managers with ' uneducated or 
very poorly educated parents' (group 1) with managers who have 
'fathers with higher or better education and mothers uneducated 
or with some education' (group 4), we find that while 13% of the 
first category (6 out of 45) rated 'low' in bureaucratic-feudal 
orientation, no-one did in the latter category. Also, while the 
'middle' degree is higher in the first category (24%, '11 out of 
45') conpared with 18% (2 out of 11) in the second category.
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'high' and 'very high' degrees are higher (55%; 27%, '6 and 3 
out of 11') in this second category ( ' fathers with better 
education, mothers uneducated or with some education') than 
among those in the first category ( ' uneducated or very poorly 
educated parents' - 47%; 16%, '21 and 7 out of 45'). Also 
complete compliance behaviour was shown by 36% (4 out of 11) of 
middle managers whose fathers held high or better education and 
whose mothers were uneducated or with poor education, compared 
with 18% (8 out of 45) of those with uneducated or very poorly 
educated parents. Managers in this latter category tended in 
their wavering behaviour toward non-compliance in higher 
percentages (33%) than those managers in the former category 
(18%).
- The effect of parental levels of education (in terms of 
managers with parents who are less educated show more compliance 
behaviour than managers with higher or better educated parents) 
has mostly appeared in the comparison of levels of compliant 
behaviour between groups (1) and (2). In both groups, parents 
are closer in their levels of education, but in the first they 
are less educated.
Taking into account the above mentioned points, the researcher 
decided to group parents according to the degree of inequality 
between fathers' and mothers' in formal education (Table 23) and then 
to study the effect on middle managers' orientation and behaviour.
From all the comparisons that are presented in the analysis of 
Tables 23 and 24 (Appendix 2), it seems that the level of education 
and the degree of inequality in education between fathers and mothers 
both affect the orientation and behaviour of middle managers in the 
study. In other words, one can suggest that those with parents 
having better and closer levels of education are more likely to have
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a reduced tendency toward compliance than those with parents having 
less and different levels of education.
4. Childhood experiences
Before demonstrating the research findings on the effects of the 
middle managers' childhood experiences on their variation in 
orientation and behaviour, we need to understand the culturally 
dominant patterns of family structure and child-social izat ion in 
Iraq. Patterns of family structure and socialization in Iraq and 
also in most Arabic countries have been described by various writers 
(Pezeshkpur 1978; Patai 1973; Nahas 1969; Berger 1962; Prothro 1969; 
Hamady 1960). From their descriptions the following picture of Iraqi 
traditional family structure and child-socialization emerges:
'Its structure is a patriarchal hierarchy %here the 
bead of the family - who is normally the father - is 
usually the most influential man in his family. If the 
father is dead, the grandfather or an 'uncle' (father's 
brother) or the eldest sen, if he is mature enough, is 
usually the most influential man. Levels of authority flow 
downward, according to age, from father to the eldest and 
then younger sons with, often, little remaining for the 
women. Although the father remains aloof from his children 
and has little to do with raising them at least until they 
are of school age, he is to be respected and children are 
expected to maintain a respectful distance from him in 
their ways of acting and q)eaking in his presence, 
particularly in public. In his relationship with his 
children he tends to be authoritarian and often severe and 
stem. Children remain totally dependent on parental 
authority for many years, which may last into late 
adolescence or even longer. The parent-child relationship 
is a dominant-submissive pattern and the child's obedience 
is maintained through both love and punishment which is 
usually a physiccüL punishment used by both parents but 
mostly fcy the father. Such punishment aims to get the 
child out of the period of 'ignorance' and into one of 
usefulness. The child lacks verbal interaction and parents 
are unlikely to play with him for any length of time. He 
receives in his early years, a great deal of ciffection, 
indulgence and permissiveness, particularly from the 
mother, but in his later childhood he suddenly comes under 
greater control, particularly from the father. A child's 
personal initiative and autonomy are restricted to a great 
degree. Conformity and respect are demanded from children 
towards seniors and considered part of the good manners a
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person must have. Seniors make decisions and give orders 
and advice to the youngsters, who are expected to carry out 
their seniors' decisions and orders.'
Some aspects of the Iraqi traditional picture have been 
changing, particularly the functions of traditional large families 
and the movement from the 'extended family' to the 'nuclear family', 
mainly among the urban educated populations. Also some changes have 
been undertaken in the position of the older generations and the 
domain of the head of the extended family, but these have not 
significantly affected the underlying authoritarian conceptual 
structure upon which the family socialization continues to function. 
Thus one may still observe the authoritarian approach in family 
socialization and relationships, especially in the father-child 
relationship which is still a model for the high degree of power- 
distance which Iraqi society expects.
This illustrates the statement made by Ifofstede (1980) in 
pointing out that the family as well as other social institutions may 
be changed, but "this does not necessarily affect the societal norms; 
and when these remain unchanged, the persistent influence of a 
majority value system patiently smoothes the new institutions until 
their structure and functioning is again adapted to the societal 
norms" (p. 26). One of the most important effects of Iraqi
authoritarian ideology and its approach to child-social ization is the 
child's dependency on and special respect for authority figures. He 
leams to conceptualize and see himself in relation to his father, 
seniors, teachers and other authority figures as 'submissive', but in 
relation to his younger brothers and sisters as 'dominant'. Not only 
his parents, but also societal norms that dominate his life at home, 
school, and even when playing outside the house with other children - 
all these make him strive to be the most powerful in relation to his
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peer group, rather than the powerless; the dominant but not the 
submissive. Thus childhood socialization participates in making the 
individual in Iraqi society, as Alwardi (1951) pointed out, 
predisposed to the values of dominance and command when he is in a 
position of power, and submission and obedience when he is powerless. 
Also, as Berger (1962) explains, the child lacks regular and 
predictable attention from adults and particularly from parents, 
because he is considered a jahil (i.e. an ignorant one) who does not 
need to be noticed much, at least until he is old enough (six or 
seven) to be properly formed into an adult as quickly as possible. 
The arbitrariness of parental control and the use of physical 
punishment induce the child to leam ways of getting attention and 
approval, to ingratiate himself and to adopt socially desirable 
behaviour in order to get rewards and avoid punishments. In other
words, "to master the means of ingration and manipulation" (Berger 
1962, p. 169).
From what has been shown, one can find that the Iraqi familial 
socialization approach consists of two major aspects; first, an 
authoritarian father-child relationship with its connected familial 
values; second, authoritarian controlling practices carried out 
mostly by the father through using mainly physical punishment without 
reasoning with the child.
These two major aspects have been the concern of this research 
in studying the middle managers' childhood experiences and are what 
the researcher has tried to study by collecting relevant data when 
she carried out her field work.
In the process of analyzing the data, the researcher found that 
in responding to the two questions (i.e. each question consists of 
two statements and the respondents were asked to pick the one they
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agreed with most) aimed at measuring the degree of power-d is tance in 
the father-child relationship that these 80 middle managers 
experienced in their family socialization, 85% (68 out of 80) of them 
said, in relation to first question, that they experienced a large 
power-distance in relation to their fathers. This authoritarian 
relationship was also reported in the second question by 81% (65 out 
of 80) of these managers. When they responded to the third question 
(which consists of five items aijned at indicating the middle 
managers' familial values that correspond to the customary dcxninant- 
submissive role pattern) 39% (31 out of 80) agreed that they
experienced all that was stated in the five items, 32% agreed with 
four items, and 24% with three items. Only 5 middle managers showed 
less agreement; 2% (2 out of 80) agreed with only two items; 1% with 
one; and 2% disagreed with all of them. In fact, these two latter 
middle managers also previously denied having experienced a large 
power-d istance in relation to their fathers, and they were the most 
prominent in trying to give what they thought as desirable answers 
which would protect them from any negative judgement. In the course 
of an interview, one of these two managers told the researcher;
"I know what you are up to ... you want to see if 
there is a relationship between our past private life and 
our present position within this working organisation ...am 
I right? I don't think that you have the right to ask 
people about their personal life ..."
Furthermore, even what was reported by the '11' middle managers 
in the first question and the '15' in the second question, i.e. 
saying that they did not experience an authoritarian father-child 
relationship, does not necessarily represent reality, because the 
vast majority of these '11 middle managers' reported having an 
authoritarian relationship in their response to the items '1' and '2' 
of the third question. These itens were no more than rewording, in a 
different way, what was stated in the first and second questions.
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So, we can conclude that the authoritarian father-child 
relationship and its connected familial values dominated the 
childhood experiences of the vast majority of these 80 middle 
managers. Also, among those few middle managers who reported having 
experienced less authoritarian relationships and values, some were 
only concerned with giving what they thought as desirable answers, or 
what would protect them fran any negative judgement about their 
personal life.
In fact such a fear of negative judgement or the attitude of 
giving 'desirable answers' also appeared when the researcher analyzed 
the responses of those 80 middle managers to the two questions 
related to the second aspect of childhood experience, that of the 
authoritarian controlling methods (i.e. using punishment vs. reward 
discipline without reasoning with the child). In fact, the research 
findings in this respect not only showed inconclusive results but 
were also unexpected in terms of what the literature suggests. For 
example (as Table 25 shows), the 39 middle managers who reported 
having experienced punishment vs. reward discipline by their fathers 
only for scane of the time and reasoning with them for most of the 
time, were the highest group to indicate complete compliant behaviour 
(23% '9 out of 39'). This compared with only one manager who showed 
such a type of behaviour among 12 middle managers who reported that 
their fathers constantly used this authoritarian discipline without 
reasoning with them at all( group 3) •
The researcher believes that these unexpected results of the 
effect of constant vs. intermittent use of punishment and reasoning 
is not only because of the attitude of many middle managers to giving 
desirable answers, but, more, it may indicate what Hofstede (1980) 
suggested about the distinction between "norm authoritarianism" and
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"personal authoritarianism" (p. 115). Thus the constant vs.
intermittent use of punishment and reasoning, which Harvey et al 
(1961) suggests highly affects the degree of 'personal 
authoritarianism', does not have such an affect when we study the 
degree of individual internal izat ion of authoritarian societal norms 
through the socialization process.
Thus the researcher decided to study the affect of only the 
first aspect of childhood experience (i.e. the authoritarian father- 
child relationship and its connected familial values) on those 80 
middle managers* behaviour and orientation, as this aspect expresses 
Iraqi norm authoritarianism which operates on the cultural level. By 
grouping those 80 middle managers into two categories, according to 
the total degree that each one of them scored in the three questions, 
we can compare those who reported having experienced a less 
authoritarian father-child relationship and familial values with 
those with high authoritarian experiences. As is shown in Table 26 
the vast majority (86%, '69 out of 80') reported having high
authoritarian childhood experiences, and 14% (11 out of 85) reported 
less authoritarian childhood experiences. The analysis of Table 26 
shows that the tendency to behave with compliance among managers who 
reported having high authoritarian childhood experiences is more than 
among those with less authoritarian experiences. But the affect of 
this variation in childhood experiences appears when we have examined 
the middle managers' behaviour more than orientation. This may 
suggest that acquiring such an orientation does not depend only on 
experiencing an authoritarian father-child relationship and familial 
values but more the reinforcement of such a pattern of relationships 
and values through different life stages in the socialization 
process. But the authoritarian father-child relationship and its
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corresponding familial values have their impact in the way 
individuals as socialized adults will construct their behaviour in 
relation to other authority figures. In analyzing Table 27, it was 
found that one cannot draw a conclusive result about the affect of 
childhood experiences on the relationship between middle managers 
orientation and behaviour. As was mentioned before, obtaining such 
results could be because of the distorted information relating to 
childhood experiences, since the questions tackled very personal 
parts of their lives, about which it was genuinely difficult for them 
to provide undistorted information. Such a tendency was pointed out 
by Schaffer (1980). He states that 'social desirability' tends to 
play a large part in determining the answers given in questionnaires 
about child rearing.
C - Educational Background
1. Level of formal education
Hie majority (73%, '58 out of 80') of the middle managers under 
study held undergraduate degrees (Diploma, B.A. or B.Sc.), while 21% 
(17 out of 80) held only schooling certificates (Intermediate and 
Secondary), 7% (5 out of 80) had acquired postgraduate degrees
(Diploma, Master and Ph.D.). Table 28 presents the data related to 
the variation in orientation and behaviour between those with a low 
level of formal education (i.e. holding only school certificates) and 
those with high level of formal education (i.e. holding undergraduate 
and postgraduate degrees). From the analysis of Tables 28 and 29, it 
seems that, in general, low degrees of bureaucratic-feudal 
orientation are more likely to be shown by those with less education. 
And the less-educated ones are more ready to behave with complete 
compliance than the more-educated managers. This result is more
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likely because of the feeling of equality or power that the holding 
of higher formal educational degrees provides those middle managers 
with, rather than the affect of education in increasing the 
individual's ability to bring a new interpretation and judgement to 
the world around him. In other words, when the power-d is tance in the 
superior-subordinate relationship between two actors is large, and 
when education is a source of power and honour, as is the case in 
Iraqi society, holding higher formal education certificates by 
subordinates would decrease the power-distance, particularly form the 
subordinate's point of view.
2. The nature of formal education (place of education)
It was hoped to examine the affect of the nature of formal 
education by comparing those who possessed an education degree from 
Western countries with those who finished their study within the 
Iraqi educational system. But, in fact, only one among 80 middle 
managers finished his Ph.D. outside the country (Poland) and 3 middle 
managers in an Arabic country (Egypt), so such a comparison has not 
been possible. However, those three middle managers who finished 
their postgraduate diplomas in the Egyptian educational system, which 
is very similar to that of Iraq (Al-Shahi 1980), showed 'high' and 
'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation but they 
tended in their wavering behaviour towards non-conpliance. Also the 
middle manager who obtained a Ph.D. from Poland showed a 'low' degree 
of bureaucratic-feudal orientation but tended in his wavering 
behaviour towards compliance.
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D - Work Experience
1. Length of service
From Table 30, we can see that the majority of the 80 middle 
managers under study have worked in governmental organizations for 
over 14 years (the length of service of 38% of them spread between 
'14 - 19' years, and 40% 'over 20 years'). Only 22% of them held 
lengths of service between 8-13 years.
The analysis of data presented in Tables 30 and 31 has shown 
that in general managers who would indicate 'low' as well as 'very 
high' degrees of compliance in their 'orientation' and 'behaviour' 
are more likely to have obtained 'more' rather than 'less' seniority. 
But the possibility of the 'very high' degree of compliance a{pearing 
among managers holding 'high' seniority is greater than the 'low' 
degree.
In fact, the researcher found that 7 of those '9' middle 
managers who rated 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal 
orientation and who showed wavering behaviour tending toward non- 
compliance, were in fact part of the second group presented in Table 
32 who have 14 - 19 years of seniority. Managers in this second 
group are more likely, than the other two groups, to have developed 
their influence in their own organizations; in other words, they are 
in the ' innovation' stage of their career. This could be behind the 
appearance of wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance in 
higher percentages (40%, '12 out of 30') compared to the first group 
who hold 'less seniority' (33%, '6 out of 18') and the third group 
who have the highest seniority (28%, '9 out of 32'). This tendency 
toward non-compliance which was shown mostly by those with 'very 
high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation could be, as was 
explained in the previous chapter, no more than admitting a "wide
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distribution of capacity for leadership and initiative", or as a 
favourable adjustment in being seen to behave in line with the 
political ideological emphasis introduced into the organizational 
environment. Many of them may find that making this favourable 
adjustment may serve their interests of moving iç> the ladder; others 
would continue to be oriented in 'very high' degrees to satisfy their 
superiors by showing a great amount of compliance, as long as such 
behaviour helps them more in moving up. Among the first group who 
held the least seniority (between 8 - 1 3  years), the 'very high' 
degrees did not appear at all and they were the lowest group in 
indicating a 'low' degree. Also their tendency toward non-compliance 
(33%, '6 out of 18') was lower than that of the second group. On the 
other hand, the 'very high' degree appeared among managers in the 
third group (those with 204- years of service) but at a much lower 
level (13%, '4 out of 32') than that of the second group (33%, '10 
out of 30'). Also they were the lowest groiç> in indicating a 
tendency toward non-compliance. This could be because the first 
groLÇ) are still working in establishing their positions and 
developing their influences in their own organizations, thus they are 
less ready to take the risk of any extreme behaviour (i.e. showing 
'very high' degrees of compliance or behaivng non-compliantly). On 
the other hand, as many of those in the third group are likely to be 
in the last stages of their career, they may not be able to expect to 
move up the promotional ladder for higher positions and start to 
suffer from "the boxed-in-feeling" (Kay 1974 a). Thus they also 
become less interested in taking risks in any extreme direction. 
Furthermore, the fact that some of the managers in the third group 
have been transferred from top management level to middle management 
positions for different reasons may also contribute to the low level 
of the 'very high' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation compared
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with that of the second group. However, the appearance of the 'very 
high' degree only among those who hold over 14 years of seniority 
could manifest the affect of the length of socialization that these 
managers have been subject to within Iraqi organizational culture, 
with it emphasis and rewarding of compliance. But this is not shown 
by those with less seniority; they are not yet fully socialized into 
the Iraqi organizational culturally predominant style.
But managers in the third group showed 'low' degrees (12% '4 out 
of 32') which may not be congruent with saying that managers in this 
group tend to avoid taking any extreme direction. In fact, when the 
researcher examined the data, she found that those 4 managers had 
worked for a number of years in the private sector before they joined 
the governmental organizations of the public sector. Thus these 
middle managers have been exposed to different organizational 
cultures for a number of years. Also despite over 20 years of 
seniority they, together with the other 4 middle managers who all 
rated ' low', spent less than 8 years in middle management (3 of them 
less than 2 years, and 2 of them less than 5 years). This is because 
these and many other employees started working at quite an early age 
(i.e. after primary or intermediate school certificates) and, at the 
same time, many of them continued their education. For that reason 
one finds that the length of service of some employees in Iraqi 
organizations could be over 20 years although they are younger than 
other employees who hold many fewer years of service, as the latter 
started working after they finished their university degree or even 
later. Thus, as 3 of those 4 middle managers with over 20 years of 
seniority who rated 'low' degree have less than 8 years in middle 
management and the other one less than 5 years, this could mean that 
they are still at the peak of their careers as middle managers and
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are still likely to be holding their influence in their 
organizations. Also, they may still be expecting, as is the case in 
the second group, to move up to higher positions.
2. Number of years in a managerial job in the present 
organization
The number of years the middle manager has been holding his 
managerial position in the present organization, it is suggested, 
affects his orientation and behaviour in relation to organizational 
authority. By grouping the 80 middle managers under study according 
to the number of years they have been working at the middle 
management level, we shall be able to compare those with less than 4 
years service with those with more years (over 4 years).
From the analysis of Tables 33 and 34, it was found that the 
affect of the 'number of years in managerial jobs in the present 
organization' on middle managers' orientation and behaviour showed 
similar results to that of length of service. But in general 
managers who spent more years in their middle management positions 
are more likely to be more oriented toward compliance than those with 
less years. Also those with more years in managerial positions are 
more likely than those with less years to behave with compliant 
behaviour, as well as tending toward non-compliance in their wavering 
behaviour.
In the process of analyzing the data the researcher found that 
among managers v4io have spent more years in managerial positions in 
their organization, those '6' managers who held 'very high' degrees 
of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and who showed wavering behaviour 
tending toward non-oonnpliance, are the same ones previously
reported this orientation and behaviour when we examined the affect
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of length of service or 'seniority' on middle managers' orientation 
and behaviour. As was found before, these 6 managers are in the peak 
period of their service or in the innovative stage of their careers; 
it is the same situation when we go further to find the deeper 
implications of the association between the length of time they have 
spent in middle management positions in their present organization 
and their orientation and behaviour. As Table 35 shows, 5 of these 6 
middle managers are part of the second group who have been at the 
middle management level for less than 8 years. As one can note from 
Table 35, those in the second group have centralized in 'high' and 
'very high' degrees compared with the first and third groups who 
centralized in 'middle ' and 'high'. Also, coiplete compliant 
behaviour appeared among them in higher percentages (23%, '5 out of 
22') more than among the first group (16%, '8 out of 51') or the 
third group (14%, '1 out of 7'). On the other hand, the majority 
(45%, '10 out of 22') of them tended toward non-compliance, but the 
majority (53%, '27 out of 51') of the first, and particularly of the 
third group (71%, '5 out of 7') tended in their wavering behaviour 
toward compliance. All the above points may indicate that managers 
in the second group, who could be in their 'innovation' stage in 
their career as 'middle managers', and who are more willing and have 
greater expectations of moving up the promotional ladder, are the 
most likely group to show extreme compliance as well as non- 
coipliance in their efforts to move up in the organizational 
hierarchy. Although they are oriented more than other groups tov̂ rd 
compliance, they behave with complete compliance or non-compliance 
depending on their interpretations of the situation they find 
themselves in. Seme of them may find that satisfying their 
organizational authority figures by showing complete compliance to
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their wishes is more likely to serve their interests in moving up the 
ladder; others - in our case the majority - may have found that it 
serves their personal interests better if they satisfy those who are 
higher than their superiors (i.e. the highest authority in the head 
office or the political authority), at least by showing the support 
to the political ideological emphasis on issues such as leadership, 
taking responsibility, and initiatives. Also the influence that 
those managers in the second group may have on their organizations - 
by which it may become less easy for their organizations to replace 
them - may make them feel more secure and important and thus more 
able to show less compliance. But the managers of the first group 
(those who have been in middle management positions for less than 4 
years) and of the third group (who have been in management level for 
over 8 years) could be less ready to show an extreme direction 
(either to behave with complete compliance or non-compliance). Thus 
they tend to take a relatively moderate position (centralizing in 
'middle' and 'high' degrees at bureaucratic-feudal orientation and in 
wavering behaviour tending toward compliance). This again could be 
because the first group still lack enough influence on their 
organizations and are more engaged with establishing their positions 
at the middle management level and thus not expecting to move up the 
ladder as quickly as the second group. And the third group may have 
lost their hope to move up the ladder, particularly since all of them 
hold over 20 years of seniority and are in their middle age (40 - 
45). So they are likely to suffer from the middle-age or career- 
crises, one phenomenon of which is "the boxed-in-feeling" (Kay 1974 
a).
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2. DISCUSSION AND OONCLODING lŒMARKS
After this mentally exhausting journey beyond the numbers 
searching for the individuality-effecting factors that contribute to 
middle managers' variation in orientation and behaviour, we can say 
that we did not find a 'clear-cut' variation associated with each 
factor. But what we did find was a kind of general tendency 
associated with each factor; only in this sense can we say that the 
research findings supported the second hypothesis. In other words, 
no single factor alone accounted for the total variability of middle 
managers orientation and behaviour. In fact, such findings in 
themselves give support to the major argument of this research in 
saying that middle managers behaviour is a function of individual and 
organizational factors interacting.
The general tendency that was found to be associated with the 
'age' factor supports what the literature has suggested; older middle 
managers are more ready to behave compliantly than the younger ones, 
but, as Bate and Mangham (1981) suggests, with "notable exceptions in 
both the older and the younger groups" (p. 205). Also older managers 
tend to be more favourably disposed or, as Tannenbaum et al. (1977, 
p. 144) says show "favorable adjustment", which may demonstrate the 
insecurity feelings that the older ones are more likely to have.
The first variable that was dealt with in studying the family 
background and childhood socialization of those (80) middle managers 
under study was the 'geographical area of living' (i.e. rural vs. 
urban subcultural differences). In ccaitrast to Wiat most Western 
writers findings, this research showed that, in general, managers who 
have been socialized in Iraqi rural areas are more oriented and 
inclined to behave in a less compliant way than those socialized in
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urban areas. The researcher believes that this represents the 
reality in Iraq and by considering the following points one can 
justify such a belief;
A. If the rural father-child relationship in Iraq is an 
authoritarian one, where the father tends to be stem and use 
corporal punishment, and the child-rear ing practices emphasize 
subordination to father's authority and family interest (Ali 1977), 
the urban socialization in Iraq is not an exception. Such 
authoritarian relationships and practices are the general cultural 
pattern not only in Iraq but in most Arabic and Middle Eastern 
countries (Patai 1973; Tayeb 1981).
B. The modem urban society in Iraq is not a product of the 
industrialization movement as is the case in Westem countries but, 
no doubt, such a movement has increased modemity in this society. 
Industrialization m  Iraq is a recent phenomenon and has not emerged 
fron within society but rather been transferred to this society from 
advanced countries in a packaged or "tum key" basis (Aboona 1975, p. 
168). Furthermore, borrowing the technology, as Berger (1962) 
recognizes, has not been preceded by creating 'values' appropriate to 
it or at least developing such values later in order to realize the 
technology fruits in a reliable stable manner. So the Iraqi urban 
population has not experienced the cultural and social changes that 
go with industrialization. The industrialization 'movement' in Iraq 
has not changed the individual's basic cultural value-orientations 
(such as 'dependency') or led peĉ le, as it did in Westem countries, 
to be self-reliant and independent. Gulick's findings (1966) showed 
that transferring Westem industrialization to the Arabic urban 
cities has not destroyed tiieir traditional cultures. Rather one may 
find, as he did in a Lebanese industrial city, a "number of cultural
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patterns which differ from those which would be expected according to 
Westem industrial theory, and at least one which is thought by many 
to be incompatible with Westem industrialization" (p. 52).
Modemization in Iraq, which was the result of the impact of exposure 
to Westem culture mainly since the First World War, affected 
people's way of life, materials, education, dress, types of living, 
etc., more than their basic cultural value-orientations and 
practices. Thus, individuals in urban populations, despite their 
surface modemity, may still be traditional in their outlook. 
Although many educated urban Iraqis as well as other Arabs are
nowadays moving away from the traditional pattem of child-rearing, 
"the majority cannot imagine themselves questioning the rightness of 
these traditional ways; they would think it funny, if not insane, for 
example, to go to doctors or to books to leam how to handle 
children" (Berger 1962, p. 135). So they raise their children mainly 
as their own parents did, according to fixed notions accumulated over 
many centuries. And if it is the modem formal schools in urban 
society that, some may argue, stand behind the differences between 
urban and rural child-training for self-reliance, all schools in 
Iraq - from those in villages with one teacher to the large modem 
ones in the cities - emphasize obedience, dependency and
memorization.
C. Rural and urban coimunities in Iraq, as we have seen
previously, have many socio-cultural traits and customs in conrnon, 
with a clear and deep influence of Bedouin values of power,
superiority, equality, pride and individuality. But the impact of 
Bedouin culture on rural communities has been greater than on urban 
inhabitants. Also if the urban population has had to submit to 
successive arbitrary rulers or governments, the rural areas were
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geographically isolated for quite a long time and thus away from the 
influence of governmental power. Thus, while such Bedouin values 
considerably weakened in urban communities, rural inhabitants 
continued to be highly influenced by these values to the degree that 
the Iraqi fallah (farmer) liked to consider himself a settled Bedouin 
(Al-Dahiri 1969). Also the governmental offices or the 'civil 
service' was from the time of the Effendis and, to a degree, still is 
the primary sector for Iraqi modem urban occupations but to a 
decreasing extent. So, most of those who form the urban community 
have been heavily and more intensely exposed to the influence of 
Iraqi bureaucracy, with all its negative characteristics such as 
dependency of subordinates on superiors, discouraging personal 
initiative and independent actions, authoritarian relationships, etc. 
But the population in rural areas, particularly those who continued 
to work and live on the farms, have stayed aloof, to various degrees, 
from such influences. No doubt the fallah in Iraq has outwardly 
submitted to the powerful feudal sheikhs and to the tax collectors, 
but his intemal desert heritage of freedom, equality, individuality, 
pride, etc. has been barely affected. Thus, his submission to them 
was his only available tactic when he had to deal with them, but he 
continued to follow his original values in his relationships with his 
peers (Alwardi 1965).
D. The nature of the open-spaced environment in rural areas on
the one hand, and the fact that the children in these areas in Iraq
usually start working on the farm and carry their share of the
family's burdens at quite an early age on the other, allows more
training in self-reliance than a child in an urban community. This 
is similar to the point that Swop (1970) makes about the differences 
between the nature of urban and rural socialization and their impact
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on American executive's style and outlook. Also as Berger (1962) 
remarks, by age 7 in a rural coirmunity, as was the case in Bedouin 
society, the child is initiated into the ccmpany of men and their 
ways and by age 12 is treated as an adult. Thus he joins the men 
more often in their meetings, where he leams how to behave as a man. 
But the child in urban areas is not very likely to have such open 
space or training in responsibility and self-reliance as well as 
treatment as an adult. And if it happens, it is more likely to be 
among traditional people than among modem ones. On the other hand, 
the data showed that managers who socialized up to their 20s in rural 
areas displayed both extremes of orientation (i.e. 'low' and 'very 
high' degrees) more than those with an urban background coly. Such 
extremes could manifest a 'cultural pattem' that results from the 
contradictory values that have coexisted together; the Bedouin values 
of power and superiority on one side and on the other, the values of 
subordination and submission in the feudal system, the 
mis interpretation of Islamic teachings and the long history of 
subordination. Such cultural patterns of extremes have influenced 
rural more than urban populations.
The research findings on 'father's occupation', which was the 
second variable in studying family background and childhood 
socialization, showed that, in general, managers who have been 
socialized by entrepreneurial fathers or parents (in terms of 
father's occupation) are much more likely to have a 'low' tendency 
toward compliance and would behave with less compliance than managers 
with fathers with bureaucratic occupations. These findings support 
the literature (i.e. Aberle and Naegele 1952; Miller and Swanson 
1960; Kohn 1962-63 and 1969; Hulin and Triad is 1981). But the
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findings also suggest that both of the two extremes of orientation 
(i.e. 'low' and 'very high') can be held by managers with 
entrepreneurial fathers, while managers with bureaucratic fathers 
exhibit a relatively moderate orientation (i.e. centralizing in 
'middle' and 'high' degrees). This could indicate the avoidance of 
risk-taking and the disposition toward a favourable adjustment that 
managers who were socialized in homes where fathers held bureaucratic 
occupations, because a father's occupational requirements have 
inportant consequences for the values that parents display to their 
children (Kohn 1969).
The third variable that is assumed to have an affect on 
childhood socialization was the 'parent's level of education'. In 
studying the association between middle managers orientation and 
behaviour and their parents' level of formal education, the 
researcher found that, in general, those managers with uneducated or 
very poorly educated parents have neither shown a higher tendency 
toward compliance nor more compliant behaviour than those with better 
educated parents, as the literature suggests (Kohn 1969; Hofstede 
1980) but rather, the opposite way round. Such a suggested affect, 
in terms of those with less educated parents having a greater 
tendency toward compliance than those with higher or better educated 
parents was only found when we compared two groups of parents where 
fathers and mothers in each group held closer levels of education. 
Consequently, managers whose parents held closer levels of education 
were found to be less oriented toward the bureaucratic-feudal 
orientation and behaved less corrpliantly than managers whose parents 
held different levels of education. This would reveal the affect of 
Iraqi societal norms and the nature of the 'educational system' 
through which 'education' becomes a source of power and honour.
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Thus, according to the findings of this research, we can state that 
at least in a society such as in Iraq, the suggested affect (Khoh 
1969; Hofstede 1980) of 'parent's level of education' is likely to be 
conditioned by the degree of inequality between fathers' and mothers' 
levels of education.
'Childhood experiences' was the fourth and the last variable 
concerned with middle manager's family background and socialization. 
Within this variable the researcher's concern has been on the two 
aspects of Iraqi family socialization that emerged from the 
description presented in this study. The first aspect was th e  
authoritarian fatJier-child relationship and its connected familial 
values, and the second was the authoritiarian controlling met±ods 
(i.e. using punishment vs. reward discipline witdiout reasoning with 
the child). In the first aspect, the research findings indicate that 
the authoritarian parents or, rather, father-child relationship and 
the familial values in relation to authority have dominated the 
childhood experiences of the vast majority of the (80) middle mangers 
under study. This result strongly supports the cultural argument 
employed by Hofstede (1980) and Tayeb (1981) and shows that the 
' family ' in Iraq builds up and reinforces the authoritarian customary 
role of the ' dominant-submissive ' pattem and its corresponding 
shared conceptual structural in relation to authority. In fact, 
Tayeb's findings about Iranian authoritarian family structure and 
ways of functioning are quite consistent with the authoritarian 
pattern of family structure and child-socialization that I have found 
in Iraq. This may appear to suggest the influences of Islamic 
teachings as Tayeb (1981) and Pezeshkpur (1978) have argued. But I 
do not agree with the notion that such authoritarian structure and 
ways of functioning are because of the marked impact of Islamic
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teachings. Rather, they are an accumulative socio-historical product 
of the evolution of society during which people try to find some
solution to their fundamental life problems within a limited range of
possible solutions. Through their battles under centuries of 
subordination, fear, crushing poverty and uncertainty of survival,
people in many Middle Eastern countries, as is the case in Iraq, have
misinterpreted and negatively practised many principles in Islam. 
Cummulatively and through the soc io-h is tor ical evolution of these 
societies, Islam itself became a source of blind obedience, extreme 
conformity and subordination to authority which is quite inconsistent 
with its original principles and message. The hierarchical family 
power structure and authoritarian parent-child relationships that 
Tayeb found in Iran (and I agree that it is also the case in Iraq) 
have also been recognized in Westem countries although to lesser 
degrees - (Levinson 1968 in Germany; Ferrarotti 1959 and Kohn 1969 in 
Italy; and Hofstede in all high PDI countries).
Few middle managers (11 out of 80) reported having experienced a 
less authoritarian childhood. But sane of them reported the opposite 
when the researcher re-worded the pertinent questions in different 
ways. In fact, many of those who continued to report having 
experienced less authoritarian childhoods were clearly very concemed 
with giving what they judged to be desirable answers or the answers 
that would protect them from a negative judgement about their family 
and personal life. Such fears of negative judgements, as we have 
seen previously, are one of the dominant value-orientations of Iraqi 
culture. When the researcher moved on to study middle managers 
variation in orientation and behaviour in terms of childhood 
experiences, it was found that the tendency to behave compliantly 
among managers with more authoritarian father-child relationships and
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familial values was, generally, more than among managers with less 
authoritarian childhoods. But when the researcher examined the 
affect of such variation in childhood experiences on the relationship 
between middle managers orientation and behaviour, the findings were 
inconclusive. This could be, as has been explained previously, the 
result of distorted information or responses given by many middle 
managers concerning their childhood experiences because of their fear 
of negative judgement.
In the second aspect of childhood experiences (i.e. 
authoritarian control by using punishment vs. reward discipline 
without reasoning with the child) the findings were not only 
inconclusive but, furthermore, at variance with what the literature 
suggested about the affect of the constant vs. intermittent use of 
punishment and reasoning (Harvey et al. 1961). Out of line with what 
Harvey et al. (1961) argued, the 39 middle managers who reported 
having experienced the use by their fathers of punishment only 
occasionally and reasoning most of the time, were the highest group 
who indicated complete compliant behaviour, compared with the very 
low appearance of this behaviour among those who said that their 
fathers constantly used this authoritarian discipline without 
reasoning with them at all. Here again these unexpected results 
could have been obtained at least partly because it was difficult for 
adults in their positions with their cultural concepts of 
'manliness', 'family orientaticxi' and 'fear of negative judgement' to 
provide undistorted information about what they consider very 
personal parts of their lives. Thus in future research, new ways 
should be found to assess individual's childhood experiences in a 
society where culture makes it very difficult to deal with the 
people's personal and family life and where people are extremely
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œncemed with and sensitive to others negative judgements, 
particularly 'strangers'. Furthermore, these results may support 
Hofstede (1980, p. 115) who suggested the need to distinguish between 
"norm authoritarianism" and “personal authoritarianism". In fact 
Harvey et al. (1961) have suggested a cause and effect relationship 
between childhood experiences and the unhealthy "authoritarian 
personality" that was introduced by Adomo et al. (1950). The effect 
of the constant vs. intermittent use of punishment and reasoning that 
they suggested to effect the degree of authoritarianism in 
personality, does not apply in studying the degree of individual 
internalization of authoritarian societal norms. In fact, this 
authoritarianism within individual orientation in any authoritarian 
culture, such as the cases in most Middle Eastern and Arabic 
societies (Melikian 1959; Kagitcibasi 1970), tends to be a more 
healthy psychological adjustment than unhealthy 'personal 
authoritarianism'. The unexpected results of the effect of the 
authoritarian control by punishment vs. reward discipline could also 
show that the use of physical punishment by Arabic fathers does not 
necessarily mean a hostile father-child relationship, as some writers 
have suggested. It must not be taken to have the same implications 
as the 'abused child' phenomenon that one can find in Westem society 
('The Times' 11 Dec. 1984). This is so, because Iraqi or Arabic 
parents by the use of such discipline are only trying to make their 
children acquire what their societal norms consider as the ideal; 'to 
be well-mannered, respectful of parents and elders, helpful and 
obedient'. In one word, to be muaddab (i.e. well-behaved). In fact 
parents used to justify their use of physical punishment by referring 
to one of the traditional sayings; "If your son is dear to you, the 
well mannered is dearer". This is in addition to the fact that the
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Iraqi and Arabic father is not only socially expected but usually 
does devote his whole life to his children, which not only 
demonstrates to them his great love and care, but also puts a great 
obligation on them to respect and obey him, particularly when they 
realize that he is usually their only source of financial security 
upon which their present and future life depends, and that their 
parents provide them with an amount of love and care that they are 
unlikely to find elsewhere. This obligation is especially strong not 
only because of the teachings of Islam to obey and respect parents, 
but also because of the pressure on people to be upwardly mobile and 
to acquire material wealth and security, which is connected with 
respect and status in society.
The third individuality factor that was looked at to find out 
its effect on middle managers' orientation and behaviour was 
'educational background'. The researcher, by using her own 
experiences in the Iraqi educational system and that of others (Al- 
Shahi 1980) in additicai to the available documents and studies have 
demonstrated how the authoritarian teacher-pupil relationship in the 
Iraqi educational system, through which all of the 80 middle managers 
under study have been socialized, portrays the customary dominant- 
submissive role pattem. Also the educational system, as is the case 
in Arabian and Middle Eastern countries (Al-Shahi 1980; Tayeb 1981), 
is a one-way process with a great lack of independency training and 
analytical thinking, and which builds-up and reinforces the dominant 
conceptual structure in relation to authority. In fact for Tayeb 
(1981) and, furthermore, for Al-Shahi (1980) this type of 
authoritarian teacher-pupil relationship, the learning by heart and 
recitation and the whole pattem of instruction are connectd with
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marked impact of the earlier model of Islamic religious educational
institutions upon secular education. This belief is clearly
represented by the following statement of Al-Shahi (1980):
■Just as the Qur'an is leamt in the form of verses and 
chapters, so in secular schoo^ teachers use set texts 
(muqarrarit), hand-outs (Malaffat), or sections of a book 
(malazim), and these must be leamt by heart. Thus, a book 
does not become a source of stimulation bo intellectual 
activity, curiousity or further thinking, it is, rather, a 
mean to an end - the passing of an examination. Students 
are not encouraged to seek infcamiation beyond the set 
texts, and so knowledge is restricted to what the teacher 
provides. Learning by rote and the slow verbatim copying 
of information from teachers are very widespread in schools 
and universities. Knowledge gained by these two methods is 
considered to be the "truth" and, by analogy, it is similar 
to tÿe knowledge gained through learning the verses of the 
Qur'an. Students take pride in the number of times they 
have read the set texts which they read from cover to 
cover: min cLL-jilid li-l-jilid. The mcwe a student recites 
these texts ky heart the more it is thought likely that he 
will remember them at examinations. Reciting the Qur'an by 
heart many times brings greater religious merit, and, in 
the words of TIaha Hussein a person becomes ... a Sheikh, 
even if he is very young'. Similarly in secular education 
a student who leams the text by heart becomes dhaki 
'intelligent', or mujtahid 'industrious' "p. 33).
While I quite agree with his description of the pattem of
secular education that is prevalent in Iraq as well as in other
Arabian and Middle Eastern countries, I do not agree that such a
pattem is originally and totally derived from the impact of
religious educational institutions, that of 'Qur'anic schools'.
Although these institutions have had considerable influence, the
dominant-submissive role pattem of the teacher-pupil relationship as
well as the one-way process of instructing education that
characterized religious as well as secular educational institutions
are the product of the cultural don inant value-orientations that have
crystalized through the socio-historical evolution of Arabic and
Middle Eastern societies. Thus, it is the societal norms or the
dominant value-orientation that have built the educational system as
well as the familial, political and economic systems into this
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authoritarian pattern, and not the religious educational institutions 
by themselves. But no doubt each kind of institution reinforces the 
pattem of structure and way of functioning of the other 
institutions. If the lack of analytical way of thinking, dependency, 
and leam ing by heart a limited amount of knowledge or facts are all 
the impact of Islamic educational institutions, we would not find 
that in the past Islamic civilization made a substantial contribution 
to human civilization, during which Baghdad was a great centre of 
leaming and where arts and sciences flourished. Thus, one should 
not forget the impact of the Ottoman occupation as well as the 
British occupation on the formal secular educational system, which in 
itself came to many Arabic and Middle Eastem countries through this 
domination, as is the case in Iraq. Camoy (1974) explains how the 
Westem schooling that was instituted in many colonized countries 
generated in those societies a dependency, alienation, loss of
personal choice, and larger power-d istances, particularly between
those who had formal schooling and those who lacked it. In fact, as 
Al-Shahi himself has mentioned, in secular education some of the 
religious educational terms have been distorted, e.g. mujtahid. This 
term in its original religious educational sense, as it is still used 
in the religious educational institutions of Nagef in Iraq, means not 
only the person who has fully studied the original sources of
knowledge but who has acquired the capacity to initiate and provide
further interpretations and implementations to the Qur'anic verses 
and words. But in the secular educational system, "a student at 
school or university is a mujtahid if he has leamt by heart or 
memorized a great deal of what is set for him" (Al-Shahi 1980, p. 
83).
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In considering the effect of the 'level of formal education' on 
middle managers orientation and behaviour, the research findings 
suggested that, in general, the less-educated middle managers are 
more oriented toward and inclined to behave compliantly than the 
more-educated ones. When we take the nature of the Iraqi educational 
system and societal norms into account, this result is more likely to 
be because of the feeling of equality or power that the holders of 
more educational degrees would have in their subordinated position in 
relation to those above them, than because of the effect of education 
in increasing their abilities to bring new interpretations and 
judgements to the world around them. Thus we can say that in the 
superior-subordinate relationship, more formal education being held 
by subordinates would reduce the pov^r-distance between them, at 
least from the subordinate's point of view, particularly when the 
superior has lower or even the same level of formal education.
Because all of the (80) middle managers under study were 
educated up to undergraduate degrees in the Iraqi educational system 
and only 4 of them studies outside the country (3 of them in Egypt), 
the researcher was unable to study, as it was hoped, the effect of 
place of education (i.e. nature of formal education) on their 
orientation and behaviour.
The last individuality factor studied in this research is 'work 
experience'. In general, managers with 'high' seniority displayed 
the extreme degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation (i.e. 'low' 
and 'very high') and of behaviour (i.e. 'complete compliant 
behaviour' and 'wavering behaviour tending toward non-conpliance') - 
which were greater in the former than in the latter - more than those 
with less seniority. This could produce suggestions about seniority
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or lengt±i of service in two ways, first: 'the more lengthy period of 
oranizational socialization within Iraqi bureaucratic-feudal culture, 
the more likely the actor would be oriented and ready to behave 
compliantly. This supports what Gordon (1970) has suggested in 
saying that "bureaucratic orientation" reflects an intended outcome 
of the "bureaucratization process" (p. 9); second: 'the more
seniority the actor holds, the greater his experience and capacity to 
handle the job would be, and, consequently, the more his influence on 
his organization and the more likely to be less compliant'. This 
supports what Hall (1972) has suggested in his concept of 'the ease 
of replacement', and the 'career's stages' of Schein (1971). The 
combination of these two different effects may reveal the 'strategic 
interaction ' that those 80 middle managers are likely to be involved 
with, in order to work and survive within Iraqi organizations with 
all the conflicting demands and ideologies that are demanded by 
different people. In fact, the researcher was also able to 
distinguish both the effects of the "innovation" stage (Schein 1971) 
and what is called the middle managers "mid-career crises" (Kay 1974 
b) when those 80 middle managers were divided into three groups 
according to their seniority or length of service. Managers in the 
second group who hold '14-19' years of seniority have tended toward 
non-ccmpliance more than the other two groups, which would suggest 
the likely influences that they have developed on their organizations 
in this "innovation" stage of their career. Also they were the 
highest group to indicate 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal 
orientation, which could reveal that they are also very ready to show 
complété compliant behaviour in their relationship with top 
management. This combination of 'very high' degree of bureaucratic- 
feudal orientation and a tendency toward non-ccmpl iance in their
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behaviour would indicate the 'strategic interaction' that these 
middle managers would follow by making the favourable adjustment that 
is required by the situations they encounter in order to serve their 
own interests to move, as soon as possible, to higher positions. 
This is supported by the fact that the highest ones among managers in 
the second group who tended toward non-ccmpl iance were those with 
'very high' degrees in bureaucratic-feudal orientation. But managers 
in the third group (over 20 years of seniority) are likely to pass 
this stage and enter - more than the other two groups - the "mid­
career crises" and thus start to suffer from "the boxed-in-feeling" 
(Kay 1974 a); they were much less oriented in 'very high' degrees 
toward caipliacne than the second group and were the lowest among the 
other two groups who tended toverd non-ccmpl iance. In other words, 
they became less interested and less ready to take the risks of 
showing these extremes of orientation and behaviour, as career 
mobility was limited for them and their age and the financial and 
other benefits locked them tightly in the middle management level. 
For these depressed managers, says Hunt (1982) the "dream" overstates 
their case, and thus they appeared psychologically to begin to die".
In considering the effect of the second variable in 'work 
experience' (the 'length of period in managerial level in the present 
organization ' ), it was found that it displays similar trends to that 
of seniority. But, in general, managers who have spent more years in 
managerial positions in their present organizations were more 
oriented toward compliance than those with less years. Also they 
showed both the two extremes of behaviour (i.e. conplete carpiiant 
behaviour and a wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance) 
more than managers who spent less years in managerial levels. In 
fact by dividing the (80) middle managers into three groups according
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to their 'length of period in managerial level in their present 
organizations', the researcher found the same implications about the 
effect of the "innovation" stage and of 'mid-career crises' that was 
found previously in middle managers orientation and behaviour.
SIMIABY
In this chapter the researcher has demonstrated the field work 
findings of studying the individuality factors that were assumed to 
affect the orientation and behaviour of Iraqi middle managers in 
relation to top managers. On the dominant level of their orientation 
and behaviour, it was found that, through their sub-cultures and 
socialization process, the family and school in Iraq participate to a 
great extent in securing or producing compliance. These institutions 
build up and reinforce the culturally authoritarian-dominant 
conceptual structure of relation to authority, with its notion of 
'personalization ' and traditional respect of authority. In 
considering middle managers variations in orientation and behaviour, 
it was found that the individual factors that were studied in this 
research affected middle managers orientation and behaviour in terms 
of the general tendency that was found to be associated with each 
factor, but no single factor alone accounted for the total 
variability of middle managers' orientation and behaviour. The 
general tendencies associated with 'age', 'father's occupation', and 
'middle manager's level of formal education' were in line with what 
the literature suggested, as older middle managers, those with 
fathers in bureaucratic occupations, and those who had had less 
formal education were more oriented to and behaved with greater 
compliance. But the general tendency associated with the 
'geographical area of living ' was not in line with what most writers
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have suggested, as Iraqi managers who were socialized in rural areas 
were less oriented to and behaved with less conpliance than urban 
ones. This clearly reflects the peculiarity of Iraqi sub-cultural 
differences, and is quite in line with what this research has 
suggested about the culture in Iraq. Also it seems that the effect 
of inequality in education between fathers and mothers on middle 
managers' orientation and behaviour is greater than the effect of the 
level of parents' education, which has been suggested by the 
literature. This is likely to be, again, because of Iraqi societal 
norms and the nature of the educational system. Although it was 
found that the tendency to behave compliantly was generally highest 
among those who reported having experienced high authoritarian 
experiences, 'social desirability' or the 'fear of negative 
judgement' dominated the middle managers' repsonses to childhood 
experiences questions. Ihe suggested effect of constant vs. 
intermittent use of punishment and reasoning in childhood experiences 
on the degree of personal authoritarianism has not appeared in 
studying the degree of the middle managers' internalization of their 
societal authoritarian norms. 'Seniority' was found to have two 
general directions of effects : firstly, the more lengthy the period 
of organizational socialization within Iraqi organizational culture, 
the more likely the actor would be oriented and ready to behave with 
compliance; secondly, the more seniority the actor hold, the greater 
his experience and capacity to handle the job, and, consequently, the 
greater his influence on his organization and the more likely he is 
of being less compliant. Within these two general directions 
associated with 'seniority' as well as 'number of years in middle 
management positions', the research findings have identified the 
effect of the "innovation" stage (Schein 1971) and of 'mid-career 
crises' (Kay 1974 a, b).
CHAPTER (9)
ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING MIDDLE MANAGERS' 




In the organizational behaviour research model proposed earlier, 
it had been argued that middle manager's behaviour towards top 
management is a function of the characteristics of both the person 
and the organizational environment. Also one of the basic arguments 
of this research has been that although individuals belong to one 
national culture and hold a dominant conceptual structure in ccmnm, 
it is also at this daninant level that they display a degree of 
variation.
Iraqi middle managers across different organizations in Iraq 
have shown a dominant pattern of orientation, i.e. 'bureaucratic- 
feudal orientation', and behaviour, i.e. 'compliant behaviour', in 
relation to the top managers of their organizations (Chapter 7). 
Such orientation and behaviour reflect their culturally shared 
conceptual structure in relation to authority. But at the dominant 
level, they still also show some variation.
In the previous chapter, the way and extent to which 
socialization in wider society (mainly family and school) builds and 
reinforces 'compliance' and the whole conceptual structure in 
relation to authority was studied and demonstrated. Also middle 
managers variations of the dominant 'orientation' and 'behaviour' 
were studied in terms of individual differences, which arise mainly 
from their past learning experiences in wider society.
Iraqi organizations have a universal or dominant 'bureaucratic- 
feudal ' pattern of culture which partly reflects the culture of wider 
society, and partly their own settings. But although the basic model 
of socialization in these organizations aims to produce an 
organizational person who conforms fully to superiors instructions 
and to the bureaucratic norms and rules, one also finds wide
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variation amongst these organizations above the doninating pattern of 
culture and socialization.
As individuals' socialization experiences in their wider society 
vary according to many affecting factors, so would their 
socialization experiences in work organizations. Hypothesis II in 
this research puts forward a set of organizational factors which,
from the researchers previous work observation and the material found 
in some relevant studies, are asuumed to mediate the middle managers' 
learning experiences and affect their behaviour toward top management 
in Iraq;
1) Nature of the relationship between top and middle managers:
a) top manager's leadership behaviour in relation %fith 
middle managers.
b) the degree of middle manager's participation in decision 
making.
2) Middle manciger's degree of role conflict and ambiguity.
3) Middle manager's degree of job satisfaction.
1. BESEftRŒ FINDINGS
In this chapter the researcher will demonstrate the research 
findings obtained from studying middle managers' variations in
'orientation' and 'behaviour' in terms of the 'organizational 
factors' stated in the second research hypothesis. Through verifying 
this hypothesis, we will be able to understand the influence of 
organizational socialization on individuals' learning experiences 
during their career within Iraqi work organizations.
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A - Nature of the Relationship Between Top and Middle Managers
This factor has been studied from the two aspects that are 
assumed to contribute towards the degree of power-d is tance between 
middle and top managers;
1 - Top managers' leadership behaviour in relation to middle 
managers
Table 36 shows that 66% (53 out of 80) of the middle managers 
under study reported that top managers in their organizations behaved 
toward them in a 'supportive' manner, and 34% (27 out of 80) stated 
that the behaviour of their top managers was more 'autocratic'. This 
could be an unexpected result for Iraqi organizations, but in fact 
this result in itself may reflect the nature and reality of tcp- 
middle managers relationship in these organizations. This result 
would have been influenced by the fact that the researcher, before 
being able to launch the research field work, had to meet the top 
managers of all the companies under study in order to obtain their 
approval. Thus many of the middle managers that were interviewed 
would have realized that their top manager was part of the picture, 
either because he had formally told them to answer the questionnaire, 
or by them taking it for granted that I must have gained the approval 
of the top manager, otherwise I would not have been able to proceed. 
Even more so, some of these middle managers, on not receiving the 
formal instruction fron their top managers or on judging that the 
received instructions are not very clear, asked me to return to the 
top manager for an additional instruction or to clarify the one at 
hand. Needless to say, I tried to convince all the middle managers 
under study that no-one would be able to check their answers and no- 
one would be able to identify them, particularly since I did not ask 
them to state either their names or their departments. But despite
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all that, many of these middle managers, through their cultural 
distrust and avoidance of risk-taking, may still have avoided stating 
that their top manager's leadership behaviour in relation to them was 
autocratic. For them, such a statement would upset the person at the 
top; it would be likely to be perceived as an insult to his
personality, something quite expected in Iraqi culture, where
criticizing issues is percieved through expected hostility and 
personalities are often superimposed on issues. Thus they were not 
ready to jeopardize (as they thought) their relationship with the 
person at the top. But rather they may have seen answering the 
questionnaire as an opportunity to flatter and show their goodwill by 
stating to others (i.e. the researcher) that he was not 'autocratic', 
especially after the recent political ideological condemnation of 
such characteristics. In fact the vast majority (11 out of 14) of
middle managers who rated 'very high' in bureaucratic-feudal 
orientation described their top leaders behaviour as 'supportive' 
(see Table 36). This may suggest that the tendency to give answers 
in favour of the top manager is likely to be high among those who are 
highly oriented toward compliance and feel a need to develop 
influence and good relationships.
Despite such probable influences in answering the questionaire, 
Tables 36 and 37 and their analysis show that managers under
autocratic leadership are more apt to comply than those managers 
under supportive leadership. Such an effect is clearly shown on 
middle managers' behaviour but not on their orientation. This would 
represent the tendency of middle managers to adjust themselves to the 
top person's leadership style and behave accordingly. Such an 
adjustment, especially to the supportive top leader, does not require 
these middle managers to change their 'shoulds' and 'beleifs in'
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(i.e. orientation), particularly if we keep in mind the authoritarian 
nature of Iraqi organizational culture. Such an environment would 
make the supportive type of leadership behaviour more a temporary one 
and a matter of the personal characteristics of a person who happened 
to be at the top of an organization. The tendency to adjust to the 
top leader's style could be strong amongst those who are more 
oriented toward compliance, which may explain why the vast majority, 
73% (8 out of 11) of managers held a 'very high' degree of
bureaucratic-feudal orientation and reported working under a 
'supportive' leadership, tended in their wavering behaviour 'not to 
comply'. These managers may have an influence on their organization 
and its top management which make them able to afford the 'ncxi- 
compliance' behaviour. But under 'autocratic' leadership, 67% (2 out 
of 3) of the managers holding 'very high' levels of bureaucratic- 
feudal orientation displayed complete compliant behaviour.
2 - Middle managers participation in decision-making
Since 'participation ' can mean any one of a variety of 
consultation or joint decision making practices, the researcher found 
that, before studying the effects of participation on middle 
managers' orientation and behaviour, it was important to let the 
middle managers draw a profile of the decision-making styles of their 
organizations. Through such a profile it would be possible to know 
what the term ' participation ' refers to in the minds of these middle 
managers. Table 38 presents the styles that the 80 middle managers 
identified as being followed by their organizations. Frcm this Table 
we can see that while 11% (9 out of 80) reported that the 'goals are 
the orders issued ' and 26% (21 out of 80)stated that the 'goals are 
set by higher authority ', the majority, 59% (47 out of 80) said that 
'goals are set after discussing with managers of different
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departments the problems at work and any planned action '. Such 
discussions, as all the middle managers explained in the interviews, 
are mostly 'individual-to-individual prior consultation' i.e. the top 
manager tells the middle manager the problem at hand, asks him to 
provide the necessary information and produce his idea and suggestion 
on his own, rather than bringing together all the middle managers as 
a group. Then the top manager makes the decision which often does 
not reflect the middle manager's contribution. The researcher found 
during the interviews that 47 middle managers in choosing statement 3 
when answering the goal-setting question (No. 30) were only 
referring to its second phase, which consist of the conception of 
'consultation' regardless of its first phase, i.e. 'goal-setting'. 
In other words they used this statement to refer to the general and 
traditional practice of 'individual-to-individual prior consultation' 
in their organizations regardless of where it is applied. In fact 
this could be a reflection of these middle managers' lack of clarity 
and administrative knowledge regarding many management concepts, such 
as goal-setting, policy and decision-making, ...etc. In discussing 
the three middle managers who stated that 'except in emergencies 
goals are usually established by group participation', the researcher 
found that it was no more than their tendency to give what they 
thought the best and most desirable answer.
In considering the middle managers' replies to question (No.31) 
related to the 'decision-making' process in their organization. Table 
38 shows that the majority (57%, 46 out of 80) stated that 'Policies 
and important decisions are made at the top level; specific decisions 
within a prescribed framework are made at the middle level '. That 
is, 24% (19 out of 80) reported the 'policies and most of the
decisions are made by the top level', and 19% (15 out of 80) said
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that 'Broad policy and general decisions are made at the top level, 
many decisions are made at the middle level'. No-one suggested that 
decision-making is widely carried out at all levels in the 
organization.
Frcxn the profile the the 80 middle managers drew of the 
'decision-making' styles of their organization, it is clear that the 
picture of 'participation' that they have is an ' indirect 
participation' and mostly that of individual-to-individual prior 
consultation.
The effect of participatiai on middle managers behaviour and 
orientation was studied using three terms; first; the 'formal 
participation ' as reported by middle managers ; second; the 
"psychological participation" (Vtoan 1960) which is the extent of 
influence which middle managers feel they have in making decisions; 
third; "delegation" (Vrocm and Yetbon 1973). One notes from Tables 
39-44 (Appendix 1) that the majority of middle managers reported 
'more participation' in all three terms. Two influences could be 
behind such a result. One is the tendency to give desirable answers, 
particularly in favour of top managers, and the other one is the 
' ideological endorsement of participation and support for a wide 
distribution of the capacity for leadership and initiative* - a 
cultural phenomenon in high PDI countries (Hofstede 1980). Such 
ideological admission of participation in terms of saying 'we have 
high degrees of participation' acts, as Hofstede (1980) sees it, as a 
compensation for what happens on the pragmatic level in high PDI 
countries (as in the case of Iraq). In these countries he says, 
pecple are more emphatic about a need for more employee partieipaticm 
and thus there is a strong ideological push toward models of formal 
participation, but also more resistance to de facto participation.
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In considering the effect of 'participation' in its three 
aspects on middle managers' orientation and behaviour. Tables 39-44 
and their analyses have shown that 'participation' has its effect on 
behaviour rather than on orientation. Such a result suggests that 
managers who participate more in decision-making are less likely to 
behave 'compliantly' in their actions than those who participate 
less, but they are not necessarily or likely to be less oriented 
toward compliance in their 'values' and 'norms'. But participation in 
terms of 'delegation' has somehow affected middle managers 
bueaucratic-feudal orientation compared with the other two aspects. 
Hiis could be because with 'delegation' the middle manager has more 
influence over decisions than he does with any other procedure, 
particularly when we know that top managers in Iraq, using an 
' individual-to-individual ' type of consultation or even group 
consultation, do not usually, when they take decisions, reflect the 
middle manager's influence. In other words, 'delegation' provides 
the Iraqi middle manager with clear cut 'authority and influence' 
which he culturally and organizationally strives for. In fact this 
does not conflict with saying that individuals in Iraqi organization 
find it easier and safer to take orders than to make decisions when 
we understand that the delegation that may be granted to middle 
managers in Iraqi organization is usually coupled with great 
limitations. Such limitations, guidelines, direct instructions, and 
oral approval are provided by top managers in addition to the 
limitations provided by rules, regulations, and policy statements; 
all make 'delegation' in Iraqi organizations more a matter of 
apparent influence and authority than carrying out real 
responsibility for taking decisions. Such 'delegation' would allow 
middle managers to enjoy authority or apparent power but not take 
responsibility for the results.
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One can note from Tables 39-44 and their analyses (Appendix 1), 
the managers with 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal 
orientation have reported more participation to a greater extent than 
managers with lower degrees. Ttiis result supports previous results 
(Chapter 7) in that managers with 'very high' degrees of 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation are more ready to admit the 
ideological endorsement of participation and wide distribution of 
capacity for leadership which is a cultural phencxnenon in high PDI 
countries. Also the likely influence which was proposed (Chapter 7) 
that these middle managers (i.e. with very high degrees of 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation) may have is evidenced in this 
chapter by the vast majority of them (13 out of 14 middle managers ) 
reporting having high 'psychological influence' in the decision­
making process in their organization (Table 41 and 42). 
Interestingly, as the form of participation that can be found in 
Iraqi organizations is that of ' individual-to-individual '
consultation, middle managers perceived the 'psychological 
participation ' as the overall influence they have on superiors in 
making decisions through 'consultation' rather than the influence 
they have on a jointly made decision.
B - Middle Manager's Degree of Bole Conflict and Ambiguity
The assumption that derives from the conceptual consideration 
concerning this factor is that a high degree of role conflict and 
ambiguity would result in more compliance. The research findings 
presented in Tables 45 and 46 and their analyses suggest that the 
effect of 'role conflict' on middle managers 'orientation' is not 
clear, and inconclusive. Also this effect on their behaviour 
(particularly among managers with 'low' and 'middle' degrees of
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bureaucratic-feudal orientation) is in reverse to the above 
assumption. In fact the above assumption (that more role conflict 
would result in more compliance) was only clearly supported by the 
responses of managers holding 'very high' bureaucratic-feudal 
orientation (see Table 46 and its analysis). The tendency of middle 
managers to give 'desirable answers' could stand behind this result, 
but it may also indicate that Iraqi middle managers who are not very 
oriented toward compliance (i.e. low degrees of B-PO), role conflict 
will not increase their compliance to superiors' expectations but may 
decrease it. But among those who are 'very highly' oriented toward 
compliance ('very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation), 
role conflict will increase their compliance to superiors.
In respect of role ambiguity. Table 47 presents the middle
managers perception of the degree to which their roles are defined.
63% (50 out of 80) said that their roles are defined by job
descriptions with or without a statement of objectives, and 24% (19 
out of 80) reported no job description but said that they were told
the objectives they were expected to achieve. Only 14% (11 out of
80) stated that they do not have a job description and were also not 
told any job objectives. Knowing that there is not job description 
or statement of objectives in Iraqi organization (as was demonstrated 
in Chapter 6), the researcher was concerned to find out why they said 
they had one. During the interviews it appeared that some of these 
middle managers were here again trying to give 'desirable answers'. 
Most of them were referring to the orders of the Division of Labour 
that their departments obtain, and referring to these as job 
descriptions; the 'objectives' were originally stated in what they 
call the 'Internal Enactment' which established their organizations. 
Interestingly, the majority were not able to say where they kept
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these orders and enactments or where they could be found. Sane of 
them, after searching for a long time, handed to me the Division of 
Labour's orders which were issued five years ago, since which time 
many changes in their departments' activities and structures have 
occurred. So it was obvious that such orders and enactments were to 
some degree theoretically there, but in reality they were no more 
than ink on paper. Also, those who said that 'they were told the 
objectives they are expected to achieve' were referring to the 
instructions and directions of top management and even of higher 
political authorities concerning their 'day-to-day' work. So it 
seems that working according to the instructions of those in 
authority is enough for these middle managers to understand what is 
expected from them clear, i.e. simply carry on obeying instructions. 
So having the Division of Labour's orders and working according to 
instructions and orders from higher up could stand behind the results 
that the vast majority (84%, 67 out of 80) reported, i.e. low role 
ambiguity, while only 16% (13 out of 80) reported high role ambiguity 
(Table 48). In considering the effect of role ambiguity on middle 
managers' 'orientation' and 'behaviour'. Tables 48 and 49 and their 
analyses suggest that this factor, as with the case with the previous 
organizational factors affects behaviour rather than orientation. So, 
as the literature suggests, middle managers who are subject to high 
role ambiguity are more likely to behave compliantly than those with 
low role ambiguity.
C - Middle Managers Degree of job Satisfaction
Table 50 shows that out of 80 middle managers 9% stated that 
they are 'not satisfied', 18% 'only slightly satisfied', 48% 
'satisfied' and 18% 'very' and 9% 'extremely' satisfied. In the
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process of analyzing the research data, the researcher found that in 
comparing middle managers' responses to the questions of job 
satisfaction as a 'series of specific variables' (Questions 53-65) 
with their responses to overall job satisfaction (Question 66) 14 out 
of 38 middle managers who reported 'satisfied' in response to overall 
job satisfaction were really saying this in terms of 'we are barely 
or just about satisfied ' (Table 50). In other words these 14 middle 
managers were 'satisfied' but their satisfaction was lower than the 
other 24 middle managers who also said they were satisfied.
Tables 51-53 and their analyses indicate that the relationship 
between middle managers ' job satisfaction and orientation is more 
clear and conclusive than the previous organizational factors; 
managers who have 'more job satisfaction ' are more oriented toward 
compliance than managers who have 'less job satisfaction'. In fact 
this suggests that orientation may affect job satisfaction rather 
than the reverse; those who are highly oriented toward compliance 
(i.e. high in bureaucratic-feudal orientation) are more likely to be 
more satisfied in Iraqi bureaucratic oriented organizations than 
those who are less oriented toward compliance. The effect of job 
satisfaction on middle managerial behaviour has appeared in more than 
one direction; 'non-compliance' behaviour is more likely to be shown 
by managers who are 'more satisfied' (Table 51). Ihis result may 
support the previous suggestion in that 'more satisfied' managers, 
with the likely influence they have on superiors, are more able to 
afford non-compliance in a political way of behaving. In another 
direction, extreme compliance (i.e. complete compliant behaviour) is 
more likely to be shown by managers who are 'very low' and 'very 
high' in satisfaction than those who are just 'satisfied' (Table 52). 
This result may suggest that compliance may be used as a strategy
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either to keep very high levels of satisfaction or to satisfy some 
active needs which are still at a very low level of satisfaction. In 
other words these two groups (i.e. 'very high' and 'very low' in 
satisfaction) will behave with such extreme compliance in order to 
serve their aims.
Table 54 provides a picture of the contribution of the
'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' variables in the 'satisfaction' and
'dissatisfaction' of the 80 middle managers under study. Such a 
picture has been obtained by first finding the variables which middle 
managers in the six groups (Table 50) reported they are
'dissatisfied' with, and those variables which they said they are 
'very and extremely satisfied' with. These were then ordered into a 
hierarchical manner according to their frequency in each group. In 
fact when we examine Table 54, it is clear that both 'extrinsic' and 
'intrinsic' variables contribute to middle managers' 'satisfaction' 
and 'dissatisfaction', but to various degrees. For example among 
those with 'very low satisfaction' (i.e. dissatisfied; slightly
satisfied; and satisfied in terms of being barely satisfied). 'Pay' 
and 'using skills and abilities' have appeared at the top of the 
hierarchy of variables with which these middle managers were 
dissatisfied. This supports Kay (1974a) in saying that 'pay' is the 
strongest hygiene factor that contributes to middle managers' 
d issatisfaction.
While 'using skills and abilities' contributed significantly to 
the satisfaction of those who were more satisfied (i.e. satisfied; 
very and extremely satisfied) 'pay' continued to be a variable with 
which these middle managers were also dissatisfied. This suggests 
that 'pay' has its effect in producing dissatisfaction but has no 
affect in producing satisfaction. But 'using skills and abilities'
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has its affect in producing 'dissatisfaction' and 'satisfaction'. In 
fact this could be a reflection of the absence of suitable working 
criteria in Iraqi organizations (as we have seen in Chapter 6) which 
in many cases means that qualified people end up with very routine 
and uninteresting jobs with very little responsibility. Thus one can 
clearly observe the discrepancy between the position one may hold and 
the kind of work or responsibility that he is assigned. Also 
'relationship with superiors' is another 'extrinsic' variable that 
managers with 'more satisfaction' (i.e. satisfied, very and extremely 
satisfied) reported being extremely satisfied with. But this 
variable is near the bottan of the variables that the ' less 
satisfied' managers (i.e. dissatisfied; slightly satisfied; just or 
barely satisfied) have reported that they are 'dissatisfied' with. 
This may support the suggestion of the importance of 'having a good 
relationship with superiors' in middle managers' satisfaction (Pelz 
1952; Kahn et al, 1964), particularly in Iraqi organizations where 
such satisfaction is highly dependent on those superiors.
2. DJSgjSSICN AND CCWCLUDING REMARKS
Through the analysis of the cross-tabulation of the association 
between 'organizational-affecting factors' and the orientation and 
behaviour of Iraqi middle managers, no single factor alone accounted 
or clearly underlay the total variability of middle managers' 
orientation and behaviour.
Although the tendency to give 'desirable answers' dominated the 
middle managers' answering of the questionnaire, it was clear that 
these organizational factors affect middle managers 'behaviour' 
rather than their 'orientation'. Thus only in the sense of the 
general tendency of the affect of organizational factors on middle
414
managers' 'behaviour', can we say that the research findings
supported the second hypothesis. Finding that 'organizational 
factors' affect middle managers' behaviour rather than orientation is 
in line with what Brim (1966) and Schein (1971) assert, in that
organizational socialization affects the way individuals adjust
themselves and construct their behaviour to meet their role 
expectations and it is unlikely that they will change in their basic 
personalities. In fact the affect that we have found on middle
managers' behaviour (actions) rather than orientation (values and
norms) is even less deep than the level suggested by Schein (1971) in 
saying that the individual may change drastically in his social 
selves in the sense of developing "new attitudes and values, new
competencies, new images of himself...... " (p.412). In fact such a
result may reflect the fundamental impact of national culture on 
organizational socialization, and give support to the cultural
argument, i.e. that in any given society social institutions,
including organizations through their socialization functions, build 
up and reinforce collectively shared value-orientation. The impact 
of such a national culture will make the personal changes and the new 
values that organizational socialization may try to produce (and 
which are not in line with cultural custom) more a temporary issue 
than a continuous and fundamental one (e.g. encouraging non-ccmpliant 
behaviour through supportive, democratic leadership). Thus as some 
investigators in organizational socialization (such as Van Maanen, 
1976) have asserted, the cultural values of wider society are the 
"cornerstone" of most organizational socialization efforts. The 
above results would reveal that to give a realistic judgement about 
the personal changes that may have occurred during organizational 
socialization, one must take into account the value-orientations that
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individuals have brought to the organizational setting from their 
socialization in wider society. In other words, one should first 
assess (as we did in this research) the 'orientations' or the 
conceptual structure of the individuals before joining work
organizations. The lack of such assessment, i.e. of the 
'orientations' that actors as socialized adults bring to the 
organization, may lead to unrealistic judgements on organizational 
socialization. One such unrealistic judgement is that of Schein 
(1971) in saying that the 'conformist' employee who is unable to 
innovate is the result of organizational socialization which "occurs 
only under conditions of coercive persuasion, i.e. where the 
individual cannot or does not psychologically feel free to leave the 
organization" (p.424). In taking the case of Iraq, one cannot make 
such a judgement as long as individuals before they have joined work 
organizations are, as a result of their socialization in wider 
society, already highly predisposed to 'conformity' and oriented to 
avoiding taking the risk of personal initiative. Thus, Iraqi
bureaucratic-oriented organizations, by providing a reaffirmation and 
reinforcement of such orientations, would be able to gain such 
conformist employees who are unable to innovate. But, undoubtedly, 
the conditions of coercive persuasion that are mentioned by Schein 
(1971) have their influence in increasing the degree of conformity 
that individuals are ready to provide their organizations with. 
Also, these conditions have their effects in persuading individuals 
who join work organizations with less orientation toward conformity 
to be more conformist. so the above result and its reflected
implications wDuld give support to Van Maanen (1976) in arguing that 
the intensity and depth of the likely personal changes that may occur 
as a result of organizational socialization is situationally
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determined and depends upon both organizational and individual 
character ist ics.
In studying the nature of the relationship between top and 
middle managers in Iraqi organization, it has been found that 
managers under autocratic leadership (in terms of top manager's 
leadership behaviour) are more apt to comply than managers under 
supportive leadership thus, supporting the literature. In fact 
finding that supportive leadership holds it influence in Iraqi 
authoritarian organization reflects the influence of culturally 
paternalistic attitudes that these organizations have failed to 
maintain and which constitute part of their employees active needs. 
These culturally paternalistic attitudes which individuals would like 
to receive from authority figures have been found by Muna (1980) to 
influence the image that Arab employees have about a 'good manager'. 
For them, he says, a good manager is the one who plays the father- 
role in terms of treating them in a considerate and human manner, 
being interested and willing to provide good services and facilities, 
as well as 'care and guidance' for their personal problems, on and 
off the job. Considering the second aspect of the nature of the 
relationship between top and middle managers (that of the middle 
managers' participation in decision-making) research findings support 
what the literature suggests, i.e. that more participation would lead 
to less conpliance. In fact finding that middle managers who 
'participate more' in dec is ion-making are less likely to behave 
compliantly than managers who 'participate less' would reflect the 
influence of 'consultation' practice which has deep roots in Arabic 
culture. In fact 'consultation' has been found more in the Arabian 
Gulf region (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, United Arab
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Emirates - Al-Jafary and Hollingsworth 1983) than in other Arabic 
countries (Muna 1980). These Gulf countries have through their 
socio-historical evolution been more able to sustain the impact of 
Bedouin culture compared with other countries such as Egypt, Iraq and 
Syria, where such influences have been weakened by the occupation by 
many foreign powers and the experience of a different type of 
historical reality than those of the above Gulf countries.
It has been found that decisions in Iraqi organizations (as is 
the case in many Arabic organizations - Muna 1980) are either made 
totally by those at the top of the organization (top managers) or 
through ' individual-to-individual prior consultation*. In both 
systems the influence of subordinates, including subordinate 
managers, is seldom acknowledged. But even if this type of 
' consultation ' does not acknowledge the influence of the middle 
manager on the decision taken. And even if the middle manager's 
opinions and suggestions are not incorporated into the decision, 
still this 'consultation ' would provide him with the feeling of 
having a sort of psychological influence on the top manager, and of 
being important. Also this 'consultation' may please and placate him 
and provide him with a degree of informality and a feeling of 
equality which may reduce the power-distance between him and the top 
manager. Thus this type of 'consultation', which these middle 
managers considered to be 'participation', seems to have the effect 
of reducing the large power-distance between middle managers and tcp 
managers in Iraqi organization, which is in line with what has been 
suggested by writers such as Strauss (1963), Hofstede (1980), and 
Kavcic and Tannenbaum (1981). In fact middle managers may have used 
this 'consultation' as a "face-saving mechanism" (Muna 1980, p.60) 
which enables them to reply 'yes, we were consulted on   or, yes.
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we do participate in when questioned by the researcher.
However, 'delegation' has been found not only to affect middle 
managers' behaviour but also to have some affect on their 
orientation. This could be because 'delegation* provides the middle 
manager with apparent, clear-cut influence of authority, which partly 
satisfies his strong need for power and influence which stems from 
his cultural value-orientation and his organizational dilenma of 
power deficiency. Thus 'delegation' could effectively help in 
solving middle managers' organizational dilemmas and benefit their 
growth and reduce their compliance through developing their 
innovative abilities and initiative. But Iraqi organizations are 
unlikely to benefit from this style of dec is ion-making in reducing 
middle managers compliance in relation to top managers. This is due 
to the fact that those in tcç> management positions are not ready or 
willing to delegate part of their authority to middle managers and if 
they do they only delegate non-policy and routine decisions. Also in 
practice they tend to freeze middle managers' formal delegated 
authority by conditioning middle manager's ability to take decisions 
to their approval or agreement. In fact middle managers themselves 
do not utilize their delegated authority. This is partly because 
they are culturally not trained to be self-independent in taking 
decisions, and partly by their tendency to avoid accepting 
responsibilities, fear of negative judgements, and lack of experience 
in problem solving and analytical thinking. These and other factors 
have made middle managers in Iraq more willing to let'̂ decisions be 
made by others for them. In fact under-utilization of 'delegation' 
has been recognized by Muna (1980) in many Arabic organizations.
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The second organizational factor that is assumed to have an 
affect on middle managers' behaviour toward top management was 'role 
conflict and ambiguity'. Research findings have suggested that role 
conflict affects middle managers' behaviour rather than orientation. 
High role conflict, particularly among managers holding 'low' and 
'middle' degrees of ' Bureaucratic-feudal orientation' tend to 
decrease their compliance to the expectations of superiors, except 
among those with 'very high' degrees of 'bureaucratic-feudal 
orientation' who tend to increase this compliance. Such a result may 
suggest that 'orientation' may somehow condition the affect of role 
conflict on 'behaviour'. Thus among those who are 'very highly' 
oriented toward compliance, one can find support for the assumption
that more role conflict leads to more compliance to superiors
expectations as the literature has suggested. Finding that role
conflict may decrease middle managers' compliance to superior's 
expectations among those who are not highly oriented toward 
compliance, would reveal many implications. Such responses are 
conditioned by the judgement of feeling that top managers'
expectations fron subordinates are not fair and there is a strong 
human reason and social values behind subordinates' objections to 
such expectations. Also even with such feelings or judgements, these 
middle managers - if we accept that in reality they will try to meet 
their subordinates expectations - would be very careful in their ways 
of communicating and talking so as not to upset the top manager or 
show any personal disagreement. On the other hand, middle managers 
in Iraqi organizaitons are not heavily exposed to role conflict, as 
is the case in Western organizations. This is due mainly to low 
oppositicxi and resistance fron subordinates which stems from the 
cultural deference to authority, avoidance of frankness and open
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confrontation, concern for safety and security, and the superiors 
reliance on a position of power. Also if conflict situations occur, 
top managers would use firm tactics to handle the situation rather 
than persuasion, bargaining, conpromise and the like (Muna 1980). 
Thus Iraqi middle managers have not experienced being subject to real 
and sustained conflict which would test or stretch their compliance 
according to different situational requirements. And if they do 
experience such conflict, it is likely to have a litle affect on 
them, due to their cultural characteristic of 'rigidity'. Rigidity, 
as Kahn and Boulding (1964) suggest, results in less feelings of 
tension in the high pressure situation, and an individual is less 
likely to modify his behaviour in ways which are organizationally 
desirable. So their reported 'high feeling of role conflict' could 
be, rather than a reflection of real experience, a tendency to give 
'desirable answers', or show a verbal or apparent concern for 
subordinates.
Role ambiguity, coupled with low tolerance for 'uncertainty', 
was assumed through what the literature suggested, to increase middle 
managers' compliance in relation with top managers. It was found 
(Chapter 8), that the individual's socialization experience in 
different stages of his life within Iraqi society does not provide 
him with high tolerance for ambiguity or uncertainty and thus 
'authoritarianism' and ' fatal ism ' provide him with buffering 
mechanisms within which he can shield himself and escape from 
uncertainty. Thus individuals' 'low tolerance for uncertainty' 
reflects itself in their reaction to role ambiguity; managers with 
greater role ambiguity are more likely to behave compliantly than 
those with less role ambiguity. In fact this factor also has its 
effect on middle managers 'behaviour' rather tdian orientation. So
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one cannot say that innovation, autonomy and professional growth 
will increase in organizations such as those in Iraq when role 
clarity and definition is low, as Stewart (1970) has suggested. This 
is so because individuals in Iraqi organizations with their 'low 
tolerance for ambiguity' and sparse role definition (e.g. no job 
description or statement of objectives) tend to depend on authority 
figures' instructions and directions to provide them with a narrow 
concept in defining their roles. Also lack of role clarity increases 
their compliance to authority figures (i.e. top managers) as this 
compliance provides them with a buffering mechanism within which they 
can escape from the uncertainty generated by the ambiguity in their 
roles. This result supports Tayeb's (1981) findings in Iranian 
organizations and the positive relationship that has been found by 
Marsh (1978) between intolerance of ambiguity and 'field dependence'. 
Also research findings in role conflict and ambiguity seem to be in 
line with what House and Rizzo (1972) have suggested in that role 
ambiguity is a more powerful variable than role conflict for 
explaining organizational behaviour.
'Job satisfaction' appears to offer support in saying that 
individual orientations are more likely to condition or affect 
responses to organizational factors than the other way round. Thus 
the relationship that was found between job satisfaction and middle 
managers' bureaucratic-feudal orientation may show that managers who 
are highly oriented toward compliance are more likely to be 'more 
satisfied ' in Iraqi organizations than those who are less oriented 
toward compliance. This result is quite in line with the assumption 
highlighted by Gordon (1970), in that "the greater the congruence 
between the orientation of the individual and the organization, the 
greater the satisfaction of the individual" (p.9). On the other
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hand, job satisfaction has been found to affect middle managers 
'behaviour'. This effect was not consistent in one direction,such as 
'high satisfaction would result more compliance', but rather in two 
directions. First; 'non-compliant behaviouour' was shown by the 
'more satisfied' managers than by the 'less satisfied' ones. This 
would reflect the view that the more satisfied are those with a 
greater influence and good relationship with superiors and these are 
more able to afford non-compliance, which is likely to be apparent 
and a political way of communicating with both superiors and 
subordinates. This is particularly true of a high percentage of 
managers who are 'very high' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation and 
who have reported very high levels of satisfaction (Tables 51-53 and 
their analyses). These middle managers have been found (chapter 7), 
as Pelz (1952) suggests, to have influence on superiors, and they are 
likely to be viewed by subordinates as effective and successful. 
Thus they try through their apparent non-compliance to show their 
subordinates their (i.e. middle managers) concern about their (i.e. 
subordinates) expectations. But as has been emphasized before, their 
attempt to meet subordinates expectations would not make them stand 
up or 'go into bat' for their subordinates rights, rather they would 
be very careful in handling the issue so as not to upset the top 
manager or show any personal disagreement or objection. Second; 
'extreme compliance' was shown not only by those who were 'very high' 
in satisfaction but also by those who were 'very low' in 
satisfaction, more so than by managers who were only 'satisfied'. It 
seems that those who were extremely high and extremely low are in a 
position to be more concerned about their level of satisfaction; 
those who are 'very low' (i.e. not satisfied and slightly satisfied) 
desperately need to satisfy their very unsatisfied active needs.
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which depends on those who overrule them (i.e. top managers). Thus 
they are ready to provide those superiors with ccmplete ccmpliance in 
hope of their help in satisfying their (i.e. middle managers') active 
needs. On the other hand those who are 'very high' in satisfaction 
(i.e. very and extremely satisfied) have reached a state of 
satisfaction of their active needs which they are not ready to lose. 
Thus their complete ccmpliance is the price they have to pay for 
maintaining and as exchange for the very high satisfaction of their 
needs.
In respect of the contribution of the 'extrinsic' and 
'instrinsic' variables in the satisfaction and disatisfaction of 
middle managers under study, research findings do not support 
Hertzberg's two-factor theory (1959). Hiis is so because in contrast 
to this theory, we found, [as Lahiri and Srivastva (1967) have found] 
that 'extrinsic' and 'instrinsic' job factors contributed to the 
'satisfaction' and dissatisfaction of middle managers but to various 
degrees.
SUMMftRY
In this chapter the researcher has demonstrated the fieldwork 
findings in studying organizational factors that were assumed to 
affect middle managers behaviour toward top managers in Iraqi 
organizations. Middle managers responses to these organizational 
factors were dominated by their desire to give 'desirable answers', 
particularly in favour of top managers. Despite that, on the level 
of their variation in 'orientation' and 'behaviour' toward top 
managers in terms of the general tendency that was found to be 
associated with each factor, organizational factors affect their 
'behaviour' (action) rather than their 'orientation'. This would
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support the notion that organizational socialization affects the way 
individuals adjust themselves and construct their behaviour to meet 
their role requirements rather than their basic characteristics. 
Even more, in the case of Iraq, organizational socialization seems 
not to result in a substantial change in middle managers' orientation 
(i.e. 'shoulds' and 'beliefs in'). This could give support to the
cultural argument that organizations are a part of society and one of 
its institutions, which through their socialization functions, build 
up and reinforce the culturally shared value-orientations. So the 
compliance and over-dependency on superiors that one can observe in 
Iraqi organizations are not the product of organizational 
socialization only, but of socialization as a life-long process in 
which organizations participate too. The general tendencies of 
middle managers' 'behaviour' associated with 'top manager's 
leadership behaviour', 'middle managers participation in decision- 
making', and 'middle managers role ambiguity', were in line with what 
the literature suggested. So managers who are subject to supportive 
leadership, who participate more, and who experience low role 
ambiguity, were less likely to behave compliantly than those with 
autocratic top leadership, less participation, and subject to high 
role ambiguity. But the general tendency associated with 'role 
conflict' was partly not in line with what the literature suggested, 
as those who reported greater feelings of role-conflict held 
relatively low degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and 
indicated less compliant behaviour. But those who reported greater 
feelings of role-conflict and held very high degrees of bureaucratic- 
feudal orientation revealed more compliance. If this has given some 
support to the idea that 'orientation' is likely to condition the 
effect of organizational factors on middle managers behaviour, the
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general tendency associated with 'job satisfaction' clearly supports 
such ideas; managers who are highly orientated toward ccmpliance are 
more likely to be 'more satisfied' in Iraqi organization than those 
who are less orientated toward ccmpliance. But if non-compliant 
behaviour was shown by the more satisfied managers, complete 
compliance was indicated by those who are 'very high' and 'very low' 
in satisfaction more than by those who are just satisfied. 
'Instrinsic' as well as 'extrinsic' variables were found to 
contribute to both satisfaction and dissatisfaction of middle 




Initially this research was conducted in an attempt to gain some 
significant insights and understanding into middle managers' 
compliant behaviour in relation to top managers in Iraq. Taking the 
position of viewing this behaviour as a function of both the 
organization and the individual (rather than the suggested one-sided 
picture of the organization alone) introduced this research to a 
wider and longer term investigation, that of exploring the impact of 
culture in constructing organizational behaviour, which later became 
the major contribution of this research. Among the many objectives 
at which this study was aimed, the investigations have mainly 
clustered around two objectives:
1 - TO explore the impact of 'culture' in wider society and the
organizational culture on employees' (viz. middle managers) 
organizational behaviour in relation to organizations' 
authority figures (viz. top managers).
2 - To investigate middle managers' compliance in relation to
top managers, and the affecting factors and the extent of 
their effect on this compliance.
To achieve these objectives we have explored in the preceding 
chapters many topics at different levels of analysis: societal, 
organizational and individual. It is time now to stand back and 
critically review the research findings to assess their implications 
and the contributions of these inplications to existing theories.
Inferences and Implications;
As a conclusion to the research findings was presented at the 
end of each chapter throughout the thesis, thus in order to avoid 
unnecessary repetition, the concern in the following pages will be
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with the main dimensional implications of these findings, without 
stating them again.
Through adopting the approach of "organizations within society" 
in studying organizational behaviour, particularly in relation to 
authority in Iraqi organizations, this research adds support to the 
utility of this approach in the field of organizational behaviour. 
Within this field, this approach, as Child (1981) states, "lacks a 
substantial body of supporting research" (p. 336). Also the outcomes 
of this research have demonstrated the contributions that a socio- 
historical study of the evolution of society and its institutional 
development can make tov̂ rd understanding organizational behaviour. 
In fact such a study, as in the case of this research, has proved 
extremely difficult because of the existing scarcity of written 
sources in the social science on Iraq and Arabic world in general. 
Moreover, most of what is available (with extremely few examples) in 
the social sciences and in the history of Arabic and Middle Eastern 
countries has adopted either a legal-formal or pure historical 
evolutionary approach, thus maintaining a neutral and favourable, or 
preaching attitude. Also the few foreign studies about Iraq and 
Arabic and Middle Eastern societies and history are either purely 
historical in nature, or view people and society from the outside and 
through their own cultural concepts. Thus the researcher had to use 
a wide range of studies from many different fields in an extensive 
critical investigation of events, development and facts, and 
carefully weighing the evidence of the validity of the information 
provided by these studies about the past. Also the interpretation of 
this evidence and exploring their cumulative meanings and impact in 
the evolution of society had to be carried out. However, one of the 
contributions that this socio-historical study of Iraqi society has
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made is in showing that the culture of Iraqi society has 
accumulatively acquired an identity, particularly in relation to 
authority, quite different than the original identity of its basic 
conponents, i.e. 'Bedouin culture ' and 'Islam'. Also I have 
demonstrated how different generations have participated in the 
distorted development of this original identity through their efforts 
to find solutions among limited alternatives to their basic life 
problems under different historical realities. This represents the 
fact that individuals are not totally moulded by the societal norms 
and values that they receive from older generations, but rather these 
social norms are subject to the individual's interpretations and 
selective adoptation through the limited alternatives available to 
serve their objectives and to cope with their life basic problems. 
In other words societal norms for any given society are both the 
"conditioning elements of further action" and the "products of 
action" (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952, cited in Child 1981, p. 329). 
Thus any new generation receives these conditioning elements of 
actions from older people which become subject to the new 
generation's interpretation and experiences in coping with their life 
problems. Accordingly the product of the new generations' actions 
reinforce, or modify and even alter, some features of the old 
product. Then the whole product passes to the next generation to be 
interpreted and experienced once more, but the framework of the whole 
product continues to be relatively persistent in nature, particularly 
in traditional societies. Also after looking at the socio-historical 
study, we gained more understanding of the grounded bases upon which 
we were able to distinguish and highlight the dominant value- 
orientations which are historically deeply rooted within the culture 
of the nation, and more to provide a deeper understanding of their
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institutional origins. In addition, reference to the socio- 
historical institutional development proved of great value in 
identifying some of the variations in localized sub-cultures within 
Iraq national culture (such as urban vs. rural sub-cultures).
The culture of Iraqi wider society was found to have a 
foundational impact in constructing organizational behaviour, which 
lends great support to the view that 'culture' can shape patterns of 
organizational behaviour (Evan 1975; Brossard and Maurioe 1976; Child 
1981; Tayeb 1981; Bate 1982), particularly in power-relationships in 
bureaucratic-organizations (Crozier 1964; 1973). From studying the 
dominant value-orientations of Iraqi contemporary society we have 
distinguished the culturally shared conceptual structure, 
particularly in relation to authority, that Iraqi individuals would 
acquire from their socialization process and are likely to hold when 
they join work organizations. In fact this study has clearly 
revealed the invalidity of considering many cultural characteristics 
as typical of Arab societies or typical characteristics of the Arabs 
only, as they were found in many non-Arabic countries (i.e. Iran; 
Tayeb 1981), and Western countries (i.e. all PDI countries; Hbfstede 
1980), but to various degrees. However, individuals in Iraq in their 
shared conceptual structure are likely to be culturally predisposed 
and oriented toward submission values, i.e. ccmpliance, dependency, 
respect for authority figures, and strategic submissive behaviour, 
when they are 'powerless'. But they are also highly oriented toward 
'superiority values', i.e. dominance, ccmmand, and haughtiness when 
they are in positions of power. Tlius these research findings 
challenged the one-sided picture of the inpact of formal 
organizations on individuals personality characteristics, since 
individuals in Iraq before joining work organizations were found to
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be initially oriented toward conformity and dependency, and it is not 
the bureaucratic structure of their organizations which has produced 
such characteristics, as Merton (1940) has suggested. But no doubt 
the bureaucracy has to a great extent reinforced and increased the 
level of such characteristics. In fact it was found that Iraqi 
organizations are not Weberian bureaucratic organizations, as had 
been assumed, but rather under the demand for 'rationality' and 
'formality' they are bureaucratic-oriented ones. The nature and 
characteristics of these organizations clearly contrasts with the 
notion of a single type of modem bureaucracy governed by 
universalistic standards, which has dominated a great part of the 
literature. Iraqi bureaucratic-oriented organizations clearly 
reflect the impact of the culture of wider society. By refering to 
the historical institutional development of these organizations 
within society, it was found that certain special features marked its 
emergence and development, and deeply crystalized their cultural 
nature and affected the extent of the existence of Weber's 
bureaucracy characteristics. Out of its first special feature, that 
of the duality of identification or the existence in a twilight zone 
of cultures (i.e. Turks, British, Iraqi national culture with its 
tradition - modern sub-cultures), organizational culture in Iraq 
acquired the identity of being a 'bureaucratic-feudal' one (i.e. a 
mixture of role and power cultures). Such a culture partly reflects 
the culture of wider society whose feudal system symbolizes its main 
characteristics, and partly the formal bureaucratic characteristics 
as were set by the Ottoman and British occupations. The connection 
between bureaucracy and politics in Iraq has been much closer than in 
the West, which represents the second feature of Iraqi bureaucracy. 
This is so because of two factors ; first: the administrative body has
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been an instrument for political influence and control, especially 
for nation-building; second; the close connection bebveen economic 
and political power. The last and the most affecting feature is that 
modem formal bureaucracy in Iraq did not emerge as a natural 
phenomenon from within society, but rather was established by the 
British Colonial power on what was inherited from the Ottoman 
occupation. Thus its structure and settings were accumulatively 
constructed through the congruence and clashing between bureaucratic 
and cultural components. Consequently cultural components appear 
within the latent function of many apparently dysfunctional 
activities in both aspects 'formality' and 'informality'. Through 
the extreme emphasis of bureaucracy on 'formality' many cultural 
components found a fruitful environment for growth, such as 
authoritarianism and maintaining a large power-distance, superiority 
propensity, haughtiness, and rigidity. But those components to which 
bureaucracy has been so hostile, such as paternalistic familisra, 
personal obligations, emotionality, and dislike of formality has 
appeared in forms judged to be 'irrational' and negative, such as 
favouritism, personal consideration, and informal cliques. These 
findings highly support Crozier's (1964, 1973) thesis of the
bureaucratic model of organizational behaviour. This thesis suggests 
that organizational structure and patterns of action are to a large 
extent culture-bound, and thus dysfunctional patterns of 
' bureaupathology ' take forms that are related to the culture where 
the sick bureaucracy is found. But if in the case of France as he 
reports as well as in England as Bate (1981) found, culture has "got 
it wrong" for organizations, in the case of Iraq not only has culture 
'got it wrong' for bureaucracy but also bureaucracy has 'got it 
wrong' for culture, by participating in developing the negative
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identity that this culture has acquired. Also it is not culture by 
itself that has 'got it wrong' for Iraqi organizations but rather the 
congruence - clashing type of interaction between bureaucratic and 
cultural components that is wrong for these organizations. So Iraqi 
bureaucracy, since its establishment, has tried, on its surface, to 
give a picture that everything is impersonal, while its underlying 
character reflects the hidden cultural 'personalization'.
In other words, while organizational culture and socialization 
in Iraq reinforces and validates the individuals' initial cultural 
orientation that suits the bureaucratic formality and centralization 
of authority, it rejects and invalidates those cultural orientation 
that do not suit this formality, such as an obligation toward 
personal ties and paternalistic familial expectations.
I hope this study will help the organizational designers in Iraq 
to realize that the human being cannot be something else but only a 
human being; he cannot be absolutely impersonal as they want him to 
be, especially when he belongs to a culture and society full of 
personal ties and loyalties. And thus they need to take into 
consideration the culture of wider society and the individuals value- 
orientations and expectations. In fact the problem with those 
designers is that they have been trying to accommodate or adapt the 
people's culture to the bureaucratic formal requirements under the 
notion of 'modernity' and 'rationality', rather than accommodate this 
bureaucracy to the culture of the pecple. All the efforts of the OD 
in Iraq are no more than an idealism, a call for 'rationality' in 
terms of a conceived Western example and 'ready-packaged' solution, 
and at the same time a condemnation of irrationality. This idealism 
has totally ignored the culture and reality of day-to-day life in 
wider society. In fact organizations in Iraq could benefit, as did
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Japanese organizations (Abegglen 1958; McClelland 1969), from their 
congruence with cultural components of wider society such as the 
'paternalistic familism' which is highly favoured by individuals in 
Iraqi society, but judged by organizational designers to be 
irrational, thus condemned and faught.
Although this research supported Crozier's (1973) thesis of the 
bureaucratic model of organizational behaviour, the research findings 
contrast with his claim of saying that rigidity, a predominance of 
formality over informality, and a concern for hierarchical 
differentiation by status and privilege are uniquely French traits, 
as they have also been found in Iraq in this research. Here the 
research findings (in addition to those of Hofstede 1980; Child 1981; 
Bate 1982) lend support to the Universal or 'dominant but variable ' 
thesis of culture (Kluckhohn 1964). This research has singled out 
this thesis on the level of different individuals in cxie 
organizational level (i.e. middle managers) across different 
organizations in one country (Iraq). These middle managers indicated 
a dominant pattern of orientation (i.e. bureaucratic-feudal 
orientation) and behaviour (i.e. compliant behaviour) in relation to 
the authority figures of their organizations (i.e. top managers) but 
to various degrees. Their dominant bureaucratic-feudal orientation 
and compliant behaviour show the large power-distance that exists 
between themselves as middle managers and those in top management 
positions. Such an orientation and behaviour reflect the shared 
conceptual structure of relation to authority that they hold in 
common. At the same time their differing degrees of dominant 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation and compliant behaviour indicate 
their variation within the generalized conceptual structure. The 
quality of their 'compliance' arises out of their cultural underlying
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impression of 'personalization of authority and loyalty', thus as the 
research's first hypothesis described, they conply with the top 
manager and conform to his expectations as he is a person who 
possesses higher authority and power, rather than because he is a 
leader with whom they share organizational leadership and 
responsibilities. Their ccmpliance is not a simple subservience in 
response to a stimulus or a reflection of a personality disorder, as 
suggested by Merton (1940). But rather their 'socialization' and 
'powerlessness' both produced their compliance. Those adults have 
been socialized in a culture whose dominant value-orientations in 
relation to authority and power are authoritarian relationships that 
maintain a large power-distance associated with the image or 
impression of personalized possession of and traditional respect for 
authority, dependency, and strategic compliance. Such cultural 
meanings or value-orientations are built up and reinforced by the 
Iraqi social institutions, mainly the family and school. Also 
organizations in Iraq, with their dominance 'bureaucratic-feudal* 
culture, have strongly participated in building up and reinforcing 
these cultural value-orientations. So the superior-subordinate role- 
taking situation within Iraqi organizations, where the middle 
managers play the role of 'subordinate' to the top manager, does not 
differ in its fundamental construction of 'dominant-submissive* 
pattern from other customary situations (i.e. child-father, pupil- 
teacher, ... etc.) which the middle manager has experienced
individually. Thus the power-distance that exists between middle and 
top managers and its authoritarian conceptual structure is actually a 
culturally derived phenomenon, which support Hofstede (1980)
findings. But while Hofstede's findings remain, as Child (1981)
states, no more than suggestions, the findings of this research are
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grounded on t±ie basis of the research's socio-historical and 
institutional analysis of the society concerned (i.e. Iraq), which is 
absent in Hofstede's analysis and judgements. So the top manager or 
the 'head' symbolically represents all the authority figures that 
either the middle manager as an individual has experienced them 
directly as father, teacher ... etc. or indirectly through their 
influences on the way societal norms of relation to authority have 
cummulatively constructed. Iraqi middle managers are highly
politically-minded in relation to authority figures in their
organization, not only because they are powerless, but also because 
they have a cultural 'superiority propensity' and thus a strong need 
and willingness to be in position of power. Thus they use their 
compliance strategically in order to handle the boss, to protect 
their positions, avoid unpleasant outcomes, and get rewards and serve 
their personal objectives, but mainly to get at the power resources.
Using the 'dominant but variable' thesis of culture in studying 
middle managers' organizational behaviour in Iraq, the investigation 
of this research did not stop at the dominant level but moved to 
investigate middle managers variations at this dominant level and the 
'individuality' and 'organizational' factors that could underlay
these variations. It was found that only in the sense of a general 
tendency that we can say that these factors affect middle managers' 
degree of compliance, as was assumed in the research's second 
hypothesis. The 'fear of negative judgement' and the tendency to 
give 'desirable answers' clearly dominated many middle managers in 
answering the questionnaire in respect to questions related to their 
'family life' or to 'the behaviour of the boss'. Thus in further 
research great attention should be given to designing and 
constructing questions inquiring about information on these aspects.
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particularly in choosing the words, as these questions can trigger 
some cultural sensitivities, as may have happened in this research. 
However the general tendencies of the affects of these factors on 
middle managers' 'orientation' and 'behaviour' suggests that 
'individuality factors' affect both 'orientation' and 'behaviour', 
but the effect of organizational factors is clearer on behaviour 
rather than on orientation. In fact studying these factors proved to 
be valuable in understanding the peculiarity of Iraqi subcultural 
differences and the nature of Iraqi social institutions and 
socialization, particularly organizational socialization. In 
considering the individuality factors, it was found that older middle 
managers, those with fathers in bureaucratic occupations, and those 
who had less formal educaticHi were more oriented and likely to behave 
ocmpliantly, which supported what the literature had suggested, but 
with notable exceptions. Factors such as urban vs. rural background, 
parental level of education, and childhood experiences clearly 
revealed the nature of Iraqi culture and social institutions, which 
was suggested in this research. Urban vs. rural subjective cultures 
or cultural differences in Iraq have contrasted what the literature 
suggests as managers with rural background have showed less 
compliance than urban ones. This reflects the peculiarity of Iraqi 
subcultural differences, as was shown by this research. Also Iraqi 
societal norms and the nature of the socialization of formal 
educational institutions have shown their influence, since it was 
found that the effect of inequality in formal education between 
fathers and mothers on middle managers orientaticxi and behaviour is 
greater than the suggested effect of the level of parental education. 
Concepts related to personal authoritarianism in Western countries, 
such as the effect of constant vs. intermittent use of punishment and
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reasoning in childhood experiences on the degree of such
authoritarianism (Harvey et al 1961), seems not to be the case in
Arabic and middle Eastern countries. In these countries, as we have 
seen, authoritarianism is on the level of societal norms or culture 
and authoritarian orientations within individuals' characteristics 
are the result of their socialization within such a culture and not a 
personality disorder, as measurement such as the E-scale (Adomo et 
al. 1950) and like may show. So if individuals in Iraqi society are 
conforming to their general cultural value-orientations, this may 
open a door for new strategies in cultural changes. In fact no doubt 
that cultural changes are extremely slow and difficult, but one can 
work to establish the starting point. The strategies of OD and 
economical and social development in non-Westem countries (such as 
Iraq) should not necessarily be based on a Western philosophical 
notion, but rather derived from the tradition of the people and cxi 
concepts that are partly already there such as 'Islam'. In fact in
the long-run, ' Islamic teachings' could provide a culturally
acceptable base which could be employed strategically to change 
socialization patterns or social value-orientations. If the 
mis interpretation and misconception of Islamic teachings helped to 
develop the negative identity of Iraqi culture, then employing the 
original identity of Islamic teachings in cultural change strategies 
could help to correct this negative identity. But the chances of 
doing this are probably pretty slim owing to the fact that employing 
Islamic teachings is a very delegated operation, and needs a lot of 
courage and patience in order to accommodate Islamic ideals to the 
reality of social life. Organizational socialization could provide 
another approach for the OD efforts in countries such as Iraq if such 
an approach tried to encourage organizations to meet the employees'
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cultural expectations - such as paternalistic familism particularly 
in authority relationships. In fact Moore (1974), by referring to 
the Japanese exaitple and to Rice's (1958) achievement in an Indian 
factory, draws attention to the importance of the congruency for non- 
Wes tern organization, between organizational environment and setting 
and the culture and tradition of wider society. He concurs with 
Whitehall and Takazawa (1968) in saying that "the effectiveness of a 
particular industrial relations system lies more in the degree of 
achieved accommodation compatible with the economic and social goals 
of the society than [does it] conformity with ... industrially 
advanced nations" (p. 39) (Moore's words in brackets).
The length of organizational socialization reflected by
'seniority' and 'number of years in managerial positions' were found
in this research to present what could be called 'directions of 
inter-influence ' between employee and organization comparable to the 
individual in wider society at large with consideration to the time 
dimension of 'age'. In other words, in one direction the longer the 
period of socialization within a specific culture (e.g. Iraqi 
bureaucratic-feudal organizational culture) the more likely the 
individual would be oriented and ready to behave as culturally
required (e.g. compliant) which present the dimension of the 
influence of culture and socialization. But in the other direction 
the more seniority the actor holds, the greater his experience and 
capacity (e.g. to handle the job in organization), and consequently, 
the greater his influence on his given group (e.g. organization), and 
thus the more likely he is to be able to afford not to behave as 
culturally required (e.g. non-ccmpliant behaviour). This presents 
the dimension of individual influence.
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Studying the 'organizational factors' that assume to affect 
middle managers' 'orientation' and 'behaviour' proved to be very 
valuable in understanding the nature of Iraqi organizational 
socialization. It was found that the effect of organizational 
factors studied in this research is marked in middle management 
'behaviour' than in their 'orientation'. This supports Brim (1966) 
and Schein (1971) who suggest that organizational socialization 
affects the individual's social selves rather than their basic 
personalities. Such an affect is likely to be even less marked when 
the organizational socialization mechanism tries to produce personal 
changes that are not familiar to the people in the wider society and 
in work organizations, particularly when such mechanism is 
accidentally and temporarily employed. In other words, due to the 
authoritarian nature of culture in wider society and of the 
organizational subculture in Iraq, democratic or supportive 
socialization that may be utilized by the individual's formal leaders 
is an accidental and temporary issue as it is a matter of their 
personal choice and characteristics thus it would only produce a 
short adjustment on the level of employees' actions. This type of 
socialization needs a continual reaffirmation and more strategic 
activities in order to produce the personal changes that are not in 
line with what people have been accustomed to. However, finding that 
'supportive leadership' and 'participation in decision-making' (in 
terms of individual - to individual consultation) hold their effect 
in reducing compliant behaviour in Iraqi organizations could reflect 
a cultural meaning that individuals may attribute to such 
socialization. A supportive leader could provide them with the image 
of a 'good father' who treats them in a considerate and human manner 
thereby satisfying some of their culturally paternalistic familism
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expectations about authority figures. In fact this would support the 
research's previous argument that organizations in Iraq could benefit 
from acconmodating themselves to the cultural paternalistic familism 
expectations of the employees. Such accommodation could make
organizational socializational influence more effective in producing 
the required personal changes. Also 'participation' in terms of 
consultation in decision-making could provide employees with the 
traditional 'consultation' of wider society and with informality, and 
with a feeling of having influence and importance thereby reducing 
the degree of psychological power-distance that exists between them 
and their superiors. 'Delegation' could be highly effective in 
resolving middle managers problems in Iraqi organizations as it 
provides them with clear-cut authority and influence which they
culturally and organizationally strive for and develops their 
initiative.
Research findings suggests that in studying the effects of 'role 
conflict and ambiguity' as well as 'job satisfaction' on middle 
managers' 'orientation' and 'behaviour', such effects were not only 
apparent more on behaviour than on orientation, but more
'orientation' ('shoulds' and 'beliefs in') seems, to one degree or 
another, to condition the affect of these organizational factors on 
behaviour. In fact the research findings on these factors reflected 
cultural influences. The assumption of the literature, that more 
role conflict leads to more compliance with the expectations of 
superiors, is only supported amongst those who are 'very highly' 
oriented towards compliance. The reported feeling of role conflict 
and the consequence of its association with any pattern of
organizational behaviour (e.g. compliance), within Iraqi 
organizations, cannot represent reality because of the low cultural
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exposure to role conflict. This low experience of role conflict 
comes about mainly because of the low opposition and resistance by 
subordinates as a reflection of their value-orientation of deference 
to authority, avoidance of frankness and open confrontation, and 
concern for safety and security. Also because of the top managers 
firm tactics in handling conflict situations which stem from their 
reliance on a position of power.
In contrast to the universal is tic assumption of some writers as 
Stewart (1970) who suggest that low role-definition would lead to 
autonomy and innovation, it was found that a high feeling of role- 
ambiguity has the affect of increasing middle managers* compliance 
behaviour. So it seems that such a suggested effect is conditioned 
by the degree of * tolerance for uncertainty* that individuals have 
been provided with during their socialization experience. The 
culturally low tolerance for ambiguity that Iraqi middle managers 
have, coupled with high role ambiguity, led them to comply more with 
authority figures in their organizations (i.e. top managers) because 
such compliance provides them with a buffering mechanism with which 
they can escape from 'uncertainty* in their roles.
As Gorden (1970) highlighted and in line with Pelz (1952) 
findings, it was found that those Iraqi middle managers who are 
highly oriented toward compliance, and thus very likely to have 
influence on, and good relationship with superiors, are highly 
satisfied. In this respect therefore, it seems that 'orientation' 
maintains its effect on 'job satisfaction' rather than the other way 
round. However, on the level of 'behaviour', both those who are 
'very high' and those 'very low' in satisfaction are more ready than 
others to provide superiors with extreme compliance, because both 
groups are in a position to be very concerned about their
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satisfaction. Whilst the first group are not ready to lose the very 
high degree of satisfaction, the second one are desperate to satisfy 
their very unsatisfied active needs, which in both cases is dependant 
on those at the top.
As Lahiri and Srivastva ( 1967 ) found in studying middle managers 
satisfaction in India, research findings did not support Herzberg's 
two-factor theory (1959), as both 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' job 
variables contributed to the 'satisfaction' and 'dissatisfaction' of 
middle managers but to varying degrees. This supported Hofstede 's 
(1981) argument against the 'universal order of needs' that 
characterize most motivational theories. It is likely that the 
degree that 'extrinsic' and 'intrinsic' factors contribute in 
producing 'satisfaction' and 'dissatisfaction' depends highly on the 
individual's culturally active needs and on the degree to which the 
relevant environment has been able to provide a satisfaction to such 
needs.
This research in its broader contribution is an example against 
all the universalistic models of assuming that organization behaviour 
is only the product of formal standardized organizations. 
Organizational behaviour is a function of both the individual and the 
organization.
LiMnancNS
Initially, the researcher was faced with a basic problem, that 
of the lack of previous studies dealing with many aspects of the 
phenomenon under study. Despite the presumed importance of 
addressing the problems associated with middle management, there are 
few articles written on the subject and remarks af^ared in some 
books and mainly through following a normative analysis. Moreover,
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despite the great need for employing the "organizations within 
society" approach in studying organizational behaviour, one is faced 
with the problem of little suportive studies. The researcher 
experienced great difficulty in studying the impact of culture on 
management and organizational behaviour in Iraq, owing not only to 
the scarcity of studies on management and organization, but also on 
the culture of the Iraqi society as a whole, including its 
sociological, psychological, political and economical aspects. Such 
scarcity of studies on culture and society in Iraq made it necessary 
to draw, in many cases, on available studies about the Arab world in 
general. This, however presents other problems as Arabic societies, 
despite all their basic similarities in their dominant patterns of 
culture, still hold many variations which stem from differing 
historical, ecological, political and economical realities. Thus 
their is a need for cultural studies across Arabic countries to 
assess their variations and their impact on organizational behaviour. 
For this purpose this research could provide a basis for comparative 
cultural studies as well as for the growing interest of what has been 
called 'Arabic bureaucracy'.
Another limitation of this study concerns the methods of 
fieldwork study. Due to the sensitivity of subject-̂ natter of this 
research requiring the respondents' co-operation, added to the 
difficult conditions of fieldwork study in developing countries, the 
research population was limited only to the 'Ministry of Trade'. So 
this may not represent all organizations in Iraq and their 
variations. Consequently, their is a need for studies to compare 
different organizations with different functions, age, and sizes to 
assess their variations within the dominated pattern of Iraqi 
organizational culture that has been suggested by this research. On
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the other hand, owing to the limited availability of research 
resources, time and access to organizations, the verification of 
research hypotheses relied mainly on information collected by 
questionnaires with the aid of personal interviews. Although 
questionnaires and open discussions may provide enlightening details 
and insights, generally they cannot satisfactorily take the place of 
close observation of the way individuals behave in organizational 
settings. No doubt this investigation has benefited from the 
researcher's previous work observations and those of the fieldwork 
study, but still they cannot provide as much as a close 'participant 
observation ' can do in understanding the coiplexity of organizational 
behaviour. Individuals are constantly redefining their relationships 
with each other and thus, the observation of their past behaviour or 
a small part of the present one cannot illustrate present 
organizational realities as a whole.
Finally, the reliance on what the numbers suggested in studying 
middle managers variations on the dominant level of 'orientation' and 
'behaviour' may present another limitation of this study because we 
were able to work and assess the direction of these variaticxis on 
this suggestive level only. Thus more studies are needed of 
'variations within societies' and their effects on individual's 
behavioural variations within work organizations. These studies 




TABLES AND GROSS-TABULATION ANALYSIS
NB : in the heading to each table
(A) Means that the percentages are calculated by 
comparing categories;
(B) Means that the percentages are calculated by 
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Table 3
The distribution of 80 middle managers 













































































































* 25 = Respondent No. 25
448
Table 4
The distribution of 80 middle managers 











































































































11 = Respondent No. 11
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%ble 5

















1 27 40 7 5 1
2 30 37 5 7 1
3 68 11 1 0 0
4 10 15 10 32 13
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Middle managers responses to the 
first imaginary situation
PHASE A PHASE B
Can his superiors expect 
that civil servant to 
carry out their policy
YES NO





He should refuse 






The responses of the 36 middle managers Wio 
said that the civil servant should refuse to 











Discuss with superiors the 
issue and if they refuse 
to listen :
























No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
15 17% 2 10% 4 19% 6 17% 4 11% 3 8% 2 6%




Middle managers responses to the 
second imaginary situation










Discuss the issue 
with your workers . 
and then contact 
those in top 
management and 















No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %




Middle managers* responses on the two imaginary situations



























'B* 18 28 40 69 
79 36 52 73 

























12 57 77 7
33 47 61 55
8 64 20 43
















80 37 54 










tact those inj 
top manage- | 
ment & argue | 
with them... ) I
Ask 35 3 48
work­











29 4 34 45





























































tact those in 
top manage­









tact those in 
top manage­






















19 27 75 
14 39 53 
70 71 42 
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Age categories of middle managers
Age Number Percent
%
33 - 38 37 46
39 - 44 28 35
45 - 50 14 18




Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation 
and levels of compliant behaviour by Age (A)
Age
Categories Younger Group Under 45 years old Older Group Over 45 years old



















4 4 8 7 23 35% - - 2 2 4 27%
TOTAL
No. 8 17 29 11 65 - 3 9 3 15
% 12% 26% 45% 17% 100% - 19% 60% 21% 100%
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Table 14
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientatic*i 
and levels of compliant behaviour by Age (B)
Age Categories Younger Group 
'Under 45 years old'
Old Group 










No - 3 4 2
9
- 1 3 1
5





No 4 10 17 2
33
- 2 4 -
6







No 4 4 8 7
23
- - 2 2
4
% 50% 23% 29% 64% - - 22% 67%
TOTAL
No 8 17 29 11
65
- 3 9 3
15
i___ ,1 %( 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Analysis of Tables 13 and 14
By comparing those who are younger (i.e. under 45 years old) 
with the older ones (i.e. over 45 years old) as presented in Table
13/ we can examine the affect of age on the middle managers*
variations in the bureaucratic-feudal orientation and compliant
behaviour. If we focus on the association of age and the degrees of
bureaucratic-feudal orientation, we can observe that 'low degrees' 
are indicated more by younger middle managers than by older ones;-
- While none of those over 45 years old display a 'low' degree,
12% (8 out of 65) of younger managers indicate a 'low' degree in 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation.
- ihe percentage of younger middle mangers with 'middle ' 
degrees (26% '17 out of 65') is higher than the older ones of
the same degree (19% '3 out of 15').
- A reverse result to the above appears when we deal with the 
'high' degree in bureaucratic-feudal orientation, for while 60% 
(9 out of 15) of the older ones show such a degree, the
percentage among the younger ones is 45% (29 out of 65).
Although the older and younger managers have indicated 'very 
high' degrees in somewhat close percentages (17% '11 out of 65' 
of the younger, and 21% '3 out of 15' of the older), obviously
the percentage in the older group is higher than in the group of
younger managers.
Up until this point we could say that younger middle managers 
are more likely to have 'low degrees' in bureaucrat ic-feudal 
orientation. But while it is not very likely for the older manager 
to have a 'low degree', it is likely for the younger one to have 
'very high' degree.
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By examining the relation of age to the levels of 'compliant 
behaviour' (Table 13) as well as its affect on the relationship 
between orientation and behaviour (Table 14), it can be noticed that 
compliance is displayed more by older than younger managers;-
- While 33% (5 out of 15) of older managers revealed complete 
caipliance behaviour, only 14% (9 out of 65) of the younger 
indicated such behaviour. Also, this type of behaviour has 
clustered in similar percentages (Table 14) among the three 
groups with 'middle ', 'high' and 'very high' in both categories. 
But the percentages of the older three groups (33%; 33%; 33%) 
are higher than the younger ones (18%; 14%; 17%). While the 
older three groups show no variation in this behaviour, there is 
some variation between the younger three groups.
- If complete conpliant behaviour has appeared among older 
managers more than among the younger ones, wavering behaviour 
either tending towards compliance or non-compliance is more 
apparent among those who are younger (51% '3 out of 65'; 35% '23 
out of 65' among the younger ones, compared with 40% '6 out of 
15'; 27% '4 out of 15' among the older ones).
- Table 14 shows that in both categories, the majority of groups 
rating 'middle' and 'high' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation 
displayed wavering behaviour tending toward compliance. But 
while 23% (4 out of 17) of the 'middle' and 29% (8 out of 29) of 
the 'high' degrees of the younger managers' category tended more 
to non-compliance, none of the 'middle' and 22% (2 out of 9) of 
'high' groups in the older managers showed such a tendency.
- The majority of older as well as younger groups with 'very 
high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation, have shown 
wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance (67% '2 out of
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3'; 64% '7 out of 11') but while none of the older group 




middle managers' geographical areas of 
living up to age 20
Geographical 
area of living 
up to age 20
No. Percent
%

















Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation 
and levels of compliant behaviour by geographical 
area of living (urban vs. rural) 
up to age 20 (A)
Geographical 
Area of Living 
Up to Age '20'
Urban Areas 
(Baghdad and Provincial 
Capitals and Cities)
Rural Areas 














1 1 I •IÎ
Total















1 1 7 6 15 23% 3 2 4 3 12 80%




No. 5 17 32 11 65 3 3 6 3 15
% 8% 26% 49% 17% 100% 20% 20% 40% 20% 100%
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Table 17
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation 
and levels of compliant behaviour by geographical areas 
of living (urban vs. rural) up to Age 20 (B)
Geographical Area 
of living up to Age 
'20'
Urban Areas 
(Baghdad and Provincial 
Capitals and Cities)
Rural Areas 











No - 4 7 8
14
- — — —
-





No 4 12 18 2
36
- 1 2 -
3





No 1 1 7 6
15
3 2 4 3
12
% 20% 6% 22% 55% 100% 67% 67% 100%
TOTAL
No 5 17 32 11
cc
3 3 6 3
1 R
% 100% 100% 100% 100%
DO
100% 100% 100% 100%
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Analysis of Tables 16 and 17
Table 16 provides us with a comparison between those managers 
who have an urban background and those with a rural one. This 
comparison reveals that managers with a rural background seem more 
likely to hold 'low' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation than 
those with urban backgrounds:-
- 'Low' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation appeared 
among managers with a rural background In much higher 
percentages (20% '3 out of 15') than the urban group (8% '5 out 
of 65'). In fact, the researcher has found that those urbanites 
who scored 'low' are originally not from Baghdad where 
urbanization or the industrialization movement has centralized, 
but, rather, they have moved with their families at some time 
between their 10s and 20s to this city.
- Urban managers displayed 'middle' and 'high* degrees in higher 
percentages (26% and 49% - 17 and 32 out of 65 respectively) 
than those displayed by rural managers (20% and 40% - 3 and 6 
out of 15 respectively). But a 'very high' degree was scored in 
a lower percentage (17% '11 out of 65') than by managers with a 
rural background (20% '3 out of 15').
When we examine the association of the geographical factor with 
the levels of conpliant behaviour, as well as its affect on the 
relationship between middle managers* orientation and behaviour 
(Table 17), we can notice (Table 16) that the tendency toward 
compliance among urban managers is higher than seme rural managers :-
- While none of those with a rural background revealed * ccmplete 
compliant behaviour * (Table 16), 22% (14 out of 65) of those 
with an urban background did. Also, while the majority of the 
urban managers (55% * 36 out of 65') showed wavering behaviour
467
tending tovard compliance, the vast majority (80% '12 out of 
15') of those with rural backgrounds tended in their wavering 
behaviour not to comply.
- As Table 17 shows, while 80% (4 out of 5) of the urban 'low'
group tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance, and
20% (1 out of 5) not toward compliance, 100% (3 out of 3) of the 
rural 'low* group tended more to non-compliance.
- While complete compliant behaviour was clustered in somewhat 
close percentages (23%; 22%; 27%) by the three urban groups who 
rated * middle*, *high* and *very high *, such behaviour did not 
appear in the rural category.
- The majority of the urban managers with * middle * (71% *12 out 
of 17*) and *high* degrees (56% *18 out of 32*) displayed 
wavering behaviour tending toward compliance. But a reverse 
result was shown by rural managers - the majority of these two 
groups displayed a greater tendency not to comply (67% *2 out of 
3*; 67% *4 out of 6*).
- Although the majority (55% *6 out of 11*) of the urban
managers with *very high* degree of bureaucrat ic-feudal
orientation revealed wavering behaviour tending toward non-
compliance, this type of behaviour was shown by all of the rural
managers with *very high* degree (iœ% *3 out of 3*).
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Table 18
Middle managers' fathers' occupations
Fathers' occupations No. % !1 TotalNo. . %
rH
<rSIIIIw
Farmer 16 20% !
48 60%





Civil servant 22 28%
40%
100%
Army officer 6 7% 32
Factory worker 4 5%
TOTAL 80 100% 80
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Table 19
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation 









(Civil servant, army officer 






Behaviour n. 1 ia I 1Î Total 1 1 I IÏ
1
Total


















1 5 2 8 25%
11
TOTAL
No. 8 10 18 12 48 ' - 10 1 20 2 32




Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation 





' Landlord ̂rchant, cr af t- 
sman, farmer, and 
independent professional
Bureaucratic 'Civil servant. Army 







Behaviour 1 i•â DCÎ 1—1 1 a IÏ Î
Complete No - 2 2 3 - 2 5 -
compliant 7 7
behaviour % — 20% 11% 25% — 20% 25%
Wavering No 4 5 11 2 - 7 10 -
behaviour 22 14
tending toward % 50% 50% 61% 17% - 70% 50% -
compliance
Wavering No 4 3 5 7 - 1 5 2
behaviour 19 8
tending tov̂ rd % 50% 30% 28% 58% - 10% 25% 100%
non-ccmpl iance
No 8 10 18 12 - 10 20 2
TOTAL 48 32
% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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AncLLysis of Tables 19 and 20
Examination of Table 19 does show that managers who originated 
from entrepreneurial backgrounds in terms of their fathers' 
occupations are more likely to have a 'low' tendency toward 
compliance than those with bureaucratic occupations
- While no-one among the managers with bureaucratic parental 
occupations displayed a 'low' degree of bureaucratic-feudal 
orientation, 17% (8 out of 48) of the entrepreneurial category 
did.
- The percentages of the 'middle' and 'high' degrees among 
managers recruited from bureaucratic backgrounds are much higher 
(31% and 63% '10 and 20 out of 32' respectively) than those 
managers with entrepreneurial fathers (21% and 37% '10 and 18 
out of 48* respectively).
- Managers with bureaucratic parental occupations scored a 'very 
high' degree in much lower percentages (6% '2 out of 32') than 
managers with entrepreneurial fathers (25% '12 out of 48').
When consideration is focused on the association of the types of
parental occupation with the levels of compliant behaviour and on 
their affect on the relationship between orientation and behaviour of 
middle managers, it can be said that managers with entrepreneurial 
fathers seem to be more likely to behave with less compliance than 
those with bureaucratic fathers:-
- As Table 19 shows, complete compliant behaviour appeared among 
managers whose fathers held bureaucratic occipations to a 
greater percentage (22% '7 out of 32') than that of managers 
with entrepreneurial fathers (14% '7 out of 48').
- Within wavering behaviour, 53% (17 out of 32) of managers with 
bureaucratic parental occupations tended to comply, compared
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with 46% (22 out of 48) among those whose fathers' occupations 
were entrepreneurial. Also the percentage of those who tended 
'not to comply' in the entrepreneurial category is higher (40% 
'19 out of 48') than managers in the bureaucratic category (25% 
'8 out of 32').
- Table 20 shows that 50% of the 8 middle managers who rated 
'low' and whose fathers held entrepreneurial occupations tended 
in their wavering behaviour more to comply, and the other 50% 
not to.
- Complete compliant behaviour was displayed in various 
percentages (20% '2 out of 10'; 11% '2 out of 18'; 25% '3 out of 
12') by the three groups of managers who rated 'middle ', 'high', 
and 'very high', and whose fathers held entrepreneurial 
occupations. Such behaviour appeared in closer percentages 
among those with 'middle' (20% '2 out of 10') and 'high' (25% '5 
out of 20') in the bureaucratic category.
- The majority of those who rated 'middle' and 'high' in both 
categories have shown wavering behaviour tending toward 
compliance (50%; 61% among entrepreneurial groups, and 70%; 50% 
among bureaucratic groups). But wavering behaviour tending 
toward non-ccnpliance was displayed by 30% (3 out of 10) of 
those holding 'middle ' and 28% (5 out of 18) of those holding 
'high' and are in the first category, compared to 10% (1 out of 
10) of 'middle' group and 25% (5 out of 20) of the 'high' group 
in the second category.
- Although the majority (58% '7 out of 12') of managers with 
'very high' degrees and whose father's occupations were 
entrepreneurial have tended in their wavering behaviour toward 
non-corpliance, this tendency is revealed by the two middle
473
managers (100% '2 out of 2') who rated 'very high' but their 
fathers held bureaucratic occupations.
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Table 21





Mother Father Total Percent
No. % No. % %
Literate 55 69% 15 19% 70 44%
Reading and 
writing 10 12% 31 39% 41 25%
Primary 7 9% 14 18% 21 13%
Intermediate 4 5% 5 6% 9 6%
Secondary 3 4% 5 6% 8 5%
Diploma 1 1% 1 1% 2 1%
B.A. B.Sc. 0 0% 9 11% 9 6%































Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation 
and levels of compliant behaviour by the degrees of 
'inequality' between fathers' and mothers' 





Parents with closer 
 ̂ levels of education
>'










1 ia •I IÏ
Total














4 4 6 6 20 37% - - 4 3 7 27%
TOTAL
No. 6 14 25 9 54 2 6 13 5 26
% 11% 26% ' 46%
i-
17% 100% 8% 23% 50% 19% 100%
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Tâble 24
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation 
and levels of compliant behaviour by the degrees of 
'inequality' between fathers' and mothers' 
levels of education (B)
Degrees of inequality 
in education between 
fathers' and mothers'
Parents with closer
levels of formal education
Parents with different






Behaviour 1 ia I
&
Î r— \t 1 I I IÎ 1
Complete No - 3 3 2 - 1 4 1
compliant Q 6
behaviour % — 21% 12% 22% — 17% 31% 20%
Wavering No 2 7 16 1 2 5 5 1
behaviour 26 13
tending toward % 33% 50% 64% 11% 100% 83% 38% 20%
compliance
Wavering No 4 4 6 6 - - 4 3
behaviour 20 7
tending toward % 67% 29% 24% 67% - - 31% 60%
non-ccmpl iance
No 6 14 25 9 2 6 13 5
TOTAL 54 26
% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Analysis of Tables 23 and 24
By examining Table 23, It can be seen that managers whose 
parents had closer levels of education tended to be less ccmpliant 
than those whose parents had different levels of education
- While 'low' and 'middle' degrees appeared higher (11%; 26% '6 
and 14 out of 54') among managers whose parents possessed closer 
levels of education than among managers whose parents had 
different levels of education (8%; 23% '2 and 6 out of 26'), 
'high' and 'very high' degrees appeared among the former group 
in lesser percentages (46%; 17%) than among the latter group 
(50%; 19%).
- Complete compliance behaviour appeared among managers with 
parents holding different levels of education in higher 
percentages (23% '6 out of 26*) than among those whose parents 
have closer levels of education (15%, '8 out of 54').
- While managers in the first category (i.e. parents with closer 
levels of education) tended in their wavering behaviour toward 
compliance to a slightly less degree (48% *26 out of 54*) than 
managers in the second category, they tended toward non- 
compliance in higher percentages (37% *20 out of 54*) than 
managers whose parents have different levels of education.
Table 24 shows how the inequality between fathers and mothers in
formal education affects the relationship between middle managers* 
orientation and behaviour. Oie can note that;-
- 67% (4 out of 6) of managers who rated 'low* in bureaucratic- 
feudal orientation and belong to the group with parents who held 
closer levels of formal education, tended in their wavering 
behaviour toward non-compliance, and 33% (2 out of 6) tended 
toward compliance. But with respect to the two middle mangers
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.who rated 'low' and were in the second group (i.e. parents with 
different levels of education), both (100%) tended towards 
compliance.
- Although complete compliant behaviour was indicated by those 
with 'middle' degrees and with parents holding closer levels of 
education slightly more (21% '3 out of 14') than those managers 
holding the same degree but in the second category, 29 (4 out of 
14) of the first category tended in their wavering behaviour 
toward non-ccmpl iance, in comparison with none in the second 
category. The vast majority of those in the second category 
(83% '5 out of 6') tended more toward compliance compared with 
50% (7 out of 14) in the first one.
- Among managers in the second category (i.e. parents with 
different levels of education), the group with 'high* degrees 
showed complete compliant behaviour to a much higher percentage 
(31% *4 out of 13*) than that shown by the similar group in the 
first category (12% *3 out of 25*). But while wavering 
behaviour tending toward compliance appeared in a higher 
percentage (64% *16 out of 25*) among those whose parents held 
closer levels of education than those in the second category 
(38% *5 out of 13*), 31% (4 out of 13) of those in the second 
category compared with 24% of managers in the first category 
tended toward non-compliance.
- Although the 'very high* group in the second category (i.e. 
parents with different levels of formal education) displayed 
slightly less (20% *1 out of 5*) complete compliant behaviour 
compared with 22% (2 out of 9), they tended in their wavering 
behaviour toward compliance to a higher percentage (20% *1 out 
of 5') and toward non-compliance to a lesser degree (60%) than 
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Table 26
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation 
and levels of compliant behaviour by the degrees of 















Ccxrpl iant Nation 
Behaviour 1 i•â I IÎ
Total
1 I I s1
Total















- 2 5 1 8 73% 4 1 6 8 19 28%
TOTAL
No. 1 3 6 1 11 7 17 32 13 69
% 9% 27% 55% 9% 100% 10% 25% 46% 19% 100%
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Table 27
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientaticn 
and levels of compliant behaviour by the degrees of 
























No - 1 - —
1
— 3 7 3
13





No 1 - 1 -
2
3 13 19 2
37





No - 2 5 1
8
4 1 6 8
19
% 64% 83% 100% 57% 6% 19% 62%
TOTAL
No 1 3 6 1
11
7 17 32 13
69
% iœ% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Analysis of Tables 26 and 27
By examining the association of middle managers* variation in 
childhood experiences and their orientation and behaviour as 
presented in Table 26, it seems that the tendency to behave 
ccnpliantly among those who reported having high authoritarian 
childhood experiences is more than among those with less 
authoritarian experiences. Such a tendency appears when we examine 
middle managers' 'behaviour* more than 'orientation*
- 'Low* and 'middle* degrees appeared among both categories in 
close percentages; 9% and 27% (1 and 3 out of 11) among those 
with less authoritarian experience, compared with 10% and 25% (7 
and 17 out of 69 ) among managers with more authoritarian 
childhoods.
- Managers with less authoritarian childhood experiences rated 
'high* degrees in somewhat higher percentages (55% *6 out of 
11') than managers with more authoritarian experiences (46% *32 
out of 69').
- Tîie 'very high* degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation 
indicated by managers were reported more authoritarian childhood 
experiences in much higher percentages (19% *13 out of 69') than 
by those with less authoritarian experiences (9% '1 out of 11').
- 19% (13 out of 69) of managers with more authoritarian father- 
child relationships and familial values and practices showed 
complété compliant behaviour compared with 9% (1 out of 11) of 
managers with less authoritarian experiences. Also the vast 
majority (73% *8 out of 11') of those with this latter 
experience tended in their wavering behaviour toward noai- 
oompliance and only 18% tended more to comply. But the majority 
of managers with the above former experience (54% *37 out of
484
69') tended more to comply and 28% (19 out of 69) tended more 
toward non-ccmpl iance.
By examining the affect of childhood experiences of those 80 
middle managers on the relationship between their orientation and 
behaviour as presented in Table 27, the researcher also found that 
the results are inconclusive. 'Hiis could mean that childhood 
experiences do not condition or affect the relationship between 
orientation and behaviour, but it could also reflect the
distorted information provided by those middle managers related to 
part of their personal life.
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Table 28
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation 





Less - educated 
Middle Managers

























- - 3 3 6 35% 4 4 8 5 21 33%
TOTAL
No. - 3 8 6 17 8 17 30 8 63
% - 18% 47% 35% 100% 13% 27% 47% 13% 100%
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Table 29
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation 














Behaviour 1 1 I IÏ I—4g 1 i I
IÎ 1
Complete No - 1 2 2 - 3 5 1
compliant 5 Q
behaviour % - 33% 25% 33% - 18% 17% 12%
y
Wavering No — 2 3 1 4 10 17 2
behaviour 6 33
tending toward % - 67% 38% 17% 50% 59% 56% 25%
compliance
Wavering No - - 3 3 4 4 8 5
behaviour 6 21
tending toward % - - 37% 50% 50% 23% 27% 63%
non-ccmpl iance
No - 3 8 6 8 17 30 8
TOTAL 17 63
% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Analysis of Tables 28 and 29
By examining Table 28, one can suggest that the less-educated
middle managers are likely to hold a higher tendency toward 
compliance than more-educated managers ;-
- While not one of the less-educated managers scored 'low' in 
the degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation, 13% (8 out of 63) 
of the more educated ones did.
- While the 'middle ' degree appeared among the more-educated 
managers in higher percentages (27% '17 out of 63') than among 
the less-educated ones (18% '3 out of 17'), the 'very high'
degree was scored by those with less formal education in much 
higher percentages (35% '6 out of 17') than by managers with 
more-education (13% '8 out of 63'). 'High' degrees appeared in 
both groups in the same percentages, i.e. 47%.
- Complete compliant behaviour was shown by the less-educated 
managers in much higher percentages (30% '5 out of 17') than by 
the more-educated ones (14% '9 out of 63'). In fact, not one of 
the 5 middle managers who held postgraduate degrees revealed
this type of behaviour.
- Although the more-educated managers tended in their wavering 
behaviour toward compliance in higher percentages (53% '33 out 
of 63') than those with less-education (35% '6 out of 17') they 
tended toward non-compliance in similar percentages - 33% - 
compared with those of the less-educated ones - 35%.
In fact, such a suggestion - that less-educated managers are 
more likely to hold higher tendencies toward compliance - can also be 
found when one examines the affect of the managers* level of formal 
education on the relationship between their orientation and behaviour 
(Table 29).
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- Complete compliant behaviour was clustered in higher 
percentages among the less-educated managers by the three groups 
who rated 'middle' (33% '1 out of 3'); 'high' (25% '2 out of 
S'); and ' very high ' ( 33% ' 2 out of 6 ' ) than among the more- 
educated ones (18% ' 3 out of 17'; 17% '5 out of 30'; 12% '1 out 
of 8').
- Although the majority of the groups v/no rated 'middle ' in both 
categories tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance, 
the percentage of the less-educated ones was higher (67% '2 out 
of 3') than the more-educated managers (59% '10 out of 17'). 
Also not one of those in the less-educated category tended 
toward non-ccmpl iance, 23% (4 out of 8) of those in the more- 
educated category did.
- The less-educated 'high' degree group tended toward compliance 
and non-compliance In very similar percentages (38%; 37%). But 
the majority of the more-educated 'high' degree group tended 
toward compliance (59% '10 out of 17') and 23% (4 out of 17) 
tended not to comply. Such results maybe because the less- 
educated middle mangers, particularly those with a high degree 
of bureaucratic-feudal orientation, are more likely to 
demonstrate verbal ncai-confoming behaviour or an ' ideological 
support for a wide distribution of capacity for leadership and 
initiative', especially when such an ideology is emphasized by 
the political authority.
- In both categories, the majority of 'very high' degree groups
non
tended in their wavering behaviour towardcompliance, but the 
percentages of the more-educated group was higher (63% '5 out of 
8') than the less educated group (50% '3 out of 6').
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Table 30
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of ccmpliant
behaviour by seniority (A)
Seniority Less seniority 
"8 - 13 years"
More seniority 
"14 and over"

























- 3 3 - 6 33% 4 - 8 9 21 34%
TOTAL
No. 1 10 7 - 7 10 31 14 62
% 5% 56% 39% - 100% 11% 16% 50% 23% 100%
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TÈble 31
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation 
and levels of compliant behaviour by seniority (B)
Seniority Less seniority 
"8 - 13 years"
More seniority 
"14 and over"









No - 1 2 -
3
- 3 5 3
 ̂1





No 1 6 2 -
9
3 7 18 2
30





No - 3 3 -
6
4 - 8 9
21
% - 30% 43% - 57% - 26% 64%
TOTAL
No 1 10 7 -
18
7 10 31 14
62
% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Analysis of Tables 30 and 31
By comparing the orientations of those with 'less* seniority 
(8 - 13 years) with those who held 'more* seniority (14+) as 
presented in Table 30, the researcher can say that, in general, 
managers who would be more oriented to show 'low* as well as 'very 
high* degrees of compliance are more likely to have 'more* rather 
than 'less* seniority. But the possibility of the 'very high* degree 
of compliance appearing among them is much higher than the 'low* 
degree
- 'Low* degrees appeared among managers with 'more* seniority in 
much higher percentages (11% *7 out of 62') than among those 
with 'less* seniority (5% *1 out of 18').
- While the majority (56% *10 out of 18') of the less senior 
managers indicated 'middle* degrees, the majority of those with 
more seniority (50% '31 out of 62') scored 'high* degrees of 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation.
- 'Very high* degrees appeared only among managers with more 
seniority (23% *14 out of 62').
When we examine the variation in compliant behaviour between 
these two groups (i.e. managers with less seniority and managers with 
more seniority) we can see that although they show this type of 
behavior at three levels in quite similar percentages, high as well 
as low levels of compliance were shown by the second group slightly 
more than by the first groip;-
- 17% (3 out of 18) of managers with less seniority revealed 
complete compliant behavior, compared with 18% (11 out of 62) of 
the second group.
- While the majority of both groups tended in their wavering 
behaviour toward compliance in close percentages (50%; 48%), 33%
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(6 out of 18) of the first group and 34% (21 out of 62) of the 
second group reported wavering behaviour tending toward non- 
compliance.
When we examine the affect of seniority on the relationship 
between middle managers' orientation and behaviour we find that 
managers who had a 'low' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation 
(those who held more seniority) are more likely to behave with non- 
canpliant behaviour than those with less seniority. But among 
managers who had 'middle' and 'high' degrees of this type of 
orientation (those with less seniority) are the ones who are more 
likely to show such behaviour;-
- Among managers with less seniority, the only manager who rated 
a 'low' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation tended in his 
wavering behaviour tovard compliance. But only 43% (3 out of 7) 
of managers with more seniority who rated this 'low' degree 
tended toward compliance and 57% (4 out of 7) tended toward non- 
ccnpl iance.
- The majority of the 'middle' degree group in both categories 
(60% '6 out of 10'; 70% '7 out of 10') tended in their wavering 
behaviour toward compliance. But while 30% (3 out of 10) of 
managers with more seniority indicated complete compliant 
behaviour compared with 10% (1 out of 10) among managers with 
less seniority, 30% of this latter group tended toward non- 
compliance in their wavering behaviour compared with none among 
the first group.
- The majority of managers with 'high' degrees of bureaucratic- 
feudal orientation and more seniority tended in their wavering 
behaviour toward compliance (58% '18 out of 31'). While 28% '2 
out of 7 ' of the less senior managers who rated this degree
493
showed such behaviour, the majority of them (43% '3 out of 7') 
tended more not to ccnply compared with 26% (8 out of 31) of the 
former group. But among managers with 'high' degrees, complete 
ccmpliant behaviour was shown by less senior managers in higher 
percentages (29% '2 out of 7') than by those with more seniority 
(16% '5 out of 31').
- All of the managers who rated 'very high' in bureaucratic- 
feudal orientation held 'more' seniority. The majority of them 
(64% '9 out of 14') tended toward non-compliance, and only 14% 
(2 out of 14) of them tended more to comply. 22% (3 out of 14) 
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Table 33
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant 
behaviour by number of years in middle management levels 
in the present organization (A)
Years as a middle 
manager in the 
present 
organization































2 2 9 3 16 31% 2 1 2 6 11 38%
TOTAL
No. 5 15 24 7 51 3 5 14 7 29
% ! 10%
!
29% 47% 14% 100% 10% 17% 49% 24% 100%
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Table 34
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant 
behaviour by number of years in middle management levels 
in the present organization (B)
Years as a middle 
manager in the 
present oraani zation
Less than 4 years 4 and 0 \re r
x̂ ^̂ Degrees of 
\Bureaucrati( 
Leveî v Feudal 
of ^\Orient 
Ccxrpliant Nation 
Behaviour n. 1 1 I 11 1 1 ia I IÎ r—1 1
Complete No - 3 3 2 - 1 4 1
compliant 8 6
behaviour % - 20% 13% 29% - 20% 29% 14%
Wavering No 3 10 12 2 1 3 8 —
behaviour 27 12
tending toward % 60% 67% 50% 28% 33% 60% 57% -
compliance
Wavering No 2 2 9 3 2 1 2 6
behaviour 16 11
tending toward % 40% 13% 37% 43% 67% 20% 14% 86%
non-compliance
No 5 15 24 7 3 5 14 7
51TOTAL 29
L .
% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Analysis of Tables 33 and 34
From Table 33, one notes that managers who have spent more years 
in their middle management positions are more likely to hold a higher 
tendency toward compliance than those with less years
- The 'low' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation appeared 
among both groups in the same percentages (10% '5 out of 51' in 
the first group, and 10% '3 out of 29' in the second). But the
group with 'less years' displayed 'middle' degrees more (29% '15
out of 51') than those with 'more years' (17% '5 out of 29').
- 'High' and 'very high' degrees were scored by managers who 
have been holding middle management positions for more than 4 
years in higher percentages (49%, 24%; '14 and 7 out of 29') 
than managers with 'less years' (47%, 14%; '24 and 7 out of 
51').
If we examine the levels of compliant behaviour that were shown 
by managers in both categories, we can see that those with more years 
in managerial positions are more likely to behave with compliant 
behaviour, as well as tending toward non-compliance in their wavering
behaviour compared to managers with less years
- Complete compliant behaviour appears among those with 'more 
years' in higher percentages (21% '6 out of 29') than among 
managers with 'less years' (16% '8 out of 51').
- 53% (27 out of 51) of managers in the first group (with 'less 
years') have tended in their wavering behaviour toward 
compliance, compared with 41% (12 out of 29) in the second 
group. But 38% (11 out of 29) of the second group (with 'more 
years') have tended not to comply, compared with 31% (16 out of 
51) in the first group.
498
When we examine the affect of the length of time the respondents 
have spent in middle management positions in their present 
organizations on the relationship between their orientation and 
behaviour (Table 34), we can say that among managers with more years 
in managerial positions (those with 'low' degrees as well as 'very 
high' degrees) are more likely to tend in their behaviour toward non- 
compliance than managers with the same degrees but who have spent 
less years in managerial positions. But an opposite result was 
obtained concerning those with 'high' degrees
- The majority (60% '3 out of 5') of managers in the first group 
who rated 'low' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation, tended in 
their wavering behaviour toward compliance. But in the second 
group (managers with more years in middle management) the
majority of those who rated 'low' (67% '2 out of 3') tended 
toward non-compliance.
- In both groups those with 'middle ' degrees indicated complete 
ccnpliant behaviour to the same level (20% '3 out of 15'; 20% '1 
out of 5'), and the majority of them tended in their wavering 
behaviour toward compliance (67% '10 out of 15'; 60% '3 out of 
5'). But 13% (2 out of 15) of those in the first group tended 
not to comply compared with 20% (1 out of 5) of the second 
group.
- Among managers in the second group, those who rated 'high' in 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation indicated complete compliant 
behaviour in higher percentages (29% '4 out of 14') than that of
those in the first group (13% '3 out of 24'). Also, in the
second group where 57% (8 out of 14) of managers with 'high'
degrees tended toward compliance, compared with 50% in the first 
group, only 14% (2 out of 14) of them tended toward non-
compliance, compared with 37% (9 out of 24) in the first group.
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- 29% of those in the first group who scored 'very high' degrees 
indicated complete compliant behaviour compared with only 14% (1 
out of 7) in the second group. While in the second group not 
one of those with 'very high* degrees tended in their wavering 
behaviour toward compliance, 28% (2 out of 7) did. Although 43% 
(3 out of 7) of managers who rated this 'very high' degree and 
who spent less years in middle management position tended toward 
non-compliance, such a tendency was shown by the vast majority 
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Table 36
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant 
behaviour by types of perceived top managers' 
leadership behaviour (A)










Levê bs Feudal 
of NOrienta- 
Compliant\\tion 
Behaviour 1 1•â I I>1
Total
1 i•â I Ig
Total








- 2 4 2 8 30% - 2 3 1 6 11%





1 1 3 1 6 22% 3 3 7 8 21 40%
TOTAL
No. 3 6 15 3 27 5 14 23 11 53
% 11% 21% 56% 11% ! iœ%
j
10% 26% 43% 21% 100%
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Table 37
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant 
behaviour by types of perceived top managers' 
leadership behaviour (B)
Types of the perceiv­















No - 2 4 2
8
- 2 3 1
6





No 2 3 8 -
13
2 9 13 2
26





No 1 1 3 1
5
3 3 7 8
21
% 33% 17% 20% 33% 60% 22% 30% 73%
I TOTAL
No 3 6 15 3
27
5 14 23 11
i
! % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Analysis of Tables 36 and 37
By comparing those who said they are working under autocratic 
top leadership with those under supportive leadership, we can examine 
the effect of top managers' leadership behaviour on middle managers' 
orientation and behaviour toward top management. If we focus on the 
association of leadership behaviour and the degrees of bureaucratic- 
feudal orientation (Table 36), it seems that one cannot reach a clear 
and conclusive result. But when we deal with 'low', 'middle ', and 
'high' degrees, one may find that those under autocratic leadership 
are somehow more oriented tov̂ rd compliance than those under 
supportive leadership;-
- Managers under autocratic and under supportive leadership 
display 'low' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation in very 
close percentages (11% '3 out of 27', and 10% '5 out of 53'). 
They also display 'middle' degrees in somewhat close percentages 
but the percentage of those under supportive leadership is 
higher (26% '14 out of 53') than of those under autocratic 
leadership (22% '6 out of 27').
- Managers under autocratic leadership have indicated 'high' 
degrees (56% '15 out of 27') more than those by managers under 
supportive leadership (43% '23 out of 53').
- The 'very high' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation 
appeared among those who describe their top leaders' behaviour 
as ' supportive ' in much higher percentages (21% '11 out of 53') 
than among managers under an 'autocratic' top leadership.
With respect to the affect of top leadership behaviour on the 
behaviour of middle managers, it is clear that managers under 
autocratic leadership reveal more 'compliance' than managers under 
supportive leadership (Table 36):-
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- Managers under autocratic leadership have disclosed complete 
compliant behaviour in much higher percentages (30% '8 out of 
27') than managers under supportive leadership (11% '6 out of 
53').
- Managers in both categories have shown wavering behaviour 
tending toward compliance in very close percentages (48% '13 out 
of 27' and 49% '26 out of 53'). But managers working under
supportive leadership indicated wavering behaviour tending 
toward non-compliance in much higher percentages (40% '21 out of 
53') than that indicated by those under autocratic leadership 
(22% '6 out of 27').
Considering the affect of top leadership behaviour on the
relationship between orientation and behaviour (Table 37), one can
also find that the tendency toward compliance is higher among
managers under autocratic leadership than among managers under 
supportive leadership
- Under autocratic leadership, 67% (2 out of 3) of those with a 
'low' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation displayed 
wavering behaviour tending toward ccmpliance compared with 40% 
(2 out of 5) of the 'low' group under supportive leadership. 
But wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance was 
indicated by the 'low' group under autocratic leadership in much 
lower percentages (33% '1 out of 3') than by the similar group 
under supportive leadership (60% '3 out of 5').
- Under autocratic leadership, managers with 'middle' and 'high' 
degrees, have displayed complete compliance behaviour in much 
higher percentages (33% '2 out of 6', 27% '4 out of 15') than 
those indicated by similar groups under supportive leadership. 
The majority of these 'middle' and 'high' groups under both
505
types of leadership displayed wavering behaviour tending toward 
compliance (50% '3 out of 6', 53% '8 out of 15' in the first 
category, and 64% '9 out of 14', 57% '13 out of 23' in the 
second category). Wavering behaviour tending toward non- 
compliance appeared among these two groups under supportive 
leadership in higher percentages (22% '3 out of 14', 30% '7 out 
of 23') than among the similar groups under autocratic 
leadership (17% '1 out of 6', 20% '3 out of 15').
- Under autocratic leadership, the majority of managers with 
'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation have 
revealed complete compliant behaviour (67% '2 out of 3')
compared with only 9% (1 out of 11) in the similar group under 
supportive leadership. But the majority of this group under 
supportive leadership (73% '8 out of 11') displayed wavering 
behaviour tending toward non-compliance compared with 33% (1 out 
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Table 39
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant 














Behaviour 1 i t g
Total
1 1■â I Ï
Total














1 - 2 2 5 19% 3 4 8 7 22 41%
TOTAL
No. 3 7 13 3 26 5 13 25 11 54





Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant 
behaviour by participation in decision-making (B)
Degrees of middle 
managers participation 
in decision-making










No - 3 4 1
8
- 1 3 2
6





No 2 4 7 -
13
2 8 14 2
26





No 1 — 2 2
5
3 4 8 7
22
% 33% - 15% 67% 60% 31% 32% 64%
TOTAL
No 3 7 13 3
26
5 13 25 11
% 1CX)% iœ% 100% 100%
-1 --
|100% 100% 100% 100%
53
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Analysis of Tables 39 and 40
To examine the affect of middle managers' degrees of
participation in decision-making, we will compare those who said they
participate less (the first category) with those who participate more 
(the second category). Taking into consideration the association of 
•participation' with the degrees of middle managers' bureaucratic- 
feudal orientation (Table 39), it seems that its affect is unclear 
and inconclusive:-
-Managers who participate less scored 'low', 'middle ', and 
'high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation slightly more 
(11%, 27%, 50% '3, 7 and 13 out of 26') than those managers who 
participated more (9%, 24%, 46% '5, 13 and 25 out of 54'). But 
the 'very high' degree appeared among managers in the first 
category much less (12% '3 out of 26') than among those in the
second category (21% '11 out of 54').
When we focus on the affect of middle managers degree of 
participation on their behaviour, it is clear from Table 39 that less 
participating managers reported more 'compliance' than more 
participating ones:-
- Complete compliant behaviour was indicated by managers who 
participated less in much higher percentages (31% '8 out of 26') 
than by managers who participated more (11% '6 out of 54').
- While less participating managers indicated wavering behaviour 
tending toward compliance slightly more (50% '13 out of 26') 
than more participating managers (48% '26 out of 54'), they 
tended toward non-compliance in much lower percentages (19% '5 
out of 26') than managers who participate more (41% '22 out of 
54').
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Examining the affect of 'participation' on the relationship 
between orientation and behaviour (Table 40), one could also find 
that the tendency toward compliance is higher among managers who 
participate less than who participate more:-
- The majority (67% '2 out of 3') of less participating managers 
with 'low' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation indicated 
wavering behaviour tending toward compliance, and 33% of them (1 
out of 3) tended toward non-compliance. But the majority of the 
more participating 'low' degree's group (60% '3 out of 5') 
tended in their wavering behaviour not to comply, and 40% 
displayed wavering behaviour tending toward ccxipliance.
- Complete compliant behaviour was shown by those managers with 
'middle' and 'high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation 
who 'participate less' much more (43% '3 out of 7', 31% '4 out 
of 13') than similar groups who 'participate more' (8% '1 out of 
13', 12% '3 out of 25'). Less participating as well as more 
participating managers who held 'middle' and 'high' degrees of 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation displayed wavering behaviour 
tending toward compliance in close percentages. None of the 
less participating managers who held 'middle' degrees and 15% (2 
out of 13) of those who held 'high' degrees of bureaucratic- 
feudal orientation displayed wavering behaviour tending toward 
non-compliance. But this type of behaviour appeared among more 
participating managers who held the above two degrees of 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation in higher percentages (31% '4 
out of 13', 32% '8 out of 25').
-Complet compliant behaviour appeard among middle
Managers with 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal
orientation who participated less in decision-making in much
higher percentages (33% '1 out of 3') than that of the more 
participating ones (18% 2 out of 11 ) * While only the more
511
participating managers indicated wavering behaviour tending 
toward ccmpliance (18% '2 out of 11'), both the less and the 
more participated managers with the 'very high' degrees of 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation displayed wavering behaviour 
tending toward non-compliance in close percentages (67% '2 out 
of 3', 64% '7 out of 11').
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Table 41
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of canpliant 
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- - 2 - 2 17% 4 4 8 9 25 37%
TOTAL
No. 2 3 6 1 12 6 17 32 13 68
% 17% 25% 50%
1
8% 100% 9% 25% 47% 19% 100%
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42
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of canpliant 
behaviour by 'psychological participation' or influence (B)

















No - - 2 1
3
- 4 5 2
11





No 2 3 2 -
7
2 9 19 2
32





No - - 2 -
2
4 4 8 9
25






6 17 32 13
68
%i iœ% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Analysis of Tables 41 and 42
In examining the affect of the middle managers' degree of 
'psychological participation' on their orientation (Table 41) one can 
also find that such an affect is not clear and conclusive
- Managers who reported having 'less psychological 
participation' rated 'low' and 'high' degrees of bureaucratic- 
feudal orientation somewhat higher (17%, 50% '2 and 6 out of 
12') than managers with 'more psychological participation' (9%, 
47% '6 and 32 out of 68'). Both managers with 'less' and with 
'more' psychological influence indicated 'middle' degrees of 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation in the same percentages (25% '3 
out of 12', and 25% '17 out of 68'). But the 'very high' degree 
of bureaucratic-feudal orientation has appeared among those with 
'more psychological participation' much more (19% '13 out of 
68') than among managers with 'less psychological participation* 
(8% '1 out of 12').
By examining the association of middle managers ' degree of 
'psychological participation' and their level of compliant behaviour, 
it is clear (Table 41) that managers with 'less psychological 
participation' tended toward 'compliance' more than managers with 
more psychological participation:-
- Complete compliant behaviour has appeared among those with 
'less psychological influence' in higher percentages (25% '3 out 
of 12') than among managers with 'more psychological 
participation' (16% '11 out of 68').
- Managers in the first category (i.e. less psychological 
participation tended in their wavering behaviour to comply more 
(58% '7 out of 12') than managers in tlie second category (47% 
'32 out of 68'). But in the second category (i.e. more
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psychological influence) displayed wavering behaviour tending 
toward non-conpliance in much higher percentages (37% *25 out of 
68') than those in the first category (17% *2 out of 12*). 
Considering the affect of 'psychological participation on the 
relationship between middle managers 'orientation* and behaviour, 
although such an affect is not very clear and conclusive the figures 
(Table 42) still to some extent suggest that managers with 'more 
psychological participation* are less apt to behave compliantly than 
those with 'less psychological participation*
- The two managers with 'low* degrees of bureaucratic-feudal 
orientation who reported having 'less psychological 
participation' both displayed wavering behaviour tending toward 
compliance. But the majority of the 'low' degree managers who
have 'more psychological participation* indicated wavering
behaviour tending toward non-compliance (67% *4 out of 6* ) and 
only 33% (2 out of 6) showed wavering behaviour tending toward 
compliance.
- Managers holding 'middle* degrees of bureaucratic-feudal 
orientation who have 'less psychological participation* have all 
shown wavering behaviour tending toward ccmpliance (100% *3 out 
of 3 * ) compared with 53% (9 out of 17) of the similar group of 
those managers who have more psychological influence. Although 
this latter group displayed complete compliant behaviour (23% *4 
out of 17*), they also showed wavering behaviour tending toward 
non-compliance (24% *4 out of 17*).
- Managers with 'high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal
orientation who reported less psychological participation
displayed ccmplete compliant behaviour in much higher 
percentages ( 33% ' 2 out of 6 ' ) than the similar group who
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reported more psychological participation (16% '5 out of 32'). 
This latter group showed wavering behaviour tending toward 
compliance (59% '19 out of 32') more than that show: by the 
former group (34% '2 out of 6'), but they displayed wavering 
behaviour tending toward non-compliance (25% '8 out of 32')
somewhat less than that displayed by managers of the former 
group (33% '2 out of 6').
- The only middle manager with a 'very high' degree of 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation who said having 'less 
psychological participation' indicated complete compliant 
behaviour compared with 15% (2 out of 13) of those 'very high' 
degree managers who reported more psychological influence. The 
majority of this latter group (69% *9 out of 13') displayed 
wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance, and 16% (2 out 
of 13) tended toward ccmpliance in their wavering behaviour.
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Table 43
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant 
behaviour by 'delegation' of decision-inaking (A)
Degrees of 
delegation of 
dec i s ion-making






Behaviour n. 1 it I 1
Total
1 1 I IÏ
Total














- - 3 1 4 22% 4 4 7 8 23 37%
TOTAL
No. - 2 14 2 18 8 18 24 12 62
%
. ............ :
11% 78% 11% 100% 13% 29% 39% 19% 100%
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Table 44
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of canpliant 
behaviour by 'delegation’ of decision-making (B)
Degrees of delegation 










No - - 4 1
5
- 4 3 2
19





No - 2 7 -
9
4 10 14 2
30





No - - 3 1
4
4 4 7 8
23
% - - 21% 50% 50% 22% 29% 67%
TOTAL
No - 2 14 2
18
8 18 24 12
62
■% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Analysis of Tables 43 and 44
A comparative examination of the two categories of Table 43, 
(i.e. less delegation and more delegation), present us with the 
affect of "delegation" on middle managers' orientation which is not 
very clear and conclusive. But it may suggest that to some extent 
middle managers to whom more decision-taking are delegated are less 
oriented toward ccmpliance than managers with 'less delegation':-
- 'Low' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation only appeared 
among those with more delegation ( 13% '8 out of 62').
- While more delegated managers displayed the 'middle ' degree of 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation higher (29% '18 out of 62') than
the less delegated managers, this latter group indicated 'high'
degrees much more (78% ' 14 out of 18') than the former groiç)
(39% '24 out of 62').
- The 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation was 
shown by managers with more delegation (19% '12 out of 62')
higher than that indicated by managers with less delegation (11% 
'2 out of 18').
Focusing on the relationship between middle managers' degrees of 
'delegation' and their behaviour, it is clear from Table 43 that 
'compliance' is displayed more by managers with less delegation than 
with more delegaticxi;-
- Managers who reported having less delegation showed complete 
compliant behaviour in much higher percentages (28% '5 out of 
18') than those with more delegation (15% '9 out of 12').
- The majority of managers in both categories tended in their 
wavering behaviour toward compliance in close percentages (50%; 
48%), but managers of the second category (i.e. more delegation) 
reported wavering behaviour tending toward non-compliance much
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more (37% '23 out of 62') than managers of the first category 
who have less delegation (22% '4 out of 18').
In examining the affect of the 'delegation* cxi the relationship 
between middle managers' orientation and behaviour, one can find that 
the figures of Table 44 suggest, to some extent, that the more 
delegated managers displayed less 'compliance' than the less 
delegated managers
- All of the 8 middle managers who held the 'low* degree of 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation and who reported having more 
delegation, indicated wavering behaviour, but 50% (4 out of 8) 
of them tended more to comply and the other 50% not to.
- The two less-delegated managers who rated 'middle ' in 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation tended toward compliance in 
their wavering behaviour, although 22% (4 out of 18) of the 
more-delegated 'middle' degree group showed complete compliant 
behaviour and 56% (10 out of 18) displayed wavering behaviour 
tending toward compliance, 22% (4 out of 18) of them tended not 
to comply.
- Complete compliant behaviour was indicated by the more- 
delegated 'high' degree group much more (29% '4 out of 14') than 
by the less-delegated 'high' degree group. The former group 
showed wavering behaviour both tending toward compliance and 
non-compliance more (58%; 29% '14 and 7 out of 24') than the 
latter group (50%; 21% '7 and 3 out of 14').
- The 'very high' degree group who reported less delegation 
indicated complete compliant behaviour (50% '1 out of 2') more 
than that indicated by those who rated 'very high' degree in 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation but held more delegation (16% '2 
out of 12'). 67% (8 out of 12) of the latter group tended
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toward non-compliance in their wavering behaviour compared with 
50% (1 out of 2) of the former group.
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TSable 45
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of canpliant 




High role conflict Low role conflict





























4 2 7 4 17 37% - 2 3 5 10 29%
TOTAL
No. 6 9 24 7 46 2 11 14 7 34
% 13% 20% 52% 15% 100% 6% 32% 41% 21% 100%
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Table 46
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant 
behaviour by role conflict (B)
Degrees of middle managers' role 
conflict













No - - 5 2
7
- 4 2 1
7






No 2 7 12 1
22
2 5 9 1
17





No 4 2 7 4
17
- 2 3 5
10
% 67% 22% 29% 57% - 18% 22% 72%
TOTAL
No 6 9 24 7 2 11 14 7
46




Analysis of Tables 45 and 46
The association of numbers in Table 45 does not provide us with 
a clear and conclusive affect of role conflict on middle managers 
orientation
- Managers who reported a feeling of 'high role conflict' rated 
'low' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation more than (13% 
'6 out of 46') managers reported 'low role conflict' (6% '2 out 
of 34').
- While those with more role conflict feelings scored 'middle ' 
degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation in lower percentages 
(20% '9 out of 46') than managers with less feelings of role- 
conflict (32% *11 out of 34, the former group rated 'high'
degrees more (52% '24 out of 46') than the latter group (41% out 
of 34').
- The 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation 
appeared among managers who reported feelings of 'high role 
conflict' in lower percentages (15% '7 out of 46') than those 
with 'low role conflict' (21% '7 out of 34').
In considering the affect of role conflict on middle managers 
behaviour, the cross-tabulation presented in Table 45 does not only 
suggest that such affects are not conclusive but more it provides us 
with a reverse result to the assumption that more role conflict would 
lead to more compliance ;-
- Complété compliant behaviour was indicated by managers with 
feelings of 'low role conflict' in higher percentages (21% '7 
out of 34') than by managers with 'high role conflict' feelings.
- While managers who reported 'low role conflict' tended 
slightly more toward compliance (50% '17 out of 34' compared 
with 48% '22 out of 46'), managers with 'high role conflict'
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tended more toward non-oompl iance (37% '17 out of 46' compared 
with 29% '10 out of 34').
Similar results can be obtained when we examine the affect of 
'role conflict' on the relationship between middle managers' 
orientation and behaviour (Table 46):-
- Among managers who reported 'high role conflict', the majority 
of those who rated 'low' in bureaucratic-feudal orientation 
tended toward non-ccmpliance in their wavering behaviour (67% '4 
out of 6'). But the 'low' degree group who reported 'low role 
conflict' all tended toward compliance in their wavering
behaviour (100% '2 out of 2').
- In the category of 'high role conflict', managers holding
'middle' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation did not 
indicate complete compliant behaviour compared with 36% (4 out 
of 11) of the 'middle' degree group in the 'low role conflict' 
category. While the former groiç> tended in their wavering 
behaviour toward compliance more (78% '7 out of 9')
than the latter group (64% '9 out of 14'), both groups tended 
toward non-compliance in exactly the same percentages (22% '2 
out of 9 ' and 22% ' 3 out of 14 ' ).
- Among managers of the first category (i.e. feelings of high
role-conflict), those who rated 'high' degrees of bureaucratic- 
feudal orientation indicated complete compliant behaviour more 
(21% '5 out of 24') than the 'high' degree managers of the 
second category ( 14% '2 out of 14'). But although this latter 
group tended in their wavering behaviour toward 'compliance' 
more (64% '9 out of 14') than the former group (50% '12 out of 
24'), 22% (3 out of 14) tended toward 'non-compliance' compared 
with 29% (7 out of 24) of the other group.
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- The assumption that more role conflict would lead to more 
'compliance' appears when we consider those with 'very high' 
degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation; the 'very high' 
degrees group who reported a feeling of 'high role conflict', 
indicated complete compliant behaviour (29% '2 out of 7') more 
than that indicated by those who reported 'low role conflict' 
(14% '1 out of 7'). Also this latter group tended toward non- 
compliance in their wavering behaviour more (72% '5 out of 7') 
than the former group (57% '4 out of 7').
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Table 47
Role definition as reported by the 
80 middle managers
There is a written 
job description 
and a statement of 
the objectives I 
am expected to 
achieve
There is a written 
job description, 
but no statement 
of the objectives 
I am expected to 
achieve
There is no job 
description, 
but I am told 
the objectives 
which I am 
expected to 
achieve
There is no job 
description, 
and I am not 
told the 
objectives 
which I am 
expected to 
achieve
No. % No. % No. % No. %
16 20% 34 42% 19 24% 11 14%
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Table 48
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of canpliant 
behaviour by role ambiguity (A)
Degrees of 
middle managers' 

























1 - 3 - 4 31% 3 4 7 9 23 34%
TOTAL
No. 4 - 8 1 13 4 20 30 13 67
% 31% - 61% 8% 100% 6% 30% 45% 19% 100%
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Table 49
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of compliant 
behaviour by role ambiguity (B)
Degrees of middle 
managers' role ambiguity










No - - 3 1
4
- 4 5 2
11
33







No 3 - 2 -
5
1 12





No 1 - 3 -
4
3 4 7 9
23
% 25% 37% 75% 20% 23% 69%
No 4 - 8 1 4 20 30 13
TOTAL
* 100% 100% 100% 1100% 100% 100% 100% 100% i
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Analysis of Tables 48 and 49
In examining the affect of 'role ambiguity' on middle managers' 
orientation in relation to authority (i.e. top management) (Table 48) 
it seems that we are facing the same situation in that the affect is 
not clear and inconclusive
- Managers who reported 'high role ambiguity' scored 'low' 
degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation much more (31% '4 out 
of 13') than those who reported 'low role ambiguity' (6 % '4 out 
of 67').
- While the 'middle ' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation 
did not appear among managers who evidenced 'high role 
ambiguity', the 'high' degree appeared in higher percentages
(61% '8 out of 13') than among managers who reported 'low role 
ambiguity' (45% '30 out of 67').
- The 'very high' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation was 
indicated by managers with 'low role ambiguity* more (19% '13 
out of 67') than by those with 'high role ambiguity' (8% *1 out 
of 13').
In respect of the affect of role-ambiguity on middle managers' 
behaviour, it appears that managers with 'high role ambiguity' are 
more likely to behave compliantly than those with 'low role
ambiguity' :-
- Managers who reported 'high role ambiguity' disclosed complete 
compliant behaviour in much higher percentages (31% '4 out of 
13') than managers with low role ambiguity (17% '11 out of 67').
- Wavering behaviour tending toward both compliance and non- 
compliance was displayed by managers reporting 'low role
ambiguity' more (49; 34% '33 and 23 out of 67*) than those
reporting 'high role ambiguity' (38%; 31% '5 and 4 out of 13').
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Regarding the affect of role ambiguity on the relationship 
between middle managers orientation and behaviour, one can say, from 
the figures presented in Table 49, that although the affect is not 
very clear, managers who reported 'high role ambiguity' are more 
likely, precisely those holding 'low' and 'very high' degrees of 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation, to behave more ccnpliantly than with 
'low role ambiguity':-
- Among managers who reported high role ambiguity those holding 
'low' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation tended in their 
wavering behaviour toward canpliance much more (75% '3 out of 
4') and toward non-compliance much less (25% '1 out of 4') than 
the similar group who reported 'low role ambiguity' (25%; 75% '1 
and 3 out of 4').
- Managers who exhibited 'high role ambiguity' and rated 'high' 
in bureaucratic-feudal orientation indicated complete compliant 
behaviour much more (38% '3 out of 8') than managers rated the 
same degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation but reported 'low 
role ambiguity' (17% '5 out of 30'). But while the latter group 
tended in their wavering behaviour toward conpliance in higher 
percentages (60% '18 out of 30') than the former group (25% *2 
out of 8'), they tended toward 'non-conpliance* less (23% '7 out 
of 30') than the other group (37% *3 out of 8*).
- The cxily middle manager holding a 'very high' degree of 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation who stated 'high role ambiguity* 
displayed complete compliant behaviour (100%). But while 15% (2 
out of 13) of managers holding 'very high' degrees of 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation and disclosing 'low role 
ambiguity' showed complete compliant behaviour, 69% (9 out of 
13) tended in their wavering behaviour toward non-compliance and 
only 16% (2 out of 13) toward compliance.
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Table 50
Levels of middle managers' job satisfaction
Not satisfied Only slightly Satisfied Very Extremely
satisfied 4----- ------ > satisfied satisfied
*5 11 13 6 8 14 3 10 1 4  7 2 9 26 15 16
21 33 18 22 17 19 20 12 25 27 29 36 31 46
42 28 34 23 24 30 32 38 40 57 63
77 52 55 39 47 35 37 45 58
62 65 74
61 72 60 66 41 43 44 67 70
75 76 68 73 48 49
50 51 80





7 14 38 14 7
9% 18% 48% 18% 9%
* _= Respondent No. 5
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Table 51
Degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation and levels of ccmpliant 
behaviour by job satisfaction (A)
Degrees of middle 
managers' job 
satisfaction






Behaviour 1 ga E t
Total
1 i-a I Ig
Total














1 - 3 1 5 24% 3 4 7 8 22 37%
TOTAL
No. 3 6 10 2 21 5 14 28 12 59
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Analysis of Tables 51/ 52 and 53
By examining Tables 51 and 5 2 , one can state that managers who 
are high in job satisfaction are more oriented toward ccmpl iance than 
those who are low iji job satisfaction. This appears when we analyze 
Table 51;-
- 'Low* degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation were shown by 
managers who held 'less job satisfaction' more (14% '3 out of 
21') than managers with 'more job satisfaction ' (8% '5 out of 
59'). In fact this 'low' degree (as appears in Table 52) does 
not appear among managers who are 'very and extremely
satisfied'.
- Managers who are 'less satisfied' displayed the 'middle' 
degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation in slightly higher 
percentages (29% '6 out of 21') than those who are 'more
satisfied' (24% '14 out of 59').
- 'High' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal orientation were 
disclosed by managers who are 'less satisfied' in close 
percentages (48% '10 out of 21') than managers with 'more
satisfaction '. But as presented in Table 52 such degrees 
appeared among those who are only 'satisfied' in higher 
percentages (53% '20 out of 38') than among managers who are 
'not satisfied and slightly satisfied' and much higher than
those who are 'very and extremely satisfied' (38% '8 out of 
21').
- Ihe 'very high' degree of bureaucratic-feudal orientation was 
indicated by managers who evidenced 'more job satisfaction' in 
much higher percentages (20% '12 out of 59') than those with
'less job satisfaction' (9% '2 out of 21'). In fact Table 52 
clearly shows that those who are 'very and extremely satisfied '
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have scored 'very high' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal 
orientation in greater percentages (33% '7 out of 21') than
those who are 'satisfied' (13% '5 out of 38') and those who are 
'not satisfied and slightly satisfied' (9% '2 out of 21'). 
Considering the affect of middle managers' job satisfaction on 
their behaviour toward top management, it seems as Tables 51 and 52 
suggest that a tendency toward non-compliant behaviour is more likely 
to be shown by those who are 'more satisfied' than by the 'less 
satisfied' ones. But as appears in Table 52, extreme compliance 
(i.e. complete compliant behaviour) is more likely to be indicated by 
managers who are 'very low' and 'very high' in satisfaction than by 
those who are only 'satisfied':-
- Managers who are 'not satisfied and slightly satisfied ' and 
'very and extremely satisfied' (the first and third groups of 
Table 52), revealed complete compliant behaviour much more (24% 
'5 out of 21') than those who are just 'satisfied' (10% '4 out 
of 38').
- The first and second groups (i.e. 'not satisfied and slightly 
satisfied'; 'satisfied') tended in their wavering behaviour 
toward compliance much more (52% '11 out of 21'; 53% '20 out of 
38') than the third group (i.e. 'very and extremely satisfied', 
38% '8 out of 21'). But the second and third groups tended 
toward 'non-compliance' much more (37% '14 out of 38*; 38% '8 
out of 21') than the first group (24% '5 out of 21').
When we examine the affect of job satisfaction on the 
relationship between middle managers orientation and behaviour, the 
figures of Table 53 suggest, to some extent, the same result in that 
extreme compliance is more likely to be shown by managers who are 
'very low' and 'very highly' satisfied than those who are only
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'satisfied'. And a tendency toward non-compliance is more likely to 
be indicated by managers who are 'more satisfied' than by 'less 
satisfied' ones;-
- Managers holding 'low' degrees of bureaucratic-feudal
orientation who are 'not satisfied and slightly satisfied'
tended in their wavering behaviour toward compliance much more 
(67% '2 out of 3') than the similar degree group, i.e. the
'satisfied' group (40% '2 out of 5'). But the latter group 
tended toward 'non-compliance' in higher percentage (60% '3 out 
of 5') than the former group (33% '1 out of 3').
- Among managers of the first category (i.e. 'not satisfied and 
slightly satisfied') and the third category ('very and extremely 
satisfied'), those holding 'middle degrees of bureaucratic- 
feudal orientation disclosed complete compliant behaviour more 
(33% '2 out of 6' and 17% '1 out of 6') than managers of the
second category (i.e. 'satisfied', 12% '1 out of 8'). Also the
first group tended toward compliance in their wavering behaviour 
slightly more (67% '4 out of 6') than the second group (63% '5 
out of 8') and much more than the third group (50% '3 out of 
6'). But while none of the first group tended tov r̂d non- 
compliance (25% '2 out of 8') of the second and third groups 
did.
- Complete compliant behaviour was indicated by the 'high' 
degree group of the first category and the third one much more 
(20% '2 out of 10'; 37% '3 out of 8') than the second category 
(10% '2 out of 20'). The 'high' degree group of third category 
(i.e. 'very and extremely satisfied') tended toward compliance 
in their wavering behaviour much less (38% '3 out of 8') than 
tlie second category (65% '13 out of 20') and the first one (50%
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'5 out of 10'). But managers holding 'high' degrees of 
bureaucratic-feudal orientation and 'not satisfied and slightly 
satisfied ' tended toward non-ccmpl iance slightly more (30% '3 
out of 10') than the other two groups (i.e. 'satisfied' 25% '5 
out of 20' and 'very and extremely satisfied' 25% '2 out of 8').
- The 'very high' degree managers who are less satisfied (i.e. 
'not satisfied and slightly satisfied') displayed complete 
compliant behaviour much higher (50% '1 out of 2') than those 
who are more satisfied (i.e. the second group 20% '1 out of 5' 
and the third group 14% '1 out of 7'). But the second and third 
groups - who hold more satisfaction - tended in their wavering 
behaviour toward non-compliance more (80% '4 out of 5' and 57% 
'4 out of 7') than the third group (who are 'less satisfied ', 
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A - Covering letter
Dear Sir,
Greetings .,.
I am an Iraqi Post-graduate student at Bath University, England, 
reading for the degree of Ph.D in Management. My research for this 
degree involves studying the work relationship between middle and top 
managers in Iraqi organizations. Consequently, the enclosed
questionnaire is an important device to provide me with the necessary 
information for completing my study. To achieve the objectives and 
requirements of the research, this questionnaire has to be 
canprehensive and, thus, includes various organizational, social and 
educational aspects which are aimed to give a broad perspective to the 
subject of this research.
I would like to assure you that your answers will remain
confidential, and the outcomes of this research will not relate to any 
of the respondents in person.
Finally, please accept my thanks and gratitude for your co­
operation and I hope that you have every success in your work.
Ihe Researcher 
Lamya A J Al-Zubaidi
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B - Instructions
Please read the following instructions carefully:
1. Most of the questions simply require you to tick an appropriate
box to indicate your answer. Please tick (v/) in a suitable box when 
required.
2. Most of the questions are about your views and opinions. For
these questions, there are no right or wrong answers. So, there is no
need to check your answers with anyone else because your opinion and 
feelings may differ from anybody else.
3. There is no need to put your name on the questionnaire or
anywhere else.
4. When you have ccxnpleted the questionnaire, please place it into
the provided envelope and I will be most happy to receive it from you 
during the second interview.
5. Please use the blank sheet provided at the end of this
questionnaire to register any comments or additional information 
related to any aspect of your work.
6. If additional information about the questionnaire is needed,
please contact the researcher at the following address:
address:
- The address
- The telephone number
544
C - The questions
Q.l Following is a number of statements. For each 










1.1 A superior 
should expect 
subordinates 











own area of 
specialization
2.3 Formality, based 
on rank or I 
position, should 
be maintained by 
members of an 
organization.
2.4 People are better 
off when the 
organization 
provides a 
ccmplete set of 
rules to be 
followed
2.5 Length of 
service in an 
organization 
should be given 





Q.2 lb what extent do you agree with the following statements 



















2.2 Subordinates in 
an organization 
should be loyal 
towards superiors 











2.4 One should not 
get invloved in 
taking important 
decisions and | 
action affecting 
the work without 
prior agreements 
from superiors
2.5 People should 
consider the 
social values and 
norms when 
executing jobs 





Q.3 Here is an imaginary situation. When you have read it, I would 
like to ask you the following questions.
[Imagine the following situation;
"A civil servant is employed in a post in which it is his duty to 
devise ways to improve sanitation and co-operation in rural villages. 
After much study in the field, he prepares a memorandum presenting a 
full program towards this end. His superiors reject it. Instead, 
they adopt a program which, in his opinion, would not be in the 
interest of the villagers whose conditions he has studied in detail. 
His superiors, nevertheless, ask him to carry out this policy in the 
field"].
Can his superior expect this civil servant 
policy?
to carry out this
Yes No
B What do you think this civil servant ought to do, in view of his 
obligation to the government and his obligation as a citizen who 
wants to improve the lot of the villagers? Should he agree or 
refuse to carry out this policy?
- Should carry out policy
- Should refuse to carry out policy
0.4 Imagine the following situation
[The top manager of your organization has issued an order to the 
effect that all employees should work extra hours and also during 
weekends for an unspecified period of time to fulfil work which is 
believed to be delayed and needs to be done. At the same time, the 
employees in your department have already informed you that they feel 
over “loaded and thus are not ready to work extra time.]
A Faced with such a situation, which of the following decisions 
would you take? Keeping in mind that you do not feel it is 
necessary for them to work extra time. (Tick one box only)
you simply inform you subordinates to stay 
work as it is the order of top management
and
you contact those at the top and inquire the need 
for working extra hours, informing them that in 
your department there is no delayed work
discuss the issue first with your workers and 
consequently you ask those at the top to re-think 
about issuing such orders, explaining that there 
is no need for your workers to stay and asking to 





If the top management refused to re-think or cancel the order, 
which of the following decisions would you take?
- you allow your workers to leave
- you ask your workers to stay and work
- others (please specify)
In that case do you feel that you have to consider two 
conflicting expectations at the same time; one fron your 
superiors and one from your subordinates?
Yes No
If the answer is yes, to what extent do you feel that you are 
under stress from these conflicting expectations?
- under very little stress
- under little stress
- under some stress
- under great stress
- under very great stress
0.5 What is your date of birth?
0.6 Where did you live most of the time?
6.1 Up to the age of 10 years
CityCounty






0.7 What was/were your father's (or guardian) main job occupations? 
Job occupation The period (if known)
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Q.8 How much formal education did your father (or guardian) 
complete? (Tick one box) r- Primary school level
- Medium school level
- Secondary school level
- Certificate Diploma level
- University level
- Postgraduate level ]
Q.9 How much formal education did your mother complete? (Tick one 
box)
- Primary school level
- Medium school level
- Secondary school level
- Certificate Diploma level
- University level
- Postgraduate level
Q.IO Which of the following statements do you agree more witn (Tick 
one box)
Or
- During childhood we could not inform our 
fathers about our mistakes because of the 
fear of their anger and punishment
- During childhood we could inform our fathers 
about any mistakes without fear of their anger 
and punishment
Q.U Which of the following statements do you agree with more? (Tick 
one box)
- During childhood we learn that our fathers 
possess the highest authority within the 
family and we must obey them without arguing 
or objections and we are responsible in 
front of them for our deeds.
Or
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During childhood we leam that our fathers 
are our friends and we can freely argue 
with them and inform them when we feel that 
their instructions are not fair without fear 
of punishment
Q.12 During our childhood we used to face the following situations. 
Indicate your opinion by ticking one box for each of these 
situations ;
12.1 It is not acceptable to inform our father that he is wrong in 
his actions
Yes NO
12.2 The father has the right to teach his children manners the way 
he likes
Yes No
12.3 It is easier to talk frankly with our mothers than with our 
fathers about our private affairs and problems
Yes No
12.4 One of the good and accepted things is that the boy should turn 
out to be like his father
Yes No
12.5 The children shcxild not participate in grown up discussions
Yes No
Q.13 Which of the following statements do you agree more with? (Tick 
only one box to show your opinion)
Or
- During childhood our fathers used the 
method of punishment and reward frequently
- During childhood our fathers used the 
method of punishment and reward seldomly
Or
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During childhood our fathers never used 
the method of punishment and reward
Q.14 Which of the following statements do you agree more with? (Tick 
only one box to show your opinion)
Or
Or
- During childhood our fathers did not 
offer an explanation as to why they 
were punishing us.
During childhood our fathers sometimes 
offered an explanation as to why they 
were punishing us
During childhood our fathers always 
offer an explanation as to why they were 
punishing us
0.15 What is your level and place of formal education?
Level of Education
- Primary School level
- Medium School level
- Secondary School level
- Certificate Diploma level
- Undergraduate level





Name of the place (i.e. 
country of formal education)
0.16 How many years have you spent as a governmental official and 
what positions have you held prior to your present one?
Title of position Name of Organization The Period
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Q.17 How many years have you spent in middle management position in 
your present organization (Tick one box)
- Less than 4 years
- 4 - less than 8 years
- 8 and over
Q.18 TO what extent does the top manager in your organization try to 








Q.19 To what extent is the top manager in your organization 








Q.20 To what extent do you feel free to approach your top manager and 
communicate with him because he is friendly and easily 








Q.21 To what extent does your top manager seem interested in 







Q.22 To what extent does your top manager give you the opportunity 
to leam by doing, including the freedom to make mistakes and to 







Q.23 To what extent does your top manager keep you informed about 








0.24 To what extent do you feel that your top manager is backing and 







Q.25 To what extent does your top manager let you feel that you are 







0.26 To what extent does your top manager give criticism in a helpful 







0.27 To what extent does your top manager value your ideas and take 








Q.28 To what extent does your top manager ask you to participate with 
him in making important decisions related to general 







Q.29 Superiors at times must make decisions which seem to be against 
the interests of their subordinates. When this happens to you 
(or when your top manager makes decisions it seems to be against 
your interests ), how much trust do you have that your top 
manager's decision is justified by other considerations and, if 







0.30 How are the goals set in your organization? (Tick one box) 
- Orders issued
- The goals are set by higher authority 
(i.e. top management) in the organization
- The goals are set after discussing with 
managers of different departments the
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problems at work and any planned action
Except in emergencies, goals are usually 
established by means of group participation
Q.31 At what level in your organization do you think decisions are 
formally made? (Tick one box)
- Policies and most of the decisions are 
made at the top
- Policies and important decisions are 
made at the top level; specific decisions 
within a prescribed framework are made 
at the middle level
- Broad policy and general decisions are 
made at the top level, many decisions 
are made at the middle level
- Decision-making is widely carried out 
at all levels in the organization
0.32 When decisions are being made in your organization, how
frequently are you asked for your opinions and suggestions? 
(Tick one box)




- Most of the time
- Always
0.33 Do you participate in goal-setting and higher policy planning in 
your organization? (Tick one box)
Yes No
0.34 Do you participate in making important decisions related to 
general organizational problems? (Tick one box)





Most of the time 
Always
Q.35 If you participate in goal-setting and higher policy planning in 
your organization, to what extent do you feel that your 
participation is effective and it is not just a matter of formal 
arrangement? (Tick one box)






0.36 To what extent do you feel that your ideas, information, 
knowledge of processes and experiences are being used? (Tick one 
box)





- Very great extent
0.37 In general, how much say or influence do you feel you have on 
what goes on in your office? (Tick one box)







Q.38 To what degree do you think you can influence the decisions of 
your top manager regarding things about which you are concerned? 
(Tick one box)






Q.39 If you have a suggestion for improving the job or changing 
operations in some way, how easy is it for you to get your 







0.40 How frequently do your superiors in top management ask your 






- Most of the time
- Always
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Q.41 Do you take the important decisions related to your job? (Tick 
one box)




- Most of the time
- Always
0.42 Do you have enough authority to take the important decisions 
related to your work in your organizational position? (Tick one 
box)
- Not enough at all





0.43 Do you take the decision which you have the authority to take 





- Most of the time
- Always
0.44 How often do you get conflicting demands frcm different people 
above and below you? (Tick one box)
- Never





Nearly all the time
Q.45 How clearly defined is your job? (Tick one box)
- There is a written job description, and
a statement of the objectives I am expected 
to achieve
- There is a written job description but no
statement of the objectives I am expected to 
achieve
- There is no written job description, but I
am told the objectives which I am expected 
to achieve
- There is no written job description, and I
am not told the objectives which I am expected 
to achieve
Q.46 To what extent do you agree that the following situations exist 
in your work organization? (For each item below, please tick one 
box, according to the following scale)
Strongly
Disagree




46.1 No one is really 
clear where we 
are going
46.2 Different parts
of the organizaticn 
are pulling in 
different directions
46.3 We do not understand 
what other departments 
are aiming at
46.4 We are all very busy 




0.47 How clear are you about the limits of your authority in your 
present position? (Tick one box)
- Not at all clear





0.48 How clear are you about what the people around you expect of 
you? (Tick one box)
- Not at all clear





0-49 Are you clear about scope of responsibility in your job? (Tick 
one box)
- Not at all clear





0.50 Are you clear about how your work is evaluated? (Tick one box)
- Not at all clear






Q.51 Are you clear about scope of advancement in your management 
position? (Tick one box)
- Not at all clear





0.52 In general, to what extent are you clear about your role in your 
organization? (Tick one box)
- Not at all clear





Please answer the questions below about your own feelings about your 
job. (For each question, please tick one box, according to the 
following scale;)
Not satisfied Only slightly Satisfied Very Extremely
satisfied satisfied satisfied
Q.53 To what extent
are you satisfied 




Q.54 To what extent
are you satisfied 
with your pay?
Q.55 To what extent




Q.56 To what extent
are you satisfied 
with your 
relationship with 
other monbers in 
your organization?
0.57 To what extent
are you satisfied 
with the amount 
of responsibilities 
you have in your 
management 
position?
Q.58 To what extent
are you satisfied 





0.59 To what extent




thought and action 
that the kind of 
work you do 
provides you with?
0.60 To what extent
are you satisfied 
with the 
opportunities 
you have for 
participation 






□  □  [
0.61 To what extent
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are you satisfied 
with the 
opportunities 
you have for 
development and 
getting a more 
important 
position in the 
future?
Q.62 To what extent
are you satisfied 
that your work 
in your present 
position makes 
good use of your 
skills and abilities?
Q.63 To what extent
are you satisfied 
that your job 
provides you with 
a sense of 
achievement, sense 
of doing something 
worthwhile?
] □  [
Q.64 To what extent
are you satisfied 
that your job 
provides you with 
a sense of 
belonging to your 
organization?
0.65 To what extent
are you satisfied 
with the way things 




satisfied are you 
with your job?
] □  □
] □  □
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